Chapter 3
A Dialogue, Part ti, Tract 1 one. He says: "If, therefore, we should call government by many men who are all good aristocracy and government by one man kingship, then aristocracy will be indeed more choice-worthy for cities than kingship, both when the government is supported by force and when it is without force, if the many are available."
From all the foregoing it follows that it is better for the community of the faithful ro be ruled by many, rather than by one who is the head, leader, and prelate of all the others.
Chapter 3 Student Above you have quoted Aristotle from his Podities and also his Ethics, and perhaps you are going to quote him often below. He uses many Greek terms the meanings of which are unknown to specialist jurists and others who have not studied moral philosophy. Bestir yourself, therefore, and explain the meanings of some of these terms, so that such people may better understand the matters to be treated, Ac the same time explain, in brief summary, who should rule others and how, according to Aristotle's intentions in the Politics and Ethics (as some understand him)}.'*
Since he treated this matter at length and is thought to have argued reasonably in many respects, no little opportunity will be given to scholars for understanding who among Catholics should govern others, and how, in both spiritual and temporal matters.
Master Although I do not think that what you ask is easy, I will try to satisfy your wish. I will report to you Aristotle's meaning in this matter according to the opinion of some (with whom, however, not everyone agrees at ali points). It is said, therefore, that in the Politics, Book 1, Aristotle puts forward three communities in which some person or persons should rule others. The first of these, according to him, is the household, which includes three combinations, communities, or conjunctions, namely of husband with wife, of father with child, and of lord with slaves. The fiest combination Aristotle calls marital, the second can be called paternal
(Aristotle calls it celmostine, i¢., likely to produce children}, and the third Aristotle calls despotic, i.e., dominative, for [Greek] despotes is the same as deminus {lord], and despotic rule is dominative rule.
" This occupies chapters 3-3.
William of Ockham {So that this may be better understood, it is said chat it must be known that such terms as dominus, daminans, dominari, and terms of ike meaning are taken in different writings and sciences equivocally. Because of ignorance of their equivacation the meaning of authors who use such terms in contrary senses is often not understood, Setting aside various meanings of such wards as dominus, dominans, pracdominans, dominium, dominantium, and the like, which are sometimes used in different ways in natural and moral philosophy, the legal sciences, and common speech (which the divine Scriptures often use), the meanings that seem to need explaining for the present purpose are of only two kinds. It must be known, therefore, according to them,!" that in one way dominus,
"lord," is said in respect of subjects who are indeed free, namely those over whom someone is lord not mainly for his own advantage but mainly for the advantage of the subjects. Such a lord is not called by Aristotle a despot, and the government by which such a ford rules he does not cali despotic. In another way "lord" is said in respect of subjects who are not free but slaves, who are the lord's possession in the same way as other temporal things are said to be someone's possession. Such a lord is called by Aristotle a despot and his rule is called despotic. Just as this despot possesses other temporal things for his own advantage and not for their advantage, so he rules slaves mainly for his own advantage and not mainly for the advantage of the slaves — though, according to Aristotle, often the same thing is beneficial for the slaves and for the lord. Therefore, although we find that Aristotle says in the Politics that the king is the lord of his subjects, he never says that he should be called a despot or that kingly government should be called despotic. Sometimes, however, tyrannical rule is called despotic, because of the great similarity between despotic and tyrannical rule. Properly speaking despotic rule is not tyrannical: for just as, according to Aristotle, some are justly slaves ~ namely, both those who are deficient in reason, so that they do not know how to rule themselves, though they are robust in body so that they are able to serve others (and these, according to Aristotle, are called natural slaves}, and those who are slaves according to just Jaw, because they are captured in a just war or in some other way become the © 'That is, those whose exposition of Aristotle the Master is presenting.
A Dialogue, Part it, Tract 1 slaves of others — so despotic rule, which is over such slaves only, is just and permissible and good; but tyrannical rule is unjust, impermissible, and evil — and thus, according to Aristotle, tyranny is the worst constitution.) Besides the despotic rule by which the head of the household rules the slaves in the household, there is the paternal rule by which he rules the children as free persons. According to Aristotle they are ruled royally and not despoticaily:; not that paternal rule is a roval government, because royal government exists only over a city or a kingdom (which is greater than a city and commonly includes many cities}; but the father is said to rule his children royally, not indeed when the household in which he rules is part of a village or city or kingdom, but when he rules in a household that is not part of a more perfect community: as Adam ruled his children, and Noah his, before the children had different households. Although such paternal rule is not called royal strictly speaking, it can, however, be called royal because of its great similarity to royal government in the strict sense: for just as in a kingdom with a king most properly and authentically called a king there is one who rules all free persons mainly for his subjects' advantage according to his will and not according to law, according to Aristotle,
Politics, Book i, chapter 157° (how this should be understood is explained afterwards), so in a household that is not part of a more perfect community, whenever there is such a father, he rules the children mainly for their advantage according to his will and not according to law, in such a way that he is able to chastise children who do wrong with every beneficial punishment and can do concerning them and to them whatever redounds to their advantage.
Because he does not rule them mainly for his own advantage, he can be said to rule, not despotically, but, in a way, royally. But in a household that is part of a village or city the father does not rule the children royally, because his power over the children is not so great that he rules them according to his will and not according to law, even in many things which would be to their advantage; and for many crimes he cannot coerce them with beneficial punishment, but such punishment must be reserved to the ruler of the village or city or kingdom.
Ane see SMMECINMRUNLNS INARA ilM Sak A CH RTAa ST Wiliam of Ockham The head of the household rutes his wife in the household neither despotically nor royally: not despotically, because she is not a slave, and not royally, because he should rule her not according to his will but according to the law of marriage, for the man does not have as much power over his wife as a father has over the children. When his house is not part of a more perfect community, therefore, the man rules his wife by a constitutional government.
This rule of man over wife is likened to constitutional government in this respect, that just as the rulers in a constitutional government excel their subjects in virtae and wisdom, so a man naturally surpasses his wife in wisdom and virtue — unless something happens apart from nature, according to Aristotle in Politics Book i"! as happens in effeminate men. (We must understand in this way the statements made above about despotic and paternal rule — namely, [subject to the qualification:] when nature is not deficient in the despot or father. If for some reason nature were deficient in the father or despot it would not be natural justice for the despot or father to rule the slaves or children. However, the governments over them are natural - i.e., arising by natural reason and not from human establishment — when nature is not deficient in the father or despot.) The three rulerships spoken of above relate to "economy," ie., to the government of a household. (Aristotle takes "economy" in that sense in moral philosophy, though in the law econoemus is the name for him to whem church property is entrusted for management
(for example the administrator of the property of canons}; in some churches he is called the Provost.) Chapter 4 The second community, which is more perfect than the household, is called the village; it is made up of many households as paris, and yet it does not attain so much perfection that it is and should be called « city. If this community is not part of a more perfect community (namely, of a city, or of some other comprising many villages or districts or cities), and if the multitude of households in it has come from one surviving parent, then, just as children
A Dialogue, Part mi, Tract 1 are ruled by their father, it is reasonable (if nature is not deficient in him} that it should be ruled by him according to his will and net according to law, as far as concerns those who have come from him. But as far as concerns the wives, of whom he is not the parent, it is reasonable that he should rule constitutionally, since reason demands that he should observe the law of marriage, according to which man and wife are in many things judged to be on equal terms. But if the multitude of households in the village has not come from one surviving parent, it is reasonable that it be governed by some government like the government by which a city is ruled.
Chapter 5 The third community, which is made up of many villages, is called a city.
Aristotle says, in Politics, Book 1, that this is the most principal of all communities. (This is said to be true of communities of people living together, not of a community of people living in separate places and in many cities. Such a community is a kingdom or dukedom; this can also be called a community [communtitas], because it consists of people who share together [comarunicant] in many things and are ruled by one ruler; and many things said about the city must be understood mutatis mutandis of a kingdom and of any community that embraces several cities.) A city, then, is the multitude of citizens living in the city. Their order is called a constitution; without order there is no city, for unless it has a ruler or rulers and subjects it must not be called a city. In a city there are (often, at least, and in a most perfect city) different kinds of subjects subject in different ways. Some are found to be subject as slaves or hirelings or denausi (those who, working with their hands or bodies, spoil their bodies by their work are called banausi, and in a city with a tempered and rational constitution they are not citizens, properly speaking). Others in the city are subject in such a way that they somehow share in rulership; although they do not rule, yet in some way they attain rulership, because they are called to court and council or elect the ruler or the electors of the ruler. The ruler in a city Aristotle sometimes calls the policernia. Policernia has, according to some, three meanings: first it means the imposition of the order of the constitution, second