Chapter 8
A Dialogue, Part tt, Tract And to the second proof and the third - which are based on the premise that if the totality of mortais were subject to one [ruler] there would be fewer oppressors of the good, and men would be less inclined to wars than if there were several without a superior having lordship in different regions — it is answered that these things could and would happen if ia fact one wise and just man powerfully ruled all, but it need not always be true that the multitude of those oppressing the good is reduced and audacity in stirring up wars restrained by one man's lordship py right. For when one man is lord of all by right it can happen — both from the particular wickedness of some great multitude of wicked men seeking their own good, and not the common good, and from the wickedness, ignorance, and negligence of the one man commanding all - that ' the multitude of oppressors of the good and audacity in stirring up wars {and troubling the good in other ways) both increase: from which, also, they would sometimes cease if many presided with no superior. For it is possible sometimes for even a few, resenting the fact that someone is placed over them, to incite many peoples to rebel with them against their superior and to oppress the good by causing wars and battles. [t can also happen that, while one who is foolish or idle or rages tyrannically against the good is lord of the whole world, the bad are more bold te oppress the goad and to stir up wars than if several wise and just [men] presided over different regions. It can therefore happen that the bad grow more insolent and the good live less quietly if one man mules over the totality of mortals than if many without a superior rule different regions.
Chapter 8 Student Say how, according to them, it can be maintained that it is not always beneficial to the totality of living persons for one secular ruler to rule, even though temporal things are controlled by the faity just as spiritual things are controlied by the clergy from which the second argument advanced above in chapter 1 tries to infer that, just as one ecclesiastical ruler is over all others in spiritual matters, so it is always beneficial for one secular ruler to preside over all in temporal matters.
William of Ockham Master To this a twofold answer is made:
[1] In one way, that the cases of a president in spiritual matters and a president in temporal matters are not altogether similar, because for one man to preside in spiritual matters over all the faithful (even if the whole world were converted to the faith) is immediately from a particular divine ordinance, and not from human ordinance. This can be gathered from sacred canons included in the Decreta, dist.
21, C. Quanrois, and dist. 22, c. Ommes and c. Sacresancta, and in a great many other places; therefore, unless God ordained otherwise and revealed this to the faithful, all the faithful (even if all mortals had received the faith) should obey one highest pontiff in spiritual matters, because it is not in the power of men to change a divine ordinance in any way. But that one secular ruler should preside over the whole world in temporal matters is from human ordinance, which (because it is not of divine law or natural law) can licitly be changed by men, because everything is dissolved by the same causes as gave it birth, EArtra, De regulis iuns, Omnis.
Therefore, before one secular ruler presided over all mortals, those who wished, for a just and reasonable cause, could licitly not consent that someone should be appointed to empire of the whole world: for when there is a loss to the liberty or power or right of some, "the consent of all must be sought" and had, dist. 54, c.
Similarly, if for some reason it would be to the notable detriment of the common good for one ruler to be appointed to world monarchy, then for that time no one should be promoted to empire. j2) In ancther way it could be said that although Christ ordained that all the faithful should obey one highest pontiff, nevertheless, because that ordinance of Christ was affirmative and not negative and therefore obliges always but not for always, it is not necessary that all the faithful should at all times obey ane pope; since, also, this is not possible, because that see must often be vacant. And therefore, although all the faithful should always be ready, according to place and time and due manner, to obey one highest pontiff, yet the election of a highest pontiff when the see is vacant can, for a reasonable and manifest cause, be deferred for a time, and not only for a short time but also for a long time; so that just as 4 Tn the gloss, col. 274, ¥. Gat aliquid.
A Dialogue, Part i, Tract i such an election has, for a reason, sometimes been delayed for several days, sometimes for several months, sometimes indeed for several years (and thus that see has sometimes been vacant for six years}, so, for a reason, it could licitly be deferred for a hundred years, oc two hundred, or more; and the like could be said of appointment to world empire.
Student I perceive that in some respects this last answer creats appointment to the supreme priesthood and promotion to empire as analogous, because elevation co the one, as to the other, can be deferred for a reason. But I would like to know whether, just as the faithful cannot enact that no one should ever be efected highest pontiff, so mortals cannot ordain that no one should ever be raised
; up to world empire.
Master It is answered that it is not and never will be permissible for mortals to enact that no one should ever be elevated to empire of the whole world, because it is not permissible to make any permanent enactment against something that is beneficial to the common good as a rule though it can harm the common good occasionally. But for one ruler to preside over ali mortals is beneficial to the common good of all mortals as a rule, though it can do harm occasionally. Therefore it can never be enacted absolutely that no one should ever be promoted to the empire, although it would be permissible to ordain with some qualifications or specifications or conditions that for the time being no one should be promoted to such an office.
Chapter 9 Student Relate how it is beneficial as a rule, though not in every case, for all mortals to be subject to one secular ruler, even though it is beneficial for each single particular kingdom to have one king and the same judgment should be made of the whole and of the part, just as the same judgment must be made in small matters and in great; upon these things is based the third argument above for the first opinion reported in the first chapter.
Master It is answered in two ways. {1] In one way, that a like judgment need not always be made of the whole and of the part, just as the same right docs not always exist in great matters and in small. For often the quantity of the thing brings about a differ-