GERHARD’S U SE OF ARISTOTELIAN AND SCHOLASTIC CATEGORIES
GERHARD’S USE OF ARISTOTELIAN AND SCHOLASTIC CATEGORIES
The reader of the Theological Commonplaces will notice Gerhard’s use of Scholastic and specifically Aristotelian terminology. At times, Gerhard can be found using the “four causes,” that is, the formal, material, efficient, and final causes, to define theological topics. (See On Scripture, § 354, for an example.) Gerhard uses the terminology of the schools that had been utilized before, during, and after the Reformation in order to give his presentation a high degree of precision and clarity. Yet the Scholastic terminology does not function like a procrustean bed for Gerhard, and the terms are by no means omnipresent. What C. F. W. Walther wrote about Johann Wilhelm Baier applies even more aptly to Gerhard: “No matter how true it is that Aristotelian philosophy has often crept into theology with the Scholastic form, nevertheless, it is this form which a considerable number of our theologians have used to avoid ambiguity of terms and to express their thoughts to their readers without having to heap up many words. Even Baier [and Gerhard!] made none other than this healthy use of philosophical, technical terms in his theology. Whoever has just once figured this out can only be thankful to him for using this form.” 13
Among the Scholastic terminology and method, the reader will find that Gerhard makes much use of syllogisms. A syllogism is an orderly process of thought by which one proceeds from two propositions that are known or proved in order to discover a proposition that was previously unknown or unproved. Gerhard’s terminology for this orderly process of reasoning varies. He can call it a “proof,” “demonstration,” “rational argument,” “conclusion,” or “inference.” No matter what he calls it, the structure of a syllogism is very clear. First comes the major premise, which sets forth some general principle that should always be valid in the form of a relationship between two variables. Second comes the minor premise, introduced quite often with an adversative (“but, yet, however”). The minor premise sets forth evidence about the condition of one of the two variables introduced in the major premise. Third comes the conclusion, often (but not always) introduced by “therefore.” Quite often Gerhard does not bother to write out the entire conclusion, since it is obvious from the major and minor premises. In these situations he writes merely, “Therefore.” And sometimes even that one word is omitted. After the conclusion, Gerhard sometimes adds an explanation of the major premise and evidence for the minor premise. An example of a syllogism that includes all of these parts can be seen in this volume, § 337.