II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q.
wants it to be kept secret, but also whenever it is clear from the way in which he entrusts it that he wants it to be kept secret.
But the arguments for the second conclusion [nn. 86–9] are not as clearly conclusive here, except for the third [n. 89], since the revealing of any secret would give an occasion for lying in entrusting anyone with secrets.
On this topic I say that the ecclesiastical penalties imposed for revealing just any secret are not the same as those imposed for revealing a confession. If someone publicly reveals any other secret, a different penalty—namely, infamy—is imposed on him. For someone who makes a false accusation, or one that cannot be proved, is designated a calumniator in the Decretals, "On calumniators."24 Someone who reveals a secret misdeed that cannot be proved is a calumniator.
II. Replies to the preliminary arguments
Replies to the arguments.
To the first argument [n. 56] I say that it is not only the penitent's right, but the community's right, that a confessed sin should be concealed. For from the opposite
(that is, from the revealing of a confessed sin) a constant disturbance in the community would arise, since any given person would indiscriminately think that some other person is abhorrent. And it is not licit for someone to give up a right of his community in the way that it is licit for someone to give up his own right.
Alternatively, one could say that, even supposing it were only his right and a right vested in his favor, it would still not be licit for him to give up this right in such a way that his confessor would be free to reveal his confession. For the confessor is bound by multiple laws, both natural and positive, none of which the penitent has the power to repudiate.
So what is a confessor to do if the penitent wants him to speak openly about his sin?
I say that a penitent can afterwards speak about his sin outside of confession, and as a secret, but this subsequent freedom on the part of the penitent does not remove the confessor's obligation under the natural law to conceal the sin. But if the penitent says that it is not to be treated as a secret, and especially around some particular person or persons to whom he allows the confessor to reveal it, perhaps for the sake of some good end that can result from such a revelation, then the confessor can speak of it as something told him publicly and not as secret in any way.
24 Gregory IX, Decretales V tit. 2 cc. 1–2.
IS THE SEAL OF CONFESSION EXCEPTIONLESS?
109 But can he then say, "I heard this in confession"?
I reply: one response25 would be that these words, "I heard this sin in this person's confession," just by themselves involve a mortal sin, because they involve revealing this sin as something known by means that it is not licit to reveal. Hence one who, after a confession, reveals a sin that is no longer in any way a secret must be very careful about how he speaks about it and describes it, so that he does not tell it as something said to him in a way that cannot licitly be revealed.
110 Against this: it is licit for him to tell what was told him outside of confession to anyone he wants to, and saying that this was confessed to him does not change the character of what he says, so it is licit for him to say this.
111 To the second argument [n. 57] I say that there can be no case in which silence militates against charity. Indeed, the opposite would militate against charity toward the community, as was shown in the four arguments for the first conclusion [nn. 79–85].
112 And when you object on the grounds of the common good [n. 57], I say this:
Deuteronomy 16:20 says, "Carry out justly what is just"; therefore, carry out with charity what charity demands. But someone who does what is contrary to the natural law in the ways explained above [nn. 79–85] by failing to conceal something wicked that has been or is going to be committed is not carrying this out with charity. For that reason, the jurists' verse, "Heresy is a crime that not even confession conceals," must be condemned, not because the meter isn't good, but because what it says is false.26
113 In reply to the third argument [n. 58] it can be said that the priest can have lots of reasons for not entering the woods besides the wickedness of the bandits that has been disclosed to him. At least he can think up lots of other reasons and say to them,
"I want to do thus and so," "I want to turn aside to such-and-such a place before I go any further." And thus if it looks as though he has turned aside for the reason he has stated, he does not reveal the confession by either word or deed.
114 But if he would not be able to leave them on any pretext without its being evident to them that he is doing so because of the confession, and he would thereby reveal the confession, some27 say that he is bound to enter the woods. And if he risks death, this is for a just cause, namely, in order that he might uphold the Law of God concerning the seal of confession; consequently, if he is killed, he is a martyr.
115 But alternatively it can be said that deeds can be equivocal signs, since different people can think of this or that deed in different ways. So a deed should not be regarded as revealing a confession unless by its very nature it brings to light the 25 Thomas Aquinas, Sent. IV d. 21 q. 3 a. 3 in corp. and ad 2.
26 The teaching from which this verse is taken is discussed by Raymond of Peñafort, De poenitentia et matrimonio, cum glossis Ioannis de Friburgo, III, 'De poenitentiis et remissionibus,' } 60, and Henry de
Susa, Summa super titulis Decretalium, V, 'De poenitentiis et remissionibus.'
27 Richard Middleton, Sent. IV d. 21 princ. 4 q. 2 ad 5.
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q.
confessed sin, and the priest's not going into the woods does not do this; for if they had not spoken together about this killing beforehand, his turning aside would never be a basis for their knowing that their companion had confessed his intention of killing the priest—whereas if turning aside were by its very nature a sign leading to knowledge of such a confessed sin, it would lead anyone to that knowledge whether the conspirators had spoken together or not.
So it can be said generally that a sign that is of itself indifferent with respect to a sin's having been confessed or not, even if in a particular set of circumstances it is a more determinate sign for certain people than it would otherwise be, is not of itself a sign that reveals a confession; consequently, it is also not unqualifiedly illicit for the confessor.
To the fourth argument [n. 59] I say that a confessor who administers the sacrament of penance indiscreetly is bound not to confess his indiscreet deed straightaway, that is, when his own confessor could identify straightaway the person regarding whom he indiscreetly exercised the power of the keys. And then, when he does confess it, he is at least bound not to give particulars of the fault with respect to which, and the manner in which, he indiscreetly exercised that power. Rather, he should speak strictly in general terms: "by my own fault I improperly and indiscreetly administered the sacrament of penance." Or if his conscience urges him to confess this sin in its particulars—because, as the argument says [n. 59], it is a particular mortal sin with particular circumstances that add to its gravity—he is bound to await an opportunity to confess to someone who cannot identify the penitent on the basis of such a confession of the sin and its circumstances.
Now if no confessor can be found who would not be able to come to know the fault and the identity of the penitent from a description of the sin and its circumstances, the [indiscreet] confessor is in circumstances in which it is impossible to confess to a human being, since he is bound more by the precept of not revealing a sin that has been confessed to him than by the precept of making an explicit confession of his fault. For he is bound by the first precept in many ways by the natural law, as the arguments for the first conclusion [nn. 79–85] prove, and in many ways by positive divine law, as the arguments for the second conclusion [nn. 86–9] prove; whereas he is bound by the second precept at most by divine positive law, as I explained in distinction 17 [nn. 42–7]. Therefore, let him confess it to God.
From this it follows that everyone who administers the sacrament of penance ought to be especially careful not to administer it indiscreetly, particularly in a case in which he would not be able to confess his indiscretion explicitly without revealing the confession of someone else who had confessed to him.
Reply to the fifth argument [n. 60]: Granted, sometimes the person with whom one sins does not aggravate the sin. For example, that it was with Alice or Berta does not aggravate fornication, other things being equal (for example, both are single,
IS THE SEAL OF CONFESSION EXCEPTIONLESS?
not closely related [to the fornicator], and so forth). When this is the case, it is stupid to confess the person with whom one sins, and someone might even wonder whether explicitly stating that person's involvement is itself a mortal sin (whether it is then or at some other time that the other person is identified in whatever way it was necessary for the person to be identified). Be all that as it may, the second person always falls under the seal of confession, as I explained in the fourth article
[nn. 99–100].
121 Accordingly, in regard to the first case one would have to deny the major premise,
"[it is licit to reveal] what is not a sin or a circumstance of a sin, [provided that this is not an aggravating circumstance]" [n. 60]. For in order for this to be true, one would have to add "or anything that could reveal the identity of the penitent." Or one should add even more to the major premise, namely, "or anything that by the natural law or divine law is to be kept secret." And the minor premise is manifestly false as applied to the second person, as is evident from the fourth article [nn. 99–100].
122 In reply to the sixth argument [n. 61]: suppose that the usual practice in the community is that anyone outside the monastery, whether exercising responsibilities or spending some time free from responsibility, can be recalled without notice at the discretion of the one who presides—or, if not entirely at his discretion, then on occasion and for some worthy reason, so that someone may rest for a time within the enclosure and then, for a time, work like Martha in some ministry outside it, and now this person will do so, and now that person, as the one who presides deems it useful.
In those circumstances, I say that an abbot can recall to the monastery a monk who has confessed to wrongdoing committed in some place where he was staying outside the monastery, for his doing so would in no way reveal the sin that was confessed to him, despite the fact that someone would say28 that a confessor cannot behave any differently (as far as an act outside the forum of confession goes) toward a penitent on the basis of his confession than he would behave if he had heard nothing at all.
If, by contrast, the practice in the community is that a monk is not transferred from outside to inside the enclosure except on the basis of some misdeed or of his incapacity for his responsibilities in that place, it is evidently not licit to recall the penitent to the monastery.
123 You might say, "In that case the abbot is not applying29 a remedy for the salvation of his sheep." I reply: let him, in the forum of penance, counsel the monk as best he knows how that he should leave that place which is so dangerous to him. If the monk should refuse, the abbot should not try to be God; rather, he should leave to God's correction the hidden sins that he himself cannot justly correct.
28 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. VIII q. 19 in corp.
29 The edition follows A alone in adding nec procurat, "or looking for."
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q.
To the last argument [n. 62] I say that that chapter does not speak explicitly of someone who knows through a confession, or even by way of a secret that has been revealed to him, that someone is excommunicate. Rather, it merely says that he knows this privately. That is, he knows or believes that the community doesn't know, and thus, because he knows this privately, he should avoid the person privately.
No wonder, since he does not owe that person this secret knowledge.
But what should he do if he knows it only through the forum of confession?
I reply, as I said in response to the third argument [nn. 113–16], that if he can avoid the person by some means that will not reveal his excommunication, he ought to avoid him. If, however, he cannot, then not only is he under no obligation to avoid him, but it is actually not licit to avoid him, because avoiding someone who is excommunicate is required merely by positive ecclesiastical law, whereas not revealing a confession is required by the natural law and by positive divine and ecclesiastical law. Now when precepts are evidently in conflict, the higher precept imposes the greater obligation and therefore is to be obeyed more steadfastly. And one who obeys the higher precept and omits the lower precept is not sinning, since no one is in a state of perplexity on the basis of divine law and ecclesiastical law.
Ordinatio IV, d. 26, q. un., nn. 12–31 The moral goodness of the marriage contract
12 In order to prove the first conclusion,1 this first preliminary conclusion is needed:
A human being's willing to procreate offspring in the human species is an act capable of being characterized by correct circumstances. Proof: it is not an intrinsically bad act, such that it cannot be characterized by correct circumstances (as is, for example, giving something that does not belong to one).
13 This is evident on several grounds:
(1) For a human being to preserve his own species is not more contrary to right reason or to natural inclination than for any other animal to preserve its species; indeed, the more perfect a species is, the more this accords with inclination. And a species cannot be preserved in a regular way otherwise than by procreation.
(2) Even if human beings were immortal, it would still be suitable for them, in keeping with a correct natural inclination, to share their species in the way that would be possible for them, namely, by procreation.
(3) Arguing from things believed: There is no commandment to do something illicit. But the commandment "Be fruitful and multiply" is given both in Genesis 1:28, before the fall, and in Genesis 9:7, after the fall, to Noah and his family.
(4) According to right reason, relying on faith, it is not bad, but instead honorable, to work toward making up for the fall of the angels and restoring the heavenly city, Jerusalem, in accordance with divine predestination; but the elect, who are predestined by God to make up for that fall, are not typically brought into being otherwise than by procreation. Therefore, etc.
1 Namely, "It is honorable for a man and a woman to join themselves together or obligate themselves to each other in an indissoluble bond for the sake of procreating offspring to be suitably brought up."
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q. UN., NN. –
Thus it is evident that this act is not intrinsically bad. Therefore, it is either intrinsically morally good or else capable of [being morally good because] characterized by correct circumstances.
Proof that it is not intrinsically sufficiently good in terms of moral goodness: no willing is intrinsically good in virtue of having a morally good object unless its object is intrinsically worthy of being willed, in other words, unless its object is the unqualifiedly ultimate good. Such willing is loving God, which can never be contrary to right reason; indeed, it is necessarily in accord with right reason that such an act tend toward such an object. But that is because this object is the ultimate end, which is to be willed in its own right by everything ordered to the end, in whatever way it can love that end. For human beings can distinguish everything that is for the end either rightly or wrongly, because they can order it to God and thus use it, or not order it to God and thus enjoy it, which is a great sin.2
But, clearly, the good thing that is the object of the act of procreating or of willing to procreate offspring is not the ultimate end, but merely something ordered, or capable of being ordered, to the ultimate end. Therefore, such an act is not intrinsically sufficiently morally good. Therefore, it is capable of [being morally good in virtue of] being characterized by the right circumstances.3
Also, one can offer a single argument to prove both points, i.e., that this act is morally neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad: The only act that is intrinsically bad is one whose object is incompatible with that act's being good or whose object is incompatible with the goodness of the act, or else one that is unsuitable for someone who acts according to right natural reason. And, conversely, the only act that is intrinsically good is one whose object is necessarily fitting for the act of someone who acts according to right reason. Now the procreation of children is neither unsuitable for a human being nor necessarily fitting according to right reason. Therefore, this act is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad. For no act is perfectly good simply in virtue of its genus4—in other words, solely in virtue of its object—except for the act of loving God, which has goodness solely in virtue of its object; and no act is bad
[simply] in virtue of its genus—in other words, solely in virtue of its object—except for the act of hating God. Hence, neither of these acts needs to be specified or can be characterized by circumstances5 [that change its goodness or badness]: for God cannot be loved too much (I am speaking here of friendship-love), and there is no good way for anyone to hate God.
2 PZN omit the preceding sentence and part of the next, continuing, "But this [act] is not the ultimate end," etc.
3 PZN omit the preceding sentence as well as all of nn. 17–18, though Q (not collated by the editors) includes them, with some minor textual variants.
4 Reading perfecte bonus ex genere tantum (Q) for the edition's bonus ex genere (A).
5 Reading oportet specificare nec est circumstantionabilis (Q) for the edition's oportet specificare vel circumstantionare; nec est circumstantionabilis (A).
THE MORAL GOODNESS OF THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT
18 This, then, is the first [preliminary] conclusion: willing to procreate offspring is an act that can be characterized by correct circumstances.
19 The second conclusion is that the first circumstance required for the moral goodness of this act is the circumstance of the end, as is universally true in moral matters.
In the present case, that circumstance is this: willing to procreate offspring to be brought up religiously in order to expand the worship of God.
20 This is proved by reason: the end of human beings is perfect human activity, as we read in Ethics I (1099a7–1099b28) and X (1174b18–1175a1);6 therefore, it is for the sake of this end that a given person ought to will to have offspring.
21 It is also proved from things believed: everyone ought to love his neighbor from charity as he loves himself, that is, with a view to the same end. And everyone ought to love himself with a view to an honorable way of life and to the worship of God.
Therefore, everyone ought to love his neighbor—and above all his offspring, to whom he is specially bound—in that same way.
22 This is confirmed through Augustine, On Genesis IX: "Not all who have offspring have the good of offspring, since it is not the offspring themselves who are said to be the good of offspring, but rather the hope or desire by which one seeks offspring so that they might be instructed in religion."7
23 There follows a second circumstance, namely, that this act ought to be of determinate persons, male and female.8 That it ought to be of male and female is not a circumstance; that's included necessarily in the act of procreating offspring. But that it be of determinate persons is a circumstance on the part of the agent causes.9 For indiscriminate copulation is contrary to (a) the good of the offspring (which is the intended end), (b) the good of the family, and (c) the good of the city.
24 Proof of the first (a): offspring would not be religiously educated by their parents, since parents would not have determinate knowledge of their offspring—at any rate, the father wouldn't, and so he would not be so careful about imposing the appropriate
6 Cf. Ordinatio IV d. 10 n. 274.
7 Or "molded religiously," or something like that. The quotation actually derives from Peter Lombard,
Sent. IV d. 31 c. 2 n. 4, but Richard Middleton attributes it to Augustine in his commentary on the Sentences (IV d. 31 princ. 1 q. 3 in corp.); there is something vaguely (but not very) like it in De Genesi ad litteram IX.7.
8 The edition precedes this sentence with Sed haec circumstantia non sufficit, licet sit prima et concludens omnes alias; et ideo, "But this circumstance is not sufficient, even though it is the first and encompasses all the others. And therefore" (A). If the first circumstance really did encompass or include (concludens) all the others, it would be sufficient.
9 The edition, following A alone, adds "that are due and appropriate for this end—not only for the procreation of offspring but also for repeated procreation of offspring. Now I say 'repeated' because it is fitting that one man have determinately one woman not only for procreation but also for repeated procreation, for nature does not allow just anyone to copulate with just anyone, and that is not found even in beasts. But it is evident that this act ought to be determinately of one man with one woman."
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q. UN., NN. –
discipline on his offspring.10 And, conversely, the offspring would not be as apt to offer the father obedience or the appropriate respect and filial fear, and it is on account of such fear that a son is more obedient to his father and can be disciplined by his father more easily than by anyone else.
Proof of the second (b): the good of the family consists in the principal persons of the family cleaving firmly to each other; otherwise, the whole thing would be indiscriminate. And for this reason the Philosopher says in Ethics VIII [1162a17–19] that human beings are naturally "conjugal" animals in that they are suited for life in a household. And no other persons would give adequate attention to each other's needs or to the needs of their offspring.
The third point (c), that it is contrary to the good of the city, is evident from the fact that friendship among citizens is sustained by matrimonial contracts of this sort; therefore, such contracts ought to be between definite persons, since the friendship of citizens is, for the most part, derived from determinate intimacy at a specified level— whereas if there were indiscriminate copulation, there would be no known and specified intimacy to serve as the cause of friendship; indeed, all intimacies would be confused.
And that is why Aristotle in Politics II [1261a4–12] is right to criticize the polity of Socrates, who wanted all wives to be in common. For in the state of fallen nature what
Aristotle himself proposes is much better, namely, that a determinate person shall have a determinate spouse. And indiscriminate copulation of male and female would be contrary to reason in every state.
This circumstance is also evident from things believed, through Holy Scripture, since
Genesis 2:24 says, "The two will be one flesh," and Christ says the same thing in Matthew 19:5; and the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 7:2, "Let each man have his own wife" (read: on account of fornication). And even granting that this determination would not be proved by natural reason to be unqualifiedly necessary, in such a way that its opposite would be repugnant to natural and manifest reason, at any rate this affirmative statement is sufficiently evident: it is honorable for persons belonging to the Church to be determinately conjoined one with another for this act.
Now the other circumstance—that it is honorable for these persons to be obligated to one another in an indissoluble bond for this end—is proved from the preceding. For just as determinacy of the persons contributes to the due education of the offspring and to the good of the family and of the city, the permanent cleaving of these determinate persons one to another also contributes to this same end; but because so many things can happen and so many difficulties can arise, they would not cleave
10 Or perhaps "providing the appropriate teaching for his offspring"—but disciplina seems clearly to be
'discipline' in the next sentence, and so I have translated accordingly here as well.
THE MORAL GOODNESS OF THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT
to each other permanently unless they were obligated to do so by this sort of indissoluble bond.
30 And even granting that it could not be proved manifestly by natural reason that this conclusion (which is the foremost conclusion in this section) is unqualifiedly necessary, what we set out to prove has been proved, namely, that it is honorable and consonant with natural reason that a man and woman should be under such an obligation for the sake of such an end.
31 And from this the solution to one question is evident: namely, whether such an obligation belongs to the natural law. For I explained earlier, in distinction 17 [n. 19], that what belongs to the natural law in the most proper sense is a practical principle known per se and a conclusion deriving demonstratively from such a principle. In a second sense, however, a [practical] truth that is evidently consonant with such principles and conclusions, though it does not follow from them necessarily, also belongs to the natural law. And in this latter way "It is honorable for a man and a woman to be obligated to the aforesaid end" belongs to the natural law.
Ordinatio IV, d. 29, q. un., nn. 2, 11–28 Coerced consent
Concerning distinction 29 I ask whether consent that is coerced on the part of one or both parties is sufficient to contract genuine matrimony.
One approach1 to this topic says that someone cannot be compelled to consent in such a way that the will consents, because the will is not compelled and cannot be compelled. Rather, someone is compelled only in a certain respect by fear of the bad consequences that he wills to avoid. On this basis it is argued that in order to avoid the bad consequences that someone fears, it is enough for him to give consent externally, in words; and so if, in addition to the consent that is given overtly in the words that he utters, he also consents inwardly, in his mind, that additional consent does not proceed from fear. Consequently, that inward consent is free, not compelled, and thus it obligates, and the marriage is ratified both by God's judgment and by that of the Church. By contrast, one who does not consent2 in his mind, but only in words, given that there is no free consent in his mind, does not contract matrimony either in the tribunal of his conscience or in the tribunal of the Church, because the Church presumes that he has not consented.
But this seems unreasonable, first, because that fear—as everyone agrees—cannot be unqualifiedly coercion either inwardly or outwardly. For someone who speaks voluntarily moves his tongue: someone else might open his mouth violently and move his tongue around, but however much that might be done, he would not be able to utter words or express anything unless he voluntarily moved his own tongue.
Therefore, this "coercion" is simply an inducement to do something in order to avoid an impending evil.
1 Richard Middleton, Sent. IV d. 29 princ. 1 q. 1 in corp.
2 The edition has Qui autem consentit (A), "By contrast, one who consents." This sentence is missing from PZNQ (see the next note), so there is no other collated MS to consult, but the sense clearly requires the addition of non, 'not.'
COERCED CONSENT
Similarly, fear that induces someone to commit a mortal sin cannot befall a man of steady character; for if that were possible, it would follow that a human being could be compelled to sin mortally.
13 On the basis of these points I argue as follows:3 anyone who is compelled to x, where x cannot exist apart from y without mortal sin, is compelled to y as well, taking
'compelled' in the same sense in both cases. But according to you this person is compelled by fear to say outward words that express consent, but those words cannot exist apart from inward consent without mortal sin, because someone who utters those words apart from inward consent lies perniciously. It follows, then, that just as he can—according to you—be compelled to utter those words, so too he can be compelled to inward consent.
14 There are many proofs of the major premise. First, the only fear that excuses is that which can befall a man of steady character, but a greater fear of disadvantage than of mortal sin is evidently not something that can befall a man of steady character.
15 Another proof: no fear can befall anyone according to right reason except with respect to submitting to a lesser evil in order to avoid doing something worse or in order to forestall something worse. But undergoing any suffering whatsoever is less bad than sinning mortally, and it is a mortal sin to express consent outwardly but not to consent inwardly.
16 This can also be proved in terms of what is licit or illicit: fear cannot induce anyone to do anything except what is licit, because it is more necessary to avoid what is illicit than to escape suffering. For the cause that determines someone to avoid what is illicit is superior to the cause that determines someone to forestall suffering, since it is through the affection for justice that God inhibits human beings from what is illicit, whereas the affection for the advantageous inclines human beings to avoid suffering.
17 This argument [n. 13] is confirmed by a twofold example:
First, if it is not licit for someone to consent inwardly, no fear should induce him to utter the words outwardly, as is the case for a religious, who should in no way be induced to say these words: for either he is consenting and thus sins mortally against his vow, or he is not consenting and thus sins mortally by telling a pernicious lie.
Therefore, no one else is sufficiently induced by fear to say these words except as he is distinguished from a religious in that it is licit for him to consent inwardly.4
Another example: suppose the person doing such violence to him that he takes her as his wife were also to demand that he swear this oath: "I swear by God's holy
Gospels that I consent to her without fear." He ought not to be induced by any fear to swear this oath, since it is a mortal sin to lie in an oath. Therefore, by argument from 3 PZNQ omit the last sentence of n. 11 and all of n. 12 and begin n. 13 with "Against this:".
4 Reading quia (add. scilicet Q) licet sibi consentire interius (PZNQ) for the edition's cui non licet sibi consentire interius (A).
ORDINATIO IV, D. , Q. UN., NN. , –
a similar case, he should not be able to be induced by any fear to agree in outward words to take her as his wife unless doing so is licit; but it is not licit unless it is accompanied by inward consent.
Now you might say that what these arguments prove is that he should not say the words on account of any fear unless he consents in his mind, but if he does consent, he is obligated, because fear does not sufficiently induce him to that consent. On the contrary: he is not compelled in an unqualified sense to utter those outward words either, in such a way that someone else moves his tongue; rather, he is said to be compelled by fear to say these words on the grounds that he is facing something else, namely death, that it is more important to evade. Therefore, reasoning from this similar case, when he is facing something that it is more important to evade than consenting to her—for example, death or mortal sin—he is compelled by fear to consent to this.
This is confirmed by the fact that the opposite view would give many people an occasion to lie perniciously. It is also confirmed through an example: if someone in great peril jettisons his cargo in the sea lest the ship go under, he jettisons it out of fear; and if there were some other act apart from which he could not jettison the cargo (either absolutely or without mortal sin), he would be compelled by fear to perform that act as well.
Second, this view is mistaken in saying that the Church presumes in such a case that there is no inward consent because it presumes that he consented outwardly only out of fear and not inwardly in his mind. This is false: the Church always presumes the more favorable interpretation, as is held in the Decretals, "On the rules for oaths,"
Estote misericordes,5 and in the single chapter of "On the examination to be made for ordination," which states, "If someone does not know that another is unworthy, he ought to regard him as worthy."6 And it is clear that the Church manifestly presumes that sexual intercourse following vows expresses a marital relation, since it presumes that the spouses are not sinning mortally in that act; therefore, reasoning from this similar case, it presumes likewise in the case at issue here [that verbal consent is accompanied by inward consent].
So I give a different answer to the question. There are two things we need to examine in this context: first, how there can be coerced consent; and second, whether coerced consent is sufficient for contracting matrimony.
Concerning the first I say that there is no coercion, properly speaking, in a human act. For it is a contradiction for the will to be coerced in an unqualified sense into an act of willing, since according to Ethics III [1110b15–17] "the violent is what has an external principle in such a way that the patient does not act along with it."
5 Gregory IX, Decretales V tit. 41 c. 2.
6 Ibid., I tit. 12 c. un.
COERCED CONSENT
Understand "the patient does not act along with it" not negatively but contrarily, that is, as meaning "the patient acts against it"—thus, the sense is "the violent is what is totally from an extrinsic principle and contrary to the inclination of the patient."
And willing cannot be in the will in this way, since if it were, someone would be willing unwillingly, which manifestly involves a contradiction.
23 Nevertheless, someone who has a will can be coerced into a passion (for example, that someone who is tied up remain where he is) or to some instrumental action that is, however, not his own action (for example, if someone strikes something with my hand in the way that he could strike with a bronze hand).7
24 But one cannot be coerced into an elicited or commanded act of will, which alone is properly speaking a human action, except in a qualified sense, that is, out of fear of an evil that is greater than the act itself. And this sort of coercion is possible in the case of a virtuous person when he knows—not just guesses or suspects but knows with certainty, at any rate the kind of certainty that is sufficient in human acts—that [if he does not perform the act] some evil will be imposed on him that is more unsuitable for him and more to be avoided than eliciting the act that displeases him. And it can very well be the case that it is more unsuitable for him according to right reason: for example, death, imprisonment, captivity, extensive maiming, sexual violation, and similar evils.
25 Therefore, since a virtuous person is master of his own will, he can also will something that he would not otherwise will, and command an act that he would otherwise will-against, lest he suffer these evils—and that in accordance with right reason. Accordingly, such fear is said to befall a man of steady character. But no fear can induce someone to commit a mortal sin in accordance with right reason, since no evil that one faces could be greater than mortal sin, since no suffering is worse than mortal sin.
26 But the case is not so clear when it comes to venial sin. I shall discuss that elsewhere.8
7 Reading ut si quis manu mea percutiat, quod posset facere similiter manu aerea (Q) for the edition's utpote si quis manu mea percutiat, quia ita posset facere manu aerea (A).
8 Scotus raises the question at Reportatio IV A d. 29 q. un. n. 9 but does not answer it.