Chapter 11
A Dialogue, Part 11, Tract 1 the excessive temporal power of such an emperor — argues from an inadequate division: for it might not happen for either of those reasons, but because of the unusual and particular wickedness of subjects, or because for some determinate time it is not certain that someone suited to such an office could be found.
To the eleventh argument — which is based on the premise that if it were not always beneficial that one emperor should be lord over all mortals, this would be because it is against natural law or against positive law — it is answered that since natural law is a natural commandment, as can be gathered from the gloss included in dist. 1, fus naturale, then, just as there can be a twofold division of natural commandments, so there can be found a twofold division
; of the natural law. Some natural commandments are absolute and without any condition, qualification, specification, or determination, such as "De not worship strange gods," "Do not commit adultery,"
"Do not bear false wimess," "Do not lie," and the like, And some are not absolute but are subject to some condition, qualification, specification or determination, such as "Use something of another's even against the owner's will — if you are in a situation of extreme necessity," "Cut off one of your members - to preserve the health of the body," and the like. Thus there is a ¢wofold natural law: some absolute and some with some condition, qualification or specification or determination, It cannot be against natural law in the first sense for one emperor to preside over all mortals, because then in no case could any emperor ever rule licitly over all mortals.
But it can be against natural law in the second sense for one emperor to preside over all mortals, because natural reason says that one emperor should ot rule over all mortals - when such lordship would be to the detriment and ruin of the commonwealth and of the common good. And therefore such lordship is as a rule just and expedient and in harmony with natural law, but on occasion it can be wicked and contrary to natural law in the second sense.
Chapter 11 Student I have heard how answer is made to the arguments by which it seems possible to prove that it is always and in every case beneficial for one secular ruler to preside over all mortals in temporal matters. Now I wish to hear how the arguments are
William of Ockham dissolved which were brought forward in chapter 2 above, by which it seems possible to show that it is never beneficial for the totality of mortals to be under one secular ruler in ternpora) matters.
Master To the first of those reasons -— which is based on the premise that the division of kingdoms proceeded from God, who rules all things in the best way — it is answered that God does some things to punish the sins of the bad, and those things are beneficial when the bad should be punished: but often, when the bad are not to be punished, they are not beneficial but the contrary.
And the division of kingdoms was from God to punish the sin of the bad; and therefore, when kings were not to be appointed to punish the sins the wicked have committed, but for the advantage of the good and te preserve them from evil deeds, it would be beneficial for all kingdoms to be subject to one supreme ruler.
The second argument - which is founded on the premise that God was displeased by the request of the Israelite people, who were using the justest laws, when they requested that a king be given to them is answered in many ways. In one way, that the people's request displeased God, not because they requested something bad, but because they asked with a bad will and a bad intention. They did indeed ask with a bad intention, because they asked for a king over themselves so as ta be in this respect like the unbelievers. And thus they said, as we read in Kings 8[:5,19,20]: "Make us a king to judge us, as all nations have."
And afterwards in the same chapter we read as follows: "But the people would not hear the voice of Samuel, but they said, 'Nay: for there shall be a king over us, and we also will be like all peopies.'" They were asking for a king also with a bad will, because, being ignorant and stupid, they asked for a king so as to avoid thereby the rule of Samuel, who had ruled them most justly.
God himself, who saw their hearts, testified to this, it seems, when he said to Samuel: "According to all their works that they have done from the day when I brought them out of Egypt until this day, as they have forsaken me and served strange Gods, so do they also unto thee."'® From these words we gather that they wickedly wished to avoid Samuel's rule.
Smdent It seems that they did not desire to throw off Samuel's rule but that of his sons, who were unjust and wicked and therefore y Kings 8:8.
A Dialogue, Part ui, Tract were rightly to be driven away. In the same place we read: "And it came io pass when Samuel was old, that he appointed his sons to be judges over Israel... And his sons walked not in his ways: but they turned aside after lucre and took bribes and perverted judgment. Then all the ancients of Israel, being assembled, came to Samuel at Ramatha. And they said to him, 'Behold, you are old, and your sons walk not in your ways: make us a king, to judge us."'° From these words we gather that they were content with Samuel's rule, but the rule of his sons displeased them.
Master It is answered that although they were not willing to say explicitly that Samuel's rule displeased them, they implied that it displeased them when they said, 'Behold, you are old," as if to say, 'Now you are not fit to mule"; and they alleged the wickedness of his sons only to hide their bad will, because they intended chiefly to throw off Samuel. We are given to understand this by God's words quoted above.
Student ] have heard one answer to that argument; now relate another.
Master In another way it is answered that although, as has often been said above, it is beneficial as a rule that a king should be ford in temporal matters, on occasion it is not beneficial. When it is beneficial and when not, though often hidden from men, and especially from the inexpert and the bad, is never hidden from God, to whom all things are naked and open. And therefore, when it was hidden from those petitioners that it was not beneficial to them to have a king, their request displeased God because, without questioning him who had ordained that they should not be ruled by a king because he knew it would not be beneficial to them to have a king, they unwisely and impudenty and unseasonably asked for a king. They should not have asked for a change in the way of ruling ordained by God before questioning the mouth of the Lord; though having a king is not as a rule bad — indeed, it is good as a rule and bad on occasion.
The third argument — which is founded on the premise that that form of government is better which is more like the form of government that would have existed if men had remained in the state of innocence, who would never have had one emperor of Kings 8:1-5.
Wiliam of Ockham all — is excluded by this: because of the difference between the state of innocence and the state of fallen nature, the form of government more like the form of government that would have existed in the state of innocence is not always better in the state of fallen nature — just as the form of government more iike the form of government that will exist in the state of glory is also not better in the state of fallen naturc, because then it would be better for each to rule himself and no one to have rule or prelacy over others (because in the state of glory rule or prelacy will not exist).
The fourth argument — which is based on the premise that for one emperor to be lord over all mortals is against the law of nations, which is the natural law, and is consequently never beneficial or permissible -— it seems possible to refute by the things said in the preceding chapter. Although what is against the law of nations is sometimes wicked, it is not always wicked: sometimes, indeed, it is equitable as a rule and wicked on occasion. For (at least in respect of many things) the law of nations is not the absolute natural law without any condition, qualification, determination, or specification, but is the natural law conditioned, qualified, or with some specification or determination. For as we read in the Decreta, dist. 1, Jus gentium, "To the law of nations belong wars, captivities, enslavements"; these, however, do not exist by natural law absolutely, without any condition, qualification, specification, or determination, because then the opposites would never be permissible, because what is against the absolute natural law is never permissible but always impermissible and beyond dispensation, Extra, De consuetudine, c. Cum tanto, and dist. 9, para. 1.°° Therefore, even if one emperor is lord over all, wars, captivities, and intermarriages between foreigners may sometimes be in accordance with the law of nations and can therefore pertain to the natural law that is conditioned or qualified or with some specification or determination.
However, they are not always wicked," because they do not belong to the absolute natural law that does not vary but remains unchange- » Rather, dist. §, para. 1. See gloss to dist. 3, col.
13, v. Hace, quae: "Against natural law no dispensation is made."
2" qua; but the argument seems to require cequa, "right." The objection is that a world emperor would prevent war, which is in accordance with the law of nations; the answer is that the law of nature does not require war.
A Dialogue, Part 1, Tract ir able and immovable," dist. 5, para. 1, and dist. 6, para. Ais itague.
The fifth argument - which is founded on the premise that some mortals are believers and some unbelievers, who should not bear the same yoke or have community or peaceful society with one another or have recourse to the same judge to receive judgment and consequently should not be under one emperor — it seems can be broken in many ways. First, because even if it were true that believers should not bear the yoke of unbelievers with unbelievers and should not have community or peaceful society with unbelievers when the unbelievers attack believers or do anything mim contempt of the creator or try to draw believers to mortal sin, and that believers should not have recourse to an unbelieving judge to receive judgment, it would, nevertheless, be permissible for believers to bear the yoke of defievers with unbelievers and to have community and peaceful fellowship with them if they attempt nothing bad, and 10 have recourse with them to a believing judge to receive judgment; and therefore, even if it were not permissibic for believers to be under one unbelieving emperor of al] mortals, it would, nevertheless, be permissible for both unbelievers and believers to be under one believing emperor. Second, because even if believers should not bear the same spiritual yoke with unbelievers, they can licitly bear with unbelievers the same temporal yoke. And thus there were many believers in both the New and Old Testaments who bore the same temporal yoke with unbelievers, obeying an unbelieving ruler. Believers can also licitly have community and peaceful society with unbelievers, as many saints did have, though not in sin and against God's honor.
It is permissible also on aceasion for believers to have recaurse te an unbelieving judge to undergo judgment, on the example of many saints who did this.
And thus it could on occasion be beneficial that even an unbelieving emperor should preside over all mortals.
Third, because it is accidental that some are believers and some unbelievers, for all mortals were believers once, and it could happen still.
The sixth argument — which is based on the premise that no one is adequate to caring for all mortals is refuted by this:
" See gloss to the decretals, Extra, De consuetuaine, ¢. Cum tanto, col. yg, ¥. Naturatt juri: "Which remains unmovable."