Augustine: Earlier Writings (continued)
ON FREE WILL I3g of sight, that is, what do we sense by seeing? Ev.—Corporeal objects. Aug.—Do we perceive hardness and softness by seeing? Ev.—No. Aug.—What then belongs properly to the function of the eyes to perceive? Ev.—Colour. Aug.—And to the ears? Ev.—Sound. Aug.—And to the sense of smell? Ev.—Odour. Aug.—To the sense of taste? Ev.—Taste. Aug.—To the sense of touch? Ev.—The soft and the hard, the smooth and the rough, and many such things. Aug.—The forms of corporeal objects, great and small, square and round, and such hke quahties we perceive both by sight and touch, and so they cannot be ascribed solely to either sight or touch, but to both. Ev.— understand. Aug.—You understand, then, that some things belong to one particular sense whose function it is to convey information about them, while other things belong in this way to several senses? Ev.—That also I understand. Aug.—Can we by any of the senses decide what belongs to any particular sense, or what belongs to all or several of them together? Ev.— By no means. That has to be decided by something else within us. Aug.—Perhaps that would be reason, which the beasts lack? For, I suppose, it is by reason that we comprehend sense-data and know that they are as they are. Ev.—Rather I think that by reason we comprehend that there is a kind of interior sense to which the ordinary senses refer everything. For in the case of the beast the sense of sight is a different thing from the sense to shun or to seek the things it sees. The former belongs to the eyes, the latter is within the soul itself. For of the things they see or hear or perceive with the other bodily senses, some the animals seek with pleasure and accept, others they avoid as displeasing, and refuse to take. This sense can be called neither sight nor hearing nor smell nor taste nor touch, but must be some other sense which presides over all the others alike. While we comprehend this by reason, as I said, still we cannot call it reason, since clearly the beasts have it too.
9. Aug.—I recognize that there is that faculty and I do not hesitate to call it the interior sense. But unless the information conveyed to us by the bodily senses goes beyond that sense it cannot become knowledge. What we know we comprehend by reason. W'e know that colours are not perceived by hearing nor voices by seeing, to mention these only. When we know this it is not by means of the eyes or the ears or by that interior sense which the beasts also possess. We cannot believe that they know that hght is not perceived by the ears nor voices by the eyes, for we do not discern these things without rational observation
and thought. Ev,—I cannot say that I quite see that. Suppose they do distinguish by the interior sense which you admit the animals have, and reahze that colours cannot be perceived by hearing nor voices by seeing? Aug,—You do not suppose that they can distinguish between the colour that is seen, the sense that is in the eyes, the interior sense that is in the soul, and the reason by which all these things are defined and enumerated?
Ev.—Not at all. Aug.—Could reason distinguish these four things and define their limits unless the notion of colour were conveyed to it in these various stages. First the sense of sight in the eyes would report to the interior sense which presides over all the external senses, and it would then report direct to reason, that is to say, if there is no intermediate stage. Ev.—I see no other way. Aug.—The sense of sight perceives colour but is itself perceived by no other sense. Do you see that? You do not see sight with the same sense as you see colour. Ev.—Certainly not. Aug.—Try to distinguish these two things; for I suppose you do not deny that colour is one thing, and to see colour is another entirely different thing. Moreover, it is another different thing to have the sense that enables us to see colour as if it were before us, even when in actual fact there is no colour before us. Ev.— distinguish these things and admit that they are all different. Aug.—Well take these three things. Do you see anything with the eyes except colour? Ev.—Nothing else. Aug.—Tell me, then, how you see the other two things, for you cannot distinguish between them if you have not seen them. Ev.—I know no way.
I know it is so, that is all. Aug.—So you do not know whether it is by reason or by what we call the interior sense which presides over the bodily senses, or by something else? Ev.— I do not know. Aug.—And yet you know that they can be defined only by reason, and that reason could not do this unless sense-data were offered for its examination. Ev.—That is certain. Aug.— Then all in the act of knowing which does not come from senseperception is provided by reason, to which are reported and referred all external circumstances. And so sense-data can be accepted, but strictly within their own limits, and can be comprehended not by sense only but also by knowledge. Ev.—That is so. Aug.—Reason distinguishes the senses which are its servants from the data they collect. Likewise it knows the difference between the senses and itself, and is sure that it is much more powerful than they. Does reason comprehend reason by any other means than by reason itself? Would you know that you possess reason otherwise than by reason? Ev.—Surely not.
ON FREE WILL I4I
Aug.—When we see a colour we do not, with the sense of sight, see that we see; when we hear a sound, we do not hear our hearing; when we smell a rose we do not smell our smelling; when we taste anything we do not taste taste in our mouths; and when we touch anything we cannot touch the sense of touch.
It is clear, therefore, that none of the five senses can perceive itself, though all in their several ways perceive corporeal objects. Ev.—That is quite clear. iv, 10. Aug.—I think it is also clear that the interior sense perceives not only the data passed on to it by the five senses, but also perceives the senses too. A beast would not make the movement necessary for seeking or avoiding anything unless it was conscious of perceiving, which of course it could not be by using the five senses only. I do not suggest that this consciousness in the beast is a step towards knowledge, for that belongs to reason, simply that it is a prerequisite of movement. If there is still some obscurity here an example will elucidate the point.
It will be enough to consider the case of one of the senses, say sight. A beast would be quite unable to open its eyes and direct them towards an object it desired to see unless it perceived that it could not see the object so long as its eyes were closed and not directed to the object. If it is conscious of not seeing when it does not see, it must also be conscious of seeing when it does see. The fact that when it sees an object it does not make the movement that would be necessary to bring it into view indicates that it perceives that it sees or does not see. But it is not so clear whether a beast has self-consciousness, as well as consciousness, of perceiving corporeal objects. Possibly it has an inward feeling that every living thing shuns death which is the opposite of life.
If so, every living thing which shuns the opposite of life must be conscious of itself as living. But if that is not clear let us omit it, and not strive to estabhsh our position with proofs that are not both certain and self-evident. What is evident is this: corporeal objects are perceived by bodily sense; no bodily sense can perceive itself; the interior sense can perceive both corporeal objects perceived by a bodily sense, and also that bodily sense itself; but reason knows all these things and knows itself, and therefore has knowledge in the strict sense of the term. Don't you think so? Ev.—I do indeed. Aug.—Come, then, what about the question the answer to which we desired to reach? To reach that answer we have taken all this time and trouble in preparing the way.
V, II. Ev.—So far as I remember, of the three questions we