V. Reply to the first question
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The human will is a will of that sort. For this correctness is determined by the divine will's accepting this act or form of worship now and some other at another time.32
V. Reply to the first question A. Theology of necessary truths 314 So my reply to the question [n. 217] is that because an elicited act of will is most truly praxis even if it is not accompanied by any commanded act (as is clear from the first section [nn. 230, 232, 234–5]), and the extension of practical cognition consists in aptitudinal conformity to praxis and aptitudinal priority (as is clear from the second section [nn. 236–7]), it follows that cognition that is aptitudinally in conformity with correct reason and naturally prior to it is practical cognition. But the whole of necessary theology for a created intellect33 is aptitudinally in conformity with, and prior to, an act of a created will. Therefore, etc.
Proof of the minor premise: the first object of theology is virtually in conformity with correct volition, because the principles of correctness in volition are drawn from the notion of that first object; also, that object's determining a created intellect to knowledge of the determinate correctness of that praxis with respect to all necessary theological truths is naturally prior to any created will's willing (otherwise they would not be necessary); therefore, from the first object follow both the conformity and the priority of theology to volition, and thus its extension to praxis; and in virtue of that extension this cognition is rightly called practical.
Confirmation of this argument: because the first object of theology is the ultimate end, and principles in a created intellect that are drawn from the ultimate end are practical principles, it follows that the principles of theology are practical; therefore, its conclusions are also practical.
315 One might object using what was said in the previous question, where I said that God is not the first subject of theology qua end but qua this essence [nn. 167, 195], and principles drawn from the end qua end are practical; therefore, etc.
316 Also, cognition of the ultimate end is not immediately in conformity, or apt to be in conformity, with praxis to be elicited; therefore, it is not proximately practical.
317 Also, the first object virtually includes conformity with correct praxis, and not merely cognition in conformity with correct praxis; otherwise, there could not be speculative science of the first object, which is evidently untenable. For how is "God is triune" or "The Father begets the Son" practical? Therefore, the first object includes some
32 I omit nn. 270–313, in which Scotus considers the views of Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, Albert the Great, Gonsalvus of Spain, Bonaventure, William of Ware, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Thomas Aquinas.
33 "necessary theology for a created intellect": that is, theology concerning necessary truths, as that theology exists in the intellect of a creature (not, as the Latin would be more naturally read, theology that a creature needs to possess).
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speculative knowledge. So from this virtual conformity of the first object to praxis it does not follow that theology is practical, since the truths that are most especially theological as theology is distinguished from metaphysics are speculative truths.
Also, if this were correct, it would follow that God's science is practical, because it is of the same first subject, and it seems that the argument for my answer to the question [n. 314] could be applied to the divine intellect just as it is to a created intellect.
To the first [n. 315], I say that principles in a given science are not drawn from the relation of an end but from that absolute item on which the relation is founded; that is "this essence."
To the second [n. 316], I say that what virtually contains cognition in conformity with praxis is virtually in conformity with praxis and thus is practical cognition, since practical conclusions have practical principles; moreover, cognition of enjoyment of the end is proximate to cognition of the end, and the former is apt to be formally in conformity with the praxis that is fruition.
To the third [n. 317], I say that the first object only includes knowledge in conformity with correct volition, because by its nature every cognition of it34 either is the correctness of some volition or virtually includes the knowledge of such correctness.
As for the conclusion that there can be no speculative science of that object, which is inferred as a supposedly untenable implication of my view, I concede the claim. For, necessarily, knowledge of that object and of anything intrinsic cognized through it is aptitudinally in conformity with, and prior to, praxis, given that the object cognized is necessary.
As for the objection concerning the truths "God is triune" and "The Father begets the Son," which are evidently most truly theological and not metaphysical, I say that those are practical truths. The first virtually includes knowledge of the correctness of love tending toward the three persons, such that if an act were elicited toward only one person, excluding another (as an unbeliever might do), the act would not be correct. The second includes knowledge of the correctness of an act that concerns two persons of whom one is from the other in this way.35
One might object to this on the grounds that only what is essential is a characteristic that terminates an act of love, whereas theology is more properly about the personal features than the essential ones, since quite a few of the essential features can be known by the metaphysician; therefore, theology as distinguished from metaphysics by what is most proper to it is not practical. The first proposition is proved from the fact that otherwise one person would have a characteristic worthy of love that 34 Reading ipso for the edition's ipsa.
35 Cf. Ordinatio I d. 1 pars 1 q. 2 nn. 31–3, 42–3, 54–5.
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another person would lack; and that is false, because in that case no person would be made happy in himself.
I reply: what is essential is absolutely the characteristic that terminates an act of love as that-on-account-of-which, but the persons terminate an act of loving as whatare-loved. Now it is not sufficient for an act to be correct that it has an appropriate formal characteristic in its object; rather, the act must also have an appropriate object in which such a formal characteristic exists. Therefore, in addition to the knowledge of correctness that what is essential includes in an act of loving God, the personal features include their own further knowledge of required correctness.
324 In reply to the fourth argument [n. 318], it could be conceded that God's theology concerning necessary things is practical, because in his intellect the first theological object is apt to quasi-generate knowledge in conformity with correct volition and naturally prior to that volition. That it is in conformity with volition is evident. Proof that it is also prior: the intellect's understanding the first object is naturally prior to the will's willing it; therefore, the divine intellect can, naturally prior to volition, have all knowledge sufficient for itself virtually included in its intellection of its first object.
Any necessary knowledge of the first object is of this sort. The inference is clearly valid, both because the intellect could have all sufficient knowledge virtually included in its intellection of the first object even if, per impossibile, there were no will at all, because that intellection precedes any volition; and because the divine intellect is not discursive, so its understanding the first object is not naturally prior to its understanding anything knowledge of which is virtually included in that object. So if the intellect understands the first object before the will wills anything, it understands anything knowledge of which is included in the first object before the will wills it.
(This second proof of the inference is less compelling.) 325 Someone might object that if this is so, the divine will turns out not to be its own first rule in its acts, if its act is preceded by knowledge to which it must conform in acting in order to act correctly; the consequent is evidently untenable, because it destroys the supreme freedom of the divine will if it is determined primarily by something else, and not by itself, to its first act. And if practical cognition precedes every act of the divine will, it is determined to its first act by the intellect, since it can't dissent from the intellect—for if it could, it could sin.
326 Moreover, it was said above [nn. 300–1] that the Philosopher was quite correct in inferring that if an intelligence naturally loves God upon having seen him, the knowledge that presents God is therefore not practical. You should draw a similar conclusion about God if he naturally loves himself.
327 Also, what gives direction is a cause with respect to what is directed; therefore, there is a real distinction between them; but there is no real distinction between God's intellection and his willing. Confirmation of the argument: if it is understood that willing has already been elicited, the intellect does not give direction, for it is only as
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something prior that it gives direction concerning what is to be elicited. But in God's case, his willing is not subsequent to his will's existing; therefore, his willing is never yet-to-be-elicited, but always already elicited; therefore, etc.
What evidently ought to be said on this topic, in keeping with what has been said thus far, is this: Understanding "rule" as what rectifies praxis, the first rule is the ultimate end, which virtually includes primarily the knowledge of the necessary correctness of any praxis, in just the way that the first object of a speculative science includes primarily the knowledge of speculative truths. Now this first rule, which is the end, ordinately rectifies the intellect and will as they are apt to act ordinately, in such a way that it generates knowledge in conformity with correct praxis before it generates correct praxis or rectifies praxis. And thus some other power will be correct before any power engaging in praxis is correct—which means that the inference drawn in the first argument [n. 325] must evidently be conceded. To the refutation of that argument one could say that just as, universally, freedom is compatible with a previous apprehension, supreme freedom is compatible with a supremely perfect previous apprehension; and a supremely perfect apprehension concerning praxis includes knowledge of the conformity of such praxis in a case in which this conformity necessarily characterizes praxis.
As to the further argument that the divine will would be determined by something other than itself, this must be denied if we are talking about determination brought about by a sufficient agent. For although the divine will could not dissent from correct knowledge that is prior to praxis, it is not as though the intellect through its knowledge is an active cause that sufficiently determines the will to act; rather, it is a matter of the perfection of the will that it is apt to act in conformity with a power that acts prior to it, only when that prior power acts perfectly with respect to an object, that is, knows the object prior to [any act of will] to the fullest extent that it can be known. I say this to distinguish the case of contingents: the divine intellect does not have, before any act of will, all the knowledge of contingents that it is possible for it to have; for that reason the divine will need not act concerning contingent things in conformity with a prior power, because that power does not, prior to the will's act, know such objects in a way that requires conformity. The case of intrinsically necessary objects of cognition is always different, because the divine intellect has supremely perfect knowledge of those apart from any act of will.
But although this response [nn. 328–9] does seem to evade the force of the argument
[n. 325], and the arguments that come after it [nn. 326–7] can also be evaded, what should actually be said is something different: necessary theology in the divine intellect is not practical, because intellection is not prior to volition in the way that what demands conformity is prior to what needs to be conformed or what gives direction is prior to what needs direction. For given any knowledge of the correctness of praxis, although the intellect could of itself conform any power that can be
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conformed or rectified from the outside,36 it could not conform or rectify the divine will with respect to its first object, because the divine will is rectified with respect to that object solely through itself, because either it tends naturally to it, or, if it tends freely, it is in no way intrinsically indifferent to correctness and in no way possesses correctness from the outside. Accordingly, determinate knowledge of correctness is not necessarily prior to volition as though volition required such knowledge in order to be elicited correctly; it requires only the presentation of the object as a precondition. And it does not require that knowledge—which is intrinsically directive—as directive, but only as ostensive. Thus, if it were possible for just the presentation of the object to precede volition and for knowledge of the necessary correctness of that praxis to follow volition (as I will say in the case of praxis concerning contingents
[n. 333]), volition would be elicited just as correctly as it in fact is. So intellection is not in fact prior and regulative or such as to require conformity.
331 So to the argument for the priority of knowledge of correctness to correct praxis
[n. 324] one could reply that although there is some priority of intellection to volition, intellection is not prior in a way that requires correct cognition to be prior to praxis, because such priority is that of a rule to what is ruled, and that sort of priority cannot exist when the will is in every way its own rule in acting.
The key point of this controversy about whether God's self-knowledge is practical comes down to this: is knowledge that would of itself be directive in praxis, if the power engaging in praxis37 in the one who has such knowledge were subject to direction in acting, practical solely because it would be directive, or not practical because the power engaging in praxis in the one who has such knowledge is not subject to direction? Whichever answer you give, you have to stick to the implications.
B. Theology of contingents 332 That brings us to the second topic in this question: is theology of contingents practical? I say that theology of contingents can be practical only in an intellect that has a determinate knowledge of the correctness of praxis before any volition on the part of the one understanding or before the elicited praxis itself, because it is only in such an intellect that this theology of contingents can be38 in conformity with praxis and prior to it. Every created intellect fits this description, since in no case is the will of a creature endowed with understanding the primary determinant of the contingent correctness that characterizes its praxis.
36 "from the outside" (aliunde): that is, by some power outside itself, in this case, by the divine intellect
37 "engaging in praxis": reading practicans for the edition's rectificans vel practicans, "rectifying or engaging in praxis." Since it is the intellect that rectifies and the will that engages in praxis, rectificans vel cannot be correct; I follow many MSS in omitting it.
38 "can be": the edition, following A, adds "or is."
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In the divine intellect, by contrast, contingent theology cannot be practical if we maintain (a) that practical cognition and the praxis to which it is extended must necessarily belong to the same supposit, and (b) that no praxis other than volition belongs to God as acting (and we do not posit some third power in God in addition to intellect and will), for no cognition in the divine will in conformity with a correct contingent praxis or volition precedes God's correct praxis or volition itself, because such correctness is primarily determined for that praxis by his volition.
That first claim (a) is true, for if any cognition of someone else's praxis is practical, it follows that my cognition of God's creating the world or of an intelligence's moving the heavens will turn out to be practical. At any rate, this evidently shows that a lower intelligence or intellect cannot have practical cognition concerning some other [higher] agent's praxis; by parity of reasoning, neither can a higher or equal agent if it contributes nothing to the agent's praxis; and if it does contribute something, then the superior agent already has its own praxis with respect to which its cognition is practical.
Also, if practical cognition has some causality with respect to the praxis to which it is extended, and it is apt to have such causality primarily only with respect to praxis that is in the one understanding, this claim (a) evidently follows.
On the contrary: it follows that if praxis were possible for one intellect and not for another, one intellect would have practical knowledge and another would have speculative knowledge of the very same thing.
It can be said that perfect correctness of praxis includes the circumstance of the agent just as it includes the other circumstances, so that without that circumstance there is no correctness. For if one takes "God is to be loved" and does not add by what, say, by a will, it is not a completely practical truth, since God is not to be loved by a non-rational animal. And so the perfect truth "God is to be loved by God" is practical in any intellect; so too "Human beings ought to fast sometimes" is practical not only for a human being who cognizes it but also for an angel and for God; so too "The heavens should be moved by an angel" is practical for human beings and for God. So I concede the conclusion that the first proof [n. 334] infers as something untenable.
One might object that this does not preserve the priority of practical cognition to praxis, because the correctness of God's love for himself is prior to an angel's or human being's ability to understand "God is to be loved by God." I reply: the priority in question has to derive from the object and the intellect. That is, the object is apt to determine an intellect to knowledge of the determinate correctness of praxis, and to do so prior to praxis, as far as this depends on the object itself. And that is the way in which this object is apt to determine every intellect to the knowledge that "God is to be loved by God," and to do so prior to praxis, as far as this depends on the object itself—even though a given intellect, because of its imperfection, is not determined to this knowledge prior to the act of a power that acts in virtue of its own perfection.
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338 To the other objection [n. 336], I note that a will can be a higher cause with respect to the praxis of a motive power, though not just any will can be such a cause with respect to just any motive power (for example, my will can't be such a cause with respect to the motive power of an angel), but only when the will and the motive power belong to the same subject. Similarly, practical cognition is a cause with respect to praxis, when it is one and the same subject that both understands and acts, but that doesn't mean that the same cognition in another subject is not practical, unless you take 'practical' strictly to mean cognition that is immediately applicable to action because the cognizer is identical with the agent, an immediacy denoted by an infinitive signifying the praxis, governed by 'to know.' For in this sense it is conceded that only God knows he loves [himself] infinitely,39 although an angel knows that God is to be loved by himself infinitely.
339 One who replies in this way must concede from the outset that every truth concerning the praxes of created agents is cognized by every intellect concerned with praxis, because every such truth is apt to be prior to and in conformity with praxes or to determine the correctness of praxes prior to the eliciting of those praxes—whether they are thus apt in virtue of the object, as necessary truths, or in virtue of something else, as contingent truths. By contrast, all necessary truths about the divine will are practical, whereas contingent truths are not, because prior to the elicited praxis to which they are extended they do not have such conformity, because they have no determinate correctness. For example, God's knowledge that a human being ought to do penance and that an angel ought to move the heavens is practical; his knowledge that God ought to will that a holy human being do penance or that an angel move the heavens is not.
340 If you ask what sort of knowledge the theology of contingents is in itself, rather than as compared to this or that intellect, it can be said that it is in itself what it is in virtue of its object. Now it is not, in virtue of its object, in conformity with praxis before any praxis, because no determinate knowledge of contingent correctness is apt to be had in virtue of its object. Therefore, in virtue of its object it is not practical, so it is speculative, assuming that the division of knowledge into practical and speculative is exhaustive [n. 303]. This fits with the denial that such knowledge is practical in the divine intellect [n. 333]; for evidently what a thing is in itself is what it is in that which is perfect, rather than imperfect, in the relevant domain.
341 Suppose someone were to object that if that is true, cognition that is speculative in itself will be practical for someone—say, a created intellect—and so practical and speculative are not incompatible. I reply: being speculative in virtue of the object is not being speculative in itself. Thus, to be practical in virtue of an object that sufficiently determines an intellect to knowledge of correctness—and if sufficiently,
39 In Latin "God knows that he loves [himself] infinitely" is a construction with an "infinitive signifying the praxis, governed by 'to know,'" as described in the preceding sentence. It is literally "God knows himself to love infinitely."
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then before any volition—is to be practical in itself. That is how these two are opposed, as are also "not-extendible to praxis" and "extendible to praxis." But to be practical in virtue of something other than the object—say, from an extrinsic cause, such as a will that determines the intellect to knowledge of praxis—is to be accidentally practical. In this way I concede that the theology of contingents is practical for us, even though it is speculative in itself.
Against this: when one of a pair of opposites characterizes something per se, the other of that pair does not characterize that thing either per se or per accidens. Therefore, knowledge that is speculative per se is not practical either per se or per accidens.
I reply: although the antecedent can be expounded in terms of per se predication in the first or second mode (but not in the third mode, in which 'per se' means the same thing as 'independently'),40 I nevertheless concede that the opposite of the predicate
'per se speculative'41 does not inhere in any mode of inhering, because contingent theology is per se speculative42 in the second mode, such that its inherence is per se and the predicate is determined by the expression 'per se.' But being practical per accidens is not opposed to this, in just the same way that being black simpliciter and being white secundum quid are not opposed; for 'secundum quid' and 'simpliciter' determine the predicates as denominating. If the argument is "it is per se speculative per se, therefore it is per se speculative," I concede that, and the predicate 'per accidens practical' is not incompatible with the predicate 'per se speculative.'
But if either of the two assumptions [n. 333] on which this response [n. 340] depends is rejected, then it can be conceded that although contingent theology is not practical in itself because it is not practical in virtue of its object, it would nonetheless be practical per accidens in every intellect, created and uncreated. For in the divine intellect it can be in conformity with praxis prior to praxis's being elicited by a created will, since the knowledge in God's intellect that someone who commits the sin of adultery43 under the New Law ought to be contrite is prior to the sinner's being contrite. And if we do not accept the first assumption, God's cognition concerning another agent's praxis is practical; if we also reject the second—say, by positing that there is divine action ad extra that is praxis and is not formally divine volition—then even if the divine intellect's knowledge that a is to be created is not prior to God's will's willing that a is to be created, the knowledge is still prior to his creating a, and thus knowledge in conformity with praxis precedes that praxis ad extra, even though the knowledge is in conformity with praxis not in virtue of its object but in virtue of something else.
40 See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.4, 73a34–73b10, for the modes of per se predication.
41 Reading praedicati huius quod est per se speculativum with the majority of the MSS against the edition's praedicati huius quod est per se practica vel huius quod est per se speculativum (A).
42 Reading speculativa with all but three of the MSS for the edition's practica vel speculativa (A).
43 "someone who commits the sin of adultery": reading peccatorem adulterum with several of the MSS for the edition's peccatorem adultum, "an adult sinner."