Augustine: Earlier Writings
ON FREE WILL I47 breathe it in and I cannot put it back again by breathing out, so that you may breathe it in and feel it. All sensible things, which we do not destroy and take into our systems when we sense them, we can perceive, both of us, either at the same time or at different times, one after the other, in such a way that the whole or the part which I perceive can also be perceived by you. I mean such things as light or sound or bodily objects which we do not destroy when we use and perceive them. Ev.—I understand. Aug.—It is therefore evident that things which we perceive with the bodily senses without causing them to change are by nature quite different from our senses, and consequently are common to us both, because they are not converted and changed into something which is our peculiar and almost private property. Ev,—I agree. Aug,—By "our peculiar and private property" I mean that which belongs to each of us alone, which each of us perceives by himself alone, which is part of the natural being of each of us severally. By "common and almost public property" I mean that which is perceived by all sentient beings without its being thereby affected and changed. Ev.—That is so. viii, 20. Aug,—Now consider carefully, and tell me whether anything can be found which all reasoning beings can see in common, each with his own mind and reason; something which is present for all to see but which is not transformed like food and drink for the use of those for whom it is present; something which remains complete and unchanged, whether they see it or do not see it. Do you perhaps think there is nothing of that kind? Ev,—Indeed, I see many such, but it will be sufficient to mention one. The science of numbers is there for all reasoning persons, so that all calculators may try to learn it, each with his own reason and intelligence. One can do it easily, another with difficulty, another cannot do it at all. But the science itself remains the same for everybody who can learn it, nor is it converted into something consumed like food by him who learns it.
If anyone makes a mistake in numbers the science itself is not at fault. It remains true and entire. The error of the poor arithmetician is all the greater, the less he knows of the science.
21. Aug,—Quite right. I see you are not untaught in these matters, and so have quickly found a reply. But suppose someone said that numbers make their impression on our minds not in their own right but rather as images of visible things, springmg from our contacts by bodily sense with corporeal objects, what would you reply? Would you agree? Ev,—l could never agree