Chapter 1
Eight Questions on the Power ofthe Pope:
Question II Chapter 1 The third question is whether by Christ's institution it pertains to the pope and the Roman Church to entrust to the emperor and other secular rulers temporal jurisdictions, which' otherwise they may not exercise.
About this question there are conflicting opinions. One is that by Christ's ordinance it does pertain to the Roman Church — i.e., the pope - to entrust tempora! jurisdictions to the emperor and other rulers, and that without his authority and commission they should in no way exercise them. This opinion should be held, it seems, by those who assert thar the pope has in both spirttual and temporal matters the fullness of power spoken of above (Question
1, chapter 2), 50 that by Christ's ordinance he can do everything not against an indispensable natural law or against a divine law that must be observed of necessity for salvation in the time of grace.'
That the pope can (according to them) entrust temporal jurisdictions to the emperor and other secular rulers plainly seems provable if the pope has such fullness of power, since such fullness of power includes power to entrust temporal jurisdictions, because that power does not go against natural law or conflict with divine law.
' For sos atias substituting ipst alter eas (cf. 1.2.20, p. 100).
' For a discussion of this theory of papal fullness of power see Short Discourse, pp.
William of Ockham That, also, he is bound to entrust such jurisdictions, since he cannot exercise them himself, is shown: because otherwise he would be negligent in doing God's work entrusted to him by God and would not imitate Christ, who said to the Father, in John 17[:4],
"I have completed the work you gave me to do." For if by Christ's ordinance he can do everything and he is obliged never to give up power granted to him — indeed, imposed on him - by God
(according to the opinion of blessed Cyprian), he must carry out everything and act so as to strive to fulfill through others what he cannot carry out by himself.
And that the emperor and other secular rulers should not (according to them) exercise such temporal jurisdictions unless they are entrusted to them by the pope seems provable. For anyone who assumes an office of administration, dignity, and henor, even a secular one, without the ruler to whom it belongs to make decisions about such offices is rightly censured for ambition. But ambition, even in respect of secular offices and jurisdictions, is reproved even by the civil laws. If, therefore, by Christ's institution it pertains to the pope to make decisions about such offices, no one exercises them licitly without the pope.
Further, as we read in Exira, De regulis iuris, Non est, Book v1, "He is not without fault who involves himself in a matter that does not pertain to him"; but if it pertains to the pope to entrust such jurisdictions to the emperor and others, they pertain to none of them without the pope; therefore if any of them involves himself in such a jurisdiction without the pope, he is not without fault, and consequently involves himself wrongly; therefore no one should exercise such a jurisdiction without the pope.
Again, according to the Apostle in Hebrews 5[:4], no one "takes honor to himself"; this should be understood not only of spiritual or ecclesiastical honor but also of secular honor, This seems proyable also from the reason the Apostle touches on there. For no one can take secular honor to himself more than Christ can take spiritual or ecclesiastical honor, since no one is worthier of secular honor than Christ is of spiritual honor. But "Christ," as the Apostle testifies, "did not glorify himself so as to be made high priest, but He [did] who said to him, 'You are my Son, this day have
| begotten you'".' Therefore no one should take secular honor to + Hebrews 5:5.
Eight Questions on the Power of the Pope himself without the pope, if it pertains to the pope to entrust such honors to whomever he likes.
For otherwise he will not enter through the door,' that is by lawful appointment; he will therefore be a thief and a robber, and he will net be an emperor or prince but a tyrant and intruder.
The same opinion should be held by those who say chat, although the pope does not have the fullness of power spoken of in Question
1, chapter 2, and here in this chapter, lest the Christian law be a law of greater slavery than was the Mosaic law, yet he has fullness of power as far as concerns everything necessary for governing the community of the faithful, and, although he does not have power in matters of supererogation, he does nevertheless have power in everything without which the totality of the faithful cannot be ruled.
For the community of the faithful cannot be ruled without secular rulers with temporal jurisdictions. If, therefore, the pope has such fullness of power by Christ's institution, it belongs to him to entrust such temporal jurisdictions; therefore, if, without him, someone took such jurisdiction to himself, he would take it to himself wrongly, and would exercise it wrongly.
In favor of this opinion it can be argued as follows. A community of persons able to have communion with one another in which all or many are prone to discord, dissensions, and disputes is not best ordered unless it is subject to one supreme rector, judge, and head upon whom the jurisdiction of all others depends, This seems provable in many ways. Fer one people, if it is best ordered, should be subject to one governor and not many. Solomon seems to suggest this when in Proverbs 11[:14] he says, "Where there is no governor the people will be ruined." For in saying "Where there is no governor," not "Where there are no governors." he seems to suggest that over one people one supreme governor should rule and not many. But the whole human race is one people. (For the unity of a people does not require that they live in one city or town; for as we read in 2 Paralipomenon 18[:3], King Josaphat said to King Achab, "As your people, so also my people," and yet neither king's people lived in only one city or town.) For the whole human race to be governed best, therefore, if must be subject, in respect of all things, to one supreme governor, upon whom the jurisdiction of all others depends.
William of Ockham The Savior seems also to suggest this in John ro[:16], when he says, "There will be one fold and one shepherd." By this we are given to understand that one supreme shepherd should be over one flock and community, however large.
Jerome also seems to think the same, in his letter to che monk Rusticus, as we read in 7, q.
1. én apibus. There he seems to assert that in every community there should be one supreme rector and judge, because according to him "the emperor is one, the judge of one province is one, and single are the bishops of every church"; therefore by like reasoning there should be one ruler of the whole earth upon whom all the jurisdiction of others depends.
It is also proved by argument. For if there is not one supreme rector or judge over the whole earth upon whom the jurisdiction of all others depends, then there are (or should be) at the same time many with no superior. But this seems to conflict with the best way of ruling. For if there are many with no superior, they are over either the same people or different people. If they are over the same —- as, according to many, in a kingdom or province a king or other secular judge, and a patriarch or archbishop or other ecclesiastical judge, are over the same people (aver the laity, at least}, though one rules in secular matters and the other in spiritual matters — it seems that such a community is not best ordered. For a community is not best ordered in which subjects cannot obey their superior in matters in which they are bound to obey; but if many with no superior are over the same people, then in many cases, even when it would be beneficial, subjects will not be able to obey their superior, because it will be possible for those judges with no superior to summon the same subjects to themselves in different places for the same time, and they will not be able to obey each of them; therefore they must be disobedient to one of them. Therefore that community is not best ordered.
But if many with no superior are over different people — as different kings reign over different kingdoms — such a community, including subjects of different rulers with no superior, is not best ordered. For since human nature is prone to dissension, discord among the different [rulers] with no superior will easily arise, which will not be able to be settled by a superior. And discord among magnates without a superior is very dangerous, according to Aris-