Second, homonyms.
§ 1. Because I intend to devote myself to the deficiencies of the Theological Commonplaces that I explained briefly in my earlier volumes or that I passed by completely, I shall first set down some ideas on the nature of theology as a preface. I shall follow my usual method to explain, first, its nomenclature, then its content. You see, what we call “names” are considered as if they were ideas “because the use of words frequently carries us to a perception of the thing itself,” as writes Scaliger, Exerc. 1, sect. 1. He also says, “From an interpretation of its name the comprehension of a thing becomes more clearly understood” (De ling. Lat., bk. 1, c. 5). Accordingly, he concludes: “In the treatment of academic disciplines, we must begin with their names” (Exerc. 359, sect. 1).
On the nomenclature of theology, to which pertains, first, its etymology.
§ 2. To the nomenclature of theology pertains (I) its etymology. Franciscus Junius (De theol., c. 1) and Sohnius (Opera, vol. 1, p. 66) think that we call this subject “theology” because it is “the talk of God about Himself.” The more accurate judgment about its name, however, is that it is the
, or “the teaching about God or about divine matters,” just as astrology is not the talk of stars but talking about stars. Augustine, De civ. Dei, bk. 8, c. 1: “Theology means either God’s words or an account or explanation of the Deity.” Some believe it is called “theology” as if it were a “knowledge of the oracles of God” (Rom. 3:2) because it is the knowledge of the divine oracles, the wisdom of divine matters, which instructs us about the essence and will of God and about His works and benefits toward the Church. The prior etymology, however, is the more suitable. Theology takes its name from God: (1) by reason of its principal effective cause, that it is a divinely revealed teaching; (2) and, indeed especially, by reason of its material or object, because it deals with God and divine matters; (3) by reason of its end and effect, because it makes men divine or “partakers of the divine nature” (2 Pet. 1:4). Thomas ([ST,] p. 1, q. 1, art. 7) and Albert (Sent., bk. 1, dist. 1, art. 2) say beautifully: “Theology is taught by God, it teaches God, and it leads to God.” We are accurate, then, in saying that theology takes its name from God.
§ 3. Although this word [“theology”] is not in Scripture, its concrete form does occur, namely, (1) the word “theologian,” which appears in the title of the Apocalypse, where the apostle John is called “the theologian” by epithet or out of respect for his preeminence. John is also honored with this encomium by Epiphanius (Haeres. 15), Cyril of Jerusalem (Catech. 12), Cyril of Alexandria (De Trinit., bk. 3), Athanasius (Orat. contra idola), Chrysostom (preface to Psalm 37), etc. (2) The simple words of which “theology” is composed appear in Scripture, namely,
(Rom. 3:2; 1 Pet. 4:11; Heb. 5:12).
Second, homonyms.
§ 4. (II) Homonyms. Among the secular writers, the word “theologian” is attributed to philosophers and poets. (See Lactantius, De ira Dei, c. 11; Nazianzen, Orat. 2, p. 22; Augustine, De civ. Dei, bk. 18, c. 14.) As a parallel to this, the apostle calls the Greek poet Epimenides “a prophet” of the Gentiles (Titus 1:12) because the Cretans considered him among their prophets. They even sacrificed to him after his death, according to Diogenes Laertius. Plato (De repub., bk. 1) and Aristotle (Metaphys., bk. 10, c. 6) first call philosophy or metaphysics “theology” to the extent that it treats the natural knowledge of God. Here it is taken in a far different sense, however, as the teaching that is drawn from the revelation of the divine essence and will as this is given in the Word.
In this sense, some people teach that the word “theology” is taken in three ways: (1) As the Christian faith and religion that is common to all the faithful—learned and unlearned—so that whoever knows and assents to the articles of faith is called a “theologian.” Chrysostom, homily 5 on 2 Thessalonians 3: “If he wishes, each one of you is a teacher—if not of someone else, then of himself.” (2) As the performance of the ecclesiastical ministry, and in this sense all ministers of the Word are called “theologians.” (3) As the more accurate knowledge of the divine mysteries. In this way, those are called theologians who are able to establish divine truth fully and destroy the falsity opposed thereto: “… able to give instruction in sound doctrine and also to refute those who contradict it” (Titus 1:9). Yet these are not all different types of theology but different meanings of the one word. The Greek fathers use this word specifically for the doctrine of the divinity of the Son, just as they call the doctrine of the incarnation and humanity of the Son
[“economy”].
Third, synonyms.
§ 5. (III) Synonyms. The early rabbis call theology
the fathers call it
and simply
from Job 28:28; 1 Cor. 2:6; James 1:5. (Cf. Augustine, De Trin., bk. 16, c. 1.) They also call it
from 1 Tim. 2:10. They distinguish these names in such a way that
properly denotes the true knowledge of God, while
denotes the proper worship of God. According to Luke 1:77, it can be called “the knowledge of salvation”; 1 Cor. 2:7, “the hidden wisdom”; 1 Cor. 12:8, “the utterance of wisdom”; 2 Cor. 4:6, “the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ” (from this passage Alexander of Hales, p. 1, q. 1, mem. 3, calls it “the knowledge of the divine essence to be learned through Christ in His work of redemption”); Col. 1:9, “the knowledge of God’s will in all spiritual wisdom and understanding”; Col. 1:10, “the knowledge of God”; 1 Tim. 3:16, “religion”; Titus 1:1, “the knowledge of the truth that accords with godliness.” This last is the most beautiful and fullest paraphrase of “theology.” Some of the ancients call it “
[‘God-instruction’],
[‘God-knowledge’], and
[‘knowledge of God’],” according to Lactantius (Inst., bk. 2, c. 16).
§ 6. Also related to synonyms are the encomia and praises that the ancients give theology, as well as the comparisons with which they illustrate its dignity and excellence. Chrysostom compares it to a “large palace,” in which are lofty towers, apartments, gardens, etc. He also compares it to a “fertile field adorned with every flower.” Ambrose compares it to “manna containing every delight”; Augustine, to heaven; the Damascene, to a “paradise on earth,” “the tree of life,” etc. Diadochius, De perf. spirit., c. 67, in vol. 5, Biblioth. patrum, p. 465:
All the gifts of God, as well as the cause for every good thing, are very good. Nothing so stirs our heart and rouses it to love His goodness, however, as the gift of theology. Because it is the early fruit of God’s grace, it also bestows the first gifts thereof to the soul. First, it causes us to hold in contempt all the friendships of this life willingly and gladly, so that we have, instead of fleeting pleasures, greater riches of the Word of God than one can describe. Second, it illumines our mind with a fire that changes the nature of the mind and thus causes it to become a consort of the ministering spirits.
Regarding the
: Whether theology exists.
§ 7. In the factual material, the first question that occurs is: Does theology exist? To this we certainly must give an affirmative answer. You see, five things teach that theology does exist: (1) The efficient cause set in the state of actuality, namely, the divine revelation, which is the foundation of theology. (2) The nature of God Himself. Because He is the greatest good, who communicates and diffuses Himself, therefore He also communicates the knowledge of Himself to rational creatures for their salvation. (3) The goal of creation. God created rational beings to acknowledge and honor Him in both this life and the life to come. (4) The principles innate to the human mind, principles that teach that there is a God and that we must worship Him. (5) The consensus of all the heathen. However far the heathen may have wandered outside the Church and away from true theology, they still have confirmed that theology does exist with their zeal for pursuing it.
Regarding the
: What the genus of theology is.
§ 8. A full and complete definition of theology will have its own place later. Here we want to discover the genus nearest to the species of theology. The Scholastics labor over this point and debate it. Some want it to be scientia [“factual knowledge”], such as Thomas and his followers (Sent., bk. 3, dist. 33; [ST,] q. 1, art. 2, q. 4).
To them the rest oppose the following basic points: (1) Believing and knowing for a fact [scire] are different, for the certainty of knowing for a fact depends on internal and inherent principles, while the certainty of faith depends on external principles, namely, on the authority of the one who is revealing. Augustine, De ordine, bk. 2, c. 5: “What we believe we owe to authority; what we understand we owe to reason.” Theology, however, is the teaching of faith (John 20:31; 2 Cor. 5:7). (2) One must draw conclusions about the sciences from the nature of their subjects (Poster. 1, text. 43). The subject of theology is Christ, a knowledge of whom no one can have scientifically. Rather, one must seek Him from divine revelation (Matt. 16:17; 1 Cor. 2:7). Theology, then, is not a science. (3) The principle of any science is the understanding [intellectus] when it moves from principles correctly understood to the factual knowledge [scientia] of the conclusions (Post. 1, text. 5). In theology, however, understanding is not the principle but the goal. Augustine, De Trin., bk. 15, c. 2: “We believe that we may understand; we do not understand that we may believe.” This the devout ancients generally prove from Isa. 7:9, where, according to the Vulgate, we read: “If you will not believe, you will not understand.” Gerson says with better sense than rhythm: “Whoever wants to understand first and believe later, to him Holy Scripture gives nothing but stumbling blocks.” Therefore. (4) Something false can underlie sciences that we have discovered by reasoning because discursive thinking can accept a falsehood as equally as an opinion can (Prior 2, c. 21). A falsehood, however, cannot underlie faith, according to Thomas ([ST,] 2a2ae, q. 1, art. 5).
§ 9. The others abandon the opinion of Thomas, therefore, and claim that theology properly is “wisdom”: (1) Because of the nature of wisdom. The Philosopher says that this is most exact (Ethic., bk. 6, c. 7) and the greatest of all knowledges (Metaphys., bk. 6, text 2). (2) Because of the definition. Plato says that wisdom is “the true knowledge of God, joined with the pure worship of Him and religious concern for Him” (De repub., bk. 6). Lactantius, Instit., bk. 3, c. 29: “All human wisdom lies in this one thing: to know and worship God. This is our dogma; this is our way of thinking.” Also, Instit., bk. 4, c. 4: “It is the same God whom we ought to understand, which belongs to wisdom, and whom we ought to revere, which belongs to religious concern. Wisdom comes first, however, and religious concern follows, because knowing God comes before worshiping Him. There is, then, one meaning in the two words, however diverse it may seem to be.” Augustine, De lib. arbitr., bk. 1, c. 9: “Wisdom is the truth in which one discerns the greatest good.” This leads him to write: “Theology is the only devout, true, and divine wisdom” (De Trin., bk. 14, c. 1). They make this claim (3) on the basis of the conditions of wisdom, of which the Philosopher lists six: “First, to know all things; second, to know the most difficult things; third, to know them for certain; fourth, to know the cause of causes; fifth, to know for the sake of oneself; sixth, to regulate and not be regulated” (Metaphys., bk. 1, c. 2). But these conditions fit theology!
§ 10. We indeed admit that, if we must assign to theology some genus from the intellectual conditions [habitus] that Aristotle enumerates, among them all, wisdom most closely approximates its nature. But were one to make an absolute consideration, he would define it more accurately as a “God-given habit” [habitus
] than through a genus drawn from Aristotle’s intellectual conditions. Savonarola gives this advice: “One must learn this with purity of heart, with good works, with contemplation, and with the illumination of the Holy Spirit rather than with the power of one’s own abilities” (De scient. divis., bk. 3, p. 800). This he proves from John 6:45.
§ 11. Again, because one wisdom is contemplative, whose goal is truth, and because another wisdom is active, whose goal is work, the Scholastics ask further: Is theology contemplative or practical? Here they differ greatly in their opinions. Scotus (in prolog. 1. Sent., q. 4) wants it to be practical. Gregory of Rimini follows him (q. 5, art. 4). Marsilius, on the other hand, wants it to be speculative (q. 3, art. 5, concl. 3-4). Bonaventure (q. 3), Albertus (Sent. 1, bk. 1, dist. 1, art. 4), and others claim that it is neither speculative nor practical but affective. Godfrey wants it to be speculative and practical at the same time (Quodlib. 13, q. 1). Thomas concedes this but adds that it is “more speculative” ([ST,] p. 1, q. 1, art. 4). Richard of Middleton says that it is “more practical” (q. 4). This is also the opinion of Thomas of Strasbourg (q. 4, art. 2).
§ 12. We prefer this last opinion to the rest and consider it more in line with the truth because the ultimate end of theology is not bare knowledge [
], but action [
]. Consequently, everything that theology treats looks toward action if not immediately and directly, then mediately and indirectly. Matt. 7:21: “Not everyone who says to Me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ shall enter the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of My Father in heaven.” Compare also Matt. 7:24-27 and Luke 6:46: “Why do you call Me ‘Lord, Lord,’ and not do what I tell you?” John 13:17: “If you know these things, blessed are you if you do them.” 1 Cor. 4:20: “The kingdom of God does not consist in talk but in power.” 1 Tim. 1:5: “The aim of the command is love from a pure heart and a good conscience and sincere faith.”
To this we should add the statements of the devout ancients. Justin, Paraen., p. 25: “The matters of our religion consist not in words but in deeds.” Chrysostom, homily 3 on 1 Corinthians: “The finest syllogism in theology is the syllogism of works.” Augustine, De doctr. Christ., bk. 1, c. 4: “All of theology is appointed for this purpose: that we enjoy God.” But now, enjoyment is an act of the will, not of the intellect. Theodoret, De curand. Graec. affection., bk. 12, at the very beginning: “The greatest good is the recognition of divine matters. However, this is not enough to make a human perfect, as if, having done them, he would be worthy. After all, he must connect the good functions of things with recognition and knowledge.” And later:
One must not only know what is to be thought about God. He must also arrange his life and behavior according to God’s laws. Just as one carefully studies painting or tailoring or some other skill and gives effort not only to grasp the concept thereof but also much more to practice this with his hands and to show with some effort that he is an imitator of masters, so also it befits practitioners of piety to learn thoroughly not only theology and its nature but also the laws and institutes of practical virtue.
Alexander of Hales, p. 1, q. 1, memb. 4, art. 2: “Theology is more of a virtue than an art, more wisdom than factual knowledge. It consists more in virtue and efficacy than in contemplation and knowledge [notitia].” Bonaventure, in prolog. q. 3: “Theology exists for the sake of contemplation and that we may become good, but principally that we may become good.” Gerson, De consol., bk. 4, pros. 4: “Just as Cicero describes an orator as a good man skilled in speaking, so we describe a theologian as a good man erudite in sacred writings, but not with an erudition of the intellect alone but much more of the affection, so that he may transfer those things he understands by theology through continual ruminating to the affection of his heart and the performance of the work.”
On the division of theology.
§ 13. Theology is divided into true and false theology. True theology embraces the true knowledge of the true God; false theology embraces false opinions about God in the hearts of heathen who are deprived of the light of the Word. Luther, Enarrat. Psalm. 31 [51?], vol. 4, Latin, f. 383: “Not only the people of God but also the people of the devil, too, think and speak about God.”
False theology.
We must note, however, that false theology is not called “theology” except equivocally and suppositionally, namely, according to the idea of the heathen but not really according to the truth of the matter. Thus when we divide theology into true and false, that happens more by the removal of one part, as false theology is removed from the theology that is true and properly so called, than by the positioning of two equal species synonymously sharing one genus. The division is also the sort as if one were to divide mankind into true and painted, or dead, people.
§ 14. False theology is subdivided into common [vulgaris] theology and philosophical theology. That is called “common” which lies in the imperfect principles of our nature and rises no higher through reasoning. That is called “philosophical” which flows into false conclusions because of error in reasoning. Rom. 1:21: “They became futile in their thinking.” This latter theology was twofold among the heathen with regard to its objects. One kind deals with the gods, properly speaking, and is called “theology” specifically; the other kind deals with demons (Augustine, De civ. Dei, bk. 9, c. 1). There were three types [genera] of this particularly named theology. The first was the mythical or historical; the second, the physical or mystical; the third, the political. From these sources flowed fabulous, natural, and civil theology. That which explained the power of demons was at times called “magic” and “witchcraft”; it discussed placating and warding off evil demons. At times it was called “mystery and initiation” [
], and this would attract and invite the good demons with sacrifices. See Eusebius (De praeparat. Evangel., bk. 4), Augustine (De civ. Dei, bks. 6-9), Caelius Rhodiginus (Lection. antiq., bk. 1, c. 33; bk. 5, c. 42), Luis Vives (August. de civit. Dei, bk. 10, c. 9). There they list and refute these sorts of heathen theology.
True theology.
§ 15. We consider true theology in itself or in [its] subject, absolutely or relatively. From this source comes the distinction into archetypal and ectypal theology. Archetypal (or prototypal) theology is in God the Creator, by which theology God knows Himself in Himself and knows everything outside Himself through Himself by an indivisible and immutable act of knowing. This theology in the Creator is uncreated and essential, infinite and pattern-setting; hence it is categorically different than ectypal theology, which is following and created, accidental and finite. Also, there is an emanation or effulgence of the former. You see, ectypal theology is expressed and formed from the former, as it were, by a gracious communication. And this, with regard to its subject, exists in either Christ the head or in His members. Ectypal theology in the man Christ is habitual wisdom that includes the most perfect knowledge of God and of divine matters, and that is called the theology of union. In the same way, this is categorically different than the theology in rational creatures because Christ’s human soul, assumed into the very person of the Word, has been elevated far beyond the dignity and knowledge of all angels and humans. For this reason it is called clearly unique.
§ 16. Ectypal theology in rational creatures is either the theology of the embraced (as they say) or of the blessed, or of the wayfarers [viatorum]. The theology of the blessed is called the theology of vision and of life because it consists of a clear and intuitive knowledge of God or of a beatific vision communicated to the blessed in eternal life. Also, it is a theology either of the blessed angels, who always see “the face of the heavenly Father” (Matt. 18:10), or of blessed men who “see God face-to-face” (1 Cor. 13:12; 2 Cor. 5:7; 1 John 3:2). In the darkness of this life, we can know and discuss but little of this theology of blessed angels and humans. Augustine writes beautifully about it: “They always see Your face, and there they read without any registers of times what Your eternal will wants. They read, they choose, they love. They are always reading, and what they read they never forget; also by choosing and loving, they read the very immutability of Your counsel” (Confess., bk. 13, c. 15). This theology of the blessed is distinguished from the theology of wayfarers in this way: The former is permanent, the latter transient; the former perfect, the latter imperfect (1 Cor. 13:9).
(Some divide ectypal theology in this way: There is a theology of angels and one of humans. And this is either in this life or in the life to come. However, it all comes out the same way.)
§ 17. The theology of wayfarers is called the theology of revelation and life. It is the divine wisdom or the knowledge of divine matters that God has communicated to humans in this life. He communicates it both through the light of nature (and this is called natural theology) and through the light of grace kindled in the revealed Word (and this is called supernatural, secret, or gracious theology). Tertullian, Contra Marc., bk. 1, p. 175: “We define that God must first be known by nature, and then must be known again by instruction—by nature from [His] works, by instruction from preaching.” Augustine divides theology into natural and revealed theology (De civ. Dei, bk. 8, c. 1). There he uses the word “revelation” in its stricter sense for the revelation made in the Word. Revelation in the general sense is common also to natural theology (Rom. 1:19: “For what can be known about God is plain to them because God has revealed it to them.”). Theodoret, De cur. Graec. affect., sermon 3, f. 38: “From the beginning, nature handed down the true theology, and later the divine discourses confirmed it.”
Natural theology is either inborn, in someone naturally, and this includes the common ideas innate to us. These are both theoretical (that God exists, that He is just, that He is good, etc.) and practical (that we must worship Him). Or natural theology is acquired, which one draws from a contemplation of created things and from a consideration of God’s works. Rom. 1:20: “His invisible things from the creation of the world have been perceived clearly in the things that have been made.”
Before the fall, natural theology would have been far more perfect and clear than it is today after the fall. For hardly even slight remnants and fragments of the divine image are left from which, as also from the inspection of created things, one can learn something about God and divine matters. Consequently, Alexander of Hales says, “God is recognized through created things as through a mirror, through His Word as through a light” (art. 1, q. 2, membr. 3, art. 2). Thomas, [ST,] p. 1, q. 1, art. 1: “The truth about God that few have searched out through reason comes to man both through a long span of time and with the mixture of many errors.” We shall discuss in greater detail this natural theology in our article on God in the chapter “On the Natural Knowledge of God” [1625 Exegesis, Commonplace II (On the Nature of god), §§ 63-88].
Supernatural theology, which rises from the light of grace, is acquired either through extraordinary means by God’s immediate illumination and inspiration, as in the case of the prophets and apostles, or through ordinary means: by prayer, meditation, temptation, etc. To meditation there belong the diligent and attentive search into Scripture, the study of the languages in which the Old and New Testaments were written, the reading of interpreters, engaging in debates, and other aids listed in their own place. Here we are talking about true ectypal theology, kindled in wayfaring man by the light of grace revealed in the Word and communicated in the ordinary manner.
Some divide this into theoretical theology, which they call
(the knowledge of God) and “theology” in the specific sense, and practical theology, which they call
and the worship of God. However, what one should conclude from this distinction he can learn from what we have said above.
On the efficient cause of theology.
§ 18. The efficient cause of supernatural theology is the divine revelation given in the revealed Word. Accordingly, the principal efficient cause is God who reveals (Matt. 11:27; 16:17; 1 Cor. 2:10). The instrumental cause is the Word, which is the medium of divine revelation.
Furthermore, just as the word of man is twofold, thus God, after whose image man was made, has a twofold Word. The word of man is twofold: (1) There is an internal and immanent word that lies hidden in the mind and is like an offshoot of the mind. This is also called the
[“inner word”]. (2) There is an external and uttered word called the
[“outer word”], which comes forth outwardly. And this, too, is twofold. For it either comes out of the mouth and represents the internal thoughts of the mind or it is written on a page. “[Words] are the voiced symbols of the feelings of the mind, and they are the written symbols of what has been voiced,” says the Philosopher (
, c. 1). And God has a twofold Word: (1) The internal and eternal Word, begotten of His substance from all eternity, which is the essential and hypostatic Word, by which it is distinguished as something far different from man’s word. (2) The external Word by which He speaks to man in time. At times God does this by an internal breathing-on or inspiration that includes immediate illumination. At times God does this through external speech, and this is published mediately or immediately by angels and humans as His heralds and ministers, or it is put into writing, and this we call the written Word of God or Holy Scripture. These distinctions, however, do not create any essential difference within the Word of God that is communicated to humans. Instead, they express merely different means of communication and revelation. After all, it is one and the same Word and counsel of God regarding our salvation that was revealed and communicated to the prophets and apostles by immediate illumination and inspiration; which was communicated to those whom the prophets and apostles taught while they were still alive on earth through oral preaching; which is communicated to us today through our reading of and meditation on the Scripture.
[The principle of knowing in theology.]
§ 19. From this we conclude deductively that the adequate and proper principle of supernatural theology is divine revelation, which exists today only in Holy Writ, that is, written in the prophetic books of the Old Testament and in the apostolic books in the New Testament. For this reason we say that the written Word of God, or (and this is the same thing) Holy Scripture, is the only and proper principle of theology.
Yet we must observe here that we are saying this not about the principle of being [essendi] but about the principle of knowing [cognoscendi principium]. God is the principle of being and the first cause of theology; indeed, from Him stem both the end and the means. In theology, however, the principle of knowing is God’s Word. Some of the Scholastics argue that the articles of faith are the principles of theology: Thomas ([ST,] p. 1, q. 1, art. 7) and Capreolus (q. 1, prolog., art. 1, concl. 5). But the rest rightly oppose them and use this argument: Things derived in any discipline cannot be the principles thereof. But articles of faith are derivatives, namely, conclusions taken from the Scriptures. Therefore not they but Scripture itself is the only and proper principle of theology.
§ 20. This we prove from the following obvious argument. Whatever all the properties and requisites of a principle befit is also rightly established as a principle. But all the properties of a principle in theology befit Holy Scripture. Therefore. We prove the minor premise. Principles in any discipline ought to be primary and immediate,1 true, beyond criticism, credible in themselves, undisputed, and indemonstrable so that nothing appears more fallacious to those who judge correctly than whatever is opposed to them or whatever is concluded from what is contrary to them and, on the other hand, all people conclude that whatever is in harmony with those principles is sure and firm. (See Aristotle, 1, Post., c. 2.) Each and every one of these properties befits the written Word of God and it alone, as we shall point out in more detail in the article On Scripture [1625 Exegesis, Commonplace I]. The written Word of God, therefore, is the only and proper principle of theology.
§ 21. Concerning this matter I shall jot down the outstanding statements of Lyra and Thomas Aquinas, statements that we should note rightly and press strongly against the Papists. Nicolaus of Lyra, preface to his comments on Tobit, writes as follows: “Just as in philosophical writings we learn the truth by going back to self-evident first principles, so also in the writings handed down by catholic doctors we learn how much we must hold by faith by going back to the canonical Scriptures, which we have by divine revelation, in which nothing false can by any means be at hand.” Thomas discusses this as follows:
Arguing from authority is especially proper to theology because its principles are obtained by revelation. Thus we ought to believe the authority of those to whom the revelation was made. This does not take anything away from the dignity of this doctrine, for though an argument [locus] from authority founded on human wisdom is the weakest, yet the argument from authority founded on divine revelation is the strongest. Yet sacred doctrine also does employ human reason, not to prove the faith (for this would remove the merit of faith) but to clarify some matters that this doctrine teaches. Therefore, because grace does not remove nature but perfects it, natural reason must be subservient to faith, just as the natural inclination of the will is obedient to love. And for this reason sacred doctrine makes use of the authorities of the philosophers wherever they were able to learn the truth through natural reason, as in Acts 17[:28]. Yet sacred doctrine uses authorities of this kind as extraneous and probable arguments. But it properly uses the authority of canonical Scripture proving from necessity [ex necessitate argumentando]; and it uses the authority of other teachers of the Church as if to prove from its own people [ex propriis], yet only as probable. You see, our faith relies upon the revelation made to the prophets and apostles who wrote the canonical books, not on the revelation (if there is such) made to other teachers. ([ST,] p. 1, q. 1, art. 8, resp. ad 2)
To these declarations of Lyra and Aquinas we add, perhaps not undeservedly, Bellarmine’s statement in the preface to Controv. primae generalis, near the end: “Both we and absolutely all heretics are agreed that the Word of God is the rule of faith according to which dogmas must be judged; that it is the common principle conceded by all from which arguments are drawn; and that finally it is the spiritual sword that cannot be refused in this struggle.” Bellarmine again, De verbo Dei, bk. 1, c. 2: “There is nothing better known, nothing more certain, than Holy Scripture, which contains the prophetic and apostolic writings. He must be a very great fool who denies that one must have faith in them.”
§ 22. Therefore when, in articles of faith and theological conclusions, arguments are sought from the decrees of popes, statutes of councils, statements of the fathers, custom of the Church, etc., we must consider these to be not from primary but from secondary and lesser principles on which one must pass judgment according to that only and proper principle of theology. You see, they have no strength for drawing conclusions, except to the extent that they are in harmony with it. If they differ from it, all power to conclude dies completely in them.
Here we will produce the confession of our adversaries themselves about each of these. Regarding decrees of the popes, Ambrosius Catharinus writes in his commentary on Galatians 2: “About any other pope except blessed Peter let the conclusion be: There is nothing that keeps a pope from erring, even in his faith, and from failing, even if some novice writers have dared to defend the opposite, contrary to the common mind of the doctors.”
Concerning the statutes of councils, Panormitanus feels this way:
A council can err, just as it has erred previously …. In matters that involve faith, the statement of one ordinary person would have to be preferred to the statement of the pope if that person were moved by better reasons of the Old and New Testaments than the pope. Nor does the fact that Christ prayed on behalf of His Church, that it not err, keep one from saying that a council can err. For I say that, though a general council may represent the entire universal Church, yet in truth it is not truly the universal Church except by representation, for the universal Church is made up of the collection of all the faithful. Consequently, all the faithful of the world make up the universal Church, whose head and bridegroom is Christ Himself. That is the Church that cannot err. (on Extr., de electione, c. Significasti, no. 3)
Regarding the statements of the fathers, Bellarmine says, “The writings of the fathers are not rules nor do they have the power to bind” (De concil., bk. 2, c. 12). Also, De verb. Dei, bk. 3, c. 10: “Who denies that the fathers had a great gift for interpreting, yet that the greatest of them made errors?”
In the matter of customs of the Church, many outstanding statements of the ancients are cited in canon law, Decret., dist. 8. In the chapter Veritate, we have one from Augustine: “Because of the truth that has been revealed, custom must yield to truth. Clearly, who would doubt that custom obviously yields to truth? Let no one set custom ahead of reason and truth, because reason and truth always exclude custom.” (Cf. c. Consuetudinem, c. Qui contempta, c. Frustra, c. Consuetudo, in the same dist.)
§ 23. On the same basis, we conclude that in those articles that are of pure faith and only of revelation one can form no arguments from the principles of human reason against the truth revealed in the divine Word. We also conclude that human reason must not be established as the second principle of theology along with the revelation given in the Word. Although some things may be handed down in theology that could somehow be learned from the light of nature and reason, yet to obtain a thorough knowledge of the mysteries of faith in the proper sense, human reason cannot rise up out of its own principles. Also, whatever things are known in theology through nature, one is not forced to solicit them from anywhere else but from their own proper principle; that is, he can demonstrate them sufficiently from God’s Word. Scaliger, Exerc., 6, sect. 3:
From a craftsman, a craftsman receives questions, pronouncements, declarations, and conclusions in two ways. One is when the knowledge of something inferior depends completely on the principles of something superior; this occurs in the subordinate sciences. The other way is when a craftsman accepts those things that another has set down but that he would also know without the other, but not in the way [he knows] his own principles nor, if the other had proved them, as though he were not able to prove them himself, but so that he might examine and judge them.
In this latter way the theologian takes some things from the philosopher, not as if he were unable, without the principles of philosophy, to know it from Scripture as the proper and characteristic principle of his science, but because in his examination he has noticed its truth in regard to the norm of his own principle. Gerson, De consol. Theol., bk. 1, pros. 1: “Just as grace is above nature, the lady above her maidservant, the instructor above her discipline; just as eternity surpasses time, as intelligence surpasses reasoning, as the visible surpasses the things that are not seen—so theology surpasses philosophy, which it does not reject but takes into its humble service. It is the order and law of eternity that the highest of the lower orders be joined to the lowest of the higher orders.” Bk. 3, prosa 4: “The theology of Christians approves the teachings of philosophy if they are true, correct, and salutary. It uses them by its own right and makes them catholic. If they are too unclear, it sheds light on them; if they are mixed with harmful errors, it separates the precious from the cheap and keeps the one and destroys the other.”
§ 24. It is preposterous, then, to attack a conclusion drawn from the characteristic and proper principle of theology—from the Word of God—on the basis of an alien principle and in this way to commit a crossing over to another genus [
], which the philosophers themselves reject. Those who do not everywhere observe this practically acknowledge it theoretically. Sadeel, in the preface to his theological works De methodo disputandi in theol., p. 7: “Because theology is above all the sciences, to subject it to philosophical principles is not only inept but also sinful and unworthy.” Sadeel again, art. 43-44, Abjurat. et respons., p. 485: “Because Scripture is the norm of all truth and equity in matters that pertain to salvation, we must judge philosophy on the basis of theology, not vice versa.” Peter Martyr, Locor. comm., class 2, c. 1, § 25: “First, we ought to show from Holy Writ what we want people to believe. Then, if we are unable to accomplish this, we shall rely on faith and put reason aside.” Suitliv., De purgat. contra Bellarm., c. 18, p. 242: “Because faith stands above reason and because reason is blind and sees too little in divine matters, at this place Bellarmine is doing nothing else but showing that his purgatory, which depends on reason for support, has nothing to do with faith and is revealing to all his blindness, which clings to darkness though it is surrounded by great light.” Mornaeus, preface to his book De Eucharist., p. 44: “Thomas binds his teaching directly to Scripture. In this respect he is quite different from those who wish to argue on the basis of the principles of philosophy or of the other disciplines, contrary to the rule of logic:
, ‘Do not cross over from one discipline to another,’ because according to the true use of logic, our reasoning ought to deduce theorems from the principles of one discipline, and from these theorems, corollaries related to the same.” Mornaeus again, De sacrif. missae, bk. 3, c. 13, p. 1123: “Human reasonings should no more be accepted in theology, in divine matters, than the reasoning of lawyers in medical matters or vice versa. In fact, we should accept it less because the subject of theology is infinite, known to no one except to the extent that He reveals Himself. Thus theology towers over the other disciplines infinitely and beyond every analogy.” Whitaker, Contra Rainoldum, c. 8, p. 261: “We frankly admit that this argument—that in matters of faith and religion we should rely solely on reason—is an illicit weapon in the armory of God. Therefore whatever they have said against philosophy and reason when philosophy and reason differ from the faith that we learn from Scripture, we joyfully follow that entire matter.” (Cf. our treatise On the Interpretation of Scripture [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 2], § 172.)
On the material and form of theology.
§ 25. For the purpose of teaching, the material of theology can be established as theological truths (as the Scholastics call them), that is, the theological principles and conclusions drawn from the revealed Word as from their proper principle. The form of theology is the actual economy and disposition of those truths. Ancient as well as more recent writers vary greatly concerning this. Augustine (Ench., c. 4) and Thomas (Opusc. 3) refer everything that theology treats to three headings: faith, hope, and charity. The same Augustine says that theology contains “the rules for believing and the precepts for living” (De doctr. Christian., bk. 2, c. 9). That is, it contains the doctrine of faith and good works. This distribution agrees with that which sets theology in two parts, the first of which explains what we must believe [credenda] and the second of which explains what we must do [facienda]. The first explains the true meaning of God; the second, the right worship of God. The first sets up true faith; the second, the clean life. In the first we grasp truth; in the second we exercise piety. In the first God is known; in the second He is worshiped. The first sets us toward God; the second, toward the neighbor. In 83
., q. 81, Augustine says that theology consists of “a knowledge of God and of ourselves,” and for this reason he is said to have lamented daily to God: “O Lord, allow me to know You and myself.” Some claim that theology’s two parts are: first, about the loss of salvation; second, about the recovery of salvation. Some set up three parts of theology with regard to its object: the first, about god; the second, about angels; the third, about humans considered in the state of their created, lost, and restored nature. Some list four parts of it: (1) the knowledge of God the Creator; (2) the knowledge of Christ the Redeemer; (3) how to grasp the grace of Christ; and (4) the external means that lead to salvation. Lombard (Princ. sent.) follows Augustine’s De doctr. Christ. (1, c. 2) and teaches that all of sacred doctrine is either about things or about signs. Of things, he teaches that some are to be enjoyed, others to be employed, and which are themselves enjoyed and employed. Of signs, he teaches that some are of the Old Testament, others of the New Testament. We have explained our opinion about the series of theological commonplaces in Aphorism., disp. 1.
On the end of theology.
§ 26. The end or goal of theology is either principal and highest, or intermediate. The principal and highest end is the glorification of God. You see, it is for this reason that God revealed Himself in His Word. He communicates theological wisdom to men for this end: that they may know Him rightly and honor, worship, and invoke Him in this life and in the life to come. Lactantius, Inst., bk. 4, c. 3, p. 195: “If the Deity, who governs this world, sustains the human race with incredible kindness and cares for it with paternal indulgence, as it were, then He certainly wants to be thanked and to be given honor. Nor can the essence of devotion be evident in man if he shows no thanks for heavenly blessings.” Augustine, De spir. et lit., c. 13: “This is the very wisdom that we call devotion, by which we worship the Father of lights from whom comes every good and perfect gift. We worship Him with a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, so that he who worships Him glories not in himself but in Him.”
The intermediate and proximate end is either internal (the formation [informatio] of human beings for eternal salvation) or external (the actual attainment of blessedness or eternal life). (See Luke 1:[77]; John 5:39; 20:31; Rom. 15:4; 2 Tim. 3:16.) Therefore whatever does not lead or draw one to this goal either directly or at least indirectly, either immediately or mediately, that does not pertain to theological knowledge. Hilary, De Trin., bk. 10, f. 228: “God does not summon us to the blessed life through difficult questions nor does He invite us with manifold types of flowery oratory. For us, eternity lies in [this] simply and completely: to believe that God raised Jesus from the dead and also to confess that Jesus is Lord.” From this, we readily gather what we must conclude about the sort of futile (rather than useful) questions and idle speculations of the Scholastics that the apostle calls “stupid, senseless controversies” (2 Tim. 2:23), namely, that they are related to
[“vain discussion”] rather than to
[“theology”] (1 Tim. 1:6). Nicolaus Clemangis, professor at Paris, said, “The teaching of the Sophists has the same nature as have crops around a pool of asphalt or the growing things around Sodom, which are only ash and dust internally, though outwardly they offer a pleasing appearance.” (Cf. Luis Vives, Aug. de C. D., bk. 2, c. 13; bk. 3, c. 31; bk. 11, c. 11 and 24; bk. 13, c. 1; bk. 18, c. 18; bk. 19, c. 12; bk. 20, c. 6; bk. 21, c. 7; and Erasmus in his Annot. on 1 Timothy 1.)
On the effect of theology.
§ 27. The effect of theology is either proper or accidental. The proper effect coincides with its genuine and proper end, for that consists in that which can make men “wise unto salvation” (2 Tim. 3:15), “enrich them in all speech and all knowledge” (1 Cor. 1:5), correct their inborn corruption, lift up their minds to God, instruct them on the things one must believe and do, and in this way point out the way to the kingdom of heaven. Diadochius discusses this proper effect of theology in the passage cited a little earlier.
The accidental effect is that it increases the condemnation of those who have shown little interest in fulfilling God’s will, though they have a good knowledge and clear view of that will (Luke 12:47). Gregory says, “Where there is a greater gift of knowledge, there a transgression subjects one to greater blame.” And Hugh, on John 13, writes: “Knowledge rather serves to aggravate if one does not act on it.”
On the object of theology.
§ 28. The subject about which [subjectum circa quod] or object of theology is assigned differently by various writers. Some claim that it has a dual object: a primary one, the glorification of God; and a secondary one, man’s salvation. The former they call the object of contemplation; the latter, the object of operation. Some state that the object is God and creatures, in the contemplation of which [creatures] they want to be occupied no less than in the knowledge of God. Others state that the object is God—not considered absolutely but relatively, that is, with respect to divine revelation. Thus Luther says in his commentary on Genesis 26: “We must look for God not in the category of substance but of relation.” Jerome, in the preface to his commentary on the Lamentations of Jeremiah, refers the object of theology to “the mysteries [sacramenta] of Christ and of the Church.” Luther, in the preface to his commentary on Psalm 51, writes: “The proper subject of theology is man, guilty of sin and lost, and God, who justifies and saves sinful man” (vol. 4, Latin, f. 379). Some state that Christ—or, what is the same, God, since He reveals Himself in the face of Christ, the Mediator—is the unique object of theology (1 Cor. 2:2; 2 Cor. 4:6). Luther writes: “God can be found nowhere but in Christ” (vol. 7, German, f. 73).2
All these ideas, however, are not opposites but subordinates.3 We have said before that theology is practical instruction; but now, in the practical disciplines, the object or subject about which is that with which the entire discipline is occupied. In theology, this is man as he is to be led to eternal blessedness. The material of this subject is man; the formal, how he must be informed for and led to salvation. Therefore just as physiology and pathology come first in medicine, and just as these consider the affections of the subject—the human body with which they are occupied, concerning how it is to be cured—so also in theology, which is spiritual medicine, we first discuss the created and corrupted [destituta] nature of man, then set forth the means that lead to the end or goal of theology, namely, the restoration and salvation of man. These means are the true and salutary knowledge of God, true faith in Christ, and whatever else serves these means.
On the adjuncts of theology.
§ 29. The adjunct [or essential feature] of theology is its outstanding superiority. This we conclude: (1) From its principal efficient cause, which is God, from whose goodness and wisdom this discipline proceeds. (2) From its instrumental cause, which are the God-taught prophets and apostles who thus are subject to no error, even of the least part, in preaching and writing the Word of God (2 Pet. 1:21). (3) From the condition of its source [principium]. Theology rests upon the divine revelation, which is the truth itself and hence is the most certain of all. Chrysostom, homily 83 on Matthew, p. 703: “His Word is unerring, but our perception is easily misled. The former has never failed, but the latter stumbles all the time.” Chrysostom again, homily 4 on 1 Corinthians, p. 347: “The way of theology certainly is far greater than the way of human reason, and all the more so because accepting divine matters by faith is greater than searching out the reasons for them.” (4) From the dignity of its material. It discusses divine subjects placed beyond the grasp of human reason. It handles God the Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier. It observes God: how all things are in Him, how they proceed from Him, how they return to Him, how they repose in Him. (5) From the usefulness of its end. It forms [informat] us for eternal life. The statement of Rabbi Hillel is famous: “Whoever acquires for himself the words of the Law receives for himself the eternal life to come.” Gerson, De consol. theol., bk. 2, pros. 1: “Theology is the teacher of the knowledge of God and the selector of His works. It teaches sobriety and prudence, justice and virtue, and nothing is more useful to men in this life than these.” Therefore Thomas is correct in his conclusion: “Among the studies of men, the study of theology is most perfect, sublime, useful, and pleasant” (Contra gent., bk. 1, c. 2), something he demonstrates broadly in that book.
The opposites of theology.
§ 30. The opposites of theology are: (1) Heathenism, which is completely ignorant of the true and salutary knowledge of God and repudiates it. (2) Epicureanism, which mocks theology. (3) Heresy, which corrupts theology.
The definition of theology.
§ 31. From all the preceding paragraphs we are able to draw the following conclusion: Theology (considered systematically and abstractly) is the doctrine drawn from the Word of God that instructs humans in true faith and devout living for eternal life. Theology (considered habitually and concretely) is the God-given habit [habitus
] conferred on man by the Holy Spirit through the Word. By this habit, man is not only instructed in an understanding of the divine mysteries through the illumination of his mind, in order that he may draw salutarily what he understands into the affection of his heart and accomplishment of his work, but it also makes him fit and ready concerning those divine mysteries. Also, it makes him a path for informing others of salvation, a path for setting heavenly truth free from the corrupting influences of gainsayers, so that human beings, glowing with faith and good works, may be drawn to the kingdom of heaven.
1 Not able to be proved syllogistically by a middle term.
2 John 14-16, 1538. WA 45:465-733; AE 24:1-422.
3 Noncontradictory things or propositions of which one is contained under the other. See Glossary.
