Augustine: Earlier Writings (continued)
8o AUGUSTINE: EARLIER WRITINGS
[being]. Ad.—Undeniably. Aug.—But if I were to ask you what part of speech is Est you would, I suppose, say it was not a noun but a verb, though our reasoning has taught us that it is also a noun. Ad,—It is just as you say. Aug.—Do you still hesitate to regard as names the other parts of speech—names in the sense we have demonstrated? Ad.— I do not hesitate, now that I have to confess that they may be signs of something. But if you ask what the specific things signified are called or named, I cannot answer. I can refer only to those parts of speech which we do not usually call names, but which I see we are now constrained so to call.
15. Aug.—Are you not disturbed by the possibility that there may be someone who would weaken our argument by saying that we must attribute to the Apostle authority in the matter of realities but not in the use of words? The ground of our argument would not be so sure as we had assumed. It is possible that, though Paul lived and taught with absolute rectitude, his language was less correct when he wTote: "In him was Est,'' especially when he himself confesses that he was unskilled in speech. How do you think we ought to refute such a man? Ad.—I have nothing to urge against him. I pray you, find someone among the acknowledged masters of words by whose authority you can effect what you desire. Aug.—You think that without authorities reason itself is hardly sufficient. But reason itself demonstrates that all the parts of speech may signify some thing, that consequently they may be names or nouns. This can be most easily seen by comparing different languages. Obviously if you ask what is the Greek name for our quis, the answer is tis; for volo, thelo; for bene, kalos; for scriptum, to gegrammenon; for et, kai; for ab, apo\ for heu, oi. The question can thus be correctly asked about all the parts of speech as I have enumerated them. This could not be done unless they were names. When we can by this process of reasoning, apart from the authority of all the eloquent men, prove that the Apostle Paul spoke correctly, what need is there to seek anyone to buttress our argument with his personal authority?
16. But possibly some man, from greater stupidity or impudence, may not agree, but on the contrary may assert that he will give way only to those authorities who with universal consent are allowed to lay down the law in regard to words. What in the Latin tongue can be found more excellent than Cicero? And yet he, in his noblest orations, called the Verrine orations, calls coram a noun. Now coram is a preposition, or possibly an THE TEACHER 8l adverb in that particular passage. It may be that I do not correctly understand the passage, and others may explain it differently. But there is one point to which I think there is no possible answer. The best masters of dialectic tell us that a complete sentence, whether affirmative or negative (what Tullius somewhere also calls a pronouncement), consists of a noun and a verb; and when the verb is in the third person, the noun, they i say, and rightly, must be in the nominative case. Now consider this point. When we say "the man sits" and "the horse runs" you observe there are two pronouncements. Ad.—I do. Aug.—In each of them there is one noun, in the one case, "man," in the other, "horse." There is likewise one verb, "sits" in the one case, "runs" in the other. Ad.—So I observe. Aug. If I said simply "sits" or "runs," you would very properly ask me "who or what?" I should have to reply, "the man," "the horse," "the animal" or some other noun which, when added to the verb, completes the pronouncement or affirmative or negative sentence. Ad.—I understand. Aug.—Now Hsten. Suppose we see some object rather far away and are uncertain whether it is an animal or a stone or something else. Suppose I say to you: "Because it is a man it is an animal." Shouldn't I be speaking rashly? Ad.—You would indeed, but not if you said: "If it is a [ man it is an animal." Aug.—You are right. So in your sentence
I "if" satisfies us both, and in mine "because" is felt to be wrong.
Ad.—I agree. Aug.—Now are these two pronouncements complete sentences: "'if satisfies," and, "'because' is wrong"? Ad.—Yes. They are complete. Aug.—Now tell me which are the verbs and which the nouns. Ad,—The verbs are "satisfies" and "is wrong"; and the nouns must be "if" and "because."
Aug.—It is therefore sufficiently proved that these two conjunctions can also be nouns. Ad.—Quite sufficiendy. Aug.—Can you by yourself prove that the other parts of speech can be brought under the same rule? Ad.—I can. vi, 17. Aug.—Let us, then, pass on. Tell me whether you think that, just as we have found that all words are names and all names are words, so all names are substandves and all substantives are names. Ad.—I see no difference between them except their sounds. Aug.—I make no objecdon provisionally. There are some who see a dis Unction between them in meaning too, but we need not consider their opinion just now. But at least you observe that we have reached signs which signify one another mutually, differing in nothing but sound, and which signify themselves together with all the other parts of speech.
A.E.W
Ad.— I don't understand. Aug,—Don't you understand that "substantive" signifies "name" and "name" "substantive," and that there is no difference between them except in sound, so far as concerns the general concept, "name." For of course we use the concept, "name" (or noun), in a special sense, when we use it to denote one of the eight parts of speech over against the other seven. Ad.—That I understand. Aug.—That is what I meant when I said that substantive and name signify one another mutually.
1 8. Ad.—I understand that, but I wonder what you meant by saying they signify themselves together with the other parts of speech. Aug.—Didn't our previous argument teach us that all parts of speech can be used as names and substantives, that is, may be signified by the signs, "name" and "substantive"? Ad.—That is so. Aug.—If I ask you the meaning of no-men— mean that disyllabic sound—wouldn't you correctly reply nomen? Ad.—Yes. Aug.—But it is not surely the same with the sign we give when we pronounce the four syllables, con-junc-ti-o? This name cannot be enumerated among the conjunctions which it signifies. Ad.—That I accept as right. Aug.—So you see what I meant by saying, a name which signifies itself and all the other things it signifies. You can work this out for yourself ifyou like in the case of the word, "substantive." Ad.—Easily enough. But it occurs to me that "name" is used in both a general and a special sense. "Substantive" is not accepted among the eight parts of speech. So there must be a difference in meaning besides the difference in sound. Aug.—What difference is there between nomen and onoma except a difference of sound, the difference between the Latin and the Greek languages? Ad.—In this case I see no difference save one of sound. Aug.—So we have discovered signs which signify themselves, and one another mutually. Whatever is signified by the one is also signified by the other, and they differ only in sound. We have just found out this fourth characteristic. The three former ones we learned in connection with names and words. Ad.—Yes. That is what we have discovered. vii, 19. Aug.—I should Hke you to recall what we have learned as a result of our conversation. Ad.—I shall do the best
I can. To begin with I recall that we spent some time in inquiring why we use speech, and we saw that we did so in order to teach or to call to mind. Even when we ask questions our motive is simply to let the person questioned know what we want to hear. We seem to sing for the pleasure it gives us, but the