Front matter
CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT WILLIAM OF OCKHAM A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT Sertes editors RaymMonp GeEuss Lecturer in Philosophy, University ofCambridge
QUENTIN SKINNER Regins Professor ofModern History it the University afCambridge Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought is now firmly established as che major student texthook series in political theory.
It aims to make available to students all the most important texts in the history of western political thought, from ancient Greece to the early twentieth century, All the familiar classic texts will be included, but the series seeks at the same time to enlarge the conventional canon by incorporating an extensive range of less wellknown works, many of them never before available in a modern
English edition. Wherever possible, texts are published in complete and unabridged form, and translations are specially commissioned for the series. Each volume contains a critical introduction together with chronologies, biographical sketches, a guide to further reading and any necessary glossaries and textual apparatus. When completed the series will aim to offer an outline of the entire evolution of western political thought.
For a list oftitles published in the series, please see end ofbook Contents Preface page vii Al nate on references ix List af abbreviations xi introduction xit Principal dates in Ockham's life XXK¥ Suggestions fer further reading som A Letter to the Frars Minor
The Work of Ninety Days, chapters 2. 26-8, 65, 88 and 93 A Ptalogue, Part 111, Tract 1, On the Power of the Pope and Clergy: Book 2, complete; Book 3, chapters 8-11; Book 4, chapters 8-11 and 22
A Dialogue, Part 111, Tract u1, On the Rights of the Roman Empire: Prologue, Book 1, chapters 1-17; Book 3, chapters s-7
Eight Questions on the Power of the Pope, Question 111 Appendix: text and translation Index of references to the Bible Index of references to canon law index of references to civil law
¥ Preface The £pistola ad Fratres Minores and extracts from Opus nonaginta dierum and Octo quaestiones de potestate papae are translated, with the publisher's permission, from the Latin texts established by H.S.
Offler and others in Gutilelmi de Ockham opera politica vols.
1 {rev. edn.) and u (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974, 1963).
The translation of ut Dielogus, 1.3, chapter 6, is made, with the permission of the editor ofthe journal, from H.S. Offler, "The Three
Medes of Natural Law in Ockham: A Revision of the Text," in Franciscan Studies, 37 (1977), 207-18. The remaining extracts from the Diaiogus are translated from the text published by Melchior
Goldast in volume t of Monarchia S. Romani Imperit (Frankfurt:
Conrad Biermann, 1614; photographic reprint Graz: 1960). The numerous departures from the Goldast text of the Dialogus are listed in the Appendix. See the Appendix also for the practice followed in rendering specifically political terms.
Notes for the present volume have been kept to little more than the minimum necessary for tracking Ockham's explicitly cited sources and the turns of his own argument.' The chief exception is that references have been provided to the passages in Marsilius of Padua's
Defender of Peace which Ockham was clearly arguing against in his discussions of conciliar authority and the authority of Peter over the other apostles. The reader wili find fuller information on historical and theological context and fuller comparisons of Ockham's views
Bor 4 Letter to the Friars Minor, The Werk of Ninety Days, and Eight Questions on the Power of the Pepe, the references to sources derive fram Professor Offler's edition. vii Preface with those of other political thinkers in our edition of his Sfoert Dsscourse on Tyrannical Government in this series."
However we assess Ockham - whether we condemn him for shattering medieval Christian spiritual-political unity or praise him for constructively disengaging religious and secular institutions from one another — there can be no doubt that the disproportion between an author's importance and his availability to readers of English is greater in his case than in that of any other western political thinker.
The present volume, along with the Short Discourse, does much to remedy this lack of access. This is especially true for the Diatogus, the text of which as printed in the early editions of Treschel and Goldast requires much correction. We are grateful to Jeremy Mynott and Quentin Skinner for making possible so substantial a presentation of Ockham and are grateful again to Professor Skinner for essential diplomatic aid in bringing the possibility to life.
John Kilcullen, who is responsible for the translation, notes, appendix, and indexes and for the collation of Goldast's text with manuscripts of the Déalogus, also wishes to thank: Professor George
D. Knysh for the proposed textual emendations credited to him in the Appendix; John Scott, who checked the translation and Appendix and checked the reading of the manuscripts, suggesting innumerable corrections and improvements; the staff of the Macquarie University
Library, Marilyn Wagstaffin particular; the staffofthe libraries which supplied microfilm of manuscripts; Sue Folwell, Hilary Hatfield, and Maureen Masely, who word-processed various parts of the translation; and the Australian Research Council, which supported the work financially. A. S. McGrade, who is responsible for general editing and for the introduction, wishes to thank his wife for many helpful suggestions and for unfailing moral support.
A. 8. McGRADE JOHN KILCULLEN '
In our edition of the Short Discourse, references to the present volume are made under the working title Selections from the Majer Potitial Works. viii A note on references Most citations are by author's name or short title of the work cited; the full title will be found in the Bibliography beginning on page 371.
Books of the Bible are cited according to che Vulgate, the version Ockham used. Biblical names are as in the Douay version, which was translated from the Vulgate. Ockham gives chapter references only, verse numbers have been added. Bible references in square brackets have been added by cditors or translator.
In Aristotte's works the medieval book and chapter divisions are not always the same as in modern editions. We have given the Bekker
Tturmbers in foomotes.
References in the text which include the symbols "q." or "dist." are to material included in the first of the various medieval compijations together sanctioned by Pope Gregory XII] in 1580 as the body of canon law (Corpus iuris canoniei): the Decretum of the twelfthcentury Bolognese jurist Gratian. Ockham uses the form "'X.," expanded here to Extra (the books "outside" the Decretum), in citing both the second and third parts of the Corpus iuris canonici: the five books of Decretales promulgated by Gregory [IX between 1230 and 1244, and the additional book of decretals (Liver sextus) added by Boniface VIII in 1298. The letter "vy." indicates a reference to the gloss. Canon law references are separately indexed on page 385, with volume and column of the standard modern edition of A. Friedberg.
Footnote references for both text and gloss are to the edition of Lyons, 1671 (Cambridge University Library).
References to Roman civil law, the Corpus iuris crvilis promulgated in the carly sixth century by the emperor Justinian, are keyed to the ix A note on references edition of Mom©msen and Krueger with the English translation of Alan Watson (Philadelphia, 1985) for the Digest; to the edition of Mommsen, Krueger, and Schoell (Berlin, 1954) for the Justitutes,
Codz, and Novels {cited by Ockham as Auth. = Authenticum), and to the edition of Lyons, 1627, for the gloss.
The three major parts of Ockham's Dialegue are cited in the form "am Déal.," with a following Roman numeral (1 or u) for the two tracts of Part 19 and arabic numerals for book and chapter. Thus,
"tn Dial, £2.7" refers to chapter 7 of Book 2 of Tract 1 of Part 11.
References to works published in the Manchester edition of Ockham's Opera politica (ed. H.S. Offler and others) are given in accordance with the conventions of that edition. References to the Short Discourse are by page in our edition.
The book and chapter titles at the beginnings of sections in this volume have been provided by the editors. x Abbreviations Auth, Authenticum (= Novellae), part of Corpus iterts ctutits
EFM Ockham, &pistela ad Fratres Minores Extra The five books of Desretales of Gregory IX and, in .
Ockham's references, the sixth book added by Boniface VIII (i. 6, Leber sextus) OND Ockham, Opus nenaginia dierum Gloss See Corpus iuris canenict and Corpus iuris ctvilis in the Bibliography OG Ockham, Octo qtaestiones Shart Discourse Ockham, A Shart Discourse on Tyrannical Government xi Introduction William of Ockham is largely responsible for the widely held modern conviction that religious institutions and secular governments should normally operate independently of one another. In Ockham's view, the separation is not absolute. Secular government does not "regularly" have authority in religious matters, but "occasionally" it does.
Conversely, church leaders should not ordinarily have political authority. In extreme cases, however, when secular processes have failed, they must intervene. This complex conception of normally but not invariably independent spiritual and temporal powers is central in the selections included in the present volume.
Partly because of its complexity, Ockham's political thought is controversial. To be sure, Ockham's institutional dualism can be seen as a conservative rationalization of traditional power relations — namely, of the de facto independence of priestly and lay authority from one anocher which was responsible for much of the dynamism of medieval life. Despite frequent expressions of mutual respect, however, medieval ecclesiastical and secular rulers were often far from agreeing in the basic understanding of their relationship. The natural impulse of kings and emperors to assume control of all significant activities within their domains came up especially hard against papal claims to more than ceremonial recognition of Christ's superiority (and Christ's vicar's superiority) to every earthly power.
By the time Ockham addressed the issues, the papalist or hierocratic side had achieved unsurpassed theoretical development in such authors as James of Viterbo, Giles of Rome, and Augustinus Triumphus. Among the more moderate thinkers, John of Paris came xii Introduction closest to asserting the balanced dualism Ockham would develop further. The most radical anti-hierocratic treatise in circulation was
Marsilius of Padua's Defender ofPeace, which assigned all coercive jurisdiction to the (theoretically popularly controlled) lay ruler. The appearance of conservatism of Ockham's position is thus somewhat misleading. In appealing to biblical theology and newly current
Aristotelian political ideas in order to distinguish religious and secular authority, Ockham challenged simpler views on both sides.
A further source of controversy is the fact that a number of Ockham's political works are directed against a reigning pope.
Ockham's career in politics began with this confrontation.
The poverty controversy and the Letter to the Friars Miner As the leading Franciscan thinker at Oxford in the generation after Duns Scotus, Ockham produced important texts in logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics, and theology. These have no overt political content. Ockham was required, however, to defend the orthodoxy of some of his early theses on prace and divine power before an examining commission at the papal court in Avignon. These views were never formally condemned, but while he was at Avignon in the mid-1320s Ockham became convinced that Pope John XXII was himself a heretic on points of doctrine central to Franciscan belief and practice.
In the religious order founded by Francis of Assisi in the early years of the thirteenth century, renunciation of both individual and communal ownership came to be a central commitment. In the course of the century, the ideal of gospel poverty achieved increasing doctrinal recognition in papal pronouncements on the poverty of Christ and his apostles which closely reflected Franciscan teaching.
The common belief of the friars in Ockham's time was that Nicholas Ilf's bull Exist gui seminat (1279) indisputably defined the complete poverty of Christ and the apostles as part of the Christian faith.
The Franciscan understanding of Christ's poverty was not, however, a part ofJohn XXII's faith. In a series of bulls promulgated during the 1320s, John rejected a previous arrangement whereby the papacy had held ownership of goods used by the friars, and he declared it heretical to deny that Christ and the apostles had xii Introduction had rights of ownership in the things they used. Through much of this period the Franciscan Minister General Michael of Cesena was in residence at the papal court, trying, in increasing desperation, to bring the pope to a position clearly consistent with earlier Franciscan and papal teaching.
It was at this time that Ockham read John's constitutions. As he explains in che first selection translated here, he found many of John's pronouncements "heretical, erroneous, silly, ridiculous, fantastic, insane, and defamatory"
(p. 3). Accordingly, in the spring of 1328, Ockham, Michael of Cesena, and a few other friars, fled Avignon and sought refuge with Ludwig of Bavaria, whom John had excommunicated in 1324 for functioning as Roman emperor without papal approval of his disputed election ten years before.
Ockham was excommunicated for leaving Avignon without papal permission, and he was regarded as a heretic by John XXil and succeeding popes for rejecting John's teachings on poverty. He thus became the first major western theologian to enter into protracted dispute with the papacy on matters of Christian doctrine — at first the doctrine of poverty and then the less well-defined doctrines of supreme spiritual and temporal power.
Our first selection is the account of his actions which Ockham addressed to the Franciscans assembled at a general meeting of the Order in 1334. Some ofthe seventy propositions in John XXII's bulls which Ockham lists as erroneous in the Letter to the Friars
Minor are discussed in the next selection. The import of others can be grasped only in the light of detailed further argumentation which cannot be reviewed here. In its framework, however, the Letter is grippingly accessible: the opening, closing, and a brief central narrative passage express in the clearest possible terms both the depth of Ockham's conviction that John XXII had deviated from the Christian faith and the strength of his own determination to oppose John's errors to the utmost of his means and ability,
The Work ofNinety Days When he wrote his Letter to the Friars Minor, Ockham had already completed, in the time indicated by its tide, the next work represented in this volume, The Work of Ninety Days. Here he deals at length with errors listed in the Lester and attacks several hundred xiv Introduction subordinate assertions by John XXII which he regarded as heretical or erroneous. The Wark ofNinety Days is the first of three "impersonal" works which together make up the bulk of Ockham's political writing. The discussion is carried on through alternating passages from John XXII's Quia vir reprobus with arguments by unnamed
"attackers" of John's doctrine, who uphold the position of "the appellant," Michael of Cesena, to whose appeal against John's earlier bulls Qui vir was a detailed response. John is referred to simply as "the attacked." Despite this involuted format, Ockham succeeds in laying out a coherent statement of the Franciscan position on gospel poverty as this had existed prior to John XXII's blitzkrieg against it In so doing, he also advances a number of important propositions about property, power, and natural rights.
Some of the issues in dispute are vividly stated at the beginning of chapter 2. In the remainder of this chapter Ockham surveys the various senses of the key terms in which these issues had been stated: "using," "use of fact," "use of right," "right of using,"
"simple users," "things consumed by use," "lordship," "property," and words such as "mine," "yours," and "his." Points debated in later chapters typically turn on the meanings of one or more of these terms.
In chapters 26-8, for example, the senses of lordship and the nature of property are crucial. Michael of Cesena had held chat in their renunciation of temporal possessions the apostles had returned, as far as property was concemed, to the state of innocence described early in the book of Genesis. In that state, he contended, there had been use of material things without any property or lordship. John XXII argued, to the contrary, that God's order to Adam and Eve to subject and dominate the earth was clear proof of human lordship in the state of innocence and that, before Eve's creation, Adam was sole proprietor of the world.
Ockham's reply on behalf of the Michaelist attackers is that Adam and Eve did indeed have a lordship of effective control over material things, but not the exclusive lordship of owners (chapter
26). Even if Adam alone was in charge of the world initially, this would not show that his lordship was proprietary (chapter 27).
Lordship is not ownership because of belonging in fact to one person. It is ownership only when appropriated to one person m such a way that it cannot belong to anyone else without the x¥ introduction owner's gift, other act of transfer, or death. Ockham illustrates this distinction by reference to the possession of property in a traditional monastic house. If someone founded a monastery and endowed it with many goods, the first monk there would not have exclusive lordship over those goods. He would not be their owner, since if a second man became a monk in the same monastery, he too would have some kind of lordship over the monastery's goods without any special act of transfer from the first monk.
The application of this example to the state of innocence is clear, Whatever lordship Adam may have had when he was alone in the world, it was not exclusive to him. It was for Eve and their posterity, since no act of his was necessary to make Eve a participant in that Jordship. Eve was not an economic creature of her husband, nor are later generations economic creatures of those before them, gleaning whatever is left from the previous generation's enjoyment of its own private property.
In chapter 65 it is the concept of a right (4s) that is crucial.
John XXII presented the Michaelists with a dilemma. Did Franciscans have a right to their food, clothing, and shelter, or did they not? If they did, then their claim to have renounced all ownership was void. But if they did not have a right to the things they used, then their use of them was unjust (faiustum) and wrong.
Ockham's response is one of the most important texts on natural rights to be found in his work. He distinguishes between a right of the forum or law-court (us fori) and a right of heaven (éus peli}, essentially a natural right. The latter is that by which persons living without positive legal institutions can licitly use material things for their preservation or comfort. The effect of property rights embodied in positive legal institutions (rights of the forum) is to abridge the original common right of heaven, so that ordinarily
(the case of extreme need is an exception) no one can licitly use anything belonging to another without the owner's permission. The effect of the "licences to use" granted by others to the Franciscans is not to confer a positive legal right on the friars but to cancel the abridgment of their original common natural right. The proof of this distinction is that, if a donor withdrew his licence, the friars would have no recourse in a court of law, as they would if a legal right had been granted them. xvi Introduction Thus the response to the dilemma posed by John XXII is that the friars' mode of possessing and using material goods ~ one of several modes of possession other than ownership which Ockham considers in this chapter — is not unjust, for it is in accord with the right or law of heaven. But neither do the friars have positive legal rights. Their poverty is intact.
According to John XXII's attackers, as we have seen, there was no property in Paradise. How, then, did property come into the world? Ockham defends five conclusions on this matter in chapter
&8 of The Work ofNinety Days. (1) There was no exclusive lordship or property in the state of innocence. (2) After the fall, the first exclusive lordship of temporal things was introduced by human law, or by human ordinance or will. The first exclusive lordships
Ockham finds indicated in the Bible were those of Cain, a farmer, and Abel, a shepherd, but since there is no suggestion that the property division implied by this division of labor was made by divine command, the inference is that it was a product of human ordinance or will.
(3) Distinct lordships over many things were introduced at various times by human laws other than the laws of kings. Ockham argues that we need not think of ali property divisions as having been made by rulers: perhaps Cain and Abel divided property on their own authority, just as Abraham and Lot seem to have divided territory between themselves on their own authority. (4) In course of time some jordships of temporal things were introduced by direct divine ordinance. To the many texts cited by John, Ockham adds the divine grants of Mount Seir to the children of Esau and of Ar to the sons of Lot (Deuteronomy 2:4 and 9). Ockham is far from questioning God's authority to grant ownership of whatever He pleases to whomever He pleases, but he denies that all property titles have such a direct theological foundation. In particular, (5) after the promulgation of the gospel, all new property divisions have been made by human law, not by divine law or by any special grant of God.
Ockham's secularization of property rights in chapter 88 of The Work of Ninety Days is complemented in chapter 93 by what might be called, from a secular standpoint, an impoverishment and marginalization of Christ and the apostles. In Quia vir John XXII had argued that Christ was universal king and lord of all temporal xvii introduction things, and this not merely insofar as he was divine, but even insofar as he was a mortal man. Ockham's attempt to prove the manifest heresy of this position forms the longest single chapter of The Work of Ninety Days.
He begins by distinguishing relevant senses of the words "king" and "lord." Of the many possible senses of rev (relating to regendo,
"ruling"), three are especially pertinent. The term may apply (t} to one person miling others temporally, and here there are many modes, including the supreme mode associated with monarchical rule of a whole community; (2) to someone who rules others in spiritual matters; or (3) to someone who rules himself and his movements and acts by right reason. The term "lord" is also equivocal. Someone may be called a lord in recognition of some power he has (in relation to the senses of lordship enumerated in chapter 2 or the kinds of ruling noted in the present chapter} or as a prerogative of holiness, virtue, wisdom, riches, or the like.
Ockham's next step is to explain what the Michaelists regard as the truth concerning Christ's kingship and lordship. The pattern of argument is the same in the two cases. (1) First Ockham affirms
Christ's authority as God. As God Christ was king of all, just as the Father is king of all. Similarly, Christ as God was lord of all, just as God the Father is lord of all. (2) This is followed by a denial or restriction of Christ's worldly power or wealth as 2 human being. As mortal man Christ was not a king in the supreme mode of temporal rule {although he was a temporal king in a more limited sense, because he ruled the apostles temporally}. Similarly,
Christ as mortal man was not lord of all temporal things by a lordship exclusive to himself (although he was lord of all by the common lordship God gave to the whole human race, if it is not permissible for anyone to renounce such lordship). (3) Finally
Ockham explains the appropriateness of applying terms such as "king" and "lord" to Christ even as a human being ~ if the terms are taken in the correct senses. Thus, Christ was supremely a king from ruling spiritually, because for this he came into the world, to govern the faithful who believe in him with respect to spiritual matters, Again, as a mortal man Christ did nor have legal ownership of anything, but he could nevertheless be called lord because of the union of human nature in him with the divine nature and because of his holiness and other graces. xviii Introduction In short, the Michaelists' position on the kingship and lordship of Christ rested on two distinctions: {1} berween Christ as God and Christ as man and (2) between secular political or economic senses of kingship and lordship on one hand and spiritual, moral, or theological senses on the other. On the basis of these two distinctions, Ockham argues in the third and longest section of chapter 93 that John XXII's assertions of Christ's kingship and lordship "smack of manifest heresy." One need not accept this judgment to find much of value in Ockham's discussion of texts such as John 18:36 (Christ's statement to Pilate: "My kingdom is not of this world") and in his consideration of the implications for Christian life and leadership to be drawn from the Franciscan view of a poor and politically powerless Christ.
Tract 1 of Part m of the Dialogue (111 Dialogus 1) Ockham's conviction that John XXII had fallen into grave error was also the motive for his next major work, the massive Part t of a Dialogue between Master and Student (1 Dialogus), a discussion of heresy, "especially papal heresy." Part of the Dialogue, apparently never written, was to have considered the content of John's teachings. Part mi, from which the next two selections in the present volume are taken, was originally planned as a series of tracts on the deeds of six individuals (including Ludwig of Bavaria and himself) involved in the current altercations about the faith. Two preliminary treatises are all that survive, one on the power of the pope and clergy (mr Dialegus 1) and one on the power and rights of the Roman Empire (1 Dialogus 1).
The second book of m Dialegus 1, translated here in its entirety, is a pioneering attempt to discuss the government of the Church in the joint contexts of biblical theology and Aristotelian political theory. To achieve a clearer understanding of the proposition that Christ appointed Peter head of all believers (a proposition which Ockham accepted), the Student determines to discuss first whether it is beneficial for the community of the faithful to Aave a single head. The pursuit of this question is intertwined with treatment of two related questions: what qualifications must a head of all helievers have, and may the community of the faithful change its form of government? xix Introduction On balance, the thirty chapters of 1 Dialogus 1.2 provide substan- . tial "political" as well as scriptural support for the medieval western church's acceptance of papal authority as universal. This support is reinforced in the remaining two books of ot Dialogus 1 by a critique of the doctrine of conciliar supremacy (Book 3) and by a defense of the traditional belief that Christ himself conferred chief authority in the Church on Peter and, through him, his successors
(Book 4). Ockham's endorsement of papal monarchy is, however, carefully nuanced. Although Book 2 supports the view that a monarchical regime is ordtaarily or regularly best for the Church, circumstances are envisaged in which one or another alternative form of government would be more beneficial.
In such circumstances, Ockham argues, the community of the faithful may temporarily set papal government aside.
Ockham discusses constitutional change in Church government as a question about the power of "the community of the faithful" to effect such change. He conspicuously does not propose formal institutional procedures whereby the community of believers might deliberate and decide upon such a momentous step. Some of the cases considered in which structural change in Church government would be indicated assume that significant multitudes of Christians who were for good or bad reasons unwilling to accept papal monarchy would accept some other regime. The suggestion seems to be that in such cases it would be, objectively speaking, beneficial to suspend papal rule for a time. Ockham might expect reasonable individuals ("kings" in the third sense of the term recognized in chapter 93 of The Work of Ninety Days?) to assess the situation correctly and act accordingly. There is, however, no basis for supposing that he thought any formal procedure could guarantee that any particular set of individuals would be thus reasonable.
Whatever the explanation for his failure to recommend formal procedures by which the community of the faithful might determine whether to change its form of government, Ockham clearly did not hold that a general council of the Church was infallible in doctrine or, presumably, in action. This is evident from Book 3 of m Dialogus 1, where he discusses the thesis, presented by Marsilius of Padua and taken up by later writers, that a general council of the Church has authority as great as or greater than the pope's. xx Introduction Ockham respects the efforts of general councils through the ages to define Catholic ruth, but he is unwilling to interpret Christ's promise to be always with "the Church" as a promise to be with any particular Christian or set of Christians, Jay or clerical, scholar or prelate. Christ's promise would, he says, be fulfilled even if there were only one orthodox Christian at any given time. Like
Adam before the creation of Eve, or like the first monk in chapter 27 of The Work ofNinety Days, a single individual might for a time bear sole responsibility for what is normally, and by right, a great community.
Ockham contests another part of Marsilius's position in the next and final book of m Dialogus 1. He argues here that Peter was appointed by Christ to feed aii his sheep, including the other apostles (mm Dralogus 1.4.8) and St, Paul (chapter 9), and that this ministry entrusted to Peter involved power and authority, not merely words, examples, and physical support (chapter 10). Later in the book (chapter 22) the Master argues that what has been believed since the time of the apostles by prelates and doctors of the Church in continuous succession and by the people subject to them should be held firmly by alt Catholics. But all these have believed that Peter was superior to the other apostles.
For Ockham, a pope's authority over all Christians is distinctly and specifically spiritual. It must respect the rights of others, both rulers and individuals. Papal authority includes a measure of coercive power but does not involve a right to command anything not contrary to divine or natural law. It does not require great wealth or show itself in magnificence. Interpreted in this way, papal authority has a unique claim to the respect of all Christians, But this interpretation sets a standard from which flagrant deviation need not be tolerated, and it proposes a style of leadership which, even when legitimate, does not impose itself at the cost of great conflict among believers.
Tract u of Part mi of the Dialogue (it Dialogus mi) The conception of lay political authority which emerges from the second tract of ut Dialogs, on the rights of the Roman Empire, is distinctly and specifically secular. At the beginning of the tract, xxi fntroduction the Student proposes an ambitious program. After a frst book devoted to fundamental questions ahout the value and basis of a world empire and the qualities needed in an emperor, there is to be a second book on the emperor's rights in temporal matters, a third on possible imperial rights in spiritual matters, a fourth on the question of whether an emperor has a strict religious obligation to defend the Empire's rights, and a fifth on various sorts of enemies of the Empire. After an understandable moment of hesitation, the Master agrees to embark. The tract (and with it the work) breaks off at chapter 23 of Book 3, after a discussion of the emperor's jurisdiction over clerics. The last argument, reminiscent of chapter
93 of The Work ofNinety Days, is that the pope's coercive jurisdiction is inferior to the emperor's, because Christ as a mortal man was inferior in coercive jurisdiction to the emperor and other secular judges of his time.
The questions about secular government which Ockham discusses in the 17 chapters translated from Book 1 of the second tract of mn Dialagus y are similar to the questions about spiritual government discussed in at Dialogus 1. What is the best form of government?
What qualities are needed in a leader? Is constitutional change permissible? The most strongly defended answers are sometimes similar in the two discussions, sometimes different. In both, the question of right or legitimacy is significantly qualified by considerations of benefit to the population governed, either the community of the faithful or the totality of mortals. The thesis that a monarchical regime is ordinarily, but not invariably, the most beneficiai dictates in each case that at least temporary variation in form of government is permissible, although the difference between the divine origin of the papal office and the human origin of secular government places a higher value on ecclesiastical than on secular monarchy, There are major differences in the functions to be served by the two governments and in the qualifications needed in the persons who are to head them. The settlement of disagreements and the correctionof subordinate officials is a common task for both monarchs, but positive, nurturing functions are more important for the papacy, while the first argument for secular monarchy is that it is the regime under which wrongdoers may best be restrained and the good allowed to live quietly among the bad. A pope should be holy and wise; although it is not necessary that he be greatly xxii introduction superior in these respects to everyone about him, a less worthy person sins if he does not give way for the office to a more worthy.
An emperor, on the other hand, should above all have good sense and be, or become, conversant about secular affairs and natural law. It is appropriate that he be literate in Scripture, but expermess here (or indeed in the technicalities of civil law) is not strictly necessary. Since the pope is not responsible for punishing secular crimes, he does not need great riches. An emperor is and does.
The interplay of benefit and right begins in chapter 1, with the Student's assertion that the Roman Empire's rights would not be rights if it were not beneficial for all mortals to be under one secular ruler in temporal matters. But 1 this beneficial? Ockham presents five opinions on this question in the first five chapters of the book, beginning with a simple affirmative and concluding with the opinion that what is beneficial varies with the quality and necessity of the times. He notes at the beginning of chapter 6, however, chat the first and last opinions need not be regarded as contrary, and the following eight chapters defend a position which combines them: it is ordinarily best for the world to have a single leader in secular matters, but there are cases in which another regime would be more beneficial - and hence deserve more support.
Ockham's declaration that the first and fifth opinions are aot necessarily opposed — since, he argues, monarchy is ordinarily or regularly but not always the best form of world government — dictates a double approach in the second, critical phase of the discussion. The next few chapters qualify the arguments in favor of monarchy, showing that they do not invariably hold good, by specifying cases in which some other regime is more beneficial.
The response to arguments for the regular superiority of other forms of government is that anything another regime can do, monarchy can (ordinarily) do better.
The first argument for monarchy in chapter 1 was that wrongdoers are best restrained under a single ruler and the good can live more quietly among the bad. Two general cases in which this argument fails are presented in chapter 6, and they set a pattern for Ockham's qualifying responses to other pro-monarchical arguments, One case in which a single ruler is not most effective in restraining the bad occurs when the bad are actually stirred up by the attempt to institute a monarchy. The Master cites (if the passage xxi Introduction is authentic) the civil wars among the Romans in the time ofJulius
Caesar. The object of Caesar's ambition — the predominance of one man, himself — is not criticized, but under the circumstances it was not right te pursue this aim. In considering other arguments,
Ockham returns to this theme more than once. The likelihood of substantial resistance to monarchy may make it wrong to attempt to institute such a regime if it does not exist, or wrong to attempt to enforce monarchical prerogatives previously acknowledged as legitimate. The other principal instance in which bad people are less well restrained by monarchy than by an alternative regime occurs when the world ruler himself "rages with tyrannical cruelty."
Nero is given as an example.
After offering similar qualifications to the ten further arguments for monarchy from chapter 1, the Master responds in chapters 1113 to the arguments offered earlier for other positions. Of special interest are his replies to arguments for an aristocratic world government, a regime of many wise men ruling together. These replies supplement a similar comparative discussion of regimes in mi Dialogus 1.2.19. A single ruler can take advantage of the greater wisdom of a multitude by seeking advice, and no one should be made ruler unless there is a strong probability that he will indeed do this when it is necessary and beneficial. To the argument that a group of rulers would be less cormuptible than a single ruler, the reply here is different from the somewhat tortuous response in the earlier chapter. Here the Master argues that errors and faults arising from bad will and negligence are more likely with several rulers than with one, since humans, especially those with power, are prone to conflict with one another, but no one is in conflict with himself.
The Master has now established that a world monarchy in temporal affairs is ordinarily beneficial for the totality of mortals — ordinarily but not always. The Student's initial assertion about the rights of the Roman Empire has been skilfully modulated. Those rights would not be rights, he had said, if such a government were not beneficial. To the extent that world monarchy is beneficial, then, a Ludwig of Bavaria would have a good basis for pressing his legitimate claims as emperor and asserting imperial authority.
But the unwillingness of an increasing number of other secular rulers to acknowledge the Empire's overlordship would qualify as a case in which it would not be right to press those claims too
XXIV Introduction far. The secular political program dictated by Ockham's discussion would seem to be a prudent one of working toward the best outcome - a just and effective world government exercised over 2 substantially willing human community and concerned primarily with the restraint of wrongdoers rather than with a spiritual mission of its own — but with due regard for the human costs involved in asserting even the best attested legal titles.
The second major question considered in m Dialegus 0.1 has to do with the "excellences or graces, virtues and characteristics" in which the head of a world government should be outstanding. The Student begins by asking, in chapter 14, whether a world monarch in temporal matters is obliged to be a Catholic. No doubt he is, the Master replies, for every adult mortal having the use of reason is so obliged. Or did the Student mean to ask whether someone can be a true emperor who is not a Catholic? On this question there are different opinions, which will be dealt with later. Ockham's situation as 2 controversialist did not encourage defense of a possible future non-Christian world monarch, but his insistence on the biblically attested legitimacy of the pagan Roman Empire in the time of Christ indicates clearly enough the direction his treatment of the question would have to take.
Chapter 15 is an important discussion of a good world governor's intellectual qualifications, with a section on advice which should be added to the discussion of this topic in 1m Dialogus 1.2.19 and chapter 4 of the present book. The Student begins by asking whether an emperor should be expert in two traditional branches of iearning, theology and civil law. With regard to the first of these, one opinion presented by the Master is that an emperor should indeed be expert in sacred literature, both on the model of Old
Testament kings and because he is obliged to defend the Christian faith and should therefore understand it. The Master does not respond to these arguments, but it seems clear from the sequel that Ockham prefers a second opinion: it is fining that the ruler be able to read Scripture and understand iss literal meaning (the basis of other meanings that can be found in it), but this is not essential, since without such skill he can usefully and justly manage temporal affairs. Ockham is also willing to settle for an emperor with less than professional competence in civil law, for there have been just and even saintly emperors and kings lacking such knowlxX
Introduction edge (who would have acquired it if it had been necessary). Also, an emperor or king, in contrast with inferior judges, is not tied by the laws. An emperor whe lacks profound knowledge in theology or civil law should therefore not devote himself so much to remedying these shortcomings that he neglects the responsibilities of government that have been entrusted to him.
The personal qualities most necessary in an emperor are natural sense, discretion, energy, and judgment of reasoning. A new emperor or king should apply himself to gaining expertise in secular affairs and knowledge of natural law, especially "natural law about which the leamed can err or doubt." The Student is puzzled by this last clause. As he understands natural law, there is no excuse for being ignorant of it, but if there are natural laws about which experts can err or be uncertain, there couid be excuses for ignorance concerning those laws. This objection leads to a significant elaboration of Ockham's conception of natural law. There are, the Master explains, three kinds of natural laws. (1) There are, first, self-evident principles and propositions following so closely from such principles that they cannot fail to occur to us when we are obliged to do or omit something in accordance with them — unless we simply refuse to think of what we are about. One cannot fail to see, for example, that it is wrong to kil a harmless innocent human being. (2) There are other natural iaws which are drawn plainiy and without great consideration from first principles.
Ignorance is no excuse for violating either of these two types of rational norms. (3) There are, however, other natural laws which can indeed be inferred from the first type, but only with great attention and study and through many intermediate propositions. These laws are inferred by few people, even among the experts, and "about these the experts sometimes have conflicting opinions, some thinking them just, athers unjust." As this reference to justice indicates, Ockham follows scholastic tradition in conceiving of natural laws as rational dictates concerning right and wrong. The knowledge he wishes his ruler to cultivate is not an amoral proficiency in calculating ways to achieve his own ends. Although the difficulty of determining the rights and wrongs involved here may provide an excuse for ignorance of them, natural laws of this third type are objective. In enjoining rulers to acquire knowledge of such natural laws, Ockham xx¥i Introduction aims at a politics guided by natural justice in detail, not only at the level of general principie.
To acquire skill in natural laws and secular affairs, the emperor should have many wise advisers. The mention of advisers leads the Srdent to cite Ecclesiasticus: "Let only one in a thousand be your adviser." The Master, in turn, offers advice about advice.
There are, he savs, various subjects on which, or reasons for which, advice may be sought. Sometimes the matter at hand is secret and dangerous to reveal. Ar other times it may be public, so it can be revealed without danger. The point of seeking advice may be to secure the advisers' agreement and thus make the decision more authoritative and effective. Or the decision may be one which is to be carried out by the advisers. In this case and in cases where confidentiality is needed, the cautionary maxim from Ecclesiasticus applies. In the other cases already mentioned — and also when knowledge of law or fact is sought or when the discretion, prudence, faithfulness, affection, or intentions of the advisers are being tested — advisers should be many. Indeed, advice should sometimes be sought from the unskilled or malevolent.
Chapter 16 has less to do with an emperor's personal qualities than with the policies he should follow in the administration of justice. Indeed there may sometimes be a tension between desirable policy and the desirable personal quality of mercy, since Ockham seems to make the common good and the safety of subjects (especially the good ones} the criterion for policy. Accordingly, sometimes an emperor should forbear or defer pursuing justice, sometimes he should temper justice with mildness, but sometimes he has a strict obligation to be rigorous. Similarly, with respect to inflicting penalties for crimes, if the emperor knows that a criminal is perfectly reformed, mercy is permissible. Otherwise, mercy toward the criminal is cruelty to subjects.
The last chapter on the qualities required in an emperor is also externally oriented, although the discussion of truth, the first trait considered, suggests that it is a virtue of character which should be carried over into the ruler's public personality, As to the fulfillment of promises, the Master asserts, presumably because the emperor's primary responsibility is for the common welfare, that he should not fulfill promises badly made or even those licitly xvii Introduction made if they have begun to be harmful. Finally, there arises the question of wealth and power. A pope, as we have seen, does not necd to be rich, according to Ockham. The case is different for an emperor. The Master reports that some think — and since he offers no other opinion, Ockham apparently agrees — the imperial office cannot be well administered without riches. Such authority is nothing without coercion, but coercion cannot be exercised without power (fetentia here, not potestas, Ockham's more usual term). Power is most strengthened by riches, for it is with riches that a ruler acquires and retains friends, or at least obedience.
Friends and obedience will not be secured by riches, however, unless the wealth is poured out Hberally (presumably not prodigally).
Thus, in the Franciscan Ockham's political theory the virtue of liberality, a habit leading to intrinsically good acts by prosperous individuals in Aristotle's EtAtes, becomes an instrumental virtue of secular statecraft. There is also a contrast with Ockham's own account of spiritual government. Different motives are effective in the two spheres. The pope should be a wise and holy example but need not be rich. Ockham's last touch on the qualifications of an etnperor is to say that he will need resoluteness (the courage that is a virtue of soul} to use his resources to carry out the policies required by the common good. Bodily fortitude is not so necessary.
Ockham's contribution to the Mirror of Princes genre in m Dialogus 1.1.14-17 is neither voluminous nor elegant, but it fits the conception of secular government laid out earlier in the book,
The restraint of wrongdoers and the other functions of secular government can ordinarily be carried out most effectively and justly by a single ruler. The qualities needed in such a ruler differ from those required in a spiritual leader because his responsibilities differ. Knowledge, including a quite refined knowledge of right and wrong, is required, but this knowledge, as well as an understanding of existing secular realities, is distinct from the knowledge needed in a spiritual leader. The distinction between spiritual and temporal in Ockham''s thought is sharp enough to allow for the possibility of a non-Christian world emperor, but it by no means consigns secular politics to a realm of amorality and mere force.
Indeed, as we shall now see, Ockham claims positive divine warrant for 2 secular politics which pursues a rationally defined peace and justice.
Introduction The last excerpt from the Dialogue included in this volume is Ockham's defense of an emperor's eligibility to be sole elector of the pope. In these three chapters from the incomplete third book of m1 Diglegus u, Ockham does not hase the emperor's capacity for this role on any sort of responsibility for religion inherent in the imperial office. Although he argues strongly for the legitimacy, in principie, of a practice engaged in by more than one medieval emperor as grounded in his office, Ockham makes the emperor's right to choose the pope contingent, ultimately, on the cooperation of other Catholic Christians, There is a further wrinkle of contingency in the Master's concession thar the papacy itself was the proximate source of some past emperors' possession of this right.
The chief point of these chapters, however -— a point in the making of which Ockham deploys a novel and suggestive threefold conception of natural law ~ is that in this matter of papal election the right of those whom the pope is to govern is more fundamental than the right of the pope himself. The Romans have not been given the right to decide haw a pope will be etected by the papacy.
Rather, the papacy must be regarded as having this right (when it does have it} by consent of the Romans.
The Student objects that the Romans do not have such a right, because they do not have it by either divine law or human law,
The response to this objection is a division of natural law which, besides doing much to reconcile a number of apparently contradictory remarks on the subject by Isidore of Seville (remarks enshrined in the canon law), sheds further light on the role of reason in Ockhamist politics.
The Master proposes in chapter 6 that the Romans have the right to elect the highest pontiff "by divine law, extending divine law to include all natural law." There are three modes of natural law, he explains: (1) that which is in conformity with natural reason that in no case fails; (2) that which is to be observed by those who use natural equity alone without any custom or human legislation; and (3) that which is gathered by evident reasoning from the jaw of nations or another law or from some act, divine or human, unless the contrary is enacted with the consent of those concerned.
As examples of the first, unfailingly obligatory natural law, the Master gives two of the Ten Commandments: do not commit
XXIX introduction adultery, do not lie. There is no suggestion that the Romans, the emperor, the pope, or anyone else has electoral rights on so absolute a basis as this. The second mode of natural law is that which governed the state of innocence. Under natural law in this sense, for example, there is no private property and no servitude. But even though this second mode of natural law has some application in the fallen condition of human nature (for example, material things are common to all in the sense that all are obliged to treat them as common unless for reasonable cause they decide on the contrary), it is more an ideal standard than a categorical norm.
The third mode of natural law, which the Master calls natural law "on supposition," is a matter of rational response to existing contingencies. The obligation to return a deposit to its owner, for example, arises from the fact that the deposit has been made.
Again, the right to repel violence by force is an example of natural law in this sense, Finally, the particular right under discussion is an example of natural law in this third mode. For supposing someone is to be set over certain persons as prelate, ruler, or rector, it is inferred by evident reason that unless the contrary is decided on by some higher authority those who are to be ruled have the right to choose their ruler.
Natural law in all of these three modes can be called divine law both because it is from Ged, the creator of nature, and because it is contained in Scripture either explicitly or implicitly, for in Scripture there are certain general propositions from which, alone or with other (presumably factual) propositions, every natural law can be inferred. The particular natural-divine right in question here can also be thought of as a matter of human right, for the principle that a community is entitled to choose its rulers is included in the law of nations. One could therefore say that the Romans have the right to elect the pope by both divine law and human law.
According to Ockham, the right of a community to choose its leaders is not inalienable. In chapter 7 the Master concedes that at some time in the past the Romans probably transferred this right and power to the pope. Yet, as he will argue in the following chapter, if the pope should become a heretic, the right to elect a true pope would devolve upon the Romans again, "reverting to its own mature." aX Introduction Ockham was first and foremost a theologian, one who undoubtedly considered God's will the supreme norm of action for any creature. The passages on natural law included in the present volume indicate, however, that he did not regard divme will as hostile to human reason. Quite the contrary. For secular political purposes there is a perfect harmony between reason and the biblical revelation of God's will. God the creator of nature also affirms, in revelation, the principles of natural reason.
Eight Questions on the Power of the Pope Ockham's conspicuous lack of interest in promoting popular participation in either ecclesiastical or secular government leaves us at this point with two normally independent monarchical institutional structures. This is not a neat result. From the standpoint of modern political theories built on one or another conception of sovereignty,
Ockham seems to have ignored the one thing necessary in a system of political thought: identification of a single supreme locus of control. Whether or not this is a defect in Ockham, it is certainly no accident. The deliberately dualistic character of his thought comes out clearly - indeed, it is the whole point - in the last selection in the present volume, Question m1 of Eight Questions on the Power of the Pape.
In this question Ockham asks whether all legitimate secular rule depends on papal authorization. He gives most attention throughout the question's thirteen chapters to a monistic premise held in common by papalists and Marsilians, the premise that "a community
... in which all or many are prone to discerd, dissensions, and disputes is not best ordered unless it is subject to one supreme rector, judge, and head, upon whom the jurisdiction of all others depends" {p. 305). This premise is first stated in an argument for universal papal secular jurisdiction in chapter 1, but it is also used in chapter 3 to defend the most extreme anti-papalist position presented in the intervening chapter. That obviously Marsilian position concedes that no community is best ordered unless it is subject to one supreme judge but insists that that judge should be appointed by the totality of mortals, or by the greater or sounder part of them, and should not be the pope. The great interest of Question m1 lies in Ockham's clear recognition that his own advoXXXi
Introduction cacy of a regular dualism of spiritual and secular governments requires him to deal, not only with papalism, but aiso with a secularism or faicism that would bring religion completely under civil control.
Ockham offers a single positive argument against the monistic premise. A community is #et best ordered if it is subject in all things to one supreme judge, "because in such a community that supreme judge could destroy justice by his wrongdoing and even endanger the whole community." The rest of Question m, except for a brief concluding chapter giving replies on behalf of papalism to the arguments for secular independence, is devoted toa explaining how this anti-unitarian position can coherently be maintained. To do this Ockham embarks on an explanation of some of the things required by, incompatible with, or consistent with {though nor essential to} the best regime.
The first requirement for the best regime (chapter 4) is that it be established for the common good of its subjects and not for the ruler's own good. A second requisite is that it be monarchical
(chapter 5). Although Ockham indicates that many arguments could be given for this, he contents himself with one: a single ruler ts best for preserving friendship, peace, and concord, and for removing discord, among those who are subjects.
In chapter 6 Ockham turns to things which conflict with the best regime. The one point made is that it conflicts with the best regime to have only slaves as subjects. Accordingly (chapter 7), it conflicts with the best regime for the ruler to have the fullness of power sometimes attributed to the pope: power to command and impose on his subjects anything not in conflict with immutable natural law or with divine law.
What is compatible with the best regime although not of its essence? As a basis for answering this question, Ockham argues that the "most principal" function of a (secular) ruler is to correct and punish wrongdoers (chapter 8). Accordingly, it is compatible with the best regime for the jurisdiction of some person or persons within the community to be independent of the supreme ruler, provided that no member of the community who does wrong is thereby able to escape just and due punishment (chapter 9). It is not inconsistent with the best regime for someone in the community to be regularly exempt from the supreme ruler's coercive power, ond introduction provided he is subject to it occasionally, so that he cannot do wrong insolently (chapter 10). Thus, the Empire does not "depend" on the papacy, and the papacy does not "depend" on the secular ruler: the authority of one is not derived from the other. The norma! exemption of the pope (and perhaps others subject to the pope) from secular authority does not conflict with the optimal ordering of the community.
After briefly presenting his characteristic thesis that regimes may properly vary and that in some circumstances the best regime may need to be given up (chapter 11), Ockham replies in some detail to monistic arguments presented earlier. He argues chat the unity required in an optimally ordered community is sufficiently attained if no one is absolutely and in ali cases exempt from the supreme secular ruler's jurisdiction. Even in cases where the supreme spiritual power needs correction, it is reasonable that others besides the supreme secular ruler should have primary responsibility for the task. Conversely, when the supreme secular ruler needs correction, primary responsibility lies with the laity. In extreme circumstances, however, action across normal jurisdictional lines may be called for.
Marsilius of Padua had posed the dilemma of a person subject to independent supreme rulers who is summoned by each to appear before him at the same time. Ockham's response does not make the dilemma go away. If reasons are given for each summons, these can be assessed, but no general rule can be given for the assessment.
If no reasons are given, there is a presumption (for the sake of peace?) in favor of the secular summons. All in all, Ockham's response may require free individual subjects to think for themselves.
A classic modem criticism of earlier political thought is that it is preoccupied with what ought to be, instead of facing what is.
Seme modern theorists then attempt to contain things as they supposedly are within a single system of control.
If checks and balances or countervailing powers are needed, these must be accommodated within a single institutional framework. If something simply will not fit within the framework, it must be regarded as fundamentally private or inner, Jacking any legitimate claim to interfere with what is public and real. Beyond the realm of such theory, however, a recognition persists that things neither are nor ought to be quite xxiii introduction so neat. Ockham deserves a considerable measure of credit for transforming this recognition from a dynamic fact of medieval life into an intellectually respectable view of our wayfaring human condition.
XXNIY Principal dates in Ockham's life 1285?
Born, perhaps in Ockham, Surrey.
By 1324 Studied and taught theology at Oxford and elsewhere in England; lectured on the Sentences of Peter Lombard and wrote extensively on theology, logic, and Aristotelian physics.
By 1328 Examined by a papally appointed commission at Avignon concerning theses in his theological works suspected of being heretical - never formally condemned in this connection.
26 May 1328 «Flees Avignon with Michael of Cesena and a few other friars oppe — to John: XXIPs teachings on the poverty of Christ and the apostles, eventually finding refuge with Ludwig of Bavaria, first in Pisa and then, for the rest of his life, in Munich.
Ludwig had been elected Roman emperor in 1314 in a disputed election. In 1324 John XXII excommunicated him for refusing to submit his election for papal examination and approval. In 1327 Ludwig asserted his imperial rights by invading Italy. He returned to Germany in 1330.
6 June 1328 Ockham is excommunicated byJohn XXII for leaving Avignon without permission and refusing to return when summoned. He is implicitly condemned as a heretic by the clause at the end of John's bull Quia querundam (1324) condemning
XY Principal dates those who rejected his earlier bull on evangelical poverty, Cum inter nonnullos.
1332-4 Ockham writes the Opus nenaginta dierum (OND, The Work ofNinety Days), a massive, formally nceutral presentation of the issues between John XXII and his attackers in the poverty controversy, bui a presentation in which the Michaelist side always has the last word.
Spring, 1334 Writes the Epistola ad Fratres Minares in capitulo apudAssisium congregatos (EFM, A Letter ta the Friars Minor Gathered in Chapter at Assisi), an explanation to his fellow Franciscans of his break with John
XXIE, with lists ofJohn's errors on evangelical poverty and other matters.
By late 1334 Writes Part: of4 Dialogue ft Dialegus}, a work stil more massive than the OND and also formally impersonal; a discussion of heresy, "especially papal heresy."- 1334-47 Produces other political works attacking the orthodoxy of John XXII and his successors, defending the legitimacy of Ludwig of Bavaria's authority as Roman emperor, and examining more generally the basis and functions of ecclesiastical and secular governmental institutions. These works include
Contra Benedictum (Against Benedtct [XII], which attacks John XXiI's successor for tolerating or confirming John's errors and the errors of others and for decreeing that no one should venture to approve either side of a controversy under examination by the pope prior to papal deciston. Book vi is Ockham's first approach te the problems of papacy and empire. m Dialfegus. Another impersonal work, apparently never completed. What survives of Part m of the Dialogue is Ockhamn's most systematic contribution to political theory.
Orta quaestiones de potestate papae (Eight Questions on the Power ofthe Pope). An impersonal discussion, in which Ockham's views can be readily identified, of XXXVI Principal dates various questions concerning the pope's authority aver the Empire.
Breviloguium de principatu-tyrannico super divina et humana, specialiter autem super Imperium et subiectos imperto, a guibusdam vocatis summris pontificibus usurpato (A Short Discourse on the Tyrannical Government
Ouer Things Divine and Human, but Especially Over the Empire and Those Subject to the Empire, Usurped by Some Whe Are Called Highest Pontiffs).
De itmperatorum et pontificum potestate (On the Power ofEmperors and Poniiffs). A direct, final discussion of papal power.
April 1347 Ockham dies in Munich, unrecenciled; is buried in the Franciscan convent.
October 1347 = Ludwig of Bavaria dies in a hunting accident.
The emperor Charles IV promulgates the Golden Bull, defining procedures for imperial elections independent of papal supervision.
XXX¥il Suggestions for further reading Translations of Gckham's earlier works, besides those listed in the bibliography to this volume, include William of Ockham, Ouodiibetal
Questions, 2 vols., translated by Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis E.
Kelley (New Haven and London, tggr).
Several passages from Ockham's political works are translated in Ewart Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, 2 vols. (London, 1954). The initial stages of Ockham's involvement in political controversy are traced in detail by Jirgen Miethke in Ockhams Weg aur Soztalphilosophie (Berlin, 1969).
Also see the article by George Knysh cited below. The tradition that Ockham sought reconciliation with the papacy at the end of his life is shown to rest on a confusion of Ockham with another
"brother William of England" by Gedeon Gal, "William of Ockham Died /mpenitent in April 1447," Franciscan Studies, 42, Annual 20, r982:90-5. For an assessment of the direct influence of Ockham's ideas, see H.S.
Offler, "The 'Influence' of Ockham's Political Thinking:
(in Die Gegenwart Ockhams, W. Vossenkuht and R. Schonberger, eds., Weinheim, r9ggo, pp.
For a genera] presentation of Ockham's political ideas, see Arthur Stephen McGrade, The Political Thought of Welham of Ockham:
Personal and fustitutional Principles (Cambridge, 1974).
Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham, 2 vols.
(Notre Dame, 1987), provides an acute presentation of the other major portion of Gckham's thought.
Also see Gordon Leff, William of Ockham:
The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse (Manchester, 1975) and, for ethics, Lucan Freppert, The Basis of Morality according to William
XOKVILI Suggestions for further reading Ockham (Chicago, 1988) and Taina M. Holopainen, Wiliam Ockham's Theory of the Foundations of Ethics (Helsinki, 1991). For negative assessments of Ockham's philosophical and political ideas, see E. Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York,
1937) and Georges de Lagarde, La naissance de lesprit latgue au deéclin die mayen age, new edn. (Paris, £g56—-yo). The classic positive assessment of nominalist theology is H.A. Oberman's The Harvest of Medieval Theology:
Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Cambridge, MA, 1963). For relevant larger contexts see Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge Histery of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge,
1982); Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, (Cambridge, 1978); J.H. Burns, ed., The Cambridge History ofMedteval Political Thought (Cambridge,
1988); Anthony Biack, Palitical Thought in Eurete (Cambridge, 1992); James M.
Blythe, Jdea/ Government and the Mixed Consittution in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1992); and Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, vol. tv, Reformation of Church and Dogma
(1300-1700) (Chicago and London, 1984).
Ockham's contribution to thinking about rights is discussed in A.S. McGrade, "Ockham and the Birth of Individual Rights," in Brian Tierney and Peter Linehan, eds., Authority and Power: Studies on Medieval Lam and Gevernment Presented to Walter Ullmann on His
Seventieth Birthday (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 149-65; and in two articles by Brian Tierney, "Villey, Ockham and the Origin of Individual Rights," in J. Witte and F.S. Alexander, eds., The Weightfer Things af the Law: A Tribute io Harold J. Berman" (Atlanta, 1988), pp. 1-31, and "Origins of Natural Rights Language: Texts and Contexts, 1150-1250," Aistory ofPolitical Thought, 10.4, Winter
The third volume of Franciscan Studies devoted to papers presented at the international Ockham colloquium held at St. Bonaventure University in 1985 (Franasean Studies, 46, Annual 24, 1986) consists largely of papers concerned with Ockham's ethics and political thought. See especially Marilyn McCord Adams, "The Structure of Ockham's Maral Theory' (pp. 1-35); George Knysh,
"Biographical Rectifications Concerning Ockham's Avignon Period"'
{pp. 61-91}; Alberto Melloni, "OQckham's Critique of Innocent IV" ipp. 162-203); Wolfgang Stiirner, "Die Begriindung der /urisdictio
XXXIX Suggestions forfurther reading temporalts bei Wilhelm von Ockham" (pp. 243-51); and the papers on Ockham and papal infallibility by John J. Ryan (pp. 285-94} and Brian Tierney (pp. 295-300}. On this last topic also see John
Kilcullen, "Ockham on Infallibility," Journal of Religious History, 16, 1991:387-409. xl A Letter to the Friars Minor A Letter ta the Friars Minor A Letter to the Friars Miner To the religious men, all the Friars Minor' gathered at Assisi in the year of our Lord 1334 on the feast of Pentecost, brother
William of Ockham [writes] to defend faithfully the orthodox faith, Divine Scriprure suggests, the examples of the saints show, right reason dictates, human lews command, and fraternal charity persuades, that an account should be given of everything. Accordingly, so that I may follow in every way the footsteps of the glorious
Apostle blessed Paul,? I desire to give, as well as I can, an account to you all, Catholic Christians and heretics, of what I have done, am doing, and will do. Know, then, and may all Christians know, that I stayed in Avignon almost four whole years before I recognized that the one who presided there had fallen into heretical perversity; because, not wishing to believe too readily that a person placed in so great an office would define that heresies should be held, I did not care either to read or to possess his heretical constitutions.
Presently, however, when some occasion arose, at the command of ' a superior I read and diligently studied three of his constitutions — or rather, heretical destitutions — namely Ad conditorem, Cum inter, and Quia quorundam. In these I found a great many things that were heretical, erroneous, silly, ridiculous, fantastic, insane, and defamatory, contrary and likewise plainly adverse to orthodox faith,
! "Boars Minor" is the traditional translation of fratres minoret," "lesset brothers,"' the official name of the Franciscan Order.
? Cf Paul's speech in Acts 22:1 ff, beginning, "Men, brethren and fathers, hear ye the account which I aow give unta you,"
William of Ockham good morals, natural reason, certain experience, and fraternal charity. I have decided that some of them should be inserted here.*
The first error in the constitution 4d conditorem that should be drawn to attention here is that the brothers' renunciation of property, by which, when they make their profession, they renounce property by a vow of poverty, "can contribute aothing to perfection if the same solicitude" concerning temporal things 'persists as was in them before."' From this it follows evidently that if after making their profession the brothers are just as solicitous about temporal things as they were in their novitiate, their vow of poverty can contribute nothing to perfection. And thus he seems here to fall manifestly into the error of those who say that a good deed done with a vow is not more meritorious than it would be if done without a vow; because, without that, the argument by which he strives to prove that the brothers' renunciation of property has not helped them toward perfection would lack all plausibility, as is plainly proved in other arguments.
And after the above assertion he adds, saying and asserting, that after the clarifying declaration of Nicholas III* the brothers "were not less solicitous, in court and out of court, in acquiring and keeping those goods," namely, those mentioned in the declaration,
"than other mendicant religious are, who have some things in common." In this statement he scems to censure the brothers for transgressing the declaration of the Rule and their vow.
The second assertion contained there® is that "by not having the lordship" reserved to the Roman Church the brothers are not "poorer than if they had the things themselves together with the lordship they say they do not have." From this it seems to follow that the Order has renounced in vain and usclessly the lordship of all temporal things reserved to the Roman Church. And yet that assertion conflicts alike with the divine Seripture and with natural reason, as is shown evidently in many works.
The third assertion is that "the lordship reserved to the Roman Church" is "simple" - that is, hidden, bare, and obscure, as he
? To understand the meaning of these propositions, and (o understand why Ockham regards them as heretical, it will in some cases be necessary to read the relevant parts of OND. For references see the footnotes to HLS. Offler's edition of ZEM,
* The constitution Exit gai seminat was issued "to clarify {declarare] some things that could have seerned doubeful in that Rule"; Friedberg, vol. m, dol. 1111.
A Letter te the Friars Minar explains below, and consequently useless — because "no temporal gain has so far resulted from it to that church, and it is not hoped that any might result in future." This error is most plainly refuted in the decretal Eviit. There it is plainly asserted that the "retention® of such lordship, together with a grant of use made to poor persons, is accounted so much the more useful as it exchanges temporal things for eternal." But the retention of a lordship hidden, bare, and obscure must be regarded as more harmful than useful. From this assertion it likewise seems to follow that everything must be thought useless from which no temporal gain results and it is not hoped that any might result in future. That this is heretical every believer knows.
The fourth assertion is that in things consumable by being used, use of fact cannot be separated from ownership or lordship. From this it follows evidently that whenever the brothers use things consumable by use, they have ownership or lordship of those things, at least in common. This assertion plainiy conflicts with divme
Scripture, natural reason, and certain experience. For we see that thieves and robbers and others use such things without lordship and ownership, though, as we know, some use them licitly and some illicitly.
However, to prove, provide a basis for, and defend that assertion he brings in many things that seem to me fantastic, which need no refutation. He defines, pronounces, and affirms, first, that "simple use of fact, which is not a servitude, and for which there is no right of using, cannot be established or had" in things consumable by use. Also, "that no one can use a thing from which, while its substance is preserved, no advantage can come to him, such as things consumable by use certainly are." Also, that "in things consumable by use an act of using cannot be established or had without some right." Also, that "although in things consumable by use neither 2 right of using nor using itself can be established or had, nevertheless someone can 'use them up.' *? Also, that "using presupposes that, with the use, the substance of the thing is preserved." Also, that " "using up' requires that, with the act, the substance of the thing be consumed." Also, that the act of * That is, by the Roman Church ? Abuti can mean either "use up" ar "misuse." See OND, 33-64-9, pp. 51O-Ie.
See also Justinian, Digest, 7.5.5-- William of Ockham using "does not exist in reality either before it is performed, or while it is being performed, or after it is completed"; and that "when the act is in progress it still does not exist in reality." In support of the above assertion he brings forward these and many other things that seem ridiculous, but are, nevertheless, contrary to the sacred Scriptures; and untess they are taken in their obvious meaning they are quite irrelevant to the intended conclusions.
In the same constitution he also definitively determines, asserts, and affirms many other assertions destructive of our Rule and of ecclesiastical poverty. I pass over them for the sake of brevity and because they are carefully discussed in other works.
And in the constitution Cum inter nonnulles, intending (as he testifies himself) to impose an end to the dispute which was taking place in the schools, where some were asserting that Christ and the apostles had no right of ownership and lordship (particular or even common) while others were affirming the contrary, he determines that the negative side is heretical. Yet Pope Nicholas III held that negative side, on the basis of the divine Scriptures.
Also, in the same constitution he pronounces definitively that unless Christ and the apostles had had the right to use, seli, and give the things they had and to acquire other things by means of them, their uses and actions would have been unjust. This seems manifestly heretical. From this it also follows that, since the Friars
Minor do not have those rights in the things they are said to have, their uses and actions would be unjust, and thus the status of the Friars Minor would be plainly heretical.
In the constitution Quia quorundam | have also found a great many assertions that seem to me erroneous, Here I will draw attention to a few of them.
The first is that "gospel truth and apostolic statements testify in a great many places" that after their return from preaching the apostles carried money. Through this error he seems to imposc on divine Scripture something plainly false. For although we read that Judas carried a purse, we never read that after their return from preaching the apostles carried money.
The second assertion is that Christ's statement when he said to the apostles that they should not carry money "was not a command- * The implication of "nevertheless" seems to be that though these statements are ridiculous they must be taken seriously in this respect, that they are heretical.
Ai Letter to the Friars Miner ment, but a [granting of] power to accept necessaries from those to whem they preached the Gospel, which it was permissible for the apestles to observe, or, also, net to observe."
The third assertion is that he? had "a purse in respect of ownership."
The fourth assertion is that "to have some things in common in respect of ownership does not detract from the highest poverty."
The fifth is that Christ did not himself practice renunciation of the right to the ownership of any thing whatever and did not impose it on the apostles, and the apostles did not accept it under vow, The sixth is that it does not belong to faith or morals "that Christ and the apostles had only simple use of fact in the things they had."
The seventh is that Nicholas II] revoked some of the things that Gregory IX, Innocent IV, and Alexander IV had declared and determined concerning the poverty of the Friars Minor.
In proof of this he asserts and brings forward certain things that scem to me fantastic, which nevertheless smack of manifest heresy.'
The first of these is that the Order of Friars Minor "is an imaginary and represented person":\' and consequently, by the same reasoning, the Church and every congregation, multitude, and people would be an imaginary and represented person.
The second is that those [things]!? "that are of fact cannot truly befit the Order"; and by the same reasoning, [things] that are of fact cannot befit the Church or any group or multitude. And thus the Church cannot make definitions concerning questions of faith or exercise jurisdiction, and it could not decide litigation or make any statutes whatever.
? Qn the meaning of the three propositions following see Miethke, Octharas Heg, pp. 502~4, and the gloss to Quis quonindam, in Corpus turis canonia, vol. 1, cols.
# Remraintat here probably means "in the mind." This is what Ockham takes it to mean; see OND, 62.214, p. 568. (Compare: esse iz opinione ... in intellectione. .
. exemplaturt... cagsitom... repracsentatunt, quae omnia aequivalent, Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, 1, dist. 35, g. un., Opera omnia vol. v1, p. 284.) " In Latin iia. "Things" is supplied because in such a context English requires some noun. "Things" here has a broad, vague meaning, covering actions and Tights as well as possessions,
William of Ockham The third is that although [things] that are of fact cannot befit the Order, nevertheless "those that are of law can befit the Order.""? From this it follows that, according to him, [things] that are of law can befit a represented and imaginary person, and some right of using can belong to someone to whom, however, an act of using is, by the nature of the thing, altogether incongruous.
Taking note, therefore, that the three constitutions spoken of above were sprinkled with the heresies and errors listed and a great many others (so that I do not remember ever seeing so small a writing of any heretic or pagan that contained so many errors and heresies or was so devoid of theological or philosophical truths), and considering that the author had also pronounced definitively that everything taught 2s dogma in them should be held, I did not at al! doubt that he was a heretic. Accordingly, knowing that all heretics "have nothing of power or right," that they are bound by a sentence of excommunication, and that they should be avoided by all Catholics and also, as far as each person's state permits, effectively attacked (because "an error not resisted is approved"), and knowing that according to the canon laws a question of faith, when it is certain that the assertion conflicts with a truth of faith, concerns not only a general council or prelates or even the clergy
"but also the laity and absolutely every Christian," dist. 96, c.
Ubinam (where the gloss takes the argument, "What touches all should be dealt with by all," fom which it foilows evidently that a question of faith concems even Catholic and believing women, on the example of many holy women who with the utmost constancy underwent death and martyrdom for the defense and confession of the orthodox faith), I gladly left Avignon to devote myself, in my small measure, to attacking that heretic and his heresies. Making my way to the city of Pisa, I joined in the appeal against this heretical pseudo-pope prudently entered by brother Michael, the Ip the language of the civil lew, "of law" either means "in the sense the term has in the law," or suggests that something is the case (or is treated as if it were the case) because of some legal rule or judgment. "Fact" seems to mean either an act of a human person, or what is the case apart from any legal rule or judgment. According to Jahn xxit a represented person cannot have "use of fact" because a mental entity cannot perform any act of a human person, but the law
(which sometimes treats a group as if it were a person) may attribute to it "use of law" (Le, "use" in the sense the term has in the law, a certain legal might).
Ockham denies chat a group is a mental entity, a group is its members (ordered in a certain way — see Miethke, pp. 512-13), and it acts when its members act
(in some appropriate way).
, A Letter te the Friars Minar Minister General (though according to some it is not simply necessary to appeal in a case of faith, since no sentence passed against the Catholic faith can become definitive
Afterwards, however, when this manifestly heretical pseudo-pope answered the appeal entered by brother Michael, the Minister
General, and drew up and published the constitution Quia vir reprobus, he strengthened us in many ways and firmly united us in our purpose; for joining mew heresies to old, he made explicit a great many things we believed he would never assert and clearly excluded many answers and evasions he could have made to some of our attacks.
And in the constitution Quie vir reprobus he taught as dogma the assertions written below, which seem to me erroneous.
The first of these is that in things consumable by use a right of using cannot be had.
The second is that in things consumable by use an act of using cannot be had.
The third is that things consumable by use cannot be used, only "used up."
The fourth is that all things common to believers in the primitive Church that are mentioned in chapters 2/:44} and 4[:32] of Acts were common to them in respect of the same sort of lordship as they had before their conversion.
The fifth is that houses, fields, and other immovables were common to the converted believers mentioned in chapters 2 and 4 of Acts and to the apostles, in respect of lordship and ownership.
The sixth is that after the sending of the Holy Spirit the apostles had estates in Judaea, in respect of lordship and ownership.
The seventh is that it was permissible for the apostles after the sending of the Holy Spirit to possess estates both in Judaea and among the gentiles.
The eighth is that after the division of the common things mentioned in chapters 2f:45] and 4[:35] of Acts, each of the apostles and other believers was the particular owner and lord of the money and other things assigned to him.
The ninth is that the vow of living without property does not extend to the things that human life necessarily requires.
The tenth is that when Peter said, "See, we have left everything"
[Matthew 19:27], he did not mean that they had left everything in respect of lordship and ownership.
William of Ockham The eleventh is that the apostles did not vow the renunciation of ownership, not even of particular ownership, of all temporal things.
The tweifth is that the apostles afterwards sold the estates of which they had'* had lordship and ownership in Judaea after the sending of the Holy Spirit.
The thirteenth is that gospel poverty, even in its most perfect degree, by no means excludes lordship and ownership of things.
The fourteenth is that the blessing "Increase and multipiy" related in Genesis 1 was given to Adam outside Paradise before Eve was formed.
The fifteenth is that before Eve was formed Adam had the lordship of temporal things that is now called ownership.
The sixteenth is that a slave actually lending his lord's moncy has neither the use nor the "using up" of the money.
The seventeenth is that the words of Pope Nicholas IIE when he defines in the decretal Exit that the Friars Minor have use of fact of all the things they use without lordship and ownership should be understood of things not consumed by use, and if the constitution Brit defined thar in things consumable by use the Friars Minor have simple use of fact, it defined the impossible.
The eighteenth is that use of fact in things consumable by use is not had by an enactment of God.
The nineteenth is that in things consumable by use the act of consuming cannot be separated from lordship.
The twentieth is that Nicholas II did not grant the brothers simple use of fact of things consumable by use, and if he did grant it his constitution contained an impossibility.
The twenty-first is that a successive act does not exist in reality and cannot exist.
The twenty-second is that every human law by which temporal lordships are possessed is contained among the laws of kings, as kings are distinguished from other public powers.
The twenty-third is that in respect of temporal things the civil law brought in formulas of action, and not lordship.
# Deleting non (which is in the manuscript; but see OND, 18.18-19, p. 454). Or keep won and translate:
",., (of which they had set had lordship and ownership)..." taking che parenthesis as Ockham's contradiction of what Joha had said (¥leGrade).
1a A Letter to the Friars Minor The twenty-fifth [ste] is that Christ, as a mortal wayfaring man, was from the instant of his conception the temporal lord of all temporal things.
The twenty-sixth is that Christ, as God, had kingship and universal lordship of things eternally by the very fact that the Father begot him.
The twenty-seventh is that Christ had lordship of clothing, food, shoes, and even of a purse, not from the instant of his conception but afterwards successively in other ways, such as by gift of the faithful or by purchase.
The twenty-eighth is that Christ, as a waylaring man, could not have renounced temporal kingship and universal lordship of things.
The twenty-ninth is thar Christ was not a poor man by not having jiordship of things, but by not taking the fruits of things.
The thirtieth is that bare lordship perpetually separate from any taking of gain from a thing does not make the person having it rich.
The thirty-first is that every lordship stripped of the taking of temporal gain must be regarded as useless.
The thirty-second is that before the apostles were sent to preach they did not relinquish the lordship or ownership of any temporal thing.
The thirty-third is that Christ gave to the apostles no other law of living than he gave to the other disciples (including under the name of disciples all Christian men and women).
The thirty-fourth is that the commandment given to the apostles of not possessing gold etc., was temporary, only for the time of that [preaching] journey.
The thirty-fifth is that after their return from preaching the apostles had bread, fish, money, cloaks, and swords, in respect of ownership or lordship.
The thirty-sixth is that it was permissible for the apostles to contend and litigate in court for temporal things as for their property.
The thirty-seventh is that the words of Matthew 5[:4o], "He who wishes to contend with you in court," etc., and of Luke 6:29], were not said to the perfect, but only to the imperfect. (This is erroneous, because they were given to both, though they can be
W Wilham of Ockham understood in different ways as said ta the perfect and to the imperfect.) The thirty-eighth is that the twelve apostles were not apostles at the time when the commandments spoken of in Matthew 5 and Luke 6, "He who wishes to contend with you i court," etc., were given to them.
The thirty-ninth is that in Corinthians 6[:1-g] the Apostle forbade or dissuaded the Corinthians only from fraudulent and unjust actions or litigation in the courts of unbelievers and did not reprehend or even recommend against other litigations, but instead wished them to litigate.
The fortieth is that the key of knowledge is in ne way a key of the Church or of the kingdom of heaven, because it is neither the same as, nor distinct from, the kev of power.
The forty-first is that the Roman pontiff can in respect of things pertaining to faith and morals revoke the definitions and determinations of the pontiffs his predecessors and define contrary assertions.
After the constitution Quta vir reprobus, he preached and taught many assertions contrary to truths he is obliged to believe explicitly.
The first of these is that in the divinity there are not three distinct persons.
The second is that God can do by his absolute power nothing except what he does by his ordinate power; and that [the statement] that God may do something other or otherwise than he does includes a contradiction; and that all things happen of necessity, so that [the statement] that something not pre-ordained by God may happen includes a contradiction.
The third is that the souls of the saints in heaven do not see God and will not see him before the day'* of general judgment.
The fourth is that the souls of the reprobate are not and will not be in hell before the day of general judgment.
The fifth is that the demons are not punished and will not be punished before the day of general judgment.
The sixth is that Christ will not be king after the day of judgment.
Because of the errors and heresies written above and countless others, I withdraw from the obedience!® of the pseudo-pope and * Substituting diem for tem.
© That is, from the set of persons who obey. See The Ouford Luglish Dictionary, "obedience," 2.b.
A Letter to the Friars Minor of all who support him to the prejudice of the orthodox faith. For it has been shown to me evidently by men of outstanding learning that because of the above errors and heresies this heretical pseudopope must be regarded as having been deprived of the papacy and excommunicated by the law itself, without any new sentence, because he manifestly falls under the canons ''of sentence passed," both of general councils and of highest pontiffs. To prove these things several volumes have been published, and concerning the heresies and errors listed and those annexed to them 1 myself, from my slender abilities, have written by my hand fifty sexterns of the common form of paper, and I still have forty and more to write." For against the errors of this pseudo-pope "I have set my face like the hardest rock," so that neither lies nor slurs nor persecution of whatever sert {that does not physically touch my person), nor the multitude, however great, of those who believe or favor or even defend him will ever at any time be abie to prevent me from attacking and refuting his errors as long as | have hand, paper, pen, and ink. For before I would regard all the above errors as compatible with the faith, ] would think that the whole Christian faith, and all Christ's promises about the Catholic faith lasting to the end of the age, and the whole Church of God, could be preserved in a few, indeed in one; and I would judge that all other
Christians erred against the Catholic faith, on the example of the prophet Elias, who, though he believed that he was God's only worshiper left,!* nevertheless did not at al! desert the true faith: though 1 do not doubt that in fact many "thousands of men" and women "have by no means bent the knee" of their faith "before Baal.?2° Anyone, therefore, who wishes to recall me or anyone else of those withdrawing from the obedience of the pscudo-pope and his supporters should attempt to provide a basis for his constitutions
" & sevtern consists of six sheets folded together to form twelve folios, i.¢., twentyfour pages; how much a folio contained depended on the hancwruing. Presumably
The Wark of Ninety Days is one of the works Ockham had been writing, in the only complete manuscript extant this work occupies 163 folios, in the modern printed edition 551 pages. The first part of the Dislegue, written at about the same time, occupies roughly 2c0 folios. These twa works, therefore, account for about two-thirds of the fifty sexterns.
® See 3 Kings, 19:10. oP AeAERNE LR SOE FR FEN AR Witham of Ockham and sermons and show that they agree with the divine Scriptures; or else he should show by sacred texts or by manifest arguments that a pope cannot fall into heretical perversity, or chat someone knowing that a pope is a notorious heretic should obey him. Lert him not allege the multitude of his adherents or rely on insults.
For those who try to arm themselves with a multitude, lies, insults, threats, accusations, and calumnies show themselves to be naked of truth and reason. Let no one think, therefore, that because of the multicude of this pseudo-pope's supporters or because of arguments that are common to heretics and to the orthodox,
I would wish to abandon acknowledged truth. For I prefer the divine Scriptures to a man who is a simpleton in sacred literature, and I prefer the teaching of the holy fathers reigning with Christ to the deliverances of those living in this mortal life. And I consider that the general chapter of Perugia, in which the brothers acted, though with fear, vet from conscience, should be preferred to all later gatherings of the brothers, in which they were moved by fear, ambition, or hatred, and that all the brothers, each and every one of them, at the time when they held the truths of faith and of the Order, are worth more than themselves if they have abandoned those truths.
But if someone shows me plainly that the constitutions and sermons of the pseude-pope do not deviate from Catholic truth, or, alternatively, that one should obey an heretical pope knowing that he is a heretic, I will not be slaw to return to the brothers who support him. No one, however, who can prove neither of these things either by argument or by authorities should be hostile either to me or to anyone who does not obey the said heretic.
I have given you an account, therefore, of the reason for my absence from the multitude of the brothers.
I am not afraid to give an account also, before a just judge, of any other statements and actions of mine whatever, although I am not ignorant of the wickedness of men. Fer I think I have learned'! more in these last four years about the characters of our contemporaries than if [ had had continual dealings with them for forty years without this quarrel. I understand better the generalizations of the sacred Scriptures describing the characters of men, when
I see them being 7 Substituting ste advertise for evertisse (the sole manuscript reads evertisse).
A Letter to the Friars Minor verified by experience every day. For in this time of testing, the thoughts of the hearts of many are being revealed. But do not "blow the nose" too much," for, since he whe now reigns is mortal, you do not know what the days to come will bring forth.
May the Omnipotent deign to turn evil portents to good! Amen.
? An allusion to Proverbs 30:33, "He that violently bloweth his nose bringeth out blood," This verse seems to have been taken to mean that evils sometimes have to be tolerated; see Extra, De renuneiatione, c. Nis! cum pridem, col. 235. ee ee The Work ofNinety Days The Work ofNinety Days 2 The multiple senses of terms used in the controversy between John XXII and his attackers 1g 26 Lordship in the state of immocence
27 Did Adam have exclusive lordship of temporal things before Eve was formed?
28 Further argument about lordship and property in the state of innocence 65 Do the licences of using material things given to the friars confer on them a right to these things?
88 The origin of property 93 The kingship and lordship of Christ