Augustine: Earlier Writings (continued)
THE SOLILOQUIES 43 senses belong to the soul or to the body. A,—To the soul, I think. R.—And intel Ugence belongs to the soul? A.—Certainly. ^ —To the soul alone, or to anything else? A.— I see nothing besides the soul, except God, where intel Hgence may be supposed to reside. R.—Now let us look into that. If anyone said to you that that object is not a wall but a tree, what would you think? A.—Either that his sight or mine was at fault, or that "tree" was his word for "wall." R.—Suppose to him there appeared to be a tree and to you a wall. Could not both be true? A.—By no means, for one and the same thing cannot be both a tree and a wall. If each of us sees differently, one or other of us must have a false image. R.—If there was neither a tree nor a wall both of you would be wrong. A.—That is possible. R.—That possibi Hty you neglected just now. A.—I confess I did. R.—Ifyou recognize that a thing appears to you other than it is, are you deceived? A.—No. R.—It is possible, then, for an appearance to be false while he to whom it appears is not deceived. A.—It is possible. R.—We must confess, therefore, that a man is deceived not when he sees falsely but when he assents to what is false. A.—Clearly we must. R.—How would you define falsehood? A.—That is false which is other than it seems. R.—If, then, there is no one to be taken in, there is no falsehood. A.—It follows. R,—There is, then, no falsity in things but only in our senses. But no one is deceived who does not assent to what is false. Our conclusion is that we must make a distinction between ourselves and our senses, if indeed our senses may be deceived while we can be free from deception. A.—I have nothing to urge to the contrary. R,—But if your soul is deceived you will not venture to deny that you are false? A.—How could I? R.—But there are no senses without a soul, and no falsity without senses. Hence either the soul works alone or co-operates with falsity. A.—The argument compels assent.
4. R.—Now tell me whether you think there can ever be a time when falsity is no more? A.—How could I think so, when there is such difficulty in finding the truth. It would be more absurd to say that falsity can cease to be than that truth should cease.
R.—Do you think that a man who does not live can use the senses? A.—It cannot be. R,—Then it is proved that the soul is immortal. A.—You make my heart glad too quickly. Step by step, I beseech you! R.—And yet if the argument has been correct I see no reason to doubt the conclusion. A.—You go too quickly, I say. I should be more readily induced to judge that I have been rash in my admissions than to be sure of the