Augustine: Earlier Writings (continued)
ON FREE WILL I25 be subject. Ev,—I think so too. Aug.—Are we to be in any doubt that virtue is absolutely superior to vice, in the sense that it is as much superior in strength and power as it is in goodness and sublimity? Ev.—Who could entertain any doubt? Aug.—Then no vicious soul can overcome a soul armed with virtue? Ev.— Most true. Aug.—I do not think you will deny that any kind of soul is better and more powerful than every body. Ev.—No one would deny it who sees, as one easily may, that a living being is to be preferred to what is not living, and that that which gives life is to be preferred to that which receives hfe. Aug.—Much less does a body, whatever its quality, surpass a soul endowed wdth virtue. Ev.—It is self-evident. Aug.—Surely a just soul, or a mind that keeps its proper jurisdiction and rule, cannot cast down and subject to lust another mind that rules with equal justice and virtue? Ev.—By no means, not only because there is the same excellence in each, but also because it must first have fallen away from justice and become a vitiated mind if it attempts to make another mind vicious. For that very reason it will be weaker.
21. Aug.—You have perfectly understood the point. It remains for you to tell me if you can, whether you think there is anything more excellent than a wise and rational mind. Ev.— Nothing I think, save God. Aug.—That is also my opinion. But seeing that that is a difficult question and cannot now be suitably discussed so that we may understand it though we hold it most firmly by faith, let us complete a diligent and careful treatment of the question we have on hand just now. xi. At present we can be sure that whatever it be that may rightly excel a mind strong in virtue, it cannot be unjust in any way. So that not even it, though it have the powder, will compel a mind to serve lust. Ev.—There is no one who will not admit that without any hesitation. Aug.—So we are left with the conclusion that whatever is equal or superior to a ruling mind possessing virtue cannot make it serve lust because of its just character. And whatever is inferior cannot do it by reason of its weakness. So our argument teaches us: Nothing makes the mind a companion of cupidity, except its own will and free choice. Ev.— I see that is our necessary conclusion.
22. Aug.—The next step is that you must come to see that the soul justly pays the penalty for its sin. Ev.— I cannot deny that.
Aug.—What then? Is it to be regarded as in itself a small penalty that the soul is dominated by lust, spoiled of its resources of virtue, drawn hitherand thither in abject poverty, now approving falsehood as if it were truth, now acting on the defensive, now rejecting what it had formerly approved but none the less falling into other falsehoods, now holding its assent back, and often fearing the most obvious reasonings, now despairing of ever finding the truth and sticking in the dark pit of folly, now attempting to reach the light of intelligence, and again falling back in sheer weariness? Meantime the cupidities exercise their dominion tyrannically and disturb the man's whole mind and life with varying and contrary tempests, fear on one side, longing on the other; here anxiety, there vain and false rejoicing; here torture because something loved has been lost, there eagerness to obtain what it does not possess; here grief for injury suffered, there incitements to seek revenge. Wherever it turns it can be restricted by avarice, wasted by luxury, bound by ambition, inflated by pride, tortured by envy, enveloped in sloth, excited by wantonness, afflicted by subjection, suffering all the other countless emotions which inhabit and trouble the realm of lust. Can we think that a condition like that is not penal, when we see that it must be undergone by all who do not cleave to wisdom?
23. Ev.—I think it is indeed a terrible penalty and an altogether just one, if anybody placed on the height of wisdom should choose to descend and become a servant to lust. But I am not sure whether it is actually within the power of any one who wants or is determined to do it. We believe that man has been created perfect by God and has been allotted a happy life so that it is by his own will that he has fallen to the miserable condition of this mortal life. But, though I firmly believe this, I have not yet grasped it with the intelligence. If you think that diligent inquiry into this question must be postponed, you do so against my will. xii, 24. But what worries me most is why we have to suffer such bitter penalties, we who certainly are foolish and were never wise. How can we be said to deserve to suffer these things as if we had deserted the fortress of virtue and chosen servitude to lust? I should never consent to your postponing the attempt to discuss and solve this problem as far as you can. Aug.—You say that as if it were crystal-clear that we never have been wise. You are thinking only of the time since we were born into this life. Wisdom is a thing which exists in the soul, but whether the soul lived some kind of life before its association with the body, and whether it then lived with wisdom is a big question, a great mystery, to be considered in the proper place. But the