Chapter 26
William of Ockharm be established or had: and, consequently, in such things a use of right separate from lordship or ownesship cannot be had, because in them no use of right in the proper sense can be had.
Following from this they say that they do not mean to deny in every sense the proposition, "The Friars Minor are not to be regarded as simple users in things consumed by use," and they do not mean to concede its opposite in every sense. For as has been said, if the word "user" corresponds in meaning with the word "use" as it is taken for use of right, then they grant that in this sense the Friars Minor are not simple users, either in things consumed by use or in things not consumed by use, because in neither the former nor the later are they users, because they have no use of right in anything. But if the word "user" corresponds in meaning with the word "use" as it is taken for use of fact, then they concede that in this sense the Friars Minor are simple users, that is, they use things without having any right by which they could litigate in court.
{On the letter] After this we must look at the letter. Use of right or offact: From this it 1s clearly established that even the attacked distinguishes between use of right and use of fact. Let him explain, therefore, what is use of fact and what is not use of right; he will not be able to, except by saying that acts of using, such as acts of eating, drinking, living in, riding, and the Jike, are uses of fact.
Neither a right of using. Here he should show what is the right of using that is put into the definition of use of right. Said was his:
Here the word "his" is taken as implying lordship or ownership of the thing, though it can be taken in another sense. The saints explain thus: "His, that is, proper":
It is true that they explain it thus in that place, but in some other places they explain the word "his" in other ways. Without ownership and lordship. This is true of the lordship which includes the pawer to give, sell, and bequeath.
Chapter 26 Qohn XXIE] To this it must be said that his statement that in the state of innocence our first parents did not have lordship of anything but only simple use of fact (at least after the blessing, "Increase," etc.} expressly contradicts sacred ScripThe Work ofNinety Days ture. For we read in Genesis 1[:28] that the Lord said to our first parents, "Increase and multiply, and fill the carth and subject it." (In place of "subject it" another reading has "and dominate it'; Augustine follows this reading in his Literal Commentary on Genesis, and in his Cry of Ged, Book xr, chapter xxi.) The passage continues, "And dominate the fish of the sea and the birds of the air, and all living things thar move upon the earth." From this it appears evident that after the blessing our first parents had lordship (dominium] in the state of innocence over the earth, the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and all living things that move upon the earth.
[Ockham] In this part the attacked tries to answer the foregoing objection. First he answers the point assumed about the state of innocence, that our first parents had the use of things consumable by use without having lordship and ownership of them. Second, he answers the chapter of Clement, at "There is no objection"
[chapter 28]. The first part is divided into two: first he shows that in the state of innocence our first parents had lordship of temporal things; second he asks what sort of lordship, common or exclusive
[proprium], and shows that the first man had exclusive lordship of such things. The second part is at "And if it be asked" [chapter
First, therefore, answering the objection, he says that our first parents, at least after the blessing "Increase," ete., had lordship of things. He proves this by the words of Genesis quoted above.
Bur the attackers say that the attacked here argues frivolously and does not go to the appellant's meaning. For the appellant meant to speak of lordship exclusive to some person or particular group.
To indicate this plainly, he always or frequently adds a reference to ownership when he speaks of lordship — e.g. "lordship or ownership" (or something equivalent) — to make it understood that he speaks of the lordship which in the legal sciences is called ownership. Now the lordship called "ownership" in the legal sciences and in writings that observe the manner of speaking of the legal sciences is something exclusive to some single person or particular group in virtue of which he or they can litigate in court, as plaintiff or defendant, against another person or group claiming or detaining the thing in which the lordship is had. They try to prove that the lordship called ownership or exclusive lordship is of this sort.
William of Ockham To make this clear they say that it must be known that just as everything called '"'preprivm" [his, her, their own; exclusive] belongs to some and not to another or others, so it is also of proprietas
Jownership, property}, which is so called because it belongs to some and not to another or others. The lordship, therefore, which is called "ownership" is se called either [1] because it belongs to some man or men and not to another man or men, or [2] because it belongs to a man or men and to no other or others outside the human race. Hf the first is granted the point is established, that the lordship the appellant speaks of is exclusive to some single person or to some particular group. The second cannot be said, because man does not have lordship of any thing without there being someone outside the human race who also has lordship of the same thing. This is indeed certain of God, because "The Lord's is the earth and its fullness." It seems also to be true of the angels, extending "lordship" to the kind of lordship our first parents had in the state of innocence, because the whole of the rest of creation is no less subject to the angels now than it was then to our first parents. The lordship called "ownership" therefore did not exist in any way in the state of innocence and never would have existed if our first parents had not sinned, because nothing would have been appropriated in such a way to any single person or particular group.
And so, since the lordship pertaining to our first parents is to be called "lordship" equivocally with respect to the lordship of which the appellant spoke and the laws speak, it is clear that the attacked argues against him frivolously, without at all touching his meaning. It must be conceded, therefore, that our first parents did have lordship of temporal things, just as it can be said that the angels have lordship over the demons and over temporal things because the demons and temporal things are subject to the angels, who dominate them: but the appellant's appeal does not mention such lordship.
; [On the letter] fn the state of innocence our first parents did not have lordship of anything, Although this has a true sense — because according to them it is true if we take "lordship" for the lordship that gives rise to human contracts and to court actions, because
The Work ofNinety Days our first parents did not have any lordship of this kind {for in the state of innocence there were no such contracts, such as purchase, sale, gift, lease, loan, and the like, or court actions, and therefore they did not have any lordship of this kind) — nevertheless in those words the appellant does not say this. He says, "The first man, and his posterity, if they had not fallen, would have had the use of things consumable by use without ownership and lordship of them." In these words he indicates clearly that he speaks of the lordship which in law is called "ownership"; and our first parents had no such lordship in the state of innocence. Thus, although it must be conceded that in the state of innocence our first parents had lordship, in some sense, over temporal things, nevertheless it should not be conceded that they then had ownership of temporal things: this is because just as the term "dominium" [lordship] has some meanings which the term "proprietas" ownership, property] does not have, so conversely the term "proprietas" has some meanings which the term "'dominium" does not have, though in the legal sciences "proprietas" is perhaps never taken in those meanings.
Bui only simple use offac: The appellant here makes absolutely no mention of this, although it is que inasmuch as simple use of fact excludes every right by which one can litigate in court: for there was no such right in the state of innocence. Expressly contradtcts sacred Scripture. They say that there is no contradiction. For a contradiction is an opposition of one and the same reality and name (not only name), according to the opinion of the wise man.®
But the appellant takes "lordship" in one way and in that passage of Genesis 1 divine Scripture takes it in another (though in many other places divine Scripture uses the term "lordship" in the way the appellant does here, and thus it was permissible for him to use the word "lordship" in that way, since the sacred Scripture and the legal sciences use it thus). Dominate: That is, use them effectively. Had lordship in the state of innocence. This is true of the lordship which is effective strength of ruling and using them for comfort and in other permissible ways; but mortals do not now have this kind of lordship over many temporal things. But it is not true of the lordship which is called ownership of temporal things, because such lordship did not then exist.
* Aristotle, Sophistical Refistations, ch. 5, 167 423. mom vceut wiguneeeines eigen eR Cp ee eeRR a I EES