Chapter 17
Wilkam of Ockham disturbance, or can withdraw if he has consented, he is obliged, of necessity for salvation, not to consent, or to withdraw, especially if he can do so with good example and edification to the whole community of the faithful. Otherwise he would reprehensibly prefer his own good or honor tu the common good.
Chapter 17 Student Say now how the arguments brought forward above in chapter 13 are answered.
Master They are all based, it seems, on the premise that no one is worthy of royal rulership unless he surpasses all others in wisdom and virtue, as Aristotle seems to think in the Polftics and also in the Ezfics, so that no one should be king unless he is the best, and better in wisdom and virtue than all his subjects. To which it is said that this is not, according to Aristotle, true universally, without any exception. To make this clear, it is said, it must be known that royal rulership can be obtained in many ways, of which it is enough for the present to enumerate two. One of these is when someone is voluntarily made king by subjects. The other is when someone voluntarily transfers himself from a despotic rule that he has justly ebtained to a royal rule. If someone should (es a tule) be appointed to royal government in the first way, then the best man in wisdom and virtue should be appointed, if such a one is found and no just impediment impedes his advancement. If a family is found that in this way excels all others, then {as a rule) it is just that this family should reign. This is what Aristotle means in Politic, Book a, chapter 16, when he says, "When, therefore, it happens that either a whole family or one individual differs in virtue so much that his virtue exceeds that of all others, then it is just that this family should be royal and rule over all, and this one man be king, as was said above."
If, however, [such a family or man} is not found, yet many good men are found, then one of them should be appointed, and the others similar and equal to him in wisdom and virtue are obliged to bear his government is good... What then if all are very expert? He will not be 'most contemptible' because he is noc like Solomon."
" Chapter 17, 1288 a5.
A Dialogue, Part 11, Tract 1 patiently and willingly for the common good. How he should be appointed you can inquire afterwards, if you like.
If, however, someone comes to royal rulership in the second way (for example, because he first held lordship of the whole region and of all those living there, whether by occupation, by gift, by purchase, by just war, or in any other just way, and afterwards, renouncing despotic rule, is content with royal rulership only that is, so that he chiefly wishes to rule his subjects for their good and advantage and not, as a despot rules, for his own good), he can justly take possession of a royal rulership even if he is not the best of men, because from the fact that he is giving up part of his right and keeping a part he should not be regarded as unjust, even if he is not the best man.
; And Aristotle's suggestion in Pofittes, Book vm, chapter 13, that it is not just for some always to rule unless they differ as much from their subjects as gods and heroes differ from men, is answered in many ways. In one way, chat this is true if account is taken only of the merit and worth of the ruler, but not if account is taken of advantage to the common good.
In another way it is said that this is true of natural justice in particular, i.e. that it is not natural justice that they should rule over all others unless they differ in such a way from all the others whom they rule: in this way it is just that the husband should mule over his wife or wives, a father over his children, and the lord over slaves that are naturally slaves, according to Aristotle, Politics,
Book 1. But it is not true of positive justice. For since it is often just (and natural)" that someone should be lord over many who are similar and equal co himself in a perfect community (because those who are similar and equal in virtue are so many that they cannot usefully all rule together, and yet such a community cannot stand without a ruler, according to Aristotle), and yet it is not natural justice that these should rule rather than those, it must therefore be determined by positive justice that these should rule, either simply for the whole of their life or for a time; and thus,
* "And natural" is an anticipation of what is to be said in the next two paragraphs The position the Master is explaining seems to be chis: It is not natural justice for any ger individual to rule his equals, but under some circumstances it may be natural jestice for one er anether of the equals to rule the rest: and positive faw will determine which.
William ofOckham though, as Aristotle thinks, it is not natural justice that this man should rule for his whole life those who are his similars and equals, nevertheless it can become, for a reason, positive justice. Aristotle did not intend to deny this.
Student How can it be natural justice that someone should rule those who are similar to himself, and yet not natural justice that this man should rule those who are similar to himself, and not natural justice that this [other] man should rule those who are similar to himself, and so on of each man?
Master It is answered that your question arises from an ignorance of elementary matters (namely, of logic) which no one working in any science whatever should fail to know, for otherwise he will argue sophistically when he thinks he is arguing demonstratively. lt is said, therefore, that just as, often, both the universal and the particular [proposition] are necessary though each of their singulars is contingent," so it is possible that the particular is in accordance with natural justice and yet no singular will be in accordance with natural justice." It is therefore possible that it is natural justice that someone should rule those who are similar to himself, and yet not natural justice that ¢is man should rule those who are similar to himself, and not natural justice that ¢Ais [other] man should rule those who are similar to himself, and so on of each man. And just as it is possible that a categorical proposition about a disjunct term, having as its subject discrete terms contained under some common term," is necessary, and that the corresponding disjunctive with * In Aristotle's terminology (which Ockham says may be improper, Summa. logicae,
I, 9.47-66, pp. 274-5, or Theory of Propasitions, p. 110), "Every red ching is colored" is a universal in respect of the singular propositions "This red thing is colored," "That red thing is colored," etc. "That every red thing is colared is necessary" may be true, but "This red thing is colored" is contingent (because, according to Aristotle, it will cease to be true when this thing perishes). See
Summa fogicae, , 9.30-8, p. 274 {or Oskham's Theory of Propasisions, p. 109}, Samia fogwae, 11-3, 34.30-42, Dp. 717-18.
* According to Ockham there are other modes besides the four famous ones {necessary, contingent, possible, impossible}; see Summa fegiae, iM, 136-68, pp.
242-3 (or Ockham's Theory of Propositions, p. §o). "In a broad sense, every proposition is called modal in which occurs some term that can belong to a whale proposition"; Ockham, Expositio in tibrum Perihermeneias Aristatehs, 0, 5.87-8, Opera philosophica, vol. It, p. 462. "In accordance with natural justice" fits this definition of a mode.
7 Eg. "This man or that man or..." — ""his" makes the term discrete (Le., a term referring to an individual), "man" is a common term.
A Dialogue, Part ii, Tract £ the mode of necessity is nevertheless false, and that therefore none of those singulars is necessary,'' so it can happen that this is true:
"Tt is natural justce for this man or that man," and so on of each man, "to rule over those who are similar te himself," which is a categorical statement about a disjunct subject, and yet the disjunctive is false, and consequently each singular is false. Therefore, according to them, so that we may reason without any deception in such matters, we must learn most diligently the difference between a disjunctive proposition and one about a disjunct term," and between 2 proposition of the same terms taken in the sense of composition and in the sense of division (according to some), or between the different senses of such propositions according to amphiboly (according to others)."* For often, because of ignorance of the difference between such propositions and senses, the meaning of authors is in many matters not known, when they are thought to have had one sense and sometimes have had another, indeed sometimes the opposite. In such matters various kinds of sophisms are committed (though by many in ignorance) when one sense or equivalent proposition is sophistically inferred from the other, or the converse; or from a proposition taken in one sense, or from one sense, are inferred things that follow not from it but from the other sense — or, conversely, one sense is sophistically inferred from things from which the other sense can by a true argument be inferred. In many other ways also sophisms are committed in such matters because of ignorance of this distinction in sense of propositions that are the same verbally.
Student You have related two ways of answering Aristotle. Now relate another, if it occurs to you.
Master In another way it is said that for some men (or man) to rule always is not just, unless they differ (or he differs) from the «This man or that man or... is P' is necessary" may be true, and yet "This man is necessarily P, or chat man is necessarily P..." may be false.
See Summa logicae, U-4, 5.136-143, pp. 768-9; cf. It, 37.11-18, p. 355 (Cckhans''s Theory of Prapasitions, p. 194).
* Amphiboly and "composition and division" are fallacies arising not from the ambiguities of terms but from ambiguities of construction: "composition and division" from uncertainty of punctuation or grouping of words (Sumema_ logicae, u-4, 8.3-6, p786), amphiboly from ambiguities of syntax. Ockham thinks that some ambiguities commonly classed under "composition and division" cannot easily be exhibited by difference of punctuation and would be beter classed under soowe eaemancommnennapane. rm ciumancee cefenee Cement ee Hilkam of Ockham subjects as much as gods and heroes differ from men, if it is feared with probability that the equals will bring about dangerous dissensions and seditions if they are not honored equally.
Student In accordance with those [answers], run through the texts brought forward above in chapter 13.
Master This opinion concedes the first text of Aristotle just as it sounds. To the second it is said that when there are many equals in some perfect community, Aristotle maintains that it is beneficial that all should share in rulership "in part" — ie., sometimes to rule, sometimes to be subject — when it is feared with probability that otherwise, unless each who is equally worthy sometimes rules, dangerous seditions will arise. If, however, there is no fear of such sedition, it is beneficial, if some suitable man is found, that one man should rule all as king, even during his whole life, unless it is presumed that he would wish to convert royal rule into tyranny or there is fear of some other evil that could happen because of some wickedness.
And to the other argument from Aristotle, that fairness is "the same for similars," the answer was given earlier.
To the other, when it is taken from Aristotle that no one is worthy to rule unless he surpasses all others in all goods, the answer piven is that this is true if only the merit and the personal worth of him who should be king are taken into account, not having regard for the common good.
To the other, when it is taken [as premise] that kingship is established in accordance with aristocracy, in which only those rule
. who are better than the rest, it is answered that if in some community willing to be ruled aristocratically some few are found who are better than the rest, then it is just that, unless there is some other obstacle, these should rule the rest. If, however, there are not found some few who are better than the rest, but there are many equal in wisdom and virtue, and so many thar it would not be beneficial for all of them to mule, then it cannor happen that aristocratic rulers are better than the rest; yet aristocratic government is beneficial for the whole community, if they are not willing to tolerate royal government; and then to appoint some few amphiboly (Summa logicse, ut-4, 5-76-94, 174-99, pp. 766-7, 770; 8.36-43, Pp.
A Dialogue, Part tu, Tract 1 of the equals to rule all will be more useful than to establish a "constitutional," oligarchic, or democratic regime.
To the statement that God chose as first king of Israel the best man from the whole people, namely Saul, it is answered that Saul was not better in virtue and wisdom than all the others, for Samuel was much better than him, and perhaps many ethers excelled him in virtue and wisdom. However, it was said that there was no one like him in the whole people on account of his tall stature, because
(as we read in that place), "he was taller among all the people by head and shoulders,""* Many infer from this that it is not universally and without exception nécessary always to choose the better man as king, because Samuel was not chosen as king and yet he was much better than Saul.
Student Applying the above to the pope, say briefly how what was written before is answered insofar as it seems to prove that ne one should be over ali the faithful as pope unless he surpasses all in wisdom and virtue.
Master It is said that if seme Catholic were found of whom such excellence were known, then, uniess some circumstance particularly impeded it, he should be set over the whole community of the faithful; so that if someone else, less perfect, were elected, or even were presiding already, by love of the common good that person would be bound of necessity for salvation to resign in his favor, unless some special reason stood in the way of such resignation.
If, however, no one were found who excelled in that way, someone should be appointed from among the equals. For although it is not natural or divine justice that this man should be appointed, it is natural justice that someone should be appointed; and because not all the equals should rule, it is therefore beneficial that someone from among the equals should be promoted by lot, if it cannot reasonably be done otherwise than by lor; just as the apostles, because they judged Matthias and Joseph called Barsabbas to be equal in all respects, gave them lots, and appointed him upon whom the lot fell to the office of apostle." If, however, some are perceived to be in some ways uncqual, though not in wisdom and virtue, then it is possible to take notice of the inequalities, in ™ 1 Kings 11:23.
William of Ockham accordance with the quality of the time: at one time notice can justly be taken of one thing and at another time of the opposite, for at one time notice could justly be taken of the power of friends and at another time of lack of friends. And thus some think it should likewise be said of other things besides wisdom and virtue.
Chapter 18 Student | have heard how the arguments are answered that seemed to prove that no one should be made highest pontiff and head of ali the faithful unless he exceiled all others in wisdom and virtue.
Now relate how answer is made to those by which it is shown in chapter 2 of this second book that it is not beneficial for the community of the faithful to be subject to one head and prelate because it is beneficial for it to be ruled by many. I ask you first of all to say what advantage, according to them," makes it more beneficial for the community of the faithful to be ruled by one than by many.
Master They say that it has many advantages. One is that it is easier to get access to one than to many, because the many are not always found in the same place, and it is of no litle benefit to subjects to be able to have easy access to the ruler for various necessities; for this reason rulers, both secular and ecclesiastical, must be regarded as blameworthy if they make themselves inaccessible to their subjects. Another advantage is that, as a rule, one ruler can, when the need arises, hold court and de justice and ward off dangers more easily than many. If one man is ruler, he need not wait for another whenever it is necessary to hold court and do justice and to ward off some danger, but if there were many rulers, one would have to wait for another or the others, even if it were necessary to expedite such matters quickly and they could not be deferred without danger. A third advantage is that one, if he strays, is corrected more easily than many, because many would have more defenders than the one would have. A fourth is that no great community can be well ruled without the advice of * Thac is, according to those who wish to answer the arguments presented in chapter
2, it. advocates of monarchy.