Augustine: Earlier Writings
known by which other things are known. A.—I agree. R.—First let us ask this question. There are two words, Veritas and Verum. Do you think they signify two things, or only one? A.—Two things, e\idently. For just as castitas is one thing and castum another, and so with many other similar pairs of words, so, I believe. Truth is one thing and that which is said to be true is another. R.—Which of the two do you think is more excellent?
A.—Truth, I think. What is chaste is a particular instance of Chastity. Similarly, what is true is a particular instance of Truth.
28. R.—When a chaste person dies, Chastity has not died too? A.—By no means. R.—Therefore, when something that is true perishes. Truth does not perish. A.—I do not see how anything that is true can perish. R.— I am surprised at that. Don't you see thousands of things perishing before our eyes? Can you imagine that this tree is a tree but is not true, or that it cannot perish? Though you do not trust the senses and can reply that you do not know whether it is a tree, at least you will not deny, I suppose, that it is truly a tree if it is a tree. For that is a judgment not of the senses but of the intelligence. If it is a false tree it is not a tree. But if it is a tree it is true, necessarily. A.— admit that. R.—Don't you admit also that a tree belongs to the class of things that are born and die? A.—I cannot deny it. R.—The conclusion, then, is that something that is true perishes. A.— I do not contradict. R.—You see, then, that when true things perish Truth does not perish, just as Chastity does not die when a chaste person dies. A,—Now I agree and expectantly await the development of your argument. R.— Well. Listen. A,—I am all agog.
29. R.—Do you think the statement is true: whatever is must be somewhere. A.—Of that I am as sure as of anything. R.— Truth exists. A.—I agree. R.—Then we must ask where it exists. For it cannot be in space unless you think that something which is not a material body can be in space, or that Truth itself is a corporeal thing. A.—I hold neither of these views. R.—Where, then, can it exist? For if we admit it exists, it must exist somewhere. A.—If I knew where it exists I should probably have no further questions to ask. R.—At least you can know where it does not exist. A.—If you tell me I might. R*—Certainly it does not exist in mortal things. \Vhatever is, cannot be permanent if that in which it exists is not permanent. A moment ago we agreed that Truth remains even when true things perish. Truth, therefore, does not exist in mortal things.
THE SOLILOQUIES 4I
But It must exist somewhere. There are, therefore, immortal things. But nothing is true in which Truth does not exist. Therefore, only immortal things are true. A false tree is no tree; a false log is no log; false silver is not silver; universally what is false is not. All that is not true is false. Therefore nothing which is not immortal can be said truly to be. Consider diligently in your own mind this Httle piece of reasoning and see whether there is any mistake in it. If it holds we have nearly finished our job. This will perhaps become more apparent in the next Book.
30. A.—I am most grateful, and I shall dihgently and carefully ponder these things with you in the silence of my own heart, if no darkness come upon me to charm me, as I greatly fear it may. R.—Believe steadfastly in God, and commit yourself wholly to him as far as you are able. Do not seek to be your own and under your own jurisdiction, but profess yourself the servant of the most clement Lord whom it is most advantageous to serve. He will not cease to lift you up to himself, and will permit nothing to happen to you that will not profit you, even when you know it not. A.—I understand. I believe. And to the limit of my power I shall obey. I earnestly ask him to increase my power. Do you want anything more of me? R.—Enough for the present. When you have seen him you will do what he prescribes.
Book II i, I . Augustine.—We have sufficiently rested from our labours. Love is impatient, and there is no Hmit to tears until love is given what it loves. Let us then begin the second Book. Reason.—Let us begin. A.—Let us be Heve in God. R.—Surely, if we can.
A.—God gives us power. R.—Pray, then, as briefly and as perfectly as you can. A.—O God, who art ever the same, let me know myself and thee. That is my prayer. R.—You who wish to know yourself, do you know that you exist? A.—I do. R.— How do you know. ^.—That I do not know. R.—Do you perceive yourself to be simple or compounded? A.— I do not know. i2._You know that you have motion? yl.—No, I don't. 7^.—You know that you think? A.—I do. i.—Then it is true that you think. ^.—It is true. R.—Do you know that you are immortal?
A.—No. R.—Of all those things which you say you do not know, which would you prefer to know? ^.—Whether I am immortal. R,—So you love to live? A.— I admit I do. i?.—Will it satisfy you to learn that you are immortal? ^.—It will be a great matter but 4.2 AUGUSTINE: EARLIER WRITINGS not sufficient. R.—Though it be not sufficient, how much will you rejoice in that knowledge? A.—A great deal. R.—You will not weep any more? A.—No. R.—But if you discover that even immortal Hfe will not enable you to know more than you already know, will you refrain from tears? A.—I shall weep as if that were no life at all. R.—So you love life not for the sake of living but for the sake of knowing. A.—I accept that conclusion.
R.—But if knowledge itself made you unhappy? A.—I cannot believe that possible. But if it is so, no man can be happy? My unhappiness has no other source than my ignorance. If knowledge makes a man unhappy, then misery is eternal. R.— Now I see all that you desire. Since you believe that knowledge makes no one unhappy, it follows that probably intelligence makes a man happy. No one is happy unless he has life, and no one lives who does not exist. You want to be, to live and to know, but to be in order to live and to live in order to know. You know that you exist and live and have intelligence; but you wish to know whether you will always have being, life and intelligence, or none of them; whether some of them will endure eternally while others perish; or, if all remain, whether they will be diminished or increased. A.—That is so. R.—If we prove that we shall live eternally, it will follow that we shall exist eternally. A.—It will. R.—There will remain only the question of our knowing eternally. ii, 2. A.—The order is clear and short. R.—Listen and answer my questions cautiously and firmly. A.—I am your man. R.—If the world is to endure for ever, it is true to say the world will endure for ever. A,—None can doubt it. R,—If it will not endure, it is similarly true that it will not endure. A.— I agree. R.—If it has perished (assuming it is to perish), it will then be true to say that the world has perished. For so long as that is not true the world has not perished. The statement "the world has perished" contradicts the statement *'it is not true that the world has perished." A.—This too I accept. R.—Well, now. Do you think anything can be true if Truth ceases to exist? A.—By no means. R.—Therefore Truth will exist even if the world perishes. A.—I cannot deny it. R.—If Truth itself perishes, it will be true that Truth has perished? A.—Who denies it? R.—But nothing can be true if there is no Truth. A.—I have admitted that a moment ago. R.—Truth, therefore, can never perish. A.—Go on as you have begun, for nothing is more true than that conclusion. iii, 3. R,—I should Uke you to tell me whether you think the