Chapter 10
William of Ockham ence of right, Extra, De simonia, Etsi questianes,"* 12, q. 2, c. Terrulas, and c. Bona rei, and 1, q.
1, Judices. And thus sometimes great things do harm but not small; for also "a moderate amount does ne harm," as is noted in the gloss on the prologue to the Decretals,'4 and Extra, De rescriptis, Si proponente. Bue when there is the same reason concerning whole and part and concerning great matters and small, then a similar judgment must be made of them and the same right exists in them, since 'where there is the same reason there ought to be the same right,"
Axtra, De comstitutionibus, Transiato."© But there is never, or not always, the same reason concerning the whole world and one particular kingdom, because, as was suggested before, it can happen, because of the particular and unusual wickedness of some multitude that has great power or because of the inadequacy of the person to be appointed, that to set one ruler over all will be detrimental to the common good, whereas to set one ruler over one particular kingdom will be to the advantage of the inhabitants of that kingdom; and therefore in such a case a similar judgment should not be made concerning the whole world and concerning one particular kingdom.
[2] In another way it is said that it is also often not beneficial that one king should be set over one kingdom. Indeed, just as sometimes different bishoprics should be united, 16, q. 1, Et semporis qualitas, so it would sometimes be beneficial to the commonwealth for different kingdoms to be united and for one person to reigo over several kingdoms. And when there did not exist one world ruler, the more several kingdoms were united the more usefully they would be ruled, if some just man were to govern them for the common advantage and not for his own benefit.
Chapter 10 Student Lengthy treatment of the remaining arguments advanced for the first opinion above in chapter 1 would perhaps be tedious
? See gloss to the deecretals, col. 1617, ¥. Modici prety.
" Rather, 11, q 1, /udices. See gloss, col. 506, v. Quingite sunt obelt.
* See gloss to the decretal, col. 5, v. far sudiciis.
= See gloss to the decretals, col. 82, v. ffans competens.
'6 See gloss to the decretals, col. 16, ¥. Quod de una.
A Dialogue, Part 1, Tract u to the reader, so if one answer can be given to them | would like to hear it.
Master It appears to some that they are refuted by a single answer, since they all infer that it is tue as a rule that it would be beneficial for the whole world to be under one secular ruler; this fails in some cases, however, and for these cases those arguments do not prove their point.
Student To me that answer seems too general, and therefore it will in no way appear reasonable unless it is applied particularly to those arguments. So try to apply it briefly to those arguments.
Master The fourth argument adduced above in chapter 1 — which is based on the premise that since all mortals can have community with one another in temporal matters they will not be governed
, best unless they are subject to one secular ruler, and therefore it is beneficial for all to be subject 10 ome emperor - seems to be ruled out by this: By no means will all who can have community with one another not be governed best unless they are subject to one ruler; therefore on occasion it is not beneficial for all to be subject to one emperor. For on occasion the best way of governing mortals is wrongly blocked, and therefore, because of the particular wickedness of subjects or because of the iniquity or inadequacy of the one te be appointed to empire, the totality of mortals sometimes cannot be governed in the best way. In some cases, therefore, it
| is better - abandoning the best form of government, because it cannot be had = for different provinces to be subject to different rulers than for one ruler to claim for himself, to the ruin of many, lordship of the world: even if he is elected by those who, if the community of mortals had been well disposed, by right and in fact should have promoted to world empire someone worthy and suitable.
And the fifth argument - which is based on the premise that if the totality of mortals were subject to one secular ruler, discord among mortals would be abolished more effectively than if there were several rulers with no superior — is broken by this: although it is true as a rule that discords are taken away more effectively by the government of one man than by several, yet this fails in the cases spoken of before.
The sixth argument - which seems to have its force from the premise that conflicts and litigations are decided more fairly if all
Witham of Ockham mortals have one supreme judge than if there are several supreme judges - is overturned by this: as a rule this [premise] has truth when all obey one both by right and in fact, yet it fails in the cases often mentioned before.
The seventh argument — which is founded on the premise that if the totality of mortals were subject to one, net only inferiors but also superiors, even kings, if they do wrong, can be lawfully corrected, which would not happen if there were several rulers with no superior — is answered by this: this [premise] is true as a rule, if no multitude powerfully rebels against a ruler of the world reigning powerfully and justly; it fails, however, when he who is by right lord of the world would not reign thus.
The eighth argument - which is founded on the premise that among all mortals there should be such a connection that each in respect of another is a superior or an inferior, as is gathered from the text of Popes Gregory and Boniface — is refuted by this,'' that without such a connection of all mortals the totality of mortals will not be governed by the best form of government, and therefore there should be such a connection among all mortals, and consequently all mortals (if they were disposed in the best way, so far as the condition of mortals permits) should be subject to one ruler: but because such a connection is in fact obstructed by wickedness, it can therefore happen on occasion that such 4 connection of all mortals also does not exist, even by right.
The ninth argument — which is based on the premise that God ordained that many rulers should be lords over mortals to punish the sins of men, and consequently such lordship of many rulers is not best - does indeed prove that the lordship of one ruler over the whole world is better than the lordship of many rulers with no superior: however, because such lordship cannot be had in fact, due to the unworthiness of men and by the just judgment of God, it is therefore on occasion beneficial that such jordship should cease for a time, even by right, so that no one is in fact raised to such lordship.
The tenth argument — which is based on the premise that if it is not beneficial to the totality of mortals to be under one emperor, this would be either because of human inadequacy or because of The refutation comes after various points have been conceded, after the colon.