Chapter 3
Eight Questions on the Power of the Pepe Again, the Christian religion frees no one from slavery, as was argued above, Question il, chapter 8. Therefore if the pope was subject to the emperor before he was made pope, he remains subject to the emperor and a slave, unless the emperor voluntarily grants him freedom and immunity.
But someone will say that a slave appointed to the papacy is set free from slavery, and also from al! subjection, in favor of the Christian religion, just as a slave made priest is set free from slavery in favor of the Church. To this it is said that nothing unjust should be enacted in favor of religion or of the Church, because impiety must not be done on the pretext of piety, £4, q5, Forte, 1, g.
1, Non est puiandum. Since, therefore, it is unjust and wicked that anyone should, without fault, be deprived of his right, the Church cannot enact that the emperor or another should
; be deprived of the right that he had in the person of the pope before he was appointed to the papal office, "lest," as the Apostle says, in t Timothy 6[:1], "the Lord's name and teaching be blasphemed." Pope Gelasius seems to follow this teaching, as we read in dist. 54, c. Generalis; he affirms that slaves should never evade their lords' rights on a pretext of religion, "lest it seem that by something established in the name of Christianity either the rights of others are invaded or public discipline is subverted." It seems, therefore, that if a slave becomes priest or highest pontiff, he is not delivered from slavery by either divine or natural jaw, Neither can he be delivered from slavery by canon law, because the canon laws can by no means abolish secular laws and rights of seculars that are not at all opposed to divine and natural law. Therefore, if a slave made pope or priest is delivered to freedom, it must be that his freedom is gained by the human law of the emperors.
Chapter 3 Having briefly reported these opinions, we must see how answer is made in accordance with them to the arguments brought against them. According to the opinion reported last, there are various ways of answering the argument brought forward above in chapter
1 in favor of the first opinion. in one way it is conceded that no community is best ordered unless it is subject to one supreme judge, and therefore it is
Willtam of Ockham conceded that, if all mortals should be governed by the best form of government, they should have one supreme judge, appointed by the choice of the totality of mortals or by the greater or sounder part. And this judge should not be the pope, but another who does not exercise the highest priesthood; and the pope and everyone else would be subject to him in alf matters that belong to the office of supreme judge. So the pope, by Christ's institution, has no coercive jurisdiction or power, either regularly or occasionally, either in temporal or in spiritual matters — although he has from Christ the power to absolve from sin in the penitential forum, to administer the other Church sacraments, and to teach how we should live so as to acquire everlasting life.
This answer seems to be based on the divine Scriptures, for we read in them, it seems, that Christ prohibited all coercive power to his apostles when he said, Matthew zo[:25], "You know that the rulers of the peoples lord it over them, and the great men exercise power over them; it will not be so among you." From these words we gather that the apostles should have exercised no power over others; this should be understood especially of coercive power; therefore neither does the pope, Peter's successor, have by Christ's institution any coercive power. This also seems provable from the fact that Christ, of whom the pope is only the vicar, never exercised any coercive power but wished to be judged by a secular judge; therefore neither does his vicar have any coercive power, but he is subject in ali things to a secular judge.
In another way it is answered that in spiritual matters the pope has full and even coercive power, and another judge has power only in temporal matters; and yet the community of mortals, despite this, can be best ordered; and therefore the statement "A community is not best ordered unless it is subject to one supreme judge" is denied.
And in another way, according to the second opinion reported above, it is said that no community of persons able to have discords among themselves would be best ordered if it mere subject regularly and in every case to one supreme judge: for in such a community the supreme judge could do wrong with impunity, to the destruction of the whole community, and this conflicts with the best ordering of any community. Again, it does not conflict with the best ordering of a community if other persons besides the supreme judge have,