Augustine: Earlier Writings
THE SOLILOQUIES 63
36. We shall speak of these things with greater care and subtlety when we begin to discuss the intel Hgence, which it is our intention to do, after we have discussed and solved the problem of the life of the soul as far as we are able. I suspect that you rather fear that death, even if it do not slay the soul, nevertheless may bring oblivion of everything, even of such truth as may have been discovered. A,—I cannot express strongly enough how much this evil is to be feared. What kind of eternal life would that be, and what death would not be preferable, if the soul so lived as we see it in a boy newly born? Not to mention the life lived in the womb, which I suppose must be called life. R.—Be of good courage. God will grant us his presence as we have experienced it in our present quest. He promises us a most blessed future after this bodily life, a future full of truth without any falsehood.
Note
The work is manifestly incomplete. A third book of Soliloquies was projected, and material for it was collected while Augustine was at Milan after his return from Cassiciacum. This material is contained in the De Animae Immortalitate, which he tells us was published without his consent, and in an unfinished condition. "By reason of its brevity and the confusion of its argument it is so obscure that it is wearisome to read, and my meaning is scarcely intelligible even to myself." Retract, I, v, i.
Tlie Teacher
Augustine's Review of the De Magistro. Retractations /, xii
About the same time I wrote a book entitled De Magistro, in which we discuss and inquire and discover that there is no teacher who teaches man knowledge except God according to what is written in the Gospel, "One is your teacher, even Christ" (Matt. 23:10). The book begins: Qiiid tibi videmur efficere velle cum loquimur?
The Teacher
INTRODUCTION THE De Magistro is briefly reviewed in the Retractations between the De Musica and the De Vera Religione, and is said to have been written about the same time as the former, i.e., about 389, after Augustine's return to Tagaste.
It is a dialogue with his natural son Adeodatus, who was then in his sixteenth year, and who died an early death shortly after. Of Adeodatus there is an interesting notice in the Confessions (IX, vi. 14). Along with his father and Alypius there was baptized by Ambrose in Milan on Easter Day, 387, "the boy Adeodatus, my son after the flesh, born of my sin. He was hardly fifteen years old, but in intelligence he excelled many grave and learned men. I acknowledge thy gifts in him, O Lord, my God. ... I had nothing to give to that boy except the sin which I transmitted to him. Thou, none else, didst inspire in us the thought of bringing him up in thy discipline. I confess thine
THE TEACHER 65 own gifts to thee. There is a book of mine extant called The Teacher, in which he took part with me. Thou knowest that all the opinions there expressed by my interlocutor were actually his when he was in his sixteenth year. I experienced many other marvellous things about him. His abihty made me stand in awe of him. Who save thou can be the doer of such miracles? Thou didst remove his Ufe early from this earth, and I remember him with all the greater confidence as I have no reason to fear for I him any sins of boyhood, adolescence or manhood." Adeodatus was also present at the discussion on The Happy Life, during the sojourn at Cassiciacum—"the youngest member of the company, whose ability, unless parental fondness deceives me, shows great promise." He naturally takes but a minor part in the Dialogue, but his suggestion that "having God" means "having no unclean spirit" was received with approbation by Monica and by Augustine too, who gently points out that it is equivalent to "hving well."
If it is true that the De Magistro gives the actual contribution of Adeodatus to the discussion, his father's admiration for his abihty is fully justified. As we have seen, he had been brought up as a Christian, and we may suppose that his general education had not been neglected. This dialogue between father and son may well exemplify the care taken to improve his talents, at all events it is in part an exercise in dialectic. Among its attractive features is the recurrence of the personal touch—the playfulness here and there on both sides, the father's commendation of the son's acuteness, caution, modesty, and willingness to be corrected when wrong without loss of temper; and the son's obvious respect for the father, combined with tenacity in argument.
The Dialogue is an essay in epistemology. How is knowledge of truth attained? How are ideas communicated? What part does teaching play in the process of learning? The first section (1-18) is an exercise in pure dialectic to very httle purpose except as an exercise, as is admitted. Fortunately it is briefly and clearly summarized by Adeodatus in a quite masterly fashion (19-20). The important part begins at x, 29 with the discussion of the relation between words and reality. Words are but signs, important as pointing beyond themselves to reality, but not by themselves imparting knowledge. At most they stimulate inquiry. Knowledge can be gained only as a result of an internal process in the mind of the pupil. All that the teacher can do by means of words is to elicit the truth. Truth
A.K.W
is interior to the mind and cannot be communicated from without. But this does not mean that truth is subjective. It comes from God, whose eternal Truth, Christ, dwells in minds prepared to receive him. Christ is the inward teacher of all who can or will listen to him. Of course, the things Christ teaches are held to be the universal truths of reason. Historical events, e.g., the story of the Three Youths of Daniel 3:27, are not matters of knowledge but of "useful" faith.
ANALYSIS
i, I—iii, 6. Introduction.
We use words to let others know what we are thinking, to teach or remind them of something we have in mind.
(2) We also use words when we pray, though we need not tell God anything. We use them also in thinking, but only to bring to mind the things they signify. Words are simply significant signs. (3) It is well-nigh impossible to get behind signs to "things." (4) Synonyms are signs too. (5) So are gestures, e.g., pointing to a visible object. Gesture-signs may be elaborate, e.g.. Deaf-and-dumb signs, and miming. (6) But actions can be demonstrated without signs by merely performing them. iv, 7—vi, 18. Words as Signs signifying merely Signs (Synonyms).
(7) We are first to consider signs which signify signs, especially words spoken or written. (8) Distinction between signs and things signified {significabilia) , (9) "sign": "word": "name." A word is an articulated spoken sign. A name is a particular kind of word, denoting a particular thing, e.g., river.
(11) "Word" and "name" in the general sense (not in the special sense of "verb" and "noun") are nearly synonymous, (12) verbum suggesting the physical aspect, nomen the mental aspect. (13) Any word, any part of speech, may be used as a noun. Several proofs follow (13-17). vii, 19—viii, 21. Recapitulation; Estimate of the Value of the Exercise. viii, 22—ix, 28. Signs which signify Things.
(22) The word homo signifies a man but is not a man. (23) No lion has come out of die mouth of one who has pronounced the word! (24) When the word homo is used, simply the noun may be meant, or an actual man. (25) Things signified are THE TEACHER 67 more important than their signs because (26) the end is more important than the means. So far as words are the means of communicating knowledge they are valuable, but not so precious as the knowledge itself. (28) Education is a good thing, for it supplies not merely knowledge of the words "virtue" and "vice," but also knowledge of the virtues and the vices, all of which is necessary for the good life.
X, 29-xiii, 45. Final Problem. Things known without Signs.
(30) We teach by giving signs, and nothing can be taught without signs; and yet (32) many things, e.g., natural objects, can be known without signs by those who have eyes to see them. (33) In fact nothing is learnt from signs or words. If I know the meaning of a word that word teaches me nothing new. If I do not know the meaning of a word, again it teaches me nothing. (34) A word is only intelligible if I know by personal experience the thing it signifies. Otherwise it can only stimulate inquiry. (37) We may know the meaning of all the words used to describe an historical event, but the event itself cannot be known. It can only be beheved. (38) Knowledge is of universals, and these we do not learn by means of words. We must consult the Eternal Wisdom of God, i.e., Christ, who dwells in the inner man, gives men to see the truth according to the ability of each. And this abihty depends on the moral quahty of the will. (39) Knowledge is either sense-knowledge or intellectual-knowledge. Neither is conveyed by words. The former comes by sense-perception, the latter by contemplation. Sense-knowledge of things past is stored as images in the memory, and cannot be communicated except to those who have shared the experience. When spoken of, it may or may not be beheved. (40) General truths of reason are not taught, but are somehow in the mind and only require to be discovered by skilful questioning. They are not put in the mind of the pupil by the teacher. (41) The pupil judges of what the teacher says in the light of the inward truth. (42 ff.) Words need not even reveal the mind of the speaker. There may be deception or misunderstanding.
(45) Even if we admit that in general words do reveal the mind of the speaker, do not these exceptions suggest that the correspondence of word and thought is never quite exact?
Teachers do not profess to teach their own opinions but objective truth, of which the pupil judges. No man is really a teacher. The idea that some men are teachers arises from the fact that apprehension of truth follows without appreciable
68 AUGUSTINE: EARLIER WRJTINGS interval on the words of the teacher, but the two processes are separable, xiv, 46. Epilogue.
Words simply put us on the alert, and make us ready to learn. Knowledge comes not from outside by external means, but from the Master who dwells within, Christ the Truth of God.
The Teacher
A Dialogue between Augustine and his son Adeodatus
THE TEXT
i, I. Augustine,—What do you suppose is our purpose when we use words? Adeodatus,—The answer that occurs to me at the moment is, we want to let people know something, or we want to learn something. Augustine,—I agree at once with the former, for it is clear that when we use words we want to let somebody know something. But in what way do we show that we wish to learn? Adeodatus,—When we ask quesdons, of course. Aug.— Even then, as I understand it, we want to let somebody know something. Do you ask a question for any other reason than to show the person questioned what you want to know? Ad.—No. Aug,—You see, then, that when we use words we desire nothing but to let someone know something. Ad,—Not quite, perhaps. If speaking means using words, I see that we do so when we sing. Now we often sing when we are alone, with no one present to hear us; and then I cannot think we want to tell anyone anything. Aug.—And yet I think there is a kind of teaching, and a most important kind, which consists in reminding people of something. I believe this will be made clear as our conversation proceeds. If, however, you do not think that we learn by remembering, or that he who reminds us of something really teaches us, I do not press the point. I assert that there are two reasons for our using words, either to teach, or to remind others or, it may be, ourselves. And we do this also when we sing. Don't you agree?
Ad,—Well, hardly. For I very rarely sing to remind myself of anything, almost always simply to give myself pleasure.
Aug,—I see what you mean. But don't you notice that what pleases you in singing is the melody? Now this can be added to the words or not added, so that singing is not the same thing as