Antithesis: Third, of the Photinians.
Antithesis: Third, of the Photinians.
§ 472. (III) The Photinians, with their words, indeed do appeal to Scripture as the only norm and judge. Actually, however, they take away the judiciary authority of Scripture when in articles of faith they depart from the letter of Scripture because of an absurdity that runs against the judgment of reason. We draw a conclusion against them in this way: Whoever departs from the letter of Scripture because of an absurdity that runs against the judgment of reason, such a one prefers the judgment of reason to the judgment of the Holy Spirit who speaks to us in and through the Holy Scriptures and, in fact, wickedly takes away the office of the judge that is owed to Scripture. The Photinians do this. Therefore.
The major premise is one of immovable truth, for in those clear and perspicuous passages of Scripture, the Holy Spirit has set forth His own sentence and judgment concerning the mysteries of faith. If, therefore, one departs from the clear letter and genuine sense of the words, he abandons the Holy Spirit’s sentence and judgment. You see, that which flows directly from the words of Scripture taken in the literal sense in the articles of faith is the true meaning of Scripture and the genuine sentence of the Holy Spirit. If an alien interpretation in harmony with the judgment be brought into them, there would actually be a departure from the genuine sense of Scripture and the judgment of the Holy Spirit. If at any time the article of creation in Genesis 1 is described, we must take their words in their proper and genuine meaning, namely, that the true God—who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—truly created real light, the real firmament, real waters, etc. If one departs from the literal sense, however—so that he wants Elohim to mean “angels,” or “creation” to mean a production made from some material coeternal with God, or “light” to mean “angelic nature,” etc.—he is departing from the true and genuine sense that the Holy Spirit intends, and he prefers the darkness of reason to the light of the Holy Spirit. Hilary, De Trinit., bk. 1: “The best reader of Scripture is he who looks for the understanding of its words from its words, instead of importing that understanding; who takes from it rather than bringing to it; and who does not force it to seem to contain in its words what he presumed before reading that it would mean.”
§ 473. The minor premise can be proved from the words and practice of the Photinians. These bear witness that the Photinians not only depart from the letter of Scripture in the articles of faith because of an absurdity that runs against the judgment of reason, but they also assail the articles of faith that are set forth in clear and perspicuous words in Scripture with argument-arrows drawn from the quiver of human reason. You see, they expressly claim that what reason declares is false can by no means be true nor should one believe it. As a consequence, they deny the mystery of the Trinity, the eternal generation of the Son from the Father, the union of the two natures in Christ, the propagation of original sin, and the resurrection of the same flesh, and they do this because reason declares that those articles of our faith are absurd, false, impossible, and contradictory.
Let these badges of theirs that we shall enumerate and this process of debating that we shall sketch be given due consideration. Socinus, De auctorit. Script., p. 54: “That with which reason and common sense conflict entirely can by no means be true.” The Catech. Racov. denies the mystery of the Trinity on the basis of the principle that “it is opposed to reason” (p. 48). It denies that there are two natures in Christ because “this conflicts with reason” (p. 58). It denies the eternal generation of the Son from the Father because “they conflict with reason” (p. 63). It denies the presence of Christ’s body and blood in the Supper because “this militates against the properties of a natural body” (p. 220). It says, “They themselves report that their opinion about oral eating is by no means certain when they admit that this mode of eating the body of Christ is completely unexplainable or that they just do not know how this happens” (p. 221). It denies the satisfaction of Christ because “reason judges that this is absurd” (p. 261), etc. Ostorodus and Weidovius (Apolog. ad decretum ordinum Belgii, p. 24, published in 1600): “Hypocrites or the insane, not sensible people, generally believe those things that are by no means in harmony with reason.” Ostorodus, Instit., c. 4, p. 30: “If reason shows clearly that the trinity of persons in God is false, how, I ask, can it come into the mind of a rational person that such can still be true and be proved from God’s Word?” Theodosius Schimbergius, Praefatio refutationi Petri Carolini praefixa, which was written by Johannes Sommerus and, as the title indicates, was printed at Ingolstadt in 1582: “Faith never embraces things that are impossible for the mind. Thus it is obvious that the Trinity and the divinity of the Son are not true articles of faith, because they are impossible for the mind. In reality, therefore, they are blasphemous and terrible dogmas.” Schmaltzius, Contra D. Schopp. de trinit., p. 21: “Those who, in religion, spurn sound logic after the Word of God thereby render their religion suspect among all sensible people.” Contra D. Frantz., disp. 2, p. 60: “It is completely contrary to reason to think that he who had been created without sin, by sinning one time, infected all people with sin forever.” Disp. 4, p. 137: “There is not a bit of the Christian religion that is not in harmony with reason. Whatever opinion does not agree with reason also can have no place in theology. As a small light is not opposed to a large one, so reason is not opposed to Scripture. Let Frantzius or anyone else teach that any sentence of Holy Writ conflicts with reason, and then let reason be silent in the Church. Religion and Holy Scripture have many things that are beyond reason; thereby they commend themselves highly. There is, however, nothing that is contrary to reason. In fact, if religion were opposed to reason, it would thereby betray its own falseness and would not be religion, for the soul and reason itself are religion.” Disp. 5, p. 165: “Frantzius and Luther are involved in a gross, crass error. They believe that something is true in theology that is false in philosophy, that is, that is contrary to reason. Luther said it quite accurately: preaching that God is man presents a greater disparity than to say that man is a jackass. Thus it is completely false that Holy Writ affirms that God, who is certainly God by nature, is man.” Disp. 8, p. 421: “As a small light cannot be contrary to a large one, so reason cannot be contrary to evangelical doctrine. This ignorance of most people is crass. Its time should finally now come to put them to shame in such a great light of the truth.” In his Resp. ad par sophism. a Ravenspergero objectorum, p. 30: “There is no faith where there is not understanding.” Ibid.: “Humbly believing something is true does not make it so.” Goslavius a Babelno, preface to his treatise Contra Keckerm.: “There are some who will cry out that I have subjected the axioms of religion to the rule of dialectics. I do not deny it, but who before me has not done that?” And later: “Is there really one truth of philosophy and another of theology? I hear that ‘the world was created out of nothing’ is theologically true, but philosophically false. But whatever the schools teach is nonsense. Thus it will be true and false, and vice versa. Both parts of the contradiction are true and false. It does not embarrass those good people to brand so great a mark of disgrace on one of these two most noble sciences.”
§ 474. However, when the Photinians in this manner make their own reason the judge in the supreme mysteries of faith, they contradict: (1) Scripture, which testifies that, after the fall, human reason is blind in passing judgment on the mysteries of faith, is obscured by the mist of errors, is entangled in the darkness of ignorance, is completely destitute of the ability to perceive divine mysteries and to make judgments concerning them, is hostile and opposed to the divine mysteries, and hence must be taken captive under the obedience of Christ, as we have shown earlier (§ 459).
(2) Experience, which testifies that human reason has been the worst temptress of her own inclinations. Our first parents were seduced by the judgment of reason and fell away from the express word of God. Consequently, the apostle warns his Corinthians: “But I am afraid that, as the serpent deceived Eve with his cunning, your thoughts may be corrupted and may be deprived of the simplicity which is in Christ” (2 Cor. 11:3). Naaman the Syrian, Nicodemus, Thomas, etc., followed the judgment of their own reason and senses in divine matters and made shameful mistakes. In Rom. 16:18, Paul describes heretics in this way: that “by good words and fair speeches,” that is, which conform to the judgment of reason, “they deceive the hearts of the innocent.” But on the other hand, Abraham “in hope believed against hope. He did not consider his own body now dead” (Rom. 4:18-19). That is, he did not follow the judgment of his own reason about the properties of his worn-out and aged body but rested on God’s promise in faith, not hesitating in disbelief.
(3) The rule of Christ, of the prophets, and of the apostles, who everywhere in divine matters call us back from the judgment of reason and senses to the Word. Isa. 55:8: “My thoughts are not your thoughts.” Zech. 8:6: “If this seems difficult in the eyes of this people, will it really be difficult in His eyes?” Matt. 19:26: “With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible.” Eph. 3:20: “God is able to do far more abundantly than all that we ask or think.” Col. 2:8: “See to it that no one makes a prey of you by philosophy.”
(4) Themselves and, in fact, in four ways. [a] They themselves repudiate the judgment of reason in questions of faith. Socinus, Solut. scrupul., response to 11, p. 40: “We must not reckon God’s inscrutable judgments by the measure of human reason.” Johannes Sommerus, Refut. P. Carolini, p. 50b: “We must not examine God’s actions according to men’s rules.” Eniedinus, Explic. locor., p. 178: “No one should introduce alien and philosophical thoughts to explain the simple words and doctrine of the apostles.” The preface-writer for Eniedinus: “On a matter so arduous, there is no need for human reasonings but especially for the explicit Word in accord with the passages ‘To the Law and to the testimony!’ and ‘What is written in the Law?’ “Ostorodus, Instit., c. 19, p. 196: “In so difficult a matter it would be hazardous to trust in human reason and judgment when we are speaking about the life of man, in fact, about his eternal salvation” (for example, in the question about killing heretics). Schmaltzius, De div. Christi, p. 91: “In matters of this sort, let them cease inquiring into the means that God used and of which, not without cause, He wanted us to be ignorant. Let them learn to rest on the clear testimonies of Holy Writ.” Schmaltzius again, Contra Frantz., p. 265: “Let Frantzius show us his ideas from Holy Writ and we shall accept them as certain, even if they surpass our reason.” (If those things that are set forth in Holy Writ must be accepted even if they surpass reason, then the divine mysteries that have been set forth in the literal sense of the words must be accepted in faith, and they must not be attacked with the principles of logic.)
[b] They deny that there is any natural knowledge of God. Ostorodus, Instit., c. 1, p. 10: “It does not come from nature that man knows something about God or the divinity, nor does it come from his consideration of the creation. Rather, it comes from hearing. From the beginning God has revealed Himself to men.” But if reason cannot rise up by its own powers to any knowledge of God, why shall we attribute to it judgment regarding the supreme mysteries of faith?
[c] They say that Scripture alone is the rule of faith, and on the basis of it alone they boast that they want to debate with us over divine matters. Socinus, Defens. animadv. contra Eutropium, p. 49: “The Christian must believe these things about God, though they are not quite in harmony with reason. People may think that God Himself has not revealed them, but actually He has.” Pisecius, preface to his Respons. ad rationes Campiani Arii: “The truth of divine matters depends not on nature, not on the senses, not on philosophical theorems but on God, on the divine laws and oracles.” And later: “We weigh all controversies in the Christian religion by the firm and solid authority of the divine laws.” Schmaltzius, Contra Schopperum, p. 3: “Until now you Evangelicals are arguing steadily against us that Scripture alone is the norm of faith and that one must stand only on that divine authority in spiritual matters.” In his preface to Contra Frantzium: “The Christian religion relies on its own principles and by no means needs assistance from an alien source.” Yet if one must stand only on divine authority in spiritual matters, why, then, do they draw judgments concerning the divine mysteries from the principles of reason?
[d] They do not even want to admit discursive reasoning that is founded in the Scriptures nor what is deduced from them, as will become clear later. How much less, then, should one listen to the judgment of a reason that does not consult Scripture about the articles of faith!
§ 475. Let us weigh the axioms and embellishments that the Photinians use in this question. (1) “That with which reason conflicts can by no means be true.” We respond. It is not human reason but divine revelation that is the principle of faith. One must not judge the articles of faith on the basis of the dictates of reason; otherwise we shall no longer have articles of faith but the whims of reason. The thoughts and utterances of reason must be coerced and limited within the sphere of those matters that have been subjected to the judgment of reason, not extended to the sphere of those matters that have been placed beyond all comprehension of reason. Otherwise if they are taken as absolutely universal and are attacked by the mysteries of faith, they would produce “the contradictions of what is falsely called knowledge” (1 Tim. 6:20).
(2) “Nothing should be believed that is opposed to right reason.” We respond. One must distinguish between man’s reason before the fall and after the fall. The former, as such, was never opposed to divine revelation; the latter, with the fault of corruption, is quite often opposed to it. One must also distinguish between the reason of a human being not yet reborn and the reason of a regenerate human. The former considers the mysteries of faith to be foolishness; the latter, as such, does not struggle against them. However, it is such only as long as it follows the light of the Word and judges the mysteries of faith not on the basis of its own principles but on the basis of Holy Writ. Again, one must distinguish between reason that has begun to be rectified in this life and that which is fully rectified in the life to come. The former has not yet been so completely renewed, illumined, and rectified that it is powerless to oppose and attack the articles of faith if it follows its own lead. Just as in the reborn there continues a “wrestling of the flesh and spirit” through which they are incited to sin, so also there continues in them a wrestling of faith and reason insofar as it has not yet been completely renewed. The latter, on the other hand, excludes all conflict between faith and reason. In addition, one must distinguish between right reason, truly and properly speaking, and right reason as it is defined according to the sense of our adversaries, the Photinians and Calvinists. Right reason, if it is taken truly and properly—namely, as that which restricts itself within the borders of its object; does not arrogate for itself the judgment of the mysteries of faith; does not, when illumined by the light of the Word and rectified by the Holy Spirit, follow its own principles in the mysteries of faith, but follows the light of the Word and the leading of the Holy Spirit—is not opposed to faith. Our adversaries, however, accept as right reason that which does pass judgment on the mysteries of faith, as their own practice reveals. Finally, one must distinguish between those things that are the objects of revelation alone and purely of faith, and those that are the objects of the sharpness of reason. In the case of the latter, some light has been left to reason. Because the former are beyond sense, beyond reason, beyond all comprehension, we must not examine them with reason but accept them in faith.
(3) “As a small light is not opposed to a great one, so Scripture is not contrary to reason.” We respond. Here there is no contrariety of itself but by accident. Reason that limits itself within its own sphere is not contrary to Scripture. When it wants to go above and beyond its own sphere, however, and to pass judgment on the supreme mysteries of faith according to the dictates of its own principles, then by accident it is opposed to Scripture, which instructs us about the mysteries of faith. As a great light often reveals those things that were hidden under a small light, so the light of grace, kindled for us in the Word, reveals those things that have been hidden in the light of nature. But if anyone wished to deny those things that he sees in a greater light because he did not see them in a lesser light, he abuses the function and benefit of the lesser light. So, too, he who denies or attacks the mysteries of faith revealed in the light of grace because they do not agree with reason in accord with the light of nature, such a one is also abusing the benefit and function of reason and of the natural light.
(4) “Religion has many things beyond reason but nothing against reason.” We respond. The articles of faith in and of themselves are not against reason. They merely are beyond reason. By accident it does happen, however, that they are also against reason, namely, when reason usurps for itself judgment over them on the basis of its own principles and does not follow the light of the Word but denies and attacks them. Next, the articles of faith are not against reason but only beyond reason, insofar as reason before the fall had not yet been corrupted and depraved. After the fall, however, they are not only beyond but also against corrupted reason, namely, that which, as such, cannot restrain itself from wanting to pass judgment on them on the basis of its own principles.
(5) “What is true theologically cannot be false philosophically because truth is one.” We respond. In and of itself there is no contrariety and no contradiction between philosophy and theology. That which theology sets forth on the basis of revelation about the mysteries of faith, sound and sincere philosophy knows it must not examine and evaluate according to the principles of reason, lest a transition to another genus [
] take place and lest the distinct principles of the distinct disciplines become confused. Thus when theology teaches that Mary bore a child and remained a virgin, sound philosophy does not say that this assertion conflicts with its own conclusion: that it is impossible for a virgin to bear a child. You see, it knows that it must accept that conclusion necessarily with this limitation, that for a virgin to bear a child naturally and remain a virgin is an impossibility, and theology does not claim the opposite of this, for it says that the virgin conceived by supernatural and divine power. On the other hand, when some amateur philosopher wants his axioms and utterances to be so general that on the basis of them even the greatest mysteries of faith must be judged, and when he thus invades another’s borders, then by accident it happens that what is true theologically is said to be false philosophically, namely, with respect not to the true use of sound philosophy but to the shameful abuse of it. Thus justice and the nature of law are everywhere one in general concept, yet the law of this province is not the same as that of another province. Instead, each commonwealth lives with its own particular laws. So, too, truth is one in general concept; yet every discipline has its own axioms that must not be dragged into a different forum but must be left in their own sphere, lest a transition to another genus occur, which sound philosophy rejects.