Chapter 7
A Dialogue, Part mt, Tract it have the right to elect their bishop fram this, that they should have a bishop, and that those whom someone is to be set over should elect him* unless they resign their right or the contrary is decided on by their superior. But whether it should be said that, properly speaking, the Romans have the right to elect by divine law, or by natural law spoken of in the third way, or by the law of nations, or by divine law and the law of nations together, does not make much difference.
J1 seems to some, however, that it is properly said that they have the right to elect by divine law and the law of nations together. And therefore when you ask whether they have the right to elect by divine or human law, they say: from neither divine nor human law alone, but from both together, extending human law to [include] the law of nations® and not only civil and canon law.
Chapter 7 Student Now that that opinion has been explained at some length, let us see how the arguments brought forward on the other side in chapter 5 above are answered in aceordanee with it.
Master To the first it is answered that in respect of those things in which sufficient and useful provision is made for Catholics by divine law and natural law, the pope does not have power to change anything to the prejudice of any Catholics and to the detriment or danger of the common good; and therefore the head in spiritual matters of all Christians does not have full power to decide and decree by whom the head should be elected, since by divine and natural law the right of election belongs to the Romans ~ especially since if he had full power this could have detrimental and dangerous effects on the common good, as was shown before.
Student Why do they say that in this matter the pope does not have full power? According to them in this matter he has ae power, since the Romans have the right to elect from divine law.
Master They do not say that there is na case in which the pope has power in respect of this matter; rather, they think that on "" The text says: "those wham someone is to be set over, by them he should be elected."
* According to some of the civil law texts the law uf nations is natural law, which implies that it is not human law.
Witham of Ockham occasion the pope has powcr, even by Christ's ordinance and by the power granted to him by Christ, to decide who should elect his successor. To explain this they say that it must be known that Christ made sufficient provision for the Church in all necessary matters, and therefore, in entrusting the Church to blessed Peter he gave blessed Peter and his successors fullness of power in spiritual matters in respect of all things necessary to his Church saving the right of others, when they wish and are able to exercise their right as they ought: so that in spiritual matters the pope can, in all necessary matters, remedy the failure of others who do not wish or are not able to exercise their right. And therefore, because the Romans have by divine law the right to elect their bishop, the pope does not have power to make decisions about that election to the Romans' prejudice when the Romans would wish and would be able to exercise their right for the common good. Similarly, because on occasion other Catholics have the right to elect the highest pontff, the pope therefore also would not have power to make decisions about that election when, on such an occasion, the other Catholics wished to exercise that right appropriately. But if the Romans and other Catholics were not willing or were not able to exercise that nght, then the pope would have power to make decisions about the election of his successor.
Student Why do they say that the pope has such fullness of power in respect of necessary matters and do not say absolutely that he has fullness of power in all matters?
Master They say this because they think that Christ gave a law of such perfect liberty that (now that the ceremonial and legal
Jcommandments] of the Old Law are revoked} the pope has no power over Christians except in respect of things commanded or forbidden by God and in respect of things to be done of necessity, not in respect of things not to be done of necessity. Thus he cannot command anyone to do something supererogatory except in a case when it must be done of necessity, and then it would have to be regarded not as supererogatory but as necessary; for example, he could impose it on someone because of a fault to fast on bread and water or to enter a monastery or the like, but in such a case that would not be supererogatory for him but necessary, because the fulfillment of a due punishment must be counted among necessary things.
A Dialogue, Part mm, Tract it Student What do they say to this, which you cook as a premise: that Christ did not explicitly decide who should elect the head of Christians, therefore he left this to the pope?*'
Master It is said that because Christ decided nothing specifically or explicitly about this, he therefore wished that in this respect all should keep the rights they have by the law of nations — namely, that which the nations reasonably follow; and in this respect he therefore entrusted to the pope no power prejudicial to the Romans.
Student Say how the second argument brought forward above in chapter ¢ is answered.
Master It is answered that the deeds of the saints are not always to be taken as a precedent, and it is therefore often not possible to prove from examples what should be done normally, though they can often be used to show what could be done on occasion.
The fact, therefore, that blessed Peter appointed his own successor cannot prove what the pope can do from Christ's specific ordinance; however, we can draw from it what a pope could do who was in every way such as blessed Peter was. Hence Gratian says, as we read in 8, q.
1, para. His omnibus: 'And that action of blessed Peter," that is, that he handed on the pontifical office to blessed Clement, "can be taken as a precedent by those who replace themselves with persons such as the one blessed Peter sought as a successor."
Student If the pope has the same power as blessed Peter had, why can he not replace himself with a successor just as blessed
Master This is answered in two ways. [1] In one way, the answer is given by the gloss, in the place referred to above, on the word
Beatus, where it asks, "Could the pope still appoint a successor to himself", and it answers, "No, because this would be to change the state of the Church, as in 25, q.
1, Que ad perpetuam, and because he makes a law for a time when he will not be judge."
Student Does this answer satisfy others?
Master No, because neither argument for the answer is sound, as it seems tm them. Not the first, because the pope can change the state of the Church in respect of things over which he has power from Christ. For just as a king can command something that * See above, p. 282.
William of Ockham neither anyone before him, ner he himself, had ever commanded, dist. 8, Que contra, so also the pope can command something new and can revoke, from reasonable cause, many things customarily done. The second argument also dees not satisfy them, because that argument would prove that no bishop could select his successor even with the pope's permission, the contrary of which we read in 7, q. t, Pettsif.
Student Relate the other answer.
Master In another way [2] it is said that blessed Peter appointed his own successor by Christ's special revelation or inspiration, or he did so by the will and consent of the Catholic Romans, who had the right to elect.
Student Since neither of those things is shown from the Scriptures, this answer is despised as easily as approved.
Master To this it is said that what is not found in the Scriptures either explicitly or implicitly and aise is not proved by clear argument is despised as easily as approved; but it is proved by clear argument that one or other of those things happened, therefore both should not be despised.
Student Say how they answer the third argument brought forward in chapter 5.
Master To this it is answered that although the Romans had the right to elect the Roman bishop from natural law spoken of in the third way, they could in many ways have transferred that right and the power of appointing electors to another or to others, just as all the canons of a cathedral church have the right to elect the bishop and yet can grant it to another: for they can grant that power in various ways, to one, or to two, or to several, from among themselves: they can also grant the power to elect to someone outside their body, Extra, De electione, Causam que. The Romans, therefore, could have granted to the highest pontiff the power of appointing electors; they could also have granted the right of election to some few from among themselves. Also, as was said before, the highest pontiff on occaston has power to make decisions about the election of his successor. Also, although the pope himself can have no say in the election of a pope, nevertheless, insofar as he is a Roman, he can together with the other Romans discuss and decide whom the right to elect should be entrusted to. Also,
A Dialosue, Part wu, Tract u inasmuch as he is a Catholic, the pope can with the Romans and other Catholics, in a general council which represents all Carholic
Christians, discuss and decide whem the power to elect che highest pontiff is to be granted to. And thus in many ways the pope can have power to grant to another or others the right to elect the highest pontiff, even though the right to elect belonged to the Romans.
It must be conceded, therefore, that sometimes the pope has granted to certain kings, and sometimes to others, the right to elect the highest pontiff. But he has not done this because he alone always has power to grant such a right, but because the Romans transferred the right to elect either to him alone or to him and others together (namely some Romans who represented the Romans, and others).** And thus, as we read in dist. 63, c. 4drianus,
Pope Adrian — not alone, but himself and a synod held in Rome, in which there were many Romans — transferred to King Charles the right and power to elect the pontiff and ta make decisions about the Apostolic See; also, as we read in the same distinction, c. In synodo, Pope Leo — not alone, but with all the Roman clergy and people — granted to Orto J, King of the Teutons, power to ' make decisions about the pontiff of the highest Apostolic See; and thus the Romans consented ro this grant, as they were able to do, as was said before.
And therefore, alehough the emperor has, together with other Romans, the right to elect from the fact that he is a Catholic and a Roman, nevertheless it was sometimes the pope and other Romans who gave him the right to elect alone, without the other Romans.
He could also have it from the pope alone, if the Romans transferred their right to the pope, or, also, if in making decisions about the electors of the highest pontiff he Romans proved negligent, to the detriment of the Church. And it is likely enough that the Romans have transferred such right and power to the pope, and therefore from that time the pope alone has been able to grant the power to elect the highest pontiff either to the emperors, or io neighboring bishops, or to the cardinals, or to the Roman clergy, or to the canons of some church in Rome, or to others, as it has scemed to him would further the advantage of the Church.
" That as, to the pope in a general council or synod.
William of Ockham Stedent If the Romans have the right to elect the Roman bishop from divine law, how can they cransfer the right to the pope, since it is not permissible for anyone to contravene divine law?
Master It is answered that for anyone to contravene what beiongs to divine law in such a way that it is explicitly commanded or forbidden in divine law, or is inferred only from things contained explicitly in divine law, is not permissible. But to contravene what is from divine law because it is inferred from something contained implicitly in divine law and from natural law spoken of in the second way is permissible, for reasonable cause, just as it is permissible, for a reason, to contravene natural law spoken of in the second way; for although, as the holy fathers testify, by the law of nature all things are common, nevertheless it is permissible to appropriate | temporal things. In this second way" the Romans have the right to elect the Roman bishop, and not in the first way; therefore it is permissible for them, for a reason, to contravene this law.
Phat is, from divine law in the second sense, which is inferred from disine law in the first sense together with natural law in the second sense.
Eight Questions on the Power of the Pope Fight Questions on the Power of the Pope Question im. Whether by Christ's institution it pertains to the pope and the Roman Church to entrust to the emperor and other secular rulers temporal jurisdictions, which otherwise they may not exercise?
Arguments for the affirmative 2 Three positions answering the question in the negative Replies to the arguments in chapter 1
It is required for the best regime that it should exist for the sake of the common good of the subjects, not for the ruler's own good
It is required for the best regime that the ruler be one person It conflicts with the best regime to have only slaves as subjects
It conflicts with the best regime that the ruler should have such fullness of power that he could by right impose on his subjects all things not concrary to natural or divine law
8 The ruler ofwhom we are speaking scems to have been instituted most principally to correct and punish wrongdoers 31g 9 Itdoes not conflict with the best regime but is compatible with it, ifthe jurisdiction or power ofsome person or perEight Questions on the Pawer ofthe Pope sons within the community does not depend upon the supreme ruler of the community or was not established by him, provided no one who does wrong in that community is thereby able to escape just and due punishment ro It does not conflict with the best regime for someone in the community to be regularly exempt from the coercive power of the supreme ruler provided he is subject to the supreme ruler occasionally, so that he cannot insalently do wrong
11 The best regime should not always be established Replies to arguments in chapters 1 and 2 based on the principle that no community of persons prone to dissensions is best ordered unless it is subject in all things to one supreme judge
Replies in accordance with the position presented in chapter i to the arguments in chapter 2