Chapter 28
The Work ofNinety Days Some say that this was done before, although here it comes later in Damascene's narration.
Chapter 28 [John XXII] There is no objection from c. Difectissimis, which was quoted on the other side. For that does not prove that our first parents did not have lordship of temporal things, but that they did not have it dividediy. Indeed, from the text of the philosopher that blessed Clement quotes in that chapter it is inferred evidently that they had lordship in common. For he says that "just as air and sunlight cannot be divided, so the other things given to be possessed in common should not be divided either." From these words it appears clearly that the philosopher said that those temporal things were given to all to be possessed in common. And if they were given by him who could give them, since he was God, and to him who was capable of having them, namely man, it follows that a lordship of them was made, The philosopher introduces the comparison of air and sunlight with temporal things not in respect of lordship + as if, just as they did not have lordship of air and sunlight, sa they should not have lordship of temporaf things — but only in respect of their not being divided. For he says this: "And just as air and sunlight cannot be divided, so the other things given to be possessed in common should not be divided either, but should be possessed as common things."
But of air blessed Augustine says this in Book of On Free Witt: "You can breathe ia some of the air that I breathe out, but you cannot breathe in the part that has gone to nourish me, because I cannot return it. (For doctors say we take nourishment through the nostrils.) When | breathe only 1 can feel this nourishment, and I cannot return it by breathing out for you to breathe it in and feel it with your nostrils."
[Ockham] In this part the attacked replies to the chapter of Clement, by which the appellant wished to prove that the first man and his posterity, if they had remained steadfast in the state of innocence, would have had the use of things consumabie by use without ownership and lordship of them. He says first that from that chapter it can be inferred that our firse parents had lordship
Milliam ofOckham in common, because the text of the philosopher which Dlessed Clement quotes shows that temporal things were given to men to be possessed, and consequently belong to their lordship. Second, at "The philosopher," he answers a certain objection. Someone may say that chis philosopher compares air and sunlight to temporal things, and therefore, just as air and sunlight do not belong to the lordship of mortals, so also they should nor have lordship of temporal things. To this he answers that the philosopher docs not intreduce the comparison in respect of lordship, but in respect of not being divided. Third, at "But of air," he quotes a text of Augustine that seems to prove that each person has exclusive lordship of air in respect of some part.
But the attackers say that here, as elsewhere, he argues frivalously. For the appellant does not deny in every sense that our first parents had lordship of temporal things in the state of innocence.
He denies that they had the lordship called "ownership," by virtue of which one can say, "This is in such a way mine that it is not yours, and that is in such a way yours thar it is not mine." And thus he speaks in agreement with the thought of blessed Clement, who says: "For use of all the things in this world should have been common to all men. But through iniquity one said that this was his, and another that that was his." By these words we are given to understand evidently that before iniquity no one should have said that this is his, and another that that is his. But the words "mine" and "his" relate (though not always) to the lordship which is called "ownership"; before iniquity, therefore, no one had the lordship called ownership. And that is the appellant's meaning; for he did not mean to prove mere than this, that use of fact of things consumable by use can be separated from all lordship called ownership. But the lordship that our first parents had in the state of innocence is of altogether another nature than that lordship; and their lordship does not seem to have been exclusive to our first parents, but it seems to have been common to them and the angels. For if, according to the Savior's judgment, the devil is called "ruler of this world" because of the power he exercises in it by usurpation, it seems that much more could the angels be called rulers and lords of these temporal things because of the power they are known to have over them. And it does not seem that they have less power over them than our first parents had in The Wark ofNinety Days the state of innocence, which their posterity would have had if they had remained steadfast in that state (though the angels do not need things in the way mankind would have needed them; but lordship does not require need of anything, hecause God, who needs nothing, is most perfectly the !ord of all things). It is therefore certain that the appellant speaks of the lordship which' is called ownership, and of that it is true, according to the attackers, that use of fact in things consumable by use can be separated from all such lordship. Something will be said about the other matters in the comments on the letter.
[On the letter] For that does not prove ihat our first parents did not have lordship of temporal things: That is not true, they say, of the lordship called ownership, of which the appellant spoke. But of another tordship, such as the angels have and had in common with men, it can be conceded: but then it is nat to the point. But that they did not have it dividedly. They concede this, because it is negative. Indeed, from the text of the philosopher that blessed Clement quotes in that chapter it is inferred evidently that they had lordship in common: It does not prove anything of the lordship called ownership.
In the meaning of the philosopher, who did not know about the state of innocence, it does not prove anything about the lordship that our first parents had in the state of innocence, but it applies to the Jordship that is power to divide and appropriate temporal things, which our first parents had after sin and before the division of things {though the philosopher did not know of this). But the appellant did not speak of this kind of lordship. Just as air and sunlight cannot be divided, so the other things groen to be possessed in common should not be divided either. These words show clearly, they say, that the philosopher does not speak of any lordship other chan the lordship that is a power to divide and appropriate. But that kind of lordship did not exist in the state of innecence, and would not have existed if they had remained steadfast in it, because the whole human race would not have had power in that state to divide and appropriate temporal things. And thus he does not speak of the lordship that existed in the state of innocence.
Given to all to be possessed in common: This is true; and therefore after sin they had power to use al] things as common without any appropriation. ff they were gruen by him who could give them, since he was God, and to him who was capable of having them, namely man,
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