Chapter 24
A Dialogue, Part ut, Tract 1 ible, on account of necessity and utility, not to baptize, or to baptize in another way than was established by Christ, for example in wine or some other liquid, if water couid not be had and baptism could not be deferred: it would be permissible also to make the body of Christ of some other bread besides wheaten, when wheaten bread could not be had: it would also be permissible, when wine could not be had, to make the blood of Christ of water or some other liquid. And thus it would be permissible ta change ali the sacraments on account of necessity and utility.
Again, no one is permitted to contravene the words of any commandment unless he has power to dispense against such a commandment or to interpret that commandment. But no one can dispense against divine commandments or interpret those commandments; therefore, no one is permitted to contravene the words of a divine commandment.
From these farguments} it follows that if Christ ordained that one highest pontiff should be set over all the faithful, it will in no way be permissible for any Christians whatever to appoint several at the same time as highest pontiffs. Those are the arguments that seem to me rather effectively to disprove the above assertion. So relate how they are answered, and begin with the tast, because perhaps some answers to the others will depend on it.
Chapter 24 Master That objection mentions two things, a power to dispense against a commandment of God or of Christ, and a power to interpret a commandment of God or of Christ. As to the [1} first, it is said that no Christians whatever have power to dispense against a commandment of God or of Christ, unless interpretation or declaration of the law is called dispensation. This is how the gloss upon 25, q. ft, c, Sunt gutdam seems to speak. It says that "the pope dispenses from the gospel by interpreting it."** The assertion of some jurists seems to harmonize with this. They say, "Deciaration or commutation is called dispensation; thus he," ic., the pope, "can dispense from a vow, and from things which are done by ™See gloss, col. 1439, ¥. pastel.
William of Ockham divine and natural law, provided there is necessity or utility and compensability.""* f2{ Concerning the power to interpret a commandment of God or of Christ and, consequently, ta dispense in the above way, the studious can perceive what should be said (according to a certain opinion) from our extensive disputation concerning the power to interpret the statements and enactments of others in the first part of our dialogue, Book wt. E will relate a few things from it, adding some.
[t is said, therefore, that interpretation of some statement or commandment or statute, divine or natural or human, is necessary only because of the ignorance of some one for whom an interpretation is necessary, because "where the words are not doubtful there is no room for interpretation," as the gloss notes, Extra,
De consnetudine, upon the chapter Cum dilecius."" Interpretation therefore pertains to anyone who knows the true meaning of what has to be interpreted, that is, when someone else is in doubt about its true meaning. But many experts know the true meaning of the commandments of God and Christ. They can interpret those commandments to those who do not know, because such interpretation is nothing but an exposition, clarification, or making manifest of the true meaning of God's commandments. And thus Christians have power sometimes to interpret a divine commandment, namely when they know its true meaning.
[f, however, the true meaning of some commandment of God were not known, because God's intention in making the commandment was not known and could not be known through reasoning or through other Scriptures but only by a revelation of God - as, according ta some, the true literal meaning of many of the prophecies included in the Book of the Apocalypse and in other prophetic writings cannot be known except through a new revelation - then the interpretation of such a commandment must be awaited from God alone. But the meaning of God's commandments or ordinances about preserving patience, not making oaths, not casrying a wallet or a bag, and about appointing a highest pontiff, and of many other commandments, is known by many Christians, and can be known through reasoning and the Scriptures; Christian experts can therefore interpret such com- * The source has not been found.
*? See gloss to the decretals, col. gy, ¥. fur communis.
A Dialogue, Part in, Tract! mandments or ordinances, and they ought to be observed according to the true interpretation. And "we must not always stick to the words," even of Christ, "but to the intention," according to the gloss, 23, q. i, on the chapter Paratus, which in that place speaks specifically of the words of Christ."
Student According to these ideas it would be no more permissible for the pope to interpret the werds of God and Christ than for anyone else wise and learned in sacred literature, and we would not have to believe the pope in such matters more than any other wise Man.
Master Ii is answered that it is not permissible for the pope to interpret the words of God or Christ otherwise than it is for another, nor do we have to believe him in such matters more than any other wise man — indeed, in such matters those more expert than the pope should be preferred to the pope himself, as we read in dist. 20, para. i, where we read that in explaining the sacred
Scriptures those who treat of the divine Scriptures are preferred to the highest pontiffs.
However, if the pope's exposition or interpretation is Catholic, containing no error, it is in seme way more authoritative than the interpretation of another learned man, because from then on it will not be permissible for anyone knowingly to opine and hold the opposite in public. This is not true of the same interpretation if it were only that of another learned man, because if it were not about something that one was obliged to believe explicitly, it would be permissible, despite this interpretation, for another, expressing an opinion in public, to hold the opposite, though not pertinaciously.
If, however, the pope's interpretation were erroneous and not in harmony with the truth, it would be permissible for anyone knowing that it is not in harmony with the truth to reject it openly and publicly, and anyone knowing this would be obliged, of necessity for salvation, to attack it, according
Student According to these ideas the pope could in no way dispense against the Apostle or against sacred Scripture. The gloss to 25, q.
I, on the chapter Sunt guidam," seems to hold the apposite of this.
It says, "It can be maintained that the pope ™See gloss, col. 1285, v. Sf verda.
* See gloss, col. 1436, v. Apostati.
William of Ockham dispenses against the Apostle, but not in matters that pertain to the articles of faith."
Master It is said that the gloss here takes "dispense" for interpreting or clarifying the Apostle's meaning: this the pope can do.
Student In this way the pope can dispense in matters that pertain to the articles of faith, which, however, the gloss denies, For he can clarify the true meaning of things that pertain to the articles af faith, as also of other things.
Master It is answered that he cannot interpret the articles of faith included in the Creed, of which the gloss speaks, otherwise than as they have been interpreted, because in respect of their literal sense they have been sufficiently interpreted and clarified. But the pope can, if he is an expert, interpret in a new interpretation [the sense] of many other things found in the sacred Scriptures, because they are not found in particular to have been interpreted by earlier interpreters in such a way that they do not need, for many simple people, and indeed for experts, a new and explicit interpretation, which many, even learned men, do not know how to gather from all the writings of highest pontiffs and of those who creat of the divine Scriptures; and none of the highest pontiffs or doctors is, or was, so expert that he has not been and could not be able, continually and always, even if he lived a thousand years or more, to advance in the understanding of divine Scripture, by newly finding Catholic literal senses (which are the foundation of ali other senses) by studying the sacred Scriptures; this is because of the difficulty of understanding sacred Scripture in various places.
Student You have said enough about this objection. Now relate how the first objection I brought ferward in the last chapter is answered.
Master To that argument it is said that we should hold a similar judgment about similars when it is not prohibited, either explicitly or implicitly, to hold a similar judgment. However, where it is explicitly or implicitly prohibited to hold a similar judgment about similars, there we should not hold a similar judgment about similars.
Because Abraham received the command about sacrificing his son, he was obliged to prepare himself to kil! his innocent son; and yet he was obliged to take care not to kill other innocents, because it was commanded to him simply to sacrifice his son, and not others, and he could therefore not have drawn any other meaning from PreeTo nee A Dialogue, Part us, Tract t the words of the commandment except that which they first expressed. And they were so explicit, being free from all ambiguity, that there was there no room for interpretation, and he could not have drawn any other meaning. And by reasoning, also, he could have drawn no other meaning from these words of God, since he was not ignorant that God was the lord of life and death. Therefore, even if there were a similarity between God's commandment not to dissolve a marriage or not to send away a wife and any other commandment of God, nevertheless, a similar judgment does not and would not have to be heid in alj respects concerning that commandment and any other commandment of God whatever, because in excepting one special case in which it is permissible to send away a wife Christ prohibited other cases, because "what is conceded of one is denied of the others" (dist.
25, c. Qualis;'™ 15, q. 3, De crimine; dist. 45, c. Diseiplina; 1, q.
1, Per Esasam); this rule holds where the argument frem the opposite sense holds, which is very strong in the jaw, as the laws say.'"' But in many other commandments of God and Christ special cases are not excepted explicitly. Therefore in them one case should not be understood to be excepted more than another. We must therefore gather from other places of divine Scripture whether some case should be excepted though it is not expressed, whether there is the same reason for excepting such a case in one commandment and in another, and whether the commandments are similar in kind (for example, whether they are natural commandments or positive commandments or one natural and the other positive). If they are simply commandments of natural law, no case should be excepted for any necessity or utility whatever, unless God specially excepted some case (as, notwithstanding the commandment of purely natural law about not knowingly killing the innocent, God made a special exception in commanding Abraham te sacrifice his son). If, however, they are purely positive commandments, a case of necessity and utility should be excepted in the same way in one as in another, unless it can be especially gathered from the Scrip- —. tures that in some such commandment a case of necessity and '0 See gloss, col. 126, Casus (which mentions the argument from the opposite sense), and v. Negatur, which seems to be the source of the other references.
See gloss to Digest, 1.21.1, v. Portssimun, col. 114.