Augustine: Earlier Writings
ON FREE WILL l8i by experience of convenience, often attributes a higher value to things which reason convinces us are of lesser rank. Reason sets a vast difference in value between celestial and terrestrial bodies, but what carnal man would not prefer that several stars should be wanting in the heavens, than that one shrub should be lacking in his field or one cow from his herd? Older men pay no attention to, or at least are prepared patiently to correct, the judgments of children, who prefer the death of a man (except one of those bound to them by the ties of happy affection), to the death of a favourite sparrow, especially if the man was an object of terror to them, and the sparrow was tuneful and beautiful. So, if there are people, unskilled in judging the values of things, who praise God for his lesser creatures, finding them more easily appreciated by their carnal senses, and do not praise him for his better and superior creatures, or praise him less than they ought, or try to find fault with his creatures and to point out how they might have been better, or even do not believe that he created them, those who have advanced some way towards wisdom either entirely scorn such judgments or hear them with good-natured patience if they cannot correct them or until they are corrected. vi, 1 8. Such being the case, it is far from the truth that the sins of the creature must be attributed to the Creator, even though those things must necessarily happen which he has foreknown. So much so that when you say you can find no reason why whatever necessarily happens in the creature should not be attributed to him, I on the contrary find no way, and I assert that none exists or can be found, of attributing to him what is done, necessarily no doubt, but also by the will of the sinner. If anyone says, I should prefer not to exist than to exist in unhappiness, I shall reply: That is a lie; for you are miserable now, and yet you do not wish to die, simply because you wish to exist. You don't want to be miserable but you want to continue in fife all the same. Give thanks, therefore, because you exist, as you wish to do, so that the misery you do not wish may be taken from you. You exist as you wish to do, but you are unhappy against your will. Ifyou are ungrateful for your existence you are rightly compelled to be unhappy, which you do not wish. I praise the goodness of the Creator because, even when you are ungrateful, you have what you wish. And I praise the justice of the Orderer of things because for your ingratitude you suffer what you do not wish.
19. If he says: I don't want to die, not because I prefer to live l82 AUGUSTINE: EARLIER WRITINGS in misery rather than not to live at all, but lest I should be still more miserable after death, my reply will be: You will not be miserable if that would be unjust. But if it would be just, let us praise him by whose laws you are dealt with justly. If he says: How shall I know that I shall not be miserable unless misery be my just reward? I shall reply: If you are in your own power either you will not be miserable, or you will be justly miserable because you rule yourself unjustly. If you wish to rule yourself iustly and cannot, you will not be in your own power. You will then be in the power of no one or in the power of another. If you are in no one's power you will act willingly or unwillingly. It cannot be unwillingly, unless some superior force overpowers you. But he who is in the power of no one cannot be overpowered by any force; if willingly, you are in no one's power, and you must be in your own power, and either you will be miserable by ruling yourself unjustly, or, seeing you can be what you wish, you have cause to give thanks for the goodness of your Creator. Ifyou are not in your own power, then someone must have you in his power who is either more powerful or less powerful than yourself. If he is less powerful the fault is your own and the misery just. But if someone, more powerful than you are, hold you in his power you will not rightly think so rightful an order to be unjust. It is true, therefore, that you will not be miserable if it is unjust, and if it is just, let us praise him whose laws bring it to pass. vii, 20. If my opponent says: I prefer to be miserable rather than not to be at all, because I already exist. If I could have been consulted before I began to be, I should have chosen not to be rather than to be miserable. The fact that, being miserable, I fear to become non-existent is part of my misery. I ought to wish not to be rather than to be miserable, but I do not. I confess that I do now actually prefer to be miserable than not to be; but the folly of this preference is in proportion to my misery. The more clearly I see how true it is that I should not have this preference, the greater is my misery. My reply will be this: Take all the greater care not to err when you think you see the truth.
If you were happy you would prefer to be rather than not to be. Now when you are miserable you nevertheless prefer a miserable existence to non-existence, though you do not wish to be miserable. Consider, then, how great a boon existence is, seeing that both the happy and the miserable desire it. If you consider this carefully you will see that your misery is in proportion to your failure to draw near to that which supremely exists. You