Chapter 22
A Dialogue, Part in, Tract 1 a regime in which one ruies by himself, since such a regime is royal or similar to royal. Therefore it is not permissible for any Christians whatever to establish in any way an aristocratic {or other) regime in place of the regime of one highest pontiff.
Chapter 22 Student Because of the great plausibility that the arguments brought forward for both opinions seem to have, I desire to prabe them further and to hear how they are answered in accordance with the different opinions. So first relate how the first opinion" tries to answer the arguments brought forward in the last chapter.
Master The first — which is based on the premise that all Christians cannot do anything contrary to an ordinance of Christ — is answered by means of what was laid down in chapter 20,°' namely that necessity and utility make permissible what would otherwise be impermissible as being contrary to an ordinance of Christ. And therefore, although all Christians are Christ's disciples and slaves and are not above him, nevertheless, from necessity or utility they can do something contrary to an ordinance of his — that is, against his words and deeds according to what at first they seem to express, though not against his intention; for he means that in his words, where he ordains or does something the opposite of which is not at all opposed to the natural law and he does net make explicit that necessity and utility should by no means be excepted, urgent necessity and evident utility are excepted.
An attempt is made to prove this in another way than before.
As we read in Matthew s[:39] Christ commanded his apostles not to resist evil, but if someone struck them on one cheek they should offer the other also; and yet it was permissible for the apostle Paul when he was struck to say to the chief priest, "God will strike you, you whitened wall,'? as Augustine testifies in his sermon on the centurion's son, quoted in 23, g. 1, c. Paratus. Therefore, just as, according to Augustine in the same place, Christ's commandments concerning patience were "rather to the preparation of the © That is, the opinion presented in chapter zo.
4 See pp. 76-7 above.
ASF (aa, ab MAME Re A Be ENE ur a TE Hilham of Ockham heart than to the work done in the open, so that patience with benevolence should be held in the secrecy of the mind, but outwardly we should do what seems beneficial to those to whom we should wish well," so, concerning Christ's ordinance about appointing one highest pontiff, we should do what is more beneficial to his Church, for whese utility he ordained that one bighest pontiff should be appointed: namely, so that when it is beneficial for the Church that there should be several, then let there be several to rule the Church aristocraticaliy.
It seems possible to confirm this answer as follows.
If it is pormissible to act contrary to the words of 4 more express commandment, then it will be permissible to act contrary to the words of a less express commandment. But the commandments concerning patience that Christ gave to the apostles in Matthew 5[:39—-41] were more express than the commandment about appointing one highest pontiff after Peter: because he said expressly, without any condition, qualification, exception, or specification, "But I say to you, do not resist evil," etc.; nowhere, however, is it found that he said, "I say to you that you should appoint a highest pontiff after Peter," or similar words. Therefore, if it is permissible to contravene the express words of Christ about patience but not his intention Gust as Christ himself also did, as Augustine attests in the place cited above, where he says: "This is clearly shown, because when the Lord Jesus himself, who was a singular example of patience, was struck in the face, he answered, 'if I have spoken evil charge me with the evil, but if well why do you strike me"
He therefore by no means fulfilled his own commandment if we look to his words, for he did not offer the other cheek to the one who struck him, but rather forbade him to do it}, much more is it permissible for Christians to act against the net express words of Christ about appointing a highest pontiff, i.e. so that they appoint not one but several highest pontiffs, when this is beneficial to the Church of Christ.
Christ commanded in express words, not excepting any case, that one should not swear. In Matthew 5[:34] he says, "But I say to you do not swear at all, either by heaven" etc., and afterwards,
"Let your speech be 'Yes, Yes, No, No' - what is more than these is from evil.' Yet notwithstanding that express commandment of A Dialogue, Part ur, Tract 1 Christ, it is permissible om occasion to swear: Extra, De electione,
Significasn: Extra, De iureiurando, Fist Christus; and 22, q.
1, Non est, where Augustine asserts that to swear is permissible on account af the weakness or incredulity of those not otherwise moved to belief. Therefore, a fertierf, even though Christ made blessed Peter highest pontiff and head of all Christians, it is permissible for Christians, for the sake of the common utility of the whole Church, to appoint several at the same time as highest pontiffs, if this is at some time beneficial.
Again, in Matthew ro[:q-10], Christ expressly commanded the apostles not to possess gold or silver or money and not to have two cloaks er to wear shoes, and yet, when manifest necessity compelled it, it was permissible for them to contravene those commandments — fulfilling, that is, Christ's intention and not his words, He seems himself to suggest this clearly enough when he says to his apostles in Luke 22{:35]: " "When
I sent you without wallet and bag and shoes, was anything lacking to you?' And they said, 'Nothing.' He therefore said to them, 'But now, he who has a wallet, let him take it, and similarly a bag, and he who does not have a sword, let him sell his cloak and buy one."" From these words Bede draws out a certain general rule, namely, that notwithstanding Christ's commandment, there is one rule of living in a time of peace and another in a time of persecution, From Bede's rule another more general rule can be gathered, namely, that for the sake of necessity and utility it is permissible to contravene an ordinance of Christ. For if, notwithstanding Christ's commandment, there is one rule of living in a time of peace and another in a time of persecution, then, by similar reasoning, notwithstanding
Christ's commandment, there is one rule of living in a case of necessity and utility and another outside the case of necessity and utility, since it is only on account of necessity and utility that there is one rule of living in a time of peace and another in a time of persecution; for if there appears no necessity or utility because of persecution, a rule of living — especially one [to which obedience has been] promised — must by no means be abandoned. Because of necessity, therefore, and utility, it is permissible not to fulfil the words of Christ. Therefore, notwithstanding any ordinance whatever of Christ concerning the appointment of one highest coe vie sewvensinemmpememiimrmensieiin pommmanse: agenee nedE ea oe 1 eAA SSS Willam ofOckham pontiff, ic will be permissible, if evident utility demands it, to appoint several highest pontiffs to govern the whole body of the faithful aristocratically.
Further, it is permissible for a reason to defer the election of the highest pontiff; therefore it is permissible for a time to appoint others to govern the community of the faithful.
Chapter 23 Student The arguments above and some others brought forward earlier are based on the premise that it is permissible to contravene the words of a commandment of God and of Christ, though not the purpose or intention of the giver of the commandment. These statements seem to have some plausibility.
I will therefore make objections against their basis, so that | may better understand both the basis and the above arguments and others like them and so that I can perceive whether they contain anything of truth."
It seems, therefore, that it is in no way permissible to contravene the words of a commandment of God or Christ, either on account of necessity or on account of utility. Of similars the same judgment must be held; therefore we must think the same way of any divine commandment whatever and of them ail, But the divine commandment net to dissolve a marriage between man and wife obliges in such a way that in no case except the case expressed by Christ, namely the case of fornication, is it permissible to send away a wife for any necessity or utility whatever, as Christ himself testifies in Matthew §[:32] and z9[:9}, and in Mark ro[:11]. Therefore every commandment of God and of Christ obliges in such a way that in no case not expressed by God or by Christ would it be permissible to contravene the divine commandment on account of necessity and utility.
Further, if it were permissible to contravene a divine commandment on account of necessity and utility, it would be permissible to change all the sacraments of Christ on account of necessity and utility. For no one is obliged to any sacraments whatever except because of a divine commandment; it would therefore be permiss4 On this topic see above, chapters 20 {at the end) and 21, and chapters 23 and 24; see also Short Discourse, pp. 45-7. $9-