Augustine: Earlier Writings
immortality of the soul. Elucidate your conclusion and show me how it has been reached. R.—You said that falsity cannot be without the senses, and that it cannot cease to be. Therefore the senses are eternal. But there are no senses without a soul. Hence the soul is eternal. Moreover there are no senses without life.
Therefore the soul lives eternally. iv, 5. A.—A blunt weapon! You could as soon conclude that man is immortal if I agreed that the world could not exist without man, and that the world is eternal. R.—You are very watchful. Yet it is no small result to have ascertained that the world cannot be without the soul, if we cannot admit the possibility of there being no falsity in the world. A,—That follows, I agree. But I think we must consider more fully whether some of our earlier admissions are not shaky. I see that a considerable step has been taken towards proving the immortality of the soul. R.—Are you satisfied that you have conceded nothing rashly? A.—Yes. I see no reason to accuse myself of rashness. R.—Then it is proved that the world cannot exist without the living soul. A.—That may mean only that when some die others are born. R.—If falsity is banished from the universe, that means that all things become true. A.—I see it follows. R.—Tell me how you think that wall is a true wall. A.—Because I am not mistaken when I look at it. R.—Because it is what it seems. A.—For that reason too. R.—If a thing is false because it seems different from what it is, and true because it is what it seems, take away the percipient and it is neither true nor false. But if there is no falsity in the universe, all things are true. And nothing can be perceived except by a living soul. The soul is therefore eternal, whether falsity can be abolished or not. A.—I see that our conclusion was pretty strong, and we have not moved forward by this additional argument. Nevertheless, my chief difficulty remains. Souls are born and die, and the fact that there are always souls in the world is due not to their immortality but to their succession.
6. R.—Do you think that any corporeal things, i.e., objects of the senses, can be comprehended by the intellect? A,—I do not. R.—Do you think God uses senses to know things? A,—I do not venture to make any rash assertion in such a matter, but, so far as I may guess, God does not make use of senses. R.—We draw the conclusion, therefore, that the soul alone has senses. A.—Provisionally, that is probable. R.—Well, now. You agree that if that wall is not a true wall it is not a wall? A.—That is quite simple. R.—Nor is anything a corporeal object unless it is THE SOLILOQUIES 45 truly such? ^.—Equally simple. J?.—Now, if nothing is true unless it is what it seems; and no bodily object can be seen except by the senses; and the soul alone has senses; and there is no corporeal object unless it is truly such; it follows that there cannot be a corporeal object unless there is a soul. A,—You press me hard and I cannot resist your argument. v, 7. R.—Give your closest attention to this. A.—I am ready. R,—Here is a stone; truly a stone if it is what it seems. It is not a stone if it is not a true stone. And it cannot be seen except by the senses. A.—Well? R.—There are, therefore, no stones hidden deep in the earth where there is no one to see them. That would not be a stone unless we were looking at it; nor will it be a stone when we depart and there is no one else here to see it. If you completely seal up a room containing many objects, there will be nothing there. That log will not be composed of wood throughout. For the inside of an opaque body escapes the senses, and therefore cannot exist. If it existed it would be true; what is true is what it appears to be. But this does not appear to any one. Therefore it is not true. Have you any reply to this? A.—The conclusion seems to spring from what I have admitted. But it is equally absurd to deny anything I have said as to concede that the conclusion is correct. R.—I do not dispute it. But what would you prefer to say: bodily objects can be seen apart from the senses; or there can be sense apart from the soul; or a stone or any other object can exist without being true; or we must find another definition ofwhat is true? A.—Let us examine the last alternative.
8. R.—Give a definition of truth. A.—Truth is that which is as it seems to him who knows it, if he will and can know it.
R.—Then that will not be true which no one can know? If that is false which seems otherwise than it is, what happens if this seems to one man to be a stone and to another a piece of wood? Can the same thing be both false and true? ^4.—What interests me more is how a thing that cannot be known can yet be not true. I do not so much care whether one thing can be at the same time both true and false. For I see that one thing may be compared with several things and may be both greater and smaller at the same time. So it happens that nothing in itself is either greater or smaller. These words apply when comparisons are made, i?.—But if you say that nothing is true in itself, are you not afraid of the consequence that nothing is in itself? The existence of this piece of wood and the truth about it come from the same source. It can neither be nor be true by itself without