Chapter 19
A Dialogue, Part iti, Tract 1 many, according to that text of Solomon in Proverbs 24/:6], "There will be safety where there is much advice"; and thus in 1 Machabees 8[:45] it is said in praise of die Romans that "three hundred and twenty men used to deliberate every day, giving advice always about the multitude, that they might act worthily." Their community will therefore be better ruled if one rules the others and can decide the time and place of meetings and ali other things (for example which counselors should be admitted or turned away and the like} than if many ruled, one of whom could not easily exclude another from the council and from whatever else has to be done, even if he were plotting evil to the state. A fifth advantage is that one can expedite many matters both in more ways and with less labor than many, for in many ways something can happen to prevent many
. persons from deciding the same affairs together.
Because of these and many other advantages, they say that it is beneficial for the community of the faithful to be miled by one best man rather than by many best men, and similarly it is beneficial for it to be ruled by a good and wise man willing to act with the advice of wise men, rather than by many good and wise men. Thus it is said (in the place cited above) in praise of the Romans, "They
, enmust their magistracy to one man each year, to cule over the whole earth, and they all obey the one," and yet, as was quoted, there were three hundred and twenty counselors giving advice every day. Thus Abimelech, as we read in Judges g{:1 ff], speaking through his mother's brothers, cleverly persuaded the men of Sichem to accept him as ford, holding out what was more advantageous to them (Gf he had been good), saying, "Say to all the men of Sichem, 'Is it better for you that seventy men, all the sons of Jerobaai, should rule over you, or that one man should rule over you?' » Chapter 19 Student I have heard some advantages which they say make it beneficial for the community of the faithful to be ruled by one believer rather than by many. Now tell how the arguments brought forward in chapter z of this second book, which seem to prove the opposite, are answered.
Wilkam of Ockham Master To the first of them,'' when it is advanced that it is most . of all beneficial for the whole congregation of the faithful to be tuled by him (or by those) whose judgment is more certain and better in nudging and deciding which things should be sought as useful and which should be rejected altogether as useless or harmful, it is answered that this is not universally true, though it is true of occasion. For it is certain that the judgment of a general council, in which the better and wiser from every province and region of Christians should meet, is more certain and better than the judgment of one, ot of a few who can conveniently remain continuously in sotne one place, and yet it is not beneficial that there should always be a general council to govern the community of the faithful — though, indeed, on occasion, for certain particular affairs that cannot be dispatched suitably by one or a few, it is beneficial for a general council to be called and its decision followed. But for matters that can usefully be dispatched by one or a few it is not beneficial for a general council to be assembled, and thus it is as a rule beneficial that the community of the faithful should be ruled by one or a few rather than by a general council. So, also, it is beneficial, as a rule, for the community of the faithful to be ruled by one best or good man making use of sufficiently good advice rather than by many ruling together, because it is better that the many, without whose advice the community of the faithful would not be ruled well, should be only the advisers of the one best or good man (who can, when it is beneficial, invite them and call them all, or certain of them, and entrust various matters to various of them), rather than that all of these should be rulers or rectors.
For it would often be necessary to call them all together for matters that could be dispatched by a few; also, many other difficulties and inconveniences would occur that are avoided if one best or good man rules with advisers who are sufficient and as good as many rulers would be (for rulership imparts neither wisdom nor goodness).
And to Aristotle - who seems to prove in Poéitics that it is beneficial for a community to be ruled by many best men rather than by one because the crowd judges better than any one person - # That is, to argument [3] of chapter 2 (p. 140 above), which is the first argument in that chapter to prove that it is more advantageaus to the Christian community to be ruled by many.
A Dialogue, Part m, Tract 1 it is answered that many often judge better and more certainly than one and a crowd better than one, and therefore there is indeed a need for discussion, taking advice, and the judgment of many: not necessarily as rulers, however; often it is enough if they are present only as advisers. Someone who is only an adviser (if he has a good intention) discusses, advises, and judges, deciding between good and evil, the just and the unjust, just as if he were a ruler. Often, also, the deliberation and judgment of one alone is enough for the things that have to be done. And therefore it is more beneficial for the whole community of the faithful if one supreme ruler rules, dispatching by himself matters for which he is sufficient by himseif and dispatching other matters for which his own skill alone is not enough with the advice of others, than if many such persons rule, who must meet for ail matters, small and large, easy and difficult.
To the other text of Aristotle - which seems to assert that many, with many eyes and many ears, perceive more things and perceive them better than one, with two eyes and two ears, and similarly, many can do more things with many hands and many feet than one with two hands and two feet, and thus rule by many is more beneficial than rule by one — it is answered that if one good and wise man rules the community of the faithful, he does not use only two eyes and two ears and also two hands and two feet, but sometimes he uses many such instruments. It is beneficial that he should sometimes use only two eyes and two hands rather than inany, but sometimes it is beneficial that he should use many rather than only two. It is therefore beneficial for the whole community of the faithful to be ruled by one who sometimes, as it is beneficial, uses his own sufficiency, and sometimes another's, rather than by many who meet unnecessarily to deal with everything.
To the text from Acts 15[:6], that "The apostles and elders met to see about this doctrine," which is taken there as if it is always beneficial for matters to be concluded and decided by many rather than by one, it is answered that sometimes it is beneficial for matters to be concluded by many rather than by one, and sometimes it is more beneficial that they be dealt with by one. Therefore it is beneficial for the community of the faithful to be ruled by one best man, or at least by a good man, who deals with and decides some matters and questions by himself but deals with some together
William of Ockham with others — many others or few, as is beneficial — and decides.
In the case spoken of in Acts 15, it was therefore beneficial for, not one by himself, but many, to inquire about that doctrine. The apostles and elders met, not indeed as all being rulers of the community of the faithful, but as being necessary and useful to the one ruler and head of all in providing support or advice. For sometimes some are called to deliberations in which the wisdom of one is enough more for support against those resisting or disobeying than to seek advice.
To Pope Innocent, when he says that what is investigated by many elders is more easily discovered [dist. 20, c. De quibus], it is answered that concerning many doubtful matters this is true; however, when one is enough to discover something by himself and does not then need the support or help or advice of many, it is better that the investigation and discovery be by one rather than by many.
To the other argument'® — based on this, that many are less pervertible and corruptible by vices, desires, and wicked passions than one person is, and consequently it is beneficial for the community of the faithful to be ruled by many rather than by one, because it is more beneficial for it to be ruled by him or those whose will is less pervertible and corruptible by wicked passions — it is answered that in some way the will of one is less pervertible and corruptible by wicked passions and feelings than the will of many. To make this clear, it is said, it must be known thar for the will of many or of a multitude to be pervertible can be understood in two ways: that it is pervertible cither in the whole of it, understanding "whole" syncategorematically,"" or in part. in the first way, the will of many is less pervertible than the will of one.®° In the second way, the will of many is more pervertible than the will of one given person, for example the will of this person or that person. A multitude can be perverted and corrupted in part more quickly and easily than can one by himself, because upon the corruption of any one of that multitude the multitude itself is
* That is, to argument [4] of chapter z (p. 137 above).
9 See Ockham's Theory of Propositions, pp. 103-4. If "whole" is taken syncategorematically, then "The whole of X is Y" is equivalent to "Every par of X is ¥."
* That is, thar the will of every individual should become perverted is less likely than that the will of any given individual should become perverted.
A Dialogue, Part it, Tract 1 in that way fi.e., in part] corrupted and perverted, because, though each one is not perverted, some perversion is found in that multitude. It is necessary to the goodness and suitability of the ruler not to be perverted even in part, and it is therefore more beneficial for the community of the faithful to be ruled by the ruler that is less pervertible even in part; and such is one man and not many.
It is therefore beneficial for the community of the faithful to be ruled by one rather than by many.
To the text of Aristotle taken from Politic, Book 1, chapter 8, it is answered that on occasion, when a few are not enough to see perfectly what should be done and what omitted (though in some way they imperfectly understand the matter}, then it is beneficial on that occasion for the multitude to meet, not indeed to rule, but to deliberate and discover what is beneficial for the whole community and to advise what the ruler ought to do; and if the ruler were not willing to follow their advice and some serious damage threatened, they would have to correct him. In such a case it would therefore be beneficial for the multiqde to meet in that way, because all together are something better than a few and can see more things concerning both character and understanding.
But when a few are enough for seeing perfectly what should be done and what omitted, it is not beneficial for the multitude to meet to deal with the matter, but it is better that a few should meet, yet enough. When one is enough it is therefore not necessary for many to meet. If one is not enough to discover what should be done, it is beneficial that he should be able to call together as many as are enough {many or few), and to proceed with their advice, im such a way that they do not rule with him.
From the above it is clear how the text of Aristotle is answered when he suggests that many are more impervertibie than one. They say that in one way they are more impervertible, and in another way they are more pervertible: not indeed that all are perverted together more easily than is any one given person, but because perversity is more easily found among them than in one given person, because when any of them is perverted perversity is found among all, though not necessarily in some one given person. The goodness and suitability of the ruler [or ruling body] requires, however, that there should be in it no perversity. Therefore, whenever perversity is found in some multitude, even in only one of William of Ockham that multitude, by that fact that multitude is not suited to rule, according to the text of the Apostle in Galatians 5{:g], "A licle yeast ferments the whole mass." Ie is therefore beneficial for the community of the faithful to be ruled by one, rather than by many ruling together and acting in place of one, because perversity is not as easily found in one as in any multitude, however small, of which that one is a part together with another who can be perverted just as he can.
Student According to that, many should never be called to give advice and neither should the multitude — and not only Aristorle and others, but also this opinion, holds the opposite. For perversity is more easily found in the multitude, and in any group whatever of many persons, than in one alone; but perversity is most of all to be avoided.
Master It is answered that whenever one is enough, so that he does not need either the advice or the support of others, many should not be called, because what can just as well be done by one is done in vain by many. But when one by himself is not enough to see or do perfectly what should be done, then it is beneficial to call many, for advice or help or support, because just as among the many and in the multitude perversity can be found, so among the many and in the multitude greater knowledge, wisdom, and goodness are found. And therefore when one is not enough many should meet - though this can be indifferent to good and to evil, since many meeting together sometimes act well, sometimes badly. Therefore, when it is believed with probability, because of the goodness of those wha have to meet, that they will advise and act rightly, action should be taken for them to meet, if one is not enough. When, however, it is found with probability that they will stray from the right paths, they should be prevented from meeting, because it is better to do nothing than to do evil.
Thus when some are called to a general council, if it is believed with probability that they will not hold the council rightly, they should be prevented from meeting; if, however, it is believed with probability that they will hold the council rightly, action should be taken for them to meet, unless it is believed that they would do less good than the disadvantage they will incur from their labors and expenses.