Chapter 15
William of Ockham whole world, and we have treated at some length the opinion which says that as a rule it is beneficial for al! mortals to be subject in temporal matters to one secular ruler. But now I intend to investigate with you, though briefly, what exceilences or graces, virtues, and characteristics the emperor of the world should be outstanding in. Now I believe that faith, skill, justice, truth, power, riches, liberality, and courage are most of all required in an emperor of the world, and so I propose to ask briefly some questions concerning these. First, therefore, I ask whether an emperor of the world is obliged to have the true and Catholic faith?
Master It seems to some that your question admits of no doubt, since every adult mortal who has the use of reason is obliged to have the faith, especially if he has been able to be informed of the faith. But perhaps you meant to ask whether someone can be a true emperor who does not have the true and Catholic faith.
About this there are different and conflicting opinions.
Chapter 15 Student Concerning the second [version of the question] I will afterwards inquire somewhat at length,'* so | pass to the skill necessary to an emperor, And first I wish to know whether an emperor of the world, if he is a Catholic, is obliged to have skill in divine Scripture?
Master There are various opinions about this. One is that a Catholic emperor of the world should have skill in the divine law and in sacred literature. For a Catholic emperor in the New Testament should not be less perfect than a king was in the Old
Testament. But a king in the Old Testament was obliged to have skill in sacred literature and to meditate on the divine Jaw continually: therefore a Catholic emperor should have these things more perfectly. Also, it pertains to a Catholic emperor to defend the Christian faith, which is contained in sacred literature, and to chastise its attackers with due punishment; but no one is obliged to defend what he does not know; therefore a Catholic emperor should have skill in sacred literature.
* See i Dial, g, 1.25; also Short Disesurse, pp. 74 Ai A Dialogue, Part mi, Tract 1 ae There is another opinion, that although it befits a Catholic emperor w have knowledge of some sacred literature, so that he knows at least how to read the sacred Scriptures and, in reading them, how to understand them literally, it is not simply necessary for him to have such skill, since without such skill he can usefully and justly control temporal matters, which alone, as we know, pertain to the emperor.
Student Should the emperor be skilled in the civil laws?
Master One opinion is that he should. For since the emperor is the supreme judge in temporal matters, he should have no fess skill than inferior judges in the laws according to which sentence is to be passed. But inferior judges are obliged to have knowledge of the civil laws, according to which they are obliged to judge.
Therefore, much more should the emperor have skill in the civil laws.
There is another opinion, that the emperor is not obliged of necessity to have skill in the civil laws, though it is very suitable and useful that he should not Jack such skill. For there have been many emperors and kings who were just, and even saints, who did not at all have skill in the civil laws, who yet would have become quite learned in the laws if they had been obliged of necessity to know them. And the case of the emperor or king is not similar to that of other, inferior, judges, for the emperor of the world and the king in his kingdom are not tied by the laws, and are not obliged of necessity to judge according to the laws in the way inferior judges are obliged of necessity to judge in accordance with the laws; as much knowledge of the laws is therefore not required in an emperor or king as in inferior judges.
Student From the foregoing it seems to me probable that it befits someone wha is to be made emperor {and king) to have deep knowledge of both the sacred Scriptures and the civil laws and that such a person. if he were found, should, other things being equal, be promoted before all others to be emperor (and also to be king, when someone should receive government of a kingdom through election and not through succession). But if the person promoted to be emperor or king were not deep in the knowledge of the sacred Scriptures and the civil jaws, would it be fitting for him to apply himself to study, to acquire outstanding knowledge of such things? Or if he were outstanding in such knowledge,
William ofOckham would it be fitting for him to be gecupied constantly in meditation on such things?
Master It is answered that it would be praiseworthy in an emperor and in a king to devote himself to such study as far as he could — with discretion, however, so that he is not kept by such study from the care entrusted to him. But to neglect his subjects or entrust the government of the empire or kingdom to another so that he may apply himself to such study must be regarded as reprehensible and deserving of condemnation in an emperor and a king, because such a ruler does not expend due care on his subjects; the Apostle's statement is verified of him, that "he who does not take care of his own people, and especially of members of his household, has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever."* For if a prelate of the Church should for the sake of his subjects' advantage sometimes interrupt the contemplative life and direct himself to the active life, as we gather from the sacred canons, 8, q.
Olim, c. In scripturis, and ¢. Qui episcopatum, much more should an emperor or king omit such study so as to devote due governance to his subjects, not only through others but in person,
Student Should an emperor have outstanding knowledge of secular affairs?
Master It is answered that he who outdoes others in skill in secular affairs, and who exceeds others in natural sense, discretion, natural activity, and judgment of reason, should, other things being equal, be promoted ahead of others to be emperor (or a king who is appointed to the government of a kingdom by election). For it seems that in a person to be promoted in such a way natural sense and excellent judgment of reason should be preferred to ali learning, command of language, eloquence, experience, and memory, however excellent; though in promoting someone to a temporal office, especially one to last a short time, both learning and experience should sometimes be preferred to excellent judgment of reason, But after someone has been appointed to empire or to the government of a kingdom, he should apply himself to skill in secular affairs and to knowledge of natural law (especially of natural law about which it is possible for even the learned to err or doubt), knowledge of which chiefly pertains to his office, more than to knowledge of the Tam. 5:8.
A Dialogue, Part ui, Traa u sacred Scriptures or of secular sciences or of any laws whatever, unless he can by their means more than in any other way acquire skill in secular affairs.
Student Why is it said that he must apply himself to knowledge of the natural law "about which it is possible for even the learned fo err or doubt'? For it seems that there is no such natural law, since any ignorance of a jaw about which it is possible for experts to err seems to excuse anyone who acts against it; because the reason why ignorance of fact excuses is that it deceives even experts, as the gloss notes, dist. 38, c. 1;7° therefore, if it is possible for experts to err about natural law, ignorance of such law could excuse. Again, probable ignorance always excuses; but ignorance that can be found in experts can be probable; therefore some ignorance of natural law would excuse. But the gloss notes the contrary of this, dist.
1,7' and Gratian, 1, 9.
Notandum, says that in all adults ignorance of natural law deserves condemnation. From these [texts] ir seems possible to gather that there is no natural law about which it is possible for experts to err or even doubt.
Master It is answered that there are found to be three kinds of natural laws. [1] Some are self-evident principles, or follow or are taken from such self-evident principles of morals; and about such natural laws no one can err or even doubt. One can, however, be ignorant of them, because it is possible not to think and never to have thought of them; and such ignorance excuses no one, because even if we have never before thought of them, such natural laws occur [to us] immediately when we are obliged to do or omit something in accordance with them, unless we will to proceed to the act, or to omit such act, without any deliberation and rule of reason. Ignorance of such a law in such a case therefore proceeds from negligence or contempt deserving of condemnation and therefore does not excuse. For if, on some occasion, someone is tempted to kill an innocent person who never did harm, then immediately, if he wills to deliberate, even briefly, about whether he should kill him, it will occur [to him] that he should not kill him; and therefore, if without any deliberation he kills him, such ignorance does not * See glass, v. Cust itague, col. 188.
" "Wgnorance of natural law excuses no one, if he is an adult and of sound mind."
William of Ockham excuse him. [2] There are ether natural laws that are drawn plainly and without great consideration from the first principles of the law, just as in knowable things certain conclusions are inferred from first principles plainly and without great consideration even by the less learned; and such ignorance of natural law does not excuse, because anyone can immediately without great study know those natural laws. And the statements of the fathers refer to such ignorance of natural law.
[3] There are other natural laws that are inferred from the first natural laws by few even of the experts, with great attention and study, and through many intermediate propositions. About these even experts sometimes have conflicting opinions, some thinking them to be just and others unjust; and ignorance ofsuch a natural law excuses, especially in omitting to do something that should be done ifone were not ignorant of the law, unless the ignorance is affected or crass and supine."*
Anemperor should therefore diligently apply himselfto acquire knowledge ofsuch natural laws, since the other natural laws — that is, in the first and second senses — will easily occur to him when it is necessary.
And so that he may acquire perfect skill in such laws and in secular affairs, itis beneficial that he should have with him many wise advisers, on the example ofthe Romans, who (as was quoted above) appointed three hundred and twenty men,who used to deliberate every day, giving advice about the multitude. For as Solomon testifies, Proverbs 15[:22],
"Plans arebrought to nothing where there is no advice, but where there are many advisers they succeed"; and in Proverbs 11{:14] he says that "there is safety where there is much advice."
Student Jt seems to conflict with the teaching of the wise man for the emperor to be obliged to have many advisers. For i Ecclesiasticus 6[:6] we read: "Be in peace with many, but let one in a thousand be your adviser."
Master It is answered that advice is sought about various matters and for various reasons. Sometimes advice is sought concerning secret matters dangerous to reveal except to faithful and discrect friends. Sometimes, however, advice is sought about public matters, matters that can be revealed without danger to the unfaithful, to 2* For the expressions "crass" and "supine" see Digest, 22.6.6; on "affected" ignorance sce Thomas Aquinas, Summa theolugiac, 1-2, q. 6, a. 8.
A Dialogue, Part us, Tract i enemies, and to the foolish. Again, sometimes the advice of others is sought so as to have the agreement of the advisers, and when it is had the decision is made more authoritative and is accepted by others with more veneration and love, reverence, or fear. And sometimes advice is sought so that the one seeking advice may carry out the decision through the advisers. Sometimes the advice of others is sought so that the one seeking advice may acquire from their answer knowledge of law or fact that he does not know, and so that when he has it he may perceive what should be done.
And sometimes the advice of others is sought so that the one seeking advice can probe and test the discretion or prudence or faithfulness or affection or will, either toward himself or toward others, of the advisers themselves.
When, therefore, advice is sought concerning secret matters dangerous to reveal, the advisers should be few — only those who are tested, faithful, friends and discreet. When, also, advice is sought so that the decision may be entrusted to the advisers for execution, few are needed, namely only [advisers who are] faithful, wise, and friends. And the text quoted above from Ecclesiasticus is ta be understood of these two cases. But when advice is needed about public matters or things that can be revealed without danger, and advice is needed only so that the agreement of the advisers may be had and so that when it is had the decision may be made more authoritative, or so that the inquirer may acquire by the advisers' answer knowledge of law or fact of which he is ignorant, or so that he may test and probe their discretion or prudence or faithfulness or affection or will, then the advisers should be many; indeed, in such a case it will sometimes not be absurd to seek advice even from the unskilled or malevolent, since sometimes from their answer, even when they are unwilling and intend to deceive, a wise man will see what he should do: just as a wise man takes instruction not only from the good deeds of the wise but also from the bad deeds of the foolish, as Solomon testifies in Proverbs 24[:30]. He says: "I passed by the field of the slothful man, and by the vineyard of the foolish man: and behold they were all filled with nettles, and thorns had covered the face thereof, and the stone wall was broken down. When I had seen this I laid it up in my heart, and by the example | received instruction."