Chapter 6
Wilham of Ockham although they have the right to elect, they do not have the right to elect for every case, but only for the case when the right to elect does not pertain to the Romans. From these things it is inferred that — whether they were able to resign the right to elect the highest ponuff or were all to become heretics or apostates from the faith ~ the Romans could not deprive God's Church of the right to elect the highest pontiff, because for such a case other
Catholics would have the right to elect.
Chapter 6 Student Say how answer is made to my premise*' that the Romans have the right to elect the highest pontiff neither by divine law nor by human law.
Master To this it is answered that the Romans have the right to elect the highest pontiff by divine law, extending "divine law" to include all natural law.
Student To me that answer seems obscure.
| therefore want it explained, in accordance with that opinion. And first explain, in accordance with it, why it is said, "extending divine law to include aff natural law," and second why all natural law can be called divine law.
Master The first is said because of the three modes of natural law. For, in one way, that is called natural law which is in conformity with natural reason that in no case fails, such as "Do not commit adultery," "Do not lie," and the like.
In another way, that is called natural law which is to be observed by those who use natural equity alone without any custom and human legislation. This is called "natural" because its contrary is contrary to the state of nature as originally established, and if all men lived according to natural reason or divine law it*® should not be observed or done. In this second way, and not in the first, all things are common by natural law, because in the state of nature as originally established all things would have been common, and if after the fall all men lived according to reason all things should have been common and nothing owned, for ownership was intro- ¥ See above, 9. 284.
A Dialogue, Part m, Tract u duced because of wickedness, 12, g.
Isidore speaks in that way' in Book v1 of the Etyrologies, included in the Deereta, dist. 1, fus naturale, when he says that according to natural law there is "common possession of all things and the one liberty of all." For common possession of all things and the one liberty of ali do not exist by natural law in the first way, for then no one could licitly appropriate anything to himself and no one could be made a slave by any law of nations or civil jaw, because natural law in the first way is immutable, invariable, and indispensable, dist. 5, para. Mune autem, and dist. 6, para. His aque respondetur.
But it is certain that some are made slaves licitly by the law of nations, as blessed Gregory testifies. In 12, g. 2, c. Cum redemptor, he says, "It is soundly done if, by the beneficence of the manumitter, men whom from the beginning nature brought forth free, and the law of nations placed under the yoke of siavery, are made free in the nature in which they were born." From these words we gather that by natural law all men are free, and yet by the law of nations some are made slaves. From this it is inferred that natural law, taking the word in one way, is not immutable; rather, it is permissible to enact the contrary, so that the contrary is done by law.
In a third way that is called natural Jaw which is gathered by evident reasoning from the law of nations or another flaw) or from some act, divine or human, unless the contrary is enacted with the consent of those concerned. This can be called naturai law "'on supposition": as, according to Isidore (as quoted above), "natural law is the return of a thing deposited or of moncy lent, the repelling of violence by force." For these are not natural laws in the first way, or in the second way either, because they would not have existed in the state of nature as originally established and would not exist among those who, living according to reason, were content with natural equity alone without any custom and human legislation, because among them nothing would be deposited or lent and no one would inflict force on another. They are therefore natural laws on supposition, because, supposing that things and money have been appropriated by the law of nations or by some human law, then it is gathered by evident reasoning that a thing deposited and money lent should be returned, unless for a reason the contrary
* That is, the second way. cect teumemeaganernnrmmnm ee Wilkam of Ockham is decided by him or those concerned. Similarly, supposing that some one in fact unjustly inflicts violence on another {which is not in accordance with natura! law but against natural law), then it is gathered by evident reasoning that it is permissible to repei such violence by force.
Because of these three modes of natural law, they say that the Romans have by divine law the right to elect the highest pontiff, extending "divine law" to every natural law. For if it were extended only to natural law spoken of in the first way (as natural law is taken in dist. 5, para.
6, para. Afis ttague respondetur, and dist. 8, para. Mrgmttate vero, and dist. 9, para.
1, and in many other places), the Romans would nor have the right to elect the highest pontiff frem divine law alone.
Student Because [ have not elsewhere heard that distinction of natural law, [ wish to make objections against it, te understand better from the solution of objections in accordance with that opinion whether it contains anything of the truth. That distinction seems, therefore, to conflict very obviously with Isidore's words in the chapter us naturale quoted earlier. First, because Isidore says,
"Natural law is common to all nations, because it is everywhere held by an instinct of nature and not by any enactment." These words cannot suit the second member of the above distinction, because things whose contrary can be permissible according te the law of nations are not common to all nations and are not heid everywhere by an instinct of nature, because they are not held where the contrary is observed according to the law of nations.
Also, because Isidore says in the same place, "But this, or anything similar to this, is never regarded as unjust, but as natural and fair." This cannot be true of either the second or third members.
For what is called natural law in the second way can be unjust, because the contrary can be in accordance with the law of nations; for what is contrary to the law of nations must be regarded as unjust. And what is called natural law in the third way can be unjust, because the contrary is in accordance with the law of nature in the second way. For it is in accordance with natural law in the second sense that restitution of money borrowed or of a thing lent should soi be made, since it is in accordance wich natural law in that sense that no money should be lent and nothing deposited; because according to the natural law, taking the term in that way,
A Dialogue, Part ut, Tract 1 all things are common, and thus according to that law no money can be lent and nothing deposited. These are the arguments that move me against the foregoing distinction; but say how they are answered.
Master They are answered in two ways.
In one way that some words in the chapter /us naturale should be understood only of natural law spoken of in the first way, and thus do not seem to establish anything against che foregoing.
In the other way it is said that the words you quote in your objection are said of every natural law, but they should be understood soundly. When, therefore, Isidore says, "Natural law is commen to aJl nations," etc., he means that natural law spoken of in the first way is commen to all nations in such a way that all nations are indispensably obliged to it, and therefore "it is had by , instinct of nature," that is, of natural reason, which is never mistaken. And natural Jaw spoken of in the second way is common to all nations in such a way that all nations are obliged to it, uafess for reasonable cause they decide on the contrary, and therefore it exists "by instinct of nature," that is, of natural reason, uni# the contrary is enacted by human ordinance; for reason dictates that all things are common until they are appropriated with the consent of men. But natural law in the third way is common to alf nations on supposition — namely, if all nations enact or do something from which a [natural] law in that sense is gathered by evident reasoning; and therefore "it is had by am instinct of nature," i.¢., of natural reason, supposing that from which it is thus inferred.
Similarly it is said of the words you quote second, "But this, or anything similar to this," etc., that they can be understood of the second member, because such a natural law is "never unjust, but is regarded as natural and fair," unless the contrary is, for some reasonable cause, established by some human law. Also, natural law spoken of in the third way is in some way "never unjust, but is" always "regarded as natura! and fair," because, supposing that from which it is inferred by evident reasoning, it is "never unjust but is" always "regarded as natural and fair," wa/ess the opposite is decided on by him or those concerned.
Student It seems that those things are said unsuitably, because according to them the same word occurring once in the foregoing words of Isidore is taken equivocally.
Ae SAT RTL Rb AE mtae AE te a be RR ile Wilham of Ockham Master This is not regarded as unsuitable, because the gloss on dist. 63, c. Mosse notes this. It says, "Note, a word occurring here once is used equivocally, as in dist. 28, Presbytertem."
Student You have explained in accordance with the opinion stated above why it said that the Romans have the right to elect the highest ponaff by divine law. extending divine law to every natural law. Now say, in accordance with the same opinion, why it says that every natural law can be called divine law.
Master They say this, first, because every law that is from God, who is the creator of nature, can be called a divine law; but every natural law is from God who is the creator of nature; therefore etc. Also, because every law that is contained explicitly or implicitly in the divine Scriptures can be called a divine law, because "divine law is contained in the divine Scriptures," dist. 8, c. Que ture; but every natural law is contained explicitly or implicitly in the divine
Scriptures, because in the divine Scriptures there are certain general propositions from which, either alone or with other [premises], can be inferred every natural law, spoken of in the first way, in the second way, and in the third way, though it may not be found in them expbcitly.
Student You have explained in accordance with the above-stated cpinion the two things that seemed obscure to me. Now say, in accordance with the same opinion, how the Romans have from divine law the right to elect the highest pontiff."
Master To this it is said that the Romans have the right to elect the highest pontiff from natural law spoken of in the third way.
For supposing that someone is to be set over certain persons as prelate, ruler, or rector, it is inferred by evident reason that, unless the contrary is decided on by the person or persons concerned, those whom he is to be set over have the right to elect the one to be set over them, so that no one should be given to them against their will. It seems that this can be proved by numberless arguments and examples, but I will bring forward a few.
An example to this [effect] is that no one should be set over the whole body of mortals except by their election and consent."
This was the answer given to the question at the beginmmg of this chapter.
# "The whole body of all mortals" is the Roman Empire; it was universally accepted that the Roman emperor should be elected.
A Dialogue, Part 1, Tract ii Further, what affects all should be dealt with by all; for somcane to be set over all affects ali, therefore it should be dealt with by all.
Again, to those whom it concerns to make themselves laws it belongs to elect a head, if they wish; but any people and city can make themselves their own law, which is called "civil" law, dist.
1, dus etvile, therefore also a people and city can elect themselves a head. And thus it always belongs to those whom someone is to be set over to elect the one to be set over them, unless the contrary is decided on by the person or persons concerned. (This is said because they can, at least in many cases, resign their right and transfer their right to another or to others. In this way, although from natural law spoken of in the third way or in the second way the people had the right to make laws, yet they transferred that power to the emperor, and so it was in his power to transfer the , right to elect the emperor to another or to others." Similarly, if those whom someone is to be set over are in such matters subject to some superior, that superior can decide that they do not have the right to elect, although they had the right to elect by the law of nature spoken of in that way? - namely, unless the contrary had been decided on either by themselves or by the superior.)
And thus it seems to them that the proposition taken before must be regarded as evident. But the highest pontiff is in a way especially to be set over the Romans, because they do not have another bishop. Therefore, by natural law spoken of in that way that is, by natural [aw on supposition, namely, on the supposition that they should have a bishop - they have the right to elect him, unless the contrary is enacted or decided on by the Romans themselves or by some other, superior to the Romans, who has power in this matter. For the Romans themselves can resign their right and also transfer the right to elect the highest pontiff to another: they could also transfer to another the right of appointing the electors of the highest pontiff. Also, someone superior to the Romans who had power in such matters could grant the right to elect to some persons other than the Romans; but that superior was Christ and not the pope, and therefore Christ and not the pope could deprive the Remans of the right to elect the highest
4 That is, to the imperial electors.
"* That is, in the third way.
2g1 Miltam ofOckham pontiff. Buc Christ did not deprive the Romans of the right to dlect their bishop; for when Christ set blessed Peter over all Christians, giving him power co select a see where he wished in such a way that in that place he would be in a way their own bishop, he did not deprive them of that right, which belongs to all whom some power, secular or ecclesiastical, is to be set over (unless the contrary is determined by those whom that power, secular or ecclesiastical, is to be set over, or by their superior); therefore, since blessed Peter selected the see of Rome, it follows that the Romans have the right to elect the successor of blessed
Peter, who in spiritual matters is to be set over them especially.
And thus the Romans have by divine Jaw, extending divine law to every natural law, the right to elect the highest pontiff.
Student It seems that according to that opinion it would be better to say that the Romans have the right to elect their bishop by the law of nations, because it is by the law of nations that all of those whom someone is to be set over have the right to elect the person to be set aver them unless they resign their right or their superior decides on the contrary.
Master Although many chings that belong to the law of nations are natural laws, taking 'natural law" in the third way, nevertheless it is more properly said, according to that opinion, that the Romans have the right to elect their bishop by divine law or by natural jaw spoken of in the third way, rather than by the law of nations; because it does net belong to the Jaw of nations to have a Catholic bishop, but this pertains to the divine law. Also, although it belongs to the law of nations that someone to be set over others should be elected by those whom he is to be set over, it belongs equally to the divine law, because it can be inferred from [premises] found in the sacred Scriptures together wich other [premises]." Thus the two suppositions from which it follows that the Romans have the right to elect their bishop belong to the divine law, though in different ways, but only one belongs to the law of nations. And for this reason it is more properly said that the Romans have the right to elect their bishop by divine law or by natural law spoken of in the third way, rather than by the law of nations.
However, since the holders of this theory do not care to contend about words, they say that it is enough for them that the Romans
* Compare the classification of Catholic wuths in 1 Diai, 2.2.