Fourth, councils.
Fourth, councils.
§ 462. (IV) We prove that councils cannot be the absolute and infallible judge in controversies of faith in this way: Whatever (1) are liable to the peril of erring; (2) have in fact quite often erred; (3) contradict themselves quite often; (4) whose definitions are uncertain; (5) who cannot be heard and interrogated as often as members of the Church need a judiciary decision—such are not fit to be the absolute and infallible judge in controversies of faith.
Bishops who have gathered together in councils: (1) Are liable to the peril of erring, for nowhere is the claim made that they have been given the privilege of infallibility. (2) Have in actual fact erred quite often, as is witnessed by the examples of the Councils of Ariminum, of Seleucia, the second of Ephesus, of Sirmium, etc. (3) Contradict themselves quite often. The Second Council of Nicaea claimed that images must be worshiped, which conflicts with the Council of Constantinople, as the fathers of the Second Council of Nicaea admit (Act. 6). In the Council of Rome under Stephan VII, Pope Formosus was condemned and all his acts abrogated. Later, another council was held at Ravenna under John IX; there Formosus was restored and Stephan condemned, and all the acts of that council held under Stephan were abrogated, etc. One or the other of these had to be in error. (4) Their definitions quite often are uncertain, and they do not define all controversies. Andrada, Defens. fid., bk. 3: “Although the Council of Trent did define original sin truly as sin, yet it intentionally omitted the definition of it.” (5) They cannot be heard and interrogated as often as members of the Church need a judiciary decision, for there are times when the Church is in such a state that does not allow the assembling of general councils, as is witnessed by the history of the early Church around the time of the apostles.
Therefore absolute and infallible judgment in controversies of faith does not belong to bishops assembled in councils.