Augustine: Earlier Writings (continued)
hear thy voice. Heal and open my eyes that I may see thy beckoning. Drive madness from me that I may recognize thee.
Tell me whither I must go that I may behold thee; and I hope to do all that thou dost command. Receive, I pray, thy fugitive, most clement Father and Lord. Already I have been punished enough. Enough have I served thine enemies ^vhom thou hast put under thy feet. Enough have I been the plaything of deceits. Receive me, thy servant, now fleeing from these things, as they formerly received me, a stranger, when I was fleeing from thee. I perceive I must return to thee. Let thy door be opened to me when I knock. Teach me how to come to thee. I have nothing else but the will to come. I know nothing save that transient dying things are to be spurned, certain and eternal things to be sought after. This only I know, O Father, but howto come to thee I know not. Tell me. Show me. Pro\dde for my journey. If those who take refuge in thee find thee by faith, give me faith; if by \'irtue, give me \irtue; if by knowledge, give knowledge. Increase in me faith, hope and charity, O thou admirable and unequalled Goodness.
6. I come to thee, and how to come I ask thee again. For if thou dost leave a man he perishes. But thou dost not, for thou art the highest good which no man hath rightly sought and failed to find. Every man hath rightly sought to whom thou hast given the power to do so. Make me to seek thee, Father. Free me from error. As I seek thee, may nothing else substitute itself for thee. If I desire nothing else but thee, may I at last find thee, Father, I beseech thee. But if there be in me the desire for anything superfluous, do thou thyself cleanse me and make me fit to see thee. Concerning the health of this my mortal body, so long as it is of some use to me, or to those whom I love, I leave it to thee, most kind and wise Father, and I will pray for relief from the scourge wherewith thou dost now chasten me.i Only I beseech thy most excellent clemency to convert me wholly to thyself, to allow nothing to gainsay me as I draw near to thee and to bid me while I bear and wear this mortal body to be pure, generous, just and prudent, a perfect lover and receiver of thy Wisdom and worthy to dwell in thy most blessed kingdom. Amen. Amen. ii, 7. I have made my prayer to God. Reason,—What then do you wish to know? Augustine.—All that I have mentioned in j my prayer. Reason.—Briefly summarize it. Augustine.—I desire
to know God and the soul. R.—Nothing more? A,—Nothing
1 A reference to his chest trouble.
THE SOLILOQUIES 27 whatever. R,—Begin your quest, then. But first explain what manner of demonstration of God would appear to you satisfying. A.—I do not know what kind of demonstration would satisfy me, for I do not think I know anything as I desire to know God. R.—What, then, is your difficulty? Don't you think you must first know what is a satisfying knowledge of God, beyond which you will make no further inquiry? A.—Certainly; but I do not see how it can be defined. Have I ever had knowledge of anything comparable with God, so that I could say I want to know God as I know that? R.—If you do not yet know God how do you know that you know nothing similar to God? A.—If I knew anything similar to God I would doubtless love it. But I love nothing but God and the soul, and I know neither. R.—Don't you love your friends? A.—How could I not love them seeing I love the soul? R.—For the same reason do you love fleas and bugs? A.—I said I loved the soul, not animals. ^
R.—Either your friends are not men or you do not love them. For man is an animal, and you said you did not love animals. A,—Indeed they are men and I love them, not because they are animals but because they are men, that is, they have rational souls which I love even in robbers. I can love reason in any man even while I justly hate the man who misuses what I love. I love my friends the more, the better they use their rational souls, or at all events the more they desire to use them well. iii, 8. R.—I agree. But if anyone promised to give you a knowledge of God like the knowledge you have of Alypius, would not you be grateful and say it was enough? A.—Indeed
I should be grateful, but I should not say it was enough.
R,—Pray why? A.—I do not know God as I know Alypius, but even Alypius I do not know sufficiently well. R.—Are you not shameless in wanting to know God better than you know Alypius? A.—That does not follow. In comparison with the heavenly bodies nothing is of less account than my dinner. I do not know what I shall have for dinner to-morrow, and yet I do know in what sign of the zodiac the moon will be. There is nothing shameless in that. R.—So a sufficient knowledge of God would resemble the knowledge you have of the course of the moon? A.—No; because the latter is sense-knowledge. I do not know whether God or some hidden natural cause may suddenly alter the ordinance and course of the moon. Were that to happen all that I had assumed would be false. R.—You
1 Anima (soul) is also the life principle of animate beings (animals). believe that might happen? ^.—No, I don't. But my question is not about what I be Ueve but about what I know. Possibly we may be rightly said to believe everything we know, but not to know what we only believe. R,—In this matter, then, you reject entirely the testimony of the senses. A,—Entirely. R.—Well now, take your friend Alypius, whom you have just said you do not know sufficiently. Do you wish to know him by sense-knowledge or by intellectual knowledge? A.—What I know of him by sense-knowledge—if it can be called knowledge—is insignificant and yet sufficient so far as it goes. But I desire to reach by intellect a knowledge of that part of him, namely, his mind, where he is truly my friend. R.—Can he be known otherwise?
A.—By no means. R.—Do you dare to say that your most familiar friend is unknown to you? A.—There is no daring about it. I think that law of friendship is most just which lays down that a man shall love his friend as himself, neither less nor more. So, seeing that I do not know myself, how can I be reproached for saying that I do not know him, especially since, I dare say, he does not profess to know himself either. R.—If the knowledge you seek is of the kind which is attained by the intellect alone, you had no right, when I said it was shameless of you to seek to know God while professing ignorance of Alypius, to offer the analogy of your dinner and the moon, for these things, as you say, belong to the world of the senses, iv, 9. But no matter. Answer me this: If the statements of Plato and Plotinus concerning God are true, would you be satisfied to know God as they knew him? A.—Even if their statements are true, it does not necessarily follow that they knew him. Many speak at great length of things they do not know, just as I said
I desire to know all the things I mentioned in my prayer. I could not desire to know what I already knew. How then was I able to speak of these things? I spoke not that which I understood with my mind, but that which I have gathered from many quarters and committed to memory and in which I have put such faith as I was able. To know is quite another matter. R,—Tell me this. You know what a line is in geometry. A.—Yes, that I clearly know. R.—In saying so you are not afraid of the Academics. A,—Not at all. They wanted to avoid philosophical error. I am no philosopher, so I am not afraid to profess knowledge of the things I know. But if I reach Wisdom as I desire I shall do as she directs. R.—Quite right. But to return to my question. You know what a line is. Do you also know the round object which is called a sphere? A,— I do.