Chapter 20
A Dialogue, Part ut, Tract 1 .
Student Now tell how Aristotle's statements which seem to conclude that aristocracy is better and more choice-worthy than kingship are answered.
Master It is answered that Aristotle did not mean to conclude that aristocracy is simply and always better and more choice-worthy than kingship even when it is ruled by one best or good man, but he meant to conclude that aristocracy is sometimes better and more choice-worthy than kingship. For since the whole multitude of rulers in an aristocracy is not, in its entirety, as pervertible as any one who would belong to that multitude, and the prudence and also the virtue or goodness is greater in the whole multitude than in one, it can happen that it is better for many to rule aristocratically than one royally. The one who ruled royally could be perverted when the others were not perverted, and it is worse for someone to be perverted when he rules by himself than when he rules with others; for if he is perverted when he rules with others he can as a rule do fewer and fesser evils than if he is perverted ruling by himself; and therefore aristocracy is sometimes better and more choice-worthy than kingship. Often, however, and more commonly, and therefore in a way simply, kingship is better than aristocracy, because of the advantages spoken of above in chapter 18 and many others. And thus it is that the ancients sometimes reasonably changed an aristocracy into a kingship and sometimes a kingship into an aristocracy, Many examples could be given from the Romans and many other nations, for sometimes kings have ruled and sometimes many together; and many nations, both the Romans and athers, have made such changes.
Chapter 20 Student On the occasion of what you have just related ] have decided that it should be asked whether, according to that opimion, it is beneficial for the community of the faithful to have the power to change an aristocratic regime into a regime similar to a royal regime and vice versa,*' so that it has power to appoint one highest pontiff who is over all others and power also to appoint or elect
* This question occupies chapters 20-7.
REAR aR that de RT William of Ockham many highest pontiffs at the same time who, with equal power, would together rule aristocratically and be over all the other faithful, so that it can change one regime into another indifferently as seems beneficial, as nations have reasonably changed aristocratic rule into royal rule and vice versa.
Master About this there are various opinions. Keeping to the opinion that asserts that sometimes aristocratic government is better for some than royal government and sometimes royal government is better for the same people, one opinion is that it is beneficial for the community of the faithful to have such power to change aristocratic government into the rule of one highest pontiff and vice versa, according as necessity and the quality of the tme demands and requires one regime or the other.
Student Bring forward some arguments for that opinion.
Master In favor of this opinion [1] the following argument can be given. Just as it is beneficial that human enactments should change with the change of the times (Extra, De consanguinitate ef affinitate,
Non debet reprehensiile), so it is beneficial that human regimes should change with the change of the times. But Christ's Church chiefly has power over human rulerships in respect of all things that are beneficial to it; therefore it has power to change such rulerships.
Student It could be said that the rulership by which the highest priest rules all the faithful is not human but divine, because it was established by God alone; therefore it is not decent, and consequently not beneficial, that che Church should have power over the papal rulership.
Master This answer is attacked. Although papal rule is divine in that Christ decided that it should exist in the Church, in many respects it seems to be human. For it is for men to decide who should be appointed to it, and who should elect, and who should correct the one appointed if he needs correction, and the like.
Therefore, similarly, it will be human in this respect, that # should be decided by men whether one only, or, when beneficial, many, should be appoinced to such rulership.
[2} Further, in respect of everything necessary for the things that are special to Christians, provision has been made for the community of the faithful in the best way, and not less well than for any other community or nation; so that in all such matters it
A Dialogue, Part it, Tract i has power in respect of ail things that are beneficial and as they are beneficial. But if the Church had power to change a regime that began to be less beneficial into another, more beneficial, regime, it would be better provided for than if it did not have such power; therefore, since in such matters it has been provided for in the best way, it has power to change rule by one into rule by many, if it notices that it is more beneficial to be ruled by many in an aristocratic regime than by one alone.
[3] Again, it is not less beneficial for the community of the faithful to have power to abolish regimes that begin to be burdensome or less useful than to have power to abolish burdensome customs, since nothing can do more harm to the Church than a burdensome and useless regime, according to the opinion of Augustine. As we read in dist. 81, Meme, he says: "No one indeed does more harm in the Church than he who, though acting perversely, has the name or order of holiness and priesthood." From this we gather that nothing does more harm to the Church than a perverse ruler and a perverse regime. Therefore, if the Church notices that the Church is ruled perversely or less usefully because of the fact that one by himself rules over all, it is beneficial for ic to have power to change such a regime into another that will be more useful for the time.
[4] Besides, it is not beneficial for the Church to be tied to a regime that can be changed into the worst regime; but the regime in which one rules by himself can be changed into the worst regime, as royal government, even though it is the best, can, so far as it depends on the nature of the rulership, be changed into tyranny, which is the worst regime, as Aristotle in the Ethics and the Politics asserts and plainly proves. Therefore it is not beneficial for the Church for it to be so restricted to the regime in which one rules by himself that it cannot change it into another regime, namely aristocracy, more useful for the time. is] Moreover, as the civil law also testifies, "In new matters for decision, to depart from a law that has seemed fair for a long time, the advantage ought to be evident." We gather from this that innovation should be made for the sake of evident advantage, even so as to depart from a law that has seemed fair for a long time.
But a law should not be departed from more than a form of government, because in every community nothing can be more necessary to observe than law; for what is incongruous with the William of Ockham law should in no way be observed. Therefore, for the sake of evident advantage, innovation should be made, so as to depart fram a form of government that has seemed reasonable and fair for a long time. Therefore, if it appears evident to the Church that for some particular ime a greater advantage will come to the Church from an aristocrate regime in which many rule the community of the faithful together than from the rule of one, such innovation should be made, so as to depart from the rule of one which has seemed fair and useful for a long time.
{6] Also, what has been introduced for the support and advantage of certain persons should not be tumed to their damage and loss.
But the regime to which all the faithful should be subject was introduced for the support and advantage of all the faithful; therefore, if a certain kind of regime begins to be damaging to the faithful, or less useful, it is beneficial that that kind of regime should be changed into another more useful for the time. Therefore the Church has power to establish aristocratic government over all the faithful, if they consider that government by one man is beginning to harm the faithful.
[7] Further, according to Pope Leo, as we read in dist. 45, ¢.
Licet enim, "A provision made for concord" should not "tend to harm." This implies that whatever was provided for the sake of concord should be abolished if it tends toward harm. But rule by one highest pontiff was provided for the concord of all the faithful, namely that one should be over others "lest schism occur," according to the gloss in the same place;® therefore if rule by one highest pontiff tends toward harm, ie., toward love of dominating or ruling tyrannically, or even to a dangerous schism among Christians that is, if a greater and temporally more powerful, or equal, part of Christians will in no way tolerate the rule of one highest pontiff and yet will tolerate the aristocratic rule of many ruling at the same time, each of whom is highest pontiff, as sometimes there have been several emperors at the same time, and sometimes there are several judges with equal power in the same case — the rule of the one, similar to royal government, should be abolished at 4 Rather, Lit nortiurguam, ® See gloss, col. 216, v, concordian: "Namely, that one should rule over others, lest schism occur."
A Dialogue, Pant tm, Tract 1 least for the time, and an aristocratic regime should be established, at jease until those evils ar dangers and others like them cease.
{8} Again, when the reason ceases the effect should cease, Extra, De appellationibus, Cum cessante. But the common advantage is the reason why one highest pontiff should be over all the faithful.
Therefore, if there comes from the rule of one, not common advantage, but common less, such rule should cease for then.
Therefore the community of the faithful then has power to establish another regime.
{g} Further, in all churches what the greater part judges should be observed ought to be observed: Extra, De his quae fiunt a maiori parte capituli, c. 1; dist. 65, c.
1, 2, and 3; Extra, De electione, Licet. Therefore, if the greater part of the faithful think that an aristocratic regime should be established over the whole community of the faithful, such a regime ought to be established. From this it follows that the Church or community of the faithful has power to establish such a regime.
Student As the gloss notes upon the quoted chapter, Fxtra, De his quae fiunt a maiori parte capituli, "We do not always conform to the greater part, or the plurality: as here, and in dist. 31, Nicena, and above, De electione, Ecclesia vesiva...
It is the rule that we conform to the greater part, but the greater part is that which relies on the greater piety and reason: dist. 9, Sana quippe; dist.
40, Muiti at the end; 4, q. 3, para. /uristurandi." The gloss on dist. 40, upon the last chapter, also seems to take this view. it says: "Not the more distinguished rank, but the action of a better life, is approved, 23, q. 4, Sicut, and 16, q. 1, Sunt nennulli, There is here an argument that the party that relies on the juster reason is called the greater, even if it is the smaller: dist. 31, Nicena, 19, in canonicis; 4, 4. 3, para. 2; and Extra, De testibus, in nostra." By these it is plainly established that we must #of always conform to the greater part. Therefore even if the greater part of Christians were to judge that the rule of one should be changed into an aristocratic rule, this should nevertheless not be done.
Master That answer is attacked. Although we should not always conform to the greater part but sometimes to the lesser, nevertheless
" The remaining references are in the gloss to this chapter of the decretals, col.
6 ceth HiAUR CIS ID eee AL . ve ee ee ne he ARA| wee William af Ockham we should always conform to the greater part unless it is plainly proved by the lesser that we should not conform to the greater part. This is gathered from the gloss on the above-quoted chapter of De hit quae fiunt a maior: parte capituli, which says, after the words quoted above: "The presumption is in favor of the plurality, dist. 61, Muilus, at the end, unless the contrary is proved, as is clear here and in dist. 23, fMud, and above, De efectione, Dudum."
In the same place, on the word Ostensum, it says: "It is not enough 10 object, unless it is proved." Since, therefore, it cannot be proved that we must not conform to the greater part of Christians if, for the common utility, they wish to change the rule of one highest pontiff into aristocratic rule, it follows that in this matter we must conform to the greater part of the faithful.
Student It seems that it cudd reasonably be shown that in this matter we must not conform to the greater part of Christians if it decides to establish aristocratic government over all the faithful.
For in contradicting the greater part the lesser part would rely on a juster argument; for the lesser part would then rely on an ordinance of Christ, which prevails over every human ordinance.
Master To some it seems that, even if Christ had ordained that one highest pontiff should rule over all the faithful, the Church could, for the common utility, establish another regime. This is proved as follows. Necessity and utility are of equal force, as Alexander III seems to suggest, Extra, De qualitate et actate pracficiendorum, Quaeris. But for the sake of necessity it is permissible
.to act against a divine commandment, even one that is explicit, in things not evil in themselves but evil only because they are prohibited. Therefore, also, for the sake of the common utility it is permissible to act against a commandment of God and an ordinance of Christ. Therefore, even if Christ had ordained that one highest pontiff should be set over al! the faithful, it would be permissible for the faithful, for the sake of the common utility, to establish some other regime, at least for the time. The major premise seems to have been proved manifestly, and it is also proved from the premise that necessity and piety have equal force, as Gregory IX suggests Extra, De feriis, last chapter; but piety includes usefulness; and the wtility of che Church or usefulness persuades."
| unless necessity urges, or piety persuades."
A Dialogue, Part ui, Tract + therefore, necessity and utility have equal force, and consequently whatever necessity makes permissible utility also makes permissible.
The minor premise is shown in many ways. Bede seems clearly to assert this in his Commentary on Mark, quoted in Extra, De regults iuris, c. Quod non est. He says, 'What is not permissible in the law, necessity makes permissible; for it is also a commandment to observe the sabbath, but the Machabees fought on the sabbath without fault." It seems to be clearly established by these words that the Machabees acted licitly, out of necessity, against an explicit divine command. Christ himself alsa seems to teach this explicitly in Matthew 12[:4] and Luke 6[:4] when he says that David and those who were with him licitly ate the loaves of offering against a divine commandment, for God explicitly commanded that no one except a priest should eat that bread. From these and a great many other {texts] we gather that the rule, "Necessity has no law," which is asserted in Extra, De consuetudine, Quanta, and the rule, "Necessity does not submit to law," Extra, De observatione ietuniorum, c. 2, and the rule, "In the laws necessity is excepted," Extra, De tureiuranda,
Ouerelam, and the like, should be understood not only of positive human laws, but also of positive divine laws, unless in those divine laws the opposite is laid down expressly, so that "necessity does not submit to" positive divine "law." {It is otherwise with natural law, because to that law necessity does submit, and neither can any necessity excuse.) [ro] Further, it is shown that such an ordinance would not conflict with an ordinance of Christ. Christians in the New Law do not have less power to change the regime of priests than those had who were living under the Old Law. But notwithstanding the commandment of God concerning the appointment of one highest pontiff in Exodus 29[:29-30], also found in the Decreta, dist. 21, para. 1, David afterwards appointed several highest pontiffs, as we gather from 1 Paralipomenon 24(:5]; and thus the evangelist [.uke, in chapter 2,°" seems to testify that in Christ's time there were several chief priests at the same time, Therefore Christians also have power to appoint several highest pontiffs, even though Christ ordained that some one person should be appointed as highest pontiff.