Chapter 88
The Work ofNinety Days debt, does not give justly or unjustly in that sense, for he is not obliged to give to him and therefore does not perform an act of particular justice but of generosity; and he is not obliged not to give and therefore does not give unjustly. However, taking "justly" and "unjustly" in the third way, it must not be conceded in that sense that he does not use justly or unjustly. Memher good nor bad:
This they concede without distinction. Just ser wajxst: This they concede in one sense and deny in another, as appears from the foregoing. ff the purpose of the act ts good the act must be good also:
They say that since he is not at all instructed in difficult matters of theology, in which nevertheless he rashly intervenes, therefore they pass over this statement of his and his statement about the object of the will.
Chapter 88 Jlohn XXII] Sacred Scripture evidently says the contrary, namely that it was rather by divine law, and not human, that lordship was introduced. For divine Jaw is what we have in the divine Scriptures, as we read in dist. 8, c. Que iure, in the beginsing, where it is said that "divine law" is what "we have in the divine Scriprures, human law" what we have "in the laws of kings." But in the divine Scriptures we read that before the laws of kings existed, indeed even before kings existed, same things were someone's; therefore, by divine law someone was able to say that something was his. The major [premise] is clear from the chapter Quo ure quoted above. The minor is proved also by'* the state of innocence. For it seems that in the state of innocence, before Eve was formed, Adam alone had fordship of temporal things. For he could not fer that time have had commen lordship, since he was by himself, since sharing {cemmunio] obviously requires several. And that he was lord before Eve was formed seems to be proved expressly by Ecclesiasticus 17{:1-4]. For there it is said, "God created man from the earth... He put fear of him upon all flesh, and he dominated the beasts and birds."
It says therefore that he dominated [dominari], from which it follows that he had lordship |dominium]: for according to Dionysius De divinis nominibus, That is, by what was the case (in John's opinion) in the state of innocence, before there were kings. peceenmite 'anmanpereseaerss William of Ockham chapter 12, from "lordship" [dsei#iun] is derived "lord" [dominus), "ruler" [dominator], and ruling [dominans}; from this it follows from the fact that he dominated that he had lordship.
And that Eve had not then been formed is clear; for immediately after the words "and he dominated the beasts and birds" ic continues, "He created from him," namely, from Adam, "a helper like himself," namely Eve. Wisdom 9[:1-2] supports the same conclusion, where it says, "O God of our fathers and lord of mercy, you made all things by your word, and by your wisdom you appointed man to rule over your creation, which was made by you," etc, And Damascene expressly says this, in Book 1, last chapter, as has been said above [chapter 27].
Also, that after the fall of our first parents, before the flood, and before there were kings, someone was able to say, "This is mine," is proved by Genesis 3[:19], where the Lord said to Adam, "In the sweat of your brow you will eat your bread"; therefore it is clear that Adam was able then to call the bread his, and yet kings did not then exist, nor indeed other men except our first parents alone. Concerning Abel also, the second child of our first parents, it is said in Genesis 4[:4] that "Abel... offered from the first-born of Ars flock"; frem this it is clear that Abel was able to say, "This flock is mine."
Also, it is clear that after the flood, without the law of kings, someone was able to call something his. For we read in Genesis g{:z0-1} that Noah planted a vine and drank the wine it produced.
I think that no sensible person will deny that he was lord of the vine, and also of the wine; and yet we do not read that any king existed then. Again, in Genesis 12[:7] the Lord said to Abraam when he was in the land of Canaan, "I will give this land to your seed," which he also did. And it is certain that those who were of his seed were able to say, "'that land is ours," and not by the laws of kings; for they had it by a grant of God, not of kings. Again, in Genesis 26[:1-3} when
Isaac went down to Gerara, the Lord said to him, "I will give the whole of these regions to you and to your seed"; his seed had lordship of these regions not by the law of kings, but by God's grant. Moreover, in Numbers 31[:53] it is said that 'shat? each one "had taken as booty was his," which it was not by the laws of kings, since the Israelite people did not then have any king, but its leader was Moses alone. Also, in Numbers 33[:51~4], the Lord said to Moses, "Command the children of Israeli, and say to them: 'When you have passed
The Work ofNinety Days over the Jordan and enter the land of Canaan, scatter all its inhabitants. I have given it to you for a possession, which you will divide among you by fot,'" and this they also did, as we read in Joshua 13[:7ff], Therefore, each of them, after the division of that land, was able to say of the portion that came to him that it was his - and this not by the iaw of kings but by divine law, since at that time, as has been said, that people was not ruled by kings. Again, in Numbers 35[:2-3], the Lord said to Moses, '(Command the children of Israet that they give the Levites out of their possessions cities to live in and suburbs round them, that they may live in the towns, and the suburbs be for their flocks and beasts of burden"; this they also did, as we read in Joshua r4[:q]. From these things it is clear that when the Lord commanded the children of Israel to give to the Levites out of their possessions, the children of Israel could, before they gave the possessions, call them theirs, and the Levites [could calf them theirs] from when they were given to them — and not by the laws of kings, since they did not have kings, but by divine ordinance. From all of these things it is clear that we And in the sacred Scriptures that someone, both in the state of innocence and after the fall of our first parents, both before the flood and after the flood, was able to say, without the taw of kings, that something was his, And in 23, g. 7, ¢.
I, it is proved that there are some lordships by divine law.
[Ockham] In this part the attacked, disproving the appellant's assertion concerning the question previously spoken of, puts forward his own opinion. It is divided into two parts: first he puts forward his own assertion; second he answers the texts adduced in favor of the contrary assertion, at "From the foregoing, therefore" [chapter gt]. The first part is divided into three: first he shows that lordship of temporal things was introduced not by human law, but by divine law; second he shows that lordship of temporal things could not have been given to men by human law, but only by divine law; third he shows what human law introduced concerning the lordship of temporal things. The second begins at "Further, that... by no law," [chapter 89], the third at "It is true, however"
In the first part, therefore, he proves the first conclusion by the following argument. Divine law is what we have in the divine
Hillam of Ockham Scriptures, human law what we have in the laws of kings. But in the divine Scriptures we read that, before there were kings, temporal things belonged to the lordship of some persons; therefore lordship of things was introduced by divine law, not by human law. He shows the major [premise] by means of a text of Augustine, which is included in dist. 8, ¢. Qua ture. Concerning the proof of the minor premise he shows first by means of three texts that exclusive lordship of things was introduced in the state of inmocence, and not by kings; certainly, therefore, by God. Second, at "Also, that after the fall," he proves by means of two texts that lordship of temporal things was introduced after the fall and before the flood, without the laws of kings. Third, at "Also... after the flood," he proves by means of one text that lordship of things was introduced after the flood, without the laws of kings. Fourth, at "Again, in Genesis 12," he proves by means of two texts that lordship of some things was introduced directly by God. Fifth, at "Moreover, in Numbers 31," he proves by one text that lordship of some things was introduced without the laws of kings. Sixth, at "Also in Numbers 33," he proves by means of three texts that lordship of some things was introduced directly by God.
But the attackers, regarding many things said here as erroneous, proceed as follows: [1] First they attempt to prove five conclusions which they believe are Catholic; [2] second they try to show that Many errors are contained in this passage; [3] third, running through the letter, they endeavor to answer every text.
[x] Concerning the first they say, {i] first, that in che state of innocence there was no exclusive lordship, This conclusion was treated above, in chapters 26, 27, and 28; therefore it is passed over at present.
[ii] The second conclusion, which they prove, is that the first exclusive lordship of temporal things was imtreduced after the fall by human law, or by human ordinance or will. They prove this as follows. The first division of lordships that we read of in Scripture was between Abel and Cain. For in Genesis 4f:2- §] we read as follows: "Abel was a shepherd of sheep, and Cain a farmer. And it came to pass after many days that Cain offered gifts to God from the fruits of the earth. Abel also offered some of the first-born of his flock and some of their fat; and the Lord looked favorably upon Abel and his offerings, but he did not look favorably upon Cain and his offerings." From these words we
The Work ofNinety Days gather that these two men had distinct lordships of things that had been divided. But we do not read that the division was made by divine commandment; therefore the first division of Jordships was introduced by human will.
But perhaps someone wil! object against this, in nwo ways. First, because before Cain or Abel was born, the Lord said to Adam,
"In the sweat of your brow you will eat jour bread," as we read in Genesis 3{:19]; therefore, Adam had his own bread before he had children. Also, in the same chapter we read, "The Lord God made Adam and his wife coats of skin, and clothed them"; by these words we are given to understand that by God's gift each of them had his or her own coat; therefore, not only was there 4 distinction of lordships before the birth of Cain and Abel, but also the distinction of lordships was introduced directly by God.
But they [the attackers] answer to both of these objections that, although there was between our first parents a division of things in respect of use, nevertheless all things were common in respect of lordship of some kind. 'This seems probable enough because of the bond of marriage and the concord and love between them.
For while love and concord existed between them, it does not seem that they should have been moved by any reason to divide temporal things between them in respect of lordship or ownership. They say also that, if they had divided temporal things between them in respect of lordship (and thus the first division of lordships would not have been between Cain and Abel), nevertheless the first division of lordships would still have been introduced by human will. For before Adam ate bread and defore the Lord gave them coats of skin, we read that "when they recognized they were naked, they sewed together fig leaves and made themselves girdles"
{Genesis 3:7]. And it does not appear that they appropriated to themselves the coats more than the girdles. Therefore, if the coats and other things were divided among them in respect of lordship, it follows that the girdles were divided among them in respect of lordship; and not by special divine commandment, but by human will, Therefore the first distinction of Jordships was introduced by human will.
[iii] The third conclusion is that distinct lordships of many things 'were introduced, and at various times, by human law without the laws of kings (as kings are distinguished from dukes, counts, barons
Loews oo RE ne ATR De oh Me THEHS TT Ise ena SERRA Rn RT —_ Milkam of Ockham and other secutar rulers). This is quite clear of the division made among the children of the children of Noah, in Genesis ro[:5].
Of them it is said, "The islands of the nations in their regions were divided by them." Many other things are added there concerning the division of lands; this division was made by human will and ordinance.
[iv] The fourth conclusion is that diverse and distinct lordships of some temporal things were introduced by direct divine ordinance.
This is clearly proved by many texts quoted by him [the attacked].
It is also clearly shawn from Deuteronomy 2(:4-5], where the Lord said to Moses: "You will pass by the borders of your brothers the chifdren of Esau, who live in Seir, and they will fear you. Take great care, therefore, not to move against them; for I will not give you of their land as much as a foot's breadth, because I have given
Mount Seir as a possession to Esau." And afterwards [Deuteronomy 2:9]: "Do not fight against the Moabites and do not go to batile against them, for J will not give you any part of their land, because
I have given Ar as a possession to the sons of Lot." From these [passages] it is clear that lordships of the regions of Seir and Ar had been given by special divine ordinance to the sons of Esau and Moab. And if it were said that this happened only by hidden inspiration or approval, and not by special commandment, this cannot be said of certain other cases. For as we read in Exodus
12:36], when the children of Israel went out from Egypt they despoiled the Egyptians by commandment of the Lord, and thus they acquired lordship of the spoils by special divine ordinance and commandment, And thus lordship of some things was introduced by divine law. This could be plentifully proved by means of others texts of divine Scripture, but let the above suffice.
[v] The fifth conclusion is that, after the promulgation of the gospel and the abolition of the legal [observances, i.e. of the Old
Law], new exclusive lordships of all temporal things existed by human law and not by divine law or by any special grant of Gad.
This is proved: For from that time neither Jews nor Christians nor pagans newly possessed anything by divine law; therefore, from that time there was no new lordship by divine law, since all were then either Jews, Christians, or pagans.
{a} That the Jews did not after that time'* newly possess anything by divine law is clear. For by divine law other things were not S Substituting ex func for tne.
The Work ofNinety Days newly possessed by the Jews besides thosc they acquired by the commandment of divine Scripture; but chose commandments had already ceased; therefore, they did not newly possess anything by divine Jaw.
[b] That Christians also did not newly possess anything by divine law is clear. For they did not acquire particular lordship'* of any thing by special grant of God, for in the whole New Testament we do not read that God gave any temporal thing to Christians in respect of particular lordship, unless you say that Christ fed the crowds: but it does not fallow from this that, after the promulgation of the gospel and the abolition of the legal [observances], he gave anything particularly to Christians. Also from the fact that he fed the crowds it does not follow that he gave them lordship of the loaves and fishes, because he did not give them these loaves and fishes except for eating, But perhaps you will say that the clergy acquire lordships of things by divine law, since by the New Testament they are owed stipends, as Christ said in Luke ro[:7], "The laborer is worthy of . his pay," and in 1 Corinthians g[:3] the Apostle says, "Who ever serves at his own expense?" and in the same place [1 Corinthians
9:13-14], "Those who serve the altar share with the altar. So also the Lord has ordained that those who preach the Gospel should live from the Gospel." By these words we are given to understand that by divine ordinance temporal stipends are due to those who preach the Gospel; therefore, temporal things are possessed by divine law.
To this they [the attackers] say that that ordinance of God is a general ordinance that determines no particular temporal thing, and therefore things are not said because of such a general ordinance to be possessed by divine law as we are speaking of it now. For just as, although by a general ordinance of God the rich should give alms to the poor and nevertheless aims given to the poor are not said to be possessed by divine law, but by human law, since in that general ordinance of God no temporai thing is specified: so, although by a general ordinance of God the faithful are obliged to give necessaries to those who preach the Gospel and to the other clergy who devote themselves to divine service, nevertheless
" "Perticular lordship" translates dominium fn spectali, in contrast with "common lordship," which translates domrininnt commune.
William of Ockham the things given to them are not for this reason said to be possessed by divine Jaw, but by human law, since it results from human will that those temporal things and not others have been given; and thus such things are possessed by the clergy by human law.
Again, although the faithful are obliged by God's ordinance to provide necessaries to preachers of the Gospei and to other clergy, they are not, however, obliged ta confer on them lordship of temporal things; for them to fulfil] the said commandment it is enough if they give them necessaries without lordship. That they transferred to them some sort of fordship of temporal things depended in the beginning on the will of those who conferred them, and afterwards, in respect of some temporal things, it was established by the human law of highest pontiffs and general councils. Thus whatever the clergy possess they possess by human law, because God did not give one penny to the clergy, either in particular or in common, though he ordered that the faithful sheuld provide them with necessaries, However, it must be known that, as the gloss says, dist. 8, c. Quo ture, sometimes " 'divine law' is taken for canon law." And in that sense it must be conceded that something is now possessed by the clergy by divine law, but we are not now speaking of divine law in that sense.
[c] That the pagans also did not from that time possess the lordship of any things whatsoever by divine law, but by human, need not be proved, since it does not appear that God gave anything to them in particular, except as "he makes his sun arise upon the good and the bad" [Matthew 5:45}. It is clear, therefore, that after the promulgation of the Gospel and the abolition of the legal
[observances], all new temporal lordships have existed by human law, and not by divine law, except as all lordships exist by divine law because everything that is just is contained in the general divine commandments.
(2] Second, from the foregoing the attackers say that three errors are contained in the foregoing passage. The first is that every human taw by which lordships of temporal things are possessed is contained in the laws of kings, according as kings are distinguished from other public powers and rulers. That he says this is explicitly clear, since from the premise that before the flood and after the flood there were in the Israelite people no such kings he tries to prove that they possessed the things they then had not by human
The Work ofNinety Days law bur by divine. But chat this is erroneous is quite clear. For only those lordships existed by divine law and not by human Jaw. that were possessed by a particular gift of God manifested by a particular revelation, as is clear of the spoils the Hebrews took from the Egyptians and of many other things spoken of in divine
Scripture. But it is manifest that the Hebrews and others justly possessed the lordships of many things which, nevertheless, they by no means possessed by gift of God manifested by a particular revelation. This is clear of Abel and Cain, in Genesis 4, and of Abraam, who by right of purchase possessed a tomb in which he buried his wife. Jacob also acquired many things through his labor and industry, as is ctear in Genesis 25, 30, and 31. The same could be plentifully proved by divine Scripture of Isaac, Joseph and other fathers of the Old Testament, and of many pagans.
Therefore, they possessed such things by human law, and yet those laws were not contained in the laws of kings. Therefore the human laws by which temporal things were possessed were not all contained in the laws of kings.
The second error is that all lordships spoken of in divine Scripture existed by divine law and not by human law. That he means this is quite clear, since he proves that some things are possessed by divine law by the argument that we have divine law in the sacred Scriptures, and in the sacred Scriptures we find that some things were possessed. From this it follows, according to him, that all the lordships spoken of in the sacred Scriptures existed by divine law, and not by human law. But it is clear that this is erroneous: for the lordship of the Romans, and of many other pagans, is spoken of in sacred Scripture, and yet their lordships existed by human law, not divine law. How we should understand the text of Augustine that he quotes in his favor will be clear in the comments on the letter.
The third error is that before Eve was formed Adam had the lordship of temporal things that is ownership or exclusive lordship.
This error has been spoken of above, in chapters 26, 27, and 28.
The fourth error is that, before he had children, Adam had exclusive lordship of the bread he ate. They think that this is probably erroneous, though they do not know how to demonstrate this completely. However, they hold this as probable because there seems no reason that could have moved Adam to appropriate to William ofOckham himself the bread he ate in respect of lordship, since such appropriating of bread in respect of lordship is seldem or never done between man and wife, between whom there is often less love and concord than there was between Adam and Eve. And chus it dees not seem that Adam appropriated to himself the bread he ate, in respect of lordship, excluding Eve from that lordship.
(On the Jetter][3] Third, running through the letter they answer all the texts brought forward. Rather by divine law: This can be conceded in one sense; for every lordship was introduced by divine law in the way of speaking in which the Apostle says, in Romans i3i:1], "There is no power except from Ged." In that sense there is no lordship except in some way fram divine law, since all lordship is from God. But he [the attacked] is not speaking in that way, since he distinguishes between the lordships that exist by divine law and those that exist by human law. And therefore, as has been said, that lordship is here said to exist by divine law which is
; possessed by a gift of God manifested by a special divine revelation, : and in that sense not all Jordships are by divine law.
Not human, that lordship was introduced: This negative statement is false in every sense, as has been proved above, because exclusive lordship was first introduced by human law. Thus let those who hold the doctrine of Thomas take note of what he says. For in [Stemma theologiael| 2-2, q. 66, a.
2. he says, "The division of possessions is not in accordance with natura! law, but according to human enactment, which belongs to positive law, as was said above. Thus ownership of possessions is not against natural law but is added to natural law by an invention of human reason."
Therefore, according to him, exclusivity [propricias] of lordships was introduced by an invention of human reason.
For divine law is what we have in the divine Scriptures. Nevertheless, not every law mentioned in the divine Scriptures is a divine law, except in the way all laws are divine because everything just is from God indirectly or directly. As we read in dist. 8, ¢. "Quo ture":
To these things it is answered thar although natural law is contained in the Law and in the Gospel, nevertheless not everything contained in the Law and in the Gospel is found to be bound up with natural law. "Human law what we have in the laws of kings": This was true for Augustine's time, in reference to which he was speaking against the heretics of his time, because at that time all nations had been
The Work ofNinety Days subjected to kings (by the word "king" in no way excluding emperors); and therefore at that time all temporal lordships were possessed by the law of emperors or kings. But for many other times it was not true, except by extending the word "kings" to all who hold any power over others. (However, this was perhaps nor true in the first division of things, because perhaps Cain and Abel divided some things between them on their own authority, without the authority of their father, just as Abraham and Lot, as we read in Genesis 13[:5~12], seem to have divided the regions between themselves on their own authority.) For it is quite clear that human
{aw was not always in the laws of kings, taking the word "king" thus strictly: for, as we read in Decretum, dist.
[c. 8], "Every people and city has power to establish its own law for itself": therefore, without kings, people and cities and other communities have power to establish human laws for themselves.
It is certain that many peoples and cities have done so; and thus the Romans at one time did not have kings and yet used human laws and also at that time made human laws and at that time possessed some things by their laws.
But in the dtvine Scriptures we read that before the laws of kings existed, indeed even before kings extsted, some things were somteone's:
This is true; for before the times of kings some things were possessed by divine law, and some by human law, though not by ihe jaw of kings.
Therefore, by divine law someone mas able ta say that something was his: This must be conceded, though it does not follow from the premise taken by isself. But from this affirmative proposition the negative, "Nothing was then possessed by human law," does not foliow. The major forennsef is clear, etc.. From the major and the minor, since both are affirmative, the negative "that before kings lordship was not introduced by human Jaw," does not follow; also, by virtue of the ferm of the argument this affirmative,
"Before kings someone was able to say that something was his by divine law," does not follow: for the premises are not arranged in mood and figure, or in any due form of argument, as is quite clear to those practiced in the elements of dialectic. However, since the conciusion he expresses in words is true, if properly interpreted, it is mot necessary to explain the defect of the argument.
Adam alone had lordship: Although he alone had lordship before Eve was formed, nevertheless the lordship was not for that reason exclusive: just as, if all the monks of some monastery died except
William of Ockham one, he alone would then have lordship of the goods of the monastery, and yet that lordship would not be exclusive, but common, i.e. to be communicated, and he would not then be the owner, ag was said above in chapter 27. Since sharing obviously requires several: Unless by chance there is some impediment.
And that Eve had not then been formed: This has been answered above, in chapter 27. "You appointed man to rule over your creation," etc: Here "man" is taken for both male and female, and thus it cannot be inferred from that text that before Eve was formed Adam had temporal lordship; and although he then had lordship, he nevertheless did not then have the lordship that is ownership. And Damascene expressly says this: This is answered in chapter 27. That afier the fall of our first parents, before the flood, and before there were kings, someone was able to say, "This is mine": This must be conceded; but it does not follow from it that that lordship was not introduced by human law, though it follows that it was not introduced by the law of kings. The appellant does not say that lordship was first introduced by the law of kings, but that it was introduced by human law; and there have been many human laws that were not laws of kings. "You will eat 'your' bread": That bread was Adam's as to use and as to a lordship in same way common, though not as fo a lordship exclusive to himself. "Offered from the first-born of 'his'
Rock": The flock was his by human law, though not by the law of kings. That after the flood, without the law of kings, someone was able te call something his. This must be conceded, for then also someone was able to say by human law that something was his. Noak planted a vine. That vine was Noah's, though perhaps not exclusively his, without the law of kings, and perhaps without human law. It is consistent with this, however, that the first division of lordship was made by human will. "J will give this land to your seed', From this jt follows evidently that the lordship of some temporal things was introduced by divine law, without human Jaw: but that was not the first exclusive lordship. "J mil! give the whole of these regions to you and to your seed': The same answer is given to this text as to the previous one. " 'hat' each one 'had taken as booty was fis": From this it does indeed follow that those lordships did not exist by the jaws of kings. "f have given it to you for a possession, which you will divide among you by lof": As before, it must be conceded that those lordships did not exist by the laws of kings. "That they give the qo The Work ofNinety Days Leuties out of their possessions": It is conceded that those possessions were not possessed by the laws of kings. Nevertheless, it is consistent with thas that the first division of Jordships was introduced by human law.
From all of these things it ts clear that we find in the sacred Seripiures that someone, both in the state of innocence and after the fail of our first parents, both before the food and after the flood. was able to say, without the law of kings, that something mas his: This conclusion has a true sense. For in the state of innocence, without the law of kings, Adam was able to say that something was his as to power of using and as to lordship; and after the sin of our first parents, without the law of kings, someone was able to say that something was his as to use and as to a lordship in some way common (namely, to both Adam and Eve), ard another, without the law of kings, was able to say that something was his as to an exclusive lordship introduced by human law. After the flood, without the law of kings, some persons were able to say that some things were theirs by divine Jaw, and some were able to say that some things were theirs by human law, and yet without the law of kings. And , thus it is clear that this conclusion does mot detract in any way from the appellant's assertion. For he did not mean that every division of lordships was introduced by the law of kings, as kings are distinguished from other powers; he meant that the first division of lordships was introduced by human law, or by the law of kings
(with the term taken thus), but afterwards some lordships were introduced by divine law. And in the time of blessed Augustine all lordships existed by the law of kings, including emperors under the term "kings," for then all regions had been subjected to kings.
And thus, if he knew how to distinguish lordships and times, he could harmonize the written sources.
7) & 4, it 4% proved that there are some lordships by divine law: This chapter is wrongly adduced here. For the words of the chapter from which the above assertion could be taken are these: "Although no earthly thing whatever can rightly be possessed by anyone except either by divine law, by which all things belong to the just, or by human law, which is in the power of the kings of the earth." But in these words we do not find that some lordships are by divine law; for then, according to these words, all things would belong to the just in respect of lordship, which, however is