Chapter 4
Eight Questions on the Power ofthe Pope -even regularly, a coercive power not prejudicial to the power of the supreme judge. Further, it does not conflict with the best ordering of a community if someone is regularly exempt from the coercive jurisdiction of the supreme judge, provided he is subject occasionally — namely, when the common good would otherwise be endangered. From these [propositions] it is inferred that it does not conflict with the best ordering of a community for the supreme judge, and others inferior to him, to be subject occasionally to someone other than the supreme judge, who would have coercive power over them.* Through this the above argument is answered as follows. No community of persons able to dissent is best ordered unless the whole of it is subject to one supreme judge regularly or occasionally, so that no one except the supreme judge is exempt from his power in such a way that in ne case would it be permissible for the supreme judge to coerce him; but for someone te be exempt regularly from the power of the supreme judge but subject to him in case of necessity does not detract from the best ordering of any community, just as it does not detract from the best ordering of a community (general or particular) if the supreme member of that community is regularly exempt from the power of the whole community and is yet in case of necessity subject to that same community. And therefore the totality of mortals is not best ordered unless it is subject to one supreme judge in that way, although on occasion it may be beneficial to recede from that best arrangement at least for a time.
Chapter 4 However, because those statements do not seem clear at every point, but obscure, so that someone could doubt how they should be understood, to elucidate their meaning and thereby make it clearer whether they are true or false, we must say briefly, in accordance with that [second] opinion, which things are requisite to the best regime, prelacy, rectorship, or form of government,
* 'Thus che pope and other clergy might have some coercive jurtsdiction, they might regularly be exempt from the secular ruler's jurisdiction, and on occasion the secular ruler might be subject to their jurisdiction. li William of Ockham which things conflict with it, and which should be regarded as compatible with it.
It is said, therefore, that it is required for the best regime, first, that it should exist for the sake of the common good of the subjects, not for the ruler's own good. For by this the best regime — both general, in respect of all mortals, and particular, in respect of certain persons — differs, not only from a regime that is illicit, yitiated, and unjust, but also from a despotic regime, i.e., lordly rule for the ruler's own good, and from ail other regimes, even licit ones, not directed to the common good.
But the papal and episcopal regime, insofar as it exists by Christ's ordinance, is of this kind, Christ seems to have suggested this when he appointed blessed Peter as pope, saying to him, "Feed my sheep," as if to say, "1 appoint you ruler over my sheep, not to take from them wool and milk, except for your necessities" (in accordance with the text of the Apostle,
1 Corinthians 9[:7], "Who feeds the flock, and dees not eat of the milk of the flock?") "but to feed them." Christ also seems to have promised blessed Peter rulership of this kind when he said to him, as we read in Matthew
16[:18], "You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell will not prevail against it. And I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven': as if to say, "I will promote you and put you over the rest only for the building up of my Church, net for dominating it" (as Peter himself suggests in his canonical epistle, 1 Peter 5[:3] when he says, "Not as dominating your charge") "so that you may lead it into the kingdom of heaven." And therefore by the words of Christ that follow,
"Whatever you bind upon earth will be bound alse in the heavens, and whatever you loose upon earth will be loosed also in the heavens," it is meant that power was promised to Peter over his subjects, not over others, for their building up, not for their destruction. And the Apostle says, in 2 Corinthians, last chapter {13:10}, that such a power over his subjects was given to him by the Lord.
Accordingly blessed Peter received no power from Christ except for the sake of his subjects' good in attaining the kingdom of heaven, so that he wonld not have been able to impose anything on them by commandment except what was necessary [0 them for reaching the kingdom of heaven. And therefore Christ's authority was of no avail to him against the rights and freedoms of the Eight Questions on the Power of the Pope faithful granted to them by God and nature, because he received power from Christ for building up, not for destroying the rights and freedoms granted to the faithful by Grod and nature: lest he should have seemed to be not merely their shepherd and slave but their lord, contrary to his own teaching by which he guided other bishops when he said, "Feed God's flock which is in your charge, caring for them not by constraint but willingly according to God, not for the sake of shameful gain but voluntarily, not as dominating your charge, but being a wholehearted example to the flock".'
Accordingly, if blessed Peter had ordered anything, either generally or in particular, contrary to the rights and freedoms of the faithful, outside of a situation of necessity and of a usefulness that could be equated with necessity, such an order would have obliged no one; and if he had pronounced any sentence against those not acquiescing, it would have been nuil by the Jaw itself, as having been passed "by someone not his judge," according to the rule in Extra, De regulis srs, Ea, in Book vi: "Things done by a judge which do not belong to his office have no force." For if what a prelate demands of his subject is contrary to a freedom granted to him by the pope, that subject is free to refuse, Extra, De excessibus praclatorum, Sane, and 10, q. 3, Quia cognovimus, and "a sentence contrary to a privilege of the pope is null, as being passed by one
'not his judge,' " Extra, De evcessibus praclaiorum, Cum ad querundam, in the gloss (and it seems to be taken explicitly from the text): a jortior' what Peter had demanded from his subject contrary to the freedom granted to him by God and nature that subject would have been free to refuse, and a sentence of Peter contrary to a privilege of God and nature would have been null, as being passed by one "not his judge," for in respect of the freedoms granted to the faithful by God and nature all were exempt from Peter's jurisdiction. Therefore, since the privileges and exemption that are granted by God and by nature should be more observed by everyone than those conferred by the pope or by blessed Peter, it seems to follow that every sentence of Peter contrary to such freedoms would have been null by the law itself, as having been passed by one
Such rculership, which looks only to the good of the subjects and not to the ruler's own good except insofar as it is included in * 1 Peter 9:2-3.
Witham of Ockham the good of others, Christ did not at all prohibit to the apostles, although he imposed on them, either by commandment or as advice, that they should abstain from all rulership existing for the sake of the ruler's own honor and advantage. He said to them, as we read in Matthew z0[:25]: "You know that the rulers of the peoples Jord it over them, and the great men exercise power over them; it will not be so among you. But whoever wishes to be the greater among you, let him be your servant, and whoever wishes to be first among you shall be your servant, just as the Son of Man did not come to be served but to serve." By these words Christ did not prohibit to the apostles every rulership, but rather showed that some rulership was to be sought by them, when he said: "Whoever wishes to be the greater among you," and "Whoever wishes to be first among you," for greatness and being first are known to pertain to rulership; the Apostle, whe was not ignorant of Christ's teaching, suggested this manifestly in 1 Timothy 3[:1] when he said, "If anyone desires the office of a bishop, he desires a good work."
But what sort of rulership Christ wished the apostles to seek he makes clear when he says, "Just as the Son of Man did not come to be ministered to" — by commands, threats, or terrors demanding secular honors, gifts, cributes, and services (especially not compulsory services), such as worldly rulers who do not embrace the best mode of ruling demand and extort from their subjects, too often even violently — "but to minister" -~ not only physically, even by humbly washing the feet of his disciples, but also spiritually: out of very great love, teaching those who believed in him for their advantage, not his own, advising them and most salutarily directing them by commands and prohibitions, which are known to pertain to rulership, as the Gospel writer Matthew testifies. In chapter r0|:5 ff] he says, "These twelve Jesus sent, commanding them, saying, 'Do not go on the road to the gentiles'. . ."Do not possess gold,'" etc. This is also found explicitly in a great many other places of the gospel teaching, Therefore, although he said that he had come "not to be ministered to, but to minister," Christ by no means removed from himself ail prelacy or rulership, but only rulership for the sake of his own advantage, glory, or honor, as he himself often testified.
Therefore, since he wished the aposties to be imitators of him in caring for the advantage of the faithful, he in no way prohibited
Eight Questions on the Power ofthe Pope them from all rulership, but instructed them by commandment or advice that in ruling they should seek to be useful to the faithful: not to dominate, loving their own advantage, glory, and honor — things such as worldly rulers, as we know, always or often seek.
And the apostles exercised the purest form of such rulership, for the good of others. (But according to some, the successors of the apostles are by no means bound by the necessity of salvation to the purity of such rulership, without any admixture of any other kind of rulership that the ruler assumes for the sake of his own good, glory and honor, unless there were some who renounced all such rulership by vow or oath; though an assertion some make affirms that those who succeed the apostles in rulership are obliged to the purity of such rulership.} Chapter § Secondly, according to the above opinion, it is required for the best regime (whether general, in respect of all mortals, or particular, in respect of some) that the ruler be one person, just as the regime is one. For this reason, according to philosophers, a royal regime, in which one person is preeminent, surpasses and excels both aristocratic and "'constitutional" regimes, in both of which many preside.
It is possible to argue for this in many ways, but for the present let it suffice to bring forward only one argument, which is as follows. That regime must be regarded as best and as superior to the rest in which charity, friendship, peace, and concord among subjects is most of all cared for, fostered, increased, and preserved and in which sedition or discord, which is the corruption of every community, is especially avoided. For it is chiefly on account of these things that every regime beneficial to the common good is established, and the ruler should with the utmost effort plant and foster them in his subjects. And thus "the prince of peace," Christ,
"upon [whose] shoulders is laid" the best "government,'? when he was about to withdraw physically from the apostles and the other faithful, especially imposed on them love and friendship,
William of Ockham saying, "This is my commandment, that you love one another.'"
He also very often wished them peace, which is the effect of friendship and charity, and commanded it and taught them to desire it for others. For he said to them, as we read in John
14[:27], "I leave you peace; my peace I pive to you"; in chapter 16({:33] he says, "May you have peace in me"; in Mark o[:49] he says, "Have peace among you"; in John 20(:26] we read, "Jesus came and stood in the middle" of the disciples, "and said, 'Peace be unte you': and, as we read in Matthew rof:12], he said to the apostles, "When you enter a house greet them, saying, 'Peace to this house." "
And Christ, the author and rector of every community, declares that the corruption and destruction of any community comes from discord; and consequently concord is useful for the preservation of any community. As we read in Matthew 12[:25], he says, "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate, and no city or house divided against itself will stand." With these things Aristotle agrees, compelled by reason alone. In Politics, Book n, chapter
3,'8 he says, "We believe that friendship is the greatest of goods for cities, for thus they never make seditions." And in £¢hics, Book vin, chapter 1,'' he says, "And it seems that friendship holds cities together, and legislators care more about it chan justice: for concord seems to be something like friendship, and they seek this most of ail." By these {passages} it is proved that government is most of all directed to preserving friendship, peace, and concord, and to removing discord, among those subject to the ruler.
And this comes about more if the ruler is one person than if there are many, as happens in an aristocracy. For if one alone is supreme ruler, no discord at al] can come about in the first and head of all: for no one dissents from himself. But if there are several supreme rulers, whether they preside over different governments or one, whether aristocratically or "constitutionally," friendship and peace can be dissolved and discord and sedition arise among the principal rulers of the whole community, which is, as we know, more serious and more dangerous than any discord among subjects and the less powerful. For every discord among the less powerful
Eight Questions on the Power ofthe Pope and subjects can be settled and healed by the ruler or rulers. But if discord has arisen among the supreme rulers, it easily spreads to everyone else, because, as Aristotle testifies in Potties, Book v, chapter g,'* "The dissensions of the notables make the whole city completely take sides; accordingly subjects must fear them and resolve the dissensions of chiefs and mighty men," namely by setting up one ruler over all, if they properly can. "In the leadership," Le., among the rulers, "the fault comes about," to the danger and destruction of all, if they are in dissension. "But the leadership is said to be half of ail";7 and therefore in every community discord among the rulers must be regarded as most dangerous. Therefore it is requisite to the regime that is simply best that the person ruling be single, just as the regime is one. Several other things are requisite to the best regime, but for the present let it suffice to have dealt with these things briefly and in outline.
Chapter 6 Several things conflict with the best regime, a few of which must be touched on. The first of these is that it conflicts with it to have as subjects only slaves; indeed, it seems to some that it is not consistent with the purity of the best regime that any subject should be a slave without fault,'* especially against his will. For the best regime is established chiefly for the good of subjects; but rule over slaves, which is also called despotism, exists chiefly for the good of the ruler; therefore such a regime must not be adjudged the best.
Further, a regime that is unjust and contrary to nature must not be esteemed as the best. But it is unjust and contrary to nature that someone should rule as slaves his betters or equals and similars in virtue and wisdom (or those of whom there can be a probable hope that they will become betters or equals and similars), as Aristotle seems plainly to assert in his Pofises, Book m.'* Jerome also seems to testify to this when he says, as we read in the Decreta,
® Prineipium is translated here and just above as "leadership" to fit the use Ockham makes of Aristotle's words, Aristotle probably meant "beginning."
* Tha is, without any fault of his own.
Dep ED ee beeen A William of Ockham dist. 25, para. Nunc autem, 'Let someone be chosen," namely as ruler and prelate, "in comparison with whom the rest may be called a flock"; and in 1, g.
1, Filtsstmus, we read, "He who is more outstanding in honor must be regarded as most contemptible uniess he excels in knowledge and holiness." Thus the wise man in Ecclesiasticus 32[:1], instructing and guiding a ruler and prince, says, "Have they appointed you ruler? Do not be exalted; be among them as if you were one of them." Therefore it seems to conflict with the best regime that all the subjects of the one ruler should be slaves.
To prove this, Aristotle's argument in Politics, Book 1,'° by which he tries to prove that rule over freemen is better than rule over slaves, also seems sufficient. For "'the rute is better that is of better subjects," as rule over men is better than rule over beasts. But free men are better than slaves; therefore rule over slaves is not to be judged the best.
But against this someone will perhaps object that the most perfect obedience in subjects does not conflict with the best regime, for then the best regime could not be found in the most perfect religious order, which promises the most perfect ubedience; but the most perfect obedience is the obedience of slaves, because anyone who promises and vows the mest perfect obedience promises to obey in all things, and slaves are obliged to this; therefore rule of slaves does not conflict with the best regime. To this it is answered that the most perfect religious profession does not promise simply to obcy in all things just as slaves are obliged io obey in all things, for then a prelate could compel such a religious to lead a secular life; but the most perfect religious profession promises to obey in all things that are not contrary to God and to its rule, especially in matters that pertain to God, to good morals, and to life under the rule.
Chapter 7 From that it follows, according to the above opinion, that it conflicts with the best regime that the ruler should have the fullness of power described above in Question 1, chapter 6, namely, so that i254 az5-b,
Eight Questions on the Power of the Pope he could by right, if he wished, command and impose on his subjects all things that do not go against or conflict with indispensable and immutable natural law or with divine law to which all Catholics are obliged. For all who are subject to someone with such fullness of power over them are his slaves in the strictest sense of the term, for no lord can by right have a power over his slaves greater than this power. But it conflicts with the best regime that all the subjects should be slaves; therefore it also conflicts with it that he should have such fullness of power.
Chapter 8 It remains to ask next what things should be regarded, according to the foregoing opinion, as compatible with the best regime, though they do not belong to its essence but can be present or absent.
To make this clear, it must above all be known that although many things pertain to the ruler of whom we are speaking — namely to give his rights to each person and preserve them, to enact necessary and just laws, to appoint subordinate judges and other
: officials, [to determine] which arts should be exercised, and by whom, in the community subject to him, and to command the acts of all the virtues, and many other things - nevertheless, he seems to have been appointed most principally to correct and punish wrongdoers. For if, in some community, no one had to be punished for any fault or crime, an adviser to good and a teacher would be enough, and a ruler would seem altogether unnecessary.
This is gathered from the sacred Scriptures. For the law and the ruler seem to have been established most principally for the same purpose. But the law is established, not for the good, but for correcting and punishing the bad, as the Apostle testifies. In 1 Timothy 1[:9} he says, "The law was not made for the just man, but for the unjust and for those who are not submissive"; and in Galatians s5[:18], "If you are led by the spirit," that is by reason, doing nothing against reason and good morals, "you are not under the law": and in 2 Corinthians 3[:17] he says, "Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom," namely so that the law of another ruler cannot bind (thus "have charity and do what you will"), and consequently you are not bound by any law if you have been fortified with charity, "which does not act wrongly"; and in dist.
William of Ockham 4, ¢. Factae we read, "Laws are made so that human audacity may be restrained," etc; and Augustine, as we read in 23, q. 5, 4d fidem, says, by laws "you are not compelled to do good, but forbidden to do evil." Therefore, similarly, a ruler shouid rule chiefly, not for the good, but for restraining the bad. 'The Apostle seems to assert this explicitly in Romans
13[:3], saying, "Rulers are not a terror to good works but to evil... And if you do what is evil, fear; for he does not carry a sword without reason. For he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon anyone who does evil." The wise man also seems to suggest this in Ecclesiasticus
7(:6], saying, "Do not seek to be made a judge, unless you have the strength te attack iniquities."
Chapter 9 In view of these things, it is said that it does not conflict with the best regime but is compatible with it, if the jurisdiction or power of some person or persons within the community does not at all depend upon the supreme ruler of that community or was not established by him, provided no one who does wrong in that community is thereby able to escape just and due punishment. For something that does not detract from the common good, though it somewhat reduces the honor or power of the ruler, does not seem to conflict with the best regime, since whoever exercises the best rule is obliged not to seek his own power or honor but the common good and the good of others, so as to imitate the Apostle when he says, in 1 Corinthians ro[:33], "Seeking what is advantageous not to myself but to many"; he also says, in Philippians
2{:4}, "Each one considering not the things that are his own but those that belong to others." And no wonder, for "charity," which should flourish in the ruler toward his subjects, "does not seek the things that are its own,"
« Corinthians 13[:5]. The emperor!' also suggests this about himself, saying, "We undertake willing labors to prepare peace for others," Auth. Ut dtvinae iusstones subscriptionem habeant gloriost quaestors, in the beginning, coll. 8; he also passes sleepless nights, "so that his subjects may remain in " That is, Justinian.
Eight Questions on the Power of the Pape total peace," Auth., Ut indices sine quoque suffragio, in the beginning, coll. z.
But for jurisdiction, power, or office to exist in a community {especially from a superior) and not to depend upon the highest ruler of that community does not go against or conflict with the common good, provided no one who does wrong thereby escapes due punishment. For since such jurisdiction or power should benefit the common good, it makes no difference who establishes it, provided it is duly and rightly exercised and in no way neglected which is alf fulfilled if no wrongdoer in that community can escape the punishment of the supreme judge or of another. For it makes no difference to the common good who lawfully appoints the leader of the army or the leader of the soldiers, provided he wages wars wisely and vigorously for the safety of the commonwealth; and it makes no difference to the common good who lawfully appoints an inferior judge, provided he justly carries out what is just. And thus we see that this is followed in every community. For when someone undertakes supreme government over some community, he never appoints anew all who are to exercise any jurisdiction, power, or office in the community. He leaves those he finds appointed by his predecessor, or someone else, to carry out their duties, and he allows some to be appointed anew by others if that is the custom or the law; because, as has been said, whom someone has lawful power from does not detract from the common good, provided he diligently does the things that benefit the common good according to the power he has received.
It therefore does not conflict with the best regime if some power of jurisdiction in a community does not at all depend upon the supreme ruier, provided the common good is in no way exposed thereby to danger
(as will not happen if whoever exercises such power is unable thereby to avoid necessary correction if he does wrong).
Chapter 10 From the foregoing it is inferred that it does not conflict with the best regime for someone in the community to be regularly exempt from the coercive power of the supreme ruler provided he is subject to the supreme ruler occasionally, so that he cannot insolently do wrong. For such exemption does not detract from the common
William of Ockham good, because if someone who is thus exempt does wrong, he cannot evade the punishment necessary to the common good. And from this it is further concluded that it does not conflict with the best regime for the correction or punishment of someone thus exempt from the power of the supreme ruler to be primarily the business of another, or others, not the supreme ruler, provided that if they fail (whether through malice, lack of power, or reprehensible ignorance), he can be punished at least occasionally by the supreme ruler. For this does not detract from the common good; for it makes no difference to the common good who lawfully punishes a criminal.
Since, therefore, a ruler having more power than a teacher and adviser is established most principally to correct and lawfully punish wrongdoers "so that human audacity may be restrained and the innocent may be safe among the wicked," it is inferred that the things spoken of above do not conflict with the best regime, since through them wrongdoers are in no way able to have an impunity dangerous to the commen good.
Chapter 11 Indeed, although the above opinion holds the foregoing views about the best regime, both general, in respect of the totality of mortals, and particular, in respect of some, nevertheless it says that such best regime should not ahways be established, either in the whole community of all mortals or in a particular community. For just as often some things are simply good and yet are bad for many because of their indisposition (for to drink wine and eat meat are good and yet are bad for many sick people), so the simply best regime is not best for all, indeed for some it is harmful, and it sometimes leads ta the corruption and endangering of the common good. This can happen both fram the wickedness of subjects and from the wickedness and inadequacy of the person to be appointed to such rule, For sometimes subjects who from ambition desire to rule without night, or who are stirred up by some other wickedness, would not at all tolerate the best regime and would rather turn to seditions and discords corrupting the commonwealth. And sometimes a person adequate in goodness and discretion could not be found, and then some other regime exercised by many together, for example aristocratic or "'constitutional" government, should be