Chapter 12
Eight Questions on the Power ofthe Pope established for the time: for that shouid be done for the time which for the time more advances the common good. And thus, by the will of God, who controls all things accerding to the suitability of times, the kingdom of the children of Israel, which at first was one, was afterwards divided into two kingdoms.
If, however, the best regime, whether of all mortals or of some, has been established, it must not afterwards be destroyed without the most urgent reason. Thus it could be interrupted for many reasons for which it could nevertheless not be destroyed. Accordingly, prescription could not destray it, since all prescription against the best regime seems iniquitous. And therefore, if prescription does not run against many lesser things, much more should it not run against the best regime, though it should run in its favor: just as prescription does not run against freedom but for freedom, for whoever has stood in the status of freedom for ten years must be regarded as a free man, Fxtra, De comiugio serverum, Licet.
Chapter 12 The opinion previously stated holds that through the above the things said in chapter 3 become clearer, and the whole argument adduced in chapter 1 is destroyed. For when, first, it is taken [as a premise] that a community of persons able to have communion with one another in which all or many are prone to discord, dissensions, and conflicts is not best ordered unless it is subject to one supreme rector, judge, and head upon whom the jurisdiction of all others depends, it is answered that it is not necessary to the best ordered community that all jurisdiction should depend upon the supreme ruler, in accordance with what was said above in chapters 10 and 1.
And when this is proved by the text of Proverbs 11[:14], "Where there is no governor the people perish," it is answered that this proves that the whole human race is not simply best ordered, and the simply best regime is not established over it, unless it is subject to one supreme ruler by whom anyone else is, at least in some case, punished if he does wrong. But the unity of the people subject to the best regime does not require that the jurisdiction of all others should depend upon the first ruler; for someone can be exempt in this respect, though he should not be exempt in every
Wilkam of Ockham case from punishment to be inflicted by the supreme ruler as first ruler of the whole community. Through the same [distinction] an answer if given to the text of John ro: "There will be one fold and one shepherd": for one supreme shepherd should be over one flock, and yet someone may be exempt from his rule in some case, namely when his exemption does not detract from the common good. And Jerome should be understood in the same way; for in every community one should be supreme rector and fudge, and yet, without detracting from the best regime, someone can be exempt in some things.
And when it is proved by argument that there should be a supreme upon whom the jurisdiction of ali others depends = because if in the whole world there is not one thus supreme, then there are or should be many without a superior, which seems to conflict with the best form of government, because they would rule either over the same or over different subjects, both of which seem unsuitable — it is answered that if the whole world were ruled by the best regime, although it would not be necessary for there to be one supreme upon whom in respect of institution and commission the jurisdiction of all others would depend, it would however be necessary for there to be one supreme ruler to whom every other should be subject as to a supreme ruler at least occasionally, by reason of some wrongdoing, though not by reason of every crime and in every case. And therefore there would not be many simply first with no superior; but there would be one simply first in respect of all, although different ones might be subject to him in different ways; for one of them could be exempt in many things without danger to the common good, and others could lack such exemption. Also, the one exempt could without prejudice to the common good have great power, even coercive, in No respect simply and regularly dependent upon the supreme ruler, because it would be enough if he were subject by reason of some wrongdoing to the supreme as to a ruler. And thus there would not be many simply supreme with no superior; therefore the argument brought forward to prove that it conflicts with the best regime in any cormmunity that there should be in that community several with no superior, whether they are over the same subjects or different ones, does not succeed against that mode of asserting the opinion.
Eight Questions on the Power ofthe Pape But perhaps someone will object on the other side that the argument does succeed also against this mode of the opinion. For if one is supreme, and another with power over many, even coercive power, is exempt in the above way from the one who is supreme, then the subjects of the exempt [ruler] are either exempt from the jurisdiction of the supreme ruler or they are not exempt from his jurisdiction, [f they are exempt from the jurisdiction of the supreme
[ruler], therefore the supreme [ruler] by no means rules all, and, consequently, in respect of the whole community there is not the best regime. And if they are not exempt from the jurisdiction of the supreme ruler, then the above argument succeeds; for it will be able to happen that the supreme ruler and the exempt [ruler] call the same subjects to their courts at the same time; therefore they will obey either both, which is impossible, or neither, and : then they will be disobedient to both, or they will obey one and not the other, and then they will inflict irreverence and injury on the one they do not obey.
To this it is answered that, without any imperfection of the best ; regime, it will be able to happen that the subjects of such an exempt |ruler] are exempt in many things {not in ail} from the jurisdiction of the supreme ruler, and that they are not exempt;"" and therefore, whether they are exempt or not, it is answered to the above argument that if the supreme ruler and the [ruler] thus exempt summon or cite the same subjects to their courts at the same time, then either they express the reason for the summons in such summons, or they do not express it. If they do not express it, they should go to the supreme ruler, because they are not obliged to obey the [ruler] thus exempt except "saving the rights of all others," just as the laity are not obliged to obey the pope except "saving the right of the secular ruler." In such a case his subjects therefore do not inflict injury upon the {ruler] thus exempt if they do not go to him, just as a bishop called to a synod does not cause injury to the one who calis him if he is impeded by a royal command, dist. 28, Si episcopus, where the gloss notes that "here deference is paid to the royal office, as in 12, q. 2, De rebus, dist. 63, Salonitanae. For the authority of a greater ruler excuses" —
© That is, ether arrangement is consistent with the best regime.
{oe at ARAN gp asudersarecietne ocmede re , William of Ockham as the gloss notes on dist. 63, c. Safonitange - "as in 14, q. §, Dect." And if those who thus call the same subjects at the same time do express the reason for the summons, a general rule cannot be given for every case to decide whom they should go to, because often necessity excuses one called to a superior, and often the one called is not at all excused; accordingly often necessity excuses one called by a superior, yet when he is called by an inferior necessity does not excuse him, because no necessity appears by which he can be excused. Therefore, when those thus called can be excused, it should be left to the diseretion of a prudent person [to decide] which he should appear before, because in such matters, because of the multiplicity of the cases that can happen, it is not possible to give a general rule that never fails. Nevertheless, it is said that they should appear before the supreme ruler unless reason dictates that because of some urgent necessity - for example, because of a weightier matter or something similar - they are excused for not appearing before him and not [for not appearing) before the other.
But perhaps someone will say to this: If a fruler] thus exempt is only occasionally subject to the supreme ruler, by reason of some wrongdoing, it follows thac he is not more subject to him [the supreme ruler] than the supreme ruler is to him, because occasionally, by reason of some wrongdoing, he can himself punish the supreme ruler, namely when all others have failed and the correction or punishment of the supreme ruler could not be passed over under dissimulation without danger io the whole commonwealth.
To this it is answered that [the ruler} thus exempt would be subject to the supreme ruler rather than vice yersa, because the first ruler would have power to punish [the ruier] thus exempt, not only from necessity, when all his subjects failed, but also by reason of the supreme rulership; but the [ruler] thus exempt would have power to correct the supreme ruler only from necessity, not by reason of his office, when all others, or the people, failed.
And when it is taken as the minor [premise] of that argument that the one supreme judge or ruler should not be anyone but the highest pontiff, it is answered that if the totality of mortals were best ordered and subject to the best regime, then, given the reasonable ordinance by which Christ determined that the highest pontiff and other clergy should in no way be involved in secular business except in case of necessity, the one supreme ruler or judge ought
Eight Ouestions on the Power ofthe Pope not be the highest pontiff but a secular ruler, lay and Christian.
That he should be a layman, and not the highest pontiff or even a cleric, is proved by the fact that, as was proved above, Question
1, chapter 4, outside the case of necessity or of utility comparable with necessity, the clergy should be strangers te secular business.
That he should be a Christian is clear from the fact thae otherwise he would try not to foster but to destroy the common spiritual good, which goes against and conflicts with the best regime over the totality of mortals.
But when it is said that the jurisdiction of the highest pontiff, especially in matters that pertain to the faith and the Christian religion, depends upon Ged alone, it is answered that, just as the possibility of understanding in various ways the statement that baptism and other sacraments depend upon God alone was in some
, way touched on above, Question m1, chapter 3, so the statement that the jurisdiction of the highest pontiff depends upon God alone can be understood in different ways - for the present, in three ways. In one way, that the highest pontiff receives his jurisdichon
; from God without human ministry, so that he can in no case be appointed or deposed by man; and his jurisdiction does not depend upon God alone in that way, since no one except blessed Peter was appointed to the papacy without human choice. In another way it can be understood that such jurisdiction depends upon God alone in respect of appointment, with the concurrence of human ministry — namely, canonical election, and that opinion concedes that the jurisdiction the pope has by Christ's ordinance depends in that way upon God alone. Third, that it depends on God alone not only in that way, but also in respect of deposition, so that the pope cannot be deposed by anyone in any case except by God alone; and it does not depend upon God alone in this way, since the pope himself, and also another, can on occasion depose him.
For he can depose himself both by heretical wickedness and by voluntary renunciation. And just as he can be accused by a man of any crime whatever, if it is notorious and causes scandal to the Church and he is incorrigible (as the gloss notes on dist. 40, c.
Si papa), so in such a case he can be judged, or deposed and removed, by man; for every accusation must be made before a judge. And the pope should not be disturbed about this, lest he seem to seek to be preeminent and not to be useful; lest, against William of Ockham the teaching of Christ given to the apostles for themselves and for all the prelates of the Church, he should wish salt that has lost its savor not to' be thrown out and trampled on by men; lest, against Christ's commandment, he should not wish the putrid member to be cut off for the health of his mystical bedy; lest he desire an erring brother corrected in charity not te be regarded as a heathen and a publican even though he has not heard the Church; lest he show that he does not want the rotten flesh cut off, the scabby sheep driven out of the fold, the ferment cleared out that corrupts the whole mass, but wishes himself to be spared and the whole Church led into ruin - all of which it is fitting to banish from the desires of the pope, who is bound to lay down his life for his subjects.
Therefore, according to that opinion, although the pope is rightly exempt from the power and jurisdiction of the supreme ruler in matters through which he has to provide for the welfare of all, so that he cannot be obstructed in them by anyone (and if the supreme ruler wishes to be useful and not to be preeminent, he is obliged to accept and praise this exemption), nevertheless, by reason of wrongdoing — not of any wrongdoing whatever (lest his authority seem contemptible, and lest for some small action, perhaps amended, he could be hindered from [furthering] the common utility), but of serious and very great wrongdoing, especially wrongdoing often repeated, that would abound in noteworthy danger, especially to the common good — it is beneficial that the pope should be able to be deposed and removed by human judgment, especially if he appears incorrigible and the Church is seandalized by him.
And it seems reasonable that such judgment concerning the pope should pertain first to some certain persons of the clergy; if they fail, whether through wickedness or through reprehensible negligence or through lack of power, this pertains to the supreme ruler, if he is a sincere and fervent follower of the faith and the Christian religion.
And if he fails (whether through wickedness or through reprehensible negligence), the deposition of the pope (or at least his detention or prohibition from becoming insolent with impunity) pertains either to the whole congregation of the faithful or to any faithful persons whatever able to have enough temporal power over him, so that a suitable remedy can be found in the Church (as [it can] against Eight Questions on the Power of the Pope the sin of any Christian, litde or great), in accordance with the text af the Apostle in 1 Corinthians, 5{:13], "Throw out evil from yourselves" {and he also says, "Throw out the old ferment') unless temporal power fails. in that case Jerome's advice must be observed, which we read in 11, q.
3, Quando ergo, namely that Christians, even those with understanding and prudence, should be silent, "lest they give holy things to dogs and throw pearls before swine, who will turn and trample on them; and let them imitate Jeremias when he said 'I sat alone, because I was full of bitterness.' "
And evidence that by reason of wrongdoing the pope in some case receives the court of the supreme ruler, who should be a layman, is taken from the divine Scriptures, in which we read that when Christ and the apostles were accused of crimes they were
; judged by secular judges, even unbelievers, And although they denied the crimes attributed to them, it is not found that they asserted or protested that they were not obliged in such a case to answer before such judges; indeed, they seem rather to have suggested that in such cases they were subject to them. For Christ gaid to Pilate, as we read in John igf:11}, "You would not have any power over me unless it were given to you from above." In these words Christ seems to have suggested that in that case Pilate had lawful and ordinate power over him given from above (that is, by God, according to the exposition of some teachers, or by a true emperor, according to the exposition of others). Therefore the power Pilate had over Christ in that case was not only permitted and usurped, but granted and given. The Apostle also seems to have asserted the same thing about himself when he was accused of a crime before unbelieving judges. As we read in Acts 24{:ro], he said to the governor, "Knowing that you have been a judge over this nation for many years, 1 will with good courage answer for myself." He did not say, "I am not obliged to answer before you," but he said, "I will answer for myself"; therefore he seems by deed and word to have recognized that in that case he was his judge. And as we read in chapter 25[:10-11], he said to the governor Festus: "I stand at Caesar's judgment-seat, where J ougat to be judged. I have done no injury to the Jews, as you well know.
William of Ockham For if | have injured them, or done anything deserving death, I do not refuse to die. But if there is nothing in these things they accuse me of, no one can deliver me to them. I appeal to Caesar."
In these words Paul recognized both Festus and Caesar as his judges. Since, therefore, it is wrong to say that Paul lied in word or deed, Caesar was, in truth, Paul's judge.
But perhaps someone wilt say that from this a manifest absurdity would follow, namely that the emperor, even an unbeliever, would be the pope's judge in a case of faith; for Paul's case, which was dealt with before the governor, was a case of faith, for he was accused by the Jews on account of the Christian faith. To this it is answered that a case of faith would be rightly dealt with before a faithful emperor if others failed, because, as we read in dist. 96,
Ubinam, a question of faith "pertains not only to the clergy but also to the laity and to absolutely all Christians." And before an unbelieving emperor a case of faith could be treated, not insofar as it related solely to the truth divinely revealed, but insofar as it could touch upon morals and detract from the commonwealth and bring injury upon the common good or upon any person. The proconsul Gallio seems to have prudently suggested both of these things; as we read in Acts 18[:14-15], when Paul was accused by the Jews, he said to them: "If, indeed, it were some matter of injustice, or a terrible crime, O Jews, I would rightly bear with you. But if they are verbal questions about names of your law, see to it yourselves, I will not be judge of them." Thus, therefore, it is said that on occasion, by reason of wrongdoing, the pope would be subject to che emperor.
To ail other canons and texts from which it is inferred that the pope must not be judged by anyone, it is answered that they should not be understood generally without any exception, but with their exceptions, as also countless other rules and also a great many texts of divine Scripture should be understood, even though they are uttered, not only indefinitely, but even in general words and with universal signs, And thus the gloss to 9, q. 3, c. Nemo, lists some exceptions, namely when the pope submits himself, as in 2, q. 7, Nos, si, and when he entrusts himself to his confessor; also in a case of heresy. And this last [exception] is included by the gloss to dist. 40, c. Si papa, which adds another (spoken of above) that comprehends countless others, namely, "if any crime of his,