Chapter 15
A Dialogue, Part wi, Tract 7 did not surpass all others in wisdom and virtue. For it is not found that any judge or king in the Oid Testament excelled all others in wisdom and virtue. Saint Peter also does not seem to have been holier and wiser than all the apostles and other orthodox believers, for Saint John the apostle seems to have outdistanced him in love of Christ and consequently in holiness and virtue; he seems also to have been inferior in wisdom to Saint Paul. Therefore, even if no Christian is found who excels all others in wisdom and virtue, someone should be elected as highest pontiff to be the prelate of all Christians.
Chapter 15 Student To give me and others occasion to find the truth about the above matters more clearly, bestir yourself and report some answers to all the things brought forward in favor of the conflicting assertions. First, however, tell how answer is made to the things reported above in chapter 2, which seem to militate against the second mode of assertion reported above in chapter 11, for which you have now argued in the last chapter. That mode of assertion seems to me to have some plausibility.
Master That mode of assertion is twofold. In one way it is said that if no one is found among the Christian people who is more excellent than ail the others, yet there is found someone suitable and good, then such a person should be elected as pope; but if no one is found who is good and suitable, then no one should be elevated to so great an office. In the other way it is said that whether a suitable person is found or not, someone should be elected to the highest pontificate, because it is better to have any sort of person a5 head than not to have a head at all,
Student First describe how answer is given according to the first of those ways.
Master To the first argument™brought forward above in chapter 2 of this second book, which seems to be based on a text of Aristotle, who seems to assert that it ts unjust that someone should rule his similars and equals, it is answered that if in some com- ® "This chapter answers argument [«] of chapter 2
(p. 128 above}; arguments [3] and [4] are answered in chapter cg, and argument (2z] in chapter 29.
William of Ockham munity all were good and not at all pervertible by wickedness, actual or potential, it would be unjust that someone should rule those similar and equal to himself in wisdom and virtue, because in that case there would seem to be no reason why one should rule rather than another. But when in some community there are many or several who have been or cam be perverted, and when the greater and more powerful part willingly accepts the rule of one, so that they cannot be diverted from such will, then it is beneficial that one should accept rulership over all, provided a person is found who is worthy to rule over the worse members
(since otherwise he could not be regarded as good or suitable). If, however, there is some party so powerful that it can raise an irrepressible sedition dangerous to the whole community, a party that would by no means be willing to accept the rule of one person, then no one should be promoted over ail those like himself and over others, but the appointment of such a ruler should be deferred to another time; for just as sometimes it is permissible for a bishop to desert his subjects because of their wickedness, even renouncing rule altogether (Extra, De renunciatione, Nisi cum pridem'' 7, q. 1,
Hoc tamen servandum®), so it is sometimes permissible to defer the appointment of a ruler because of the wickedness of some. And therefore, although as a rule it is beneficial for the whole community of the faithful that some one person should be elected to the highest priesthood to be over all the others, nevertheless, if there were so much wickedness in some party of Christians that it could expose the whole of Christianity to danger, and they would in no way obey one high priest, no one should then be elected to that office, but his election should be deferred; for as lesser evils are often permitted to avert greater ones, dist. 3, c. Omnis," 50 sometimes certain good things, even great ones, are not done so that the greatest dangers may be avoided. Aristotle means, therefore, that it is unjust that someone should rule others similar in virtue and equal unless it is beneficial, because of some advantage or " Para. Propter malitian: "And because of the wickedness of the people, a prelate is sometimes compelled to deckine t govern them, when the people are so stiff necked that he can get nowhere with them." The gloss to the decretals, col. 234, v. Plebis, tefers to 7, q. 1, c. Adversitas, para. Foc tune sercandum [sie].
*? 4, q. 1, ¢. ddersitas, para. Hoc tute observandum.
4 Not in text but in gloss, col. 9, ¥. Pernestit. de simatapee pmnmnnsigweriien wane vagueness ee ERR= A Dialogue, Part wt, Tract i necessity, to determine that someone should rule over his similars and equals also, and not only over unequals and dissimilars.
To the argument by which Aristotle seems to prove absolutely and without distinction or qualification that it is unjust that someone should rule his similars and equals because equal office and rank is due to equals in virtue, it is answered that when it can come about suitably and usefully that equal office and rank is given to equals, then this should be done, and Aristotle is speaking with reference to this case. But when it is not possible or not useful or less useful, especially to the common good, for equal office and rank to be conferred on equals, then, without any injustice, indeed justly, by election or lot or in any other permissible way, someone can be promoted in rank and offices over his similars and equals.
If others were disturbed by this and were provoked into making a sedition, they would become dissimilar and unequal in virtue to the other to whom they had before been equal and similar, as being ambitious and envious, preferring their own honor to the common good, since they would rather want the common good to be endangered or not cared for than that someone should be promoted over them to the common advantage.
As for Aristotle's example of those who have equal or unequal digestive power and of those who have an equal or unequal body
(that it is beneficial for those equal in digestive power or body to have equal food or clothing, which harms those unequal in digestive power and body), it does not prove universally and without any exception that the same office and rank should be given to those who are equal and similar in virtue, because in the provision of food and clothing to equals or unequals in digestive power or body notice is taken only of each one's own strength and own body — namely, of what benefits or harms each of them separately. In distributing offices and ranks, however, notice is sometimes taken only of the merit and worth of those to whom they should be distributed, because it is then unjust that unequal office or rank should be given to equals, and then Aristotle's example has its place; but notice is sometimes taken not only of the merit and worth of those to be honored but also of the public advantage, which is better cared for governmentally by one than by many; and then, because more regard should be had to the common good than to the merit and worth of those to be honored, it is just that