Augustine: Earlier Writings
THE USEFULNESS OF BELIEF 1^97 them God was not well pleased: for they were overthrown in the wilderness. Now these things were our examples that we should not lust after evil things, as they lusted. Neither be yc idolaters as some of them were; as it is written, The people sat down to eat and drink and rose up to play. Neither let us commit fornication, as some of them committed and fell in one day three and twenty thousand men. Neither let us tempt Christ, as some of them tempted and were destroyed by serpents. Neither let us murmur as some of them murmured, and were destroyed of the destroyer. Now all these things happened unto them in a figure, but they were written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the age are come" (I Cor. io:i-ii). There is another allegory also in the apostle's writings which is very pertinent to the present issue, inasmuch as the Manichees themselves are wont to produce it and point to it. To the Galatians Paul says: "For it is written that Abraham had two sons, the one by a bond-maid, the other by a freewoman. But he who was born of the bond-maid was born after the flesh; but he of the freewoman was by promise. Which things are an allegory: for these are the two covenants; the one from Mount
Sinai, which gendereth to bondage, which is Kagar. For Sinai is a mountain in Arabia, and answereth to Jerusalem which now is, and is in bondage with her children. But the Jerusalem which is above is free, which is the mother of us all"
9. Here these wicked men, while they try to make the La\v of none effect, at the same time compel us to approve of these Scriptures. They pay attention where it is said that those are in servitude who are under the Law, and above other passages brandish this decisive one: "You who are justified by the Law are banished from Christ. You have fallen from grace" (Gal. 5 :^) . Now we admit that all this is true. We do not say the Law is necessary save for those for whom servitude is profitable. It was profitably laid down because men, who could not be won from their sins by reason, had to be coerced by threats and terrors of penalties which even fools can understand. When the grace of Christ sets men free from such threats and penalties it does not condemn the Law but invites us now to submit to his love and not to be slaves to fear. Grace is a benefaction conferred by God, which those do not understand who desire to continue under the bondage of the Law. Paul righdy calls them unbelievers, reproachfully, who do not believe that they arc now set free by our Lord Jesus from a servitude to whicli they had been subjected by the just judgment of God. Hence this other saying of the same apostle: "The Law was our pedagogue in Christ'* (Gal. 3:24). God, thus, gave men a pedagogue whom they might fear, and later gave them a master whom they might love. But in these precepts and mandates of the Law which Christians may not now lawfully obey, such as the Sabbath, circumcision, sacrifice and the like, there are contained such mysteries that every pious man may understand there is nothing more pernicious than to take whatever is there literally, and nothing more wholesome than to let the truth be revealed by the spirit. For this reason: "The letter killeth but the spirit quickeneth" (II Cor. 3:6). And again: "The same vail remains in the reading of the Old Testament and there is no revelation, for in Christ the vail is done away'* (II Cor. 3:14). It is not the Old Testament that is done away in Christ but the concealing vail, so that it may be understood through Christ. That is, as it were, laid bare, which without Christ is obscure and hidden. The same apostle adds immediately: "When thou shalt turn to Christ the vail will be taken away" (II Cor. 3:16). He does not say: "The Law or the Old Testament will be taken away." It is not the case, therefore, that by the grace of the Lord that which was covered has been abolished as useless; rather the covering has been removed which concealed useful truth. This is what happens to those who earnestly and piously, not proudly and wickedly, seek the sense of the Scriptures. To them is carefully demonstrated the order of events, the reasons for deeds and words, and the agreement of the Old Testament with the New, so that not a point remains where there is not complete harmony; and such secret truths are conveyed in figures that when they are brought to light by interpretation they compel those who wished to condemn rather than to learn, to confess their discomfiture. iv, 10. Meantime, leaving aside all deep science, let me treat you as I think I should treat my familiar friend, that is according to my own ability, and not as learned men whom I have admired might do. There are three kinds of error to which men are liable when they read. First, they may accept as true what is false, and what the writer knew to be false. Secondly—though this is not so obvious but no less deadly—they may accept as true a false opinion actually held by the writer. Thirdly, they may understand some truth from another's writing, which the writer himself did not understand. In this kind of error there is XKQ Jjttle advantage. Indeed, if you consider it carefully you will THE USEFULNESS OF BELIEF 299 see that herein lies the whole benefit of reading. An example of the first kind of error is this. Suppose someone were to believe that Rhadamanthus in the underworld hears and judges the cases of the dead because he read it in Vergil's Aeneid. Here is a double error. He believes an incredible thing, and the author himself is not to be credited with believing it. Here is an example of the second kind of error. Suppose someone were to take it as true that the soul is composed of atoms and after death is dissolved into the same atoms and perishes, because Lucretius wrote it. He is no less unhappy if in so great a matter he is persuaded to accept as certain what is false, though indeed Lucretius, whose book has deceived him, did hold that opinion. What advantage is it to be certain about a writer's opinion when one has chosen a companion in error and not a deliverer from error? The third kind of error is complementary. Suppose someone were to read a passage in a book of Epicurus in which continence was praised, and were to assert that Epicurus taught that virtue was the Supreme Good, and consequently was not to be blamed. The error of Epicurus in believing that bodily pleasure was man's Supreme Good does no harm to such a reader, for he has not accepted so base and deadly an opinion. Indeed, Epicurus pleases him for no other reason than that he supposes that he, Epicurus, did not hold an opinion that ought not to be held. An error of this kind is not only entirely proper but is often very worthy in a good man. Suppose it were reported to me of one whom I loved that, having reached adult life, he declared to many listeners that he liked boyhood and infancy so much that he wanted to continue in that condition of life; suppose the proof that he said so was so strong that I could not decently deny it; would I seem blameworthy if I judged that when he said it he meant that what pleased him was innocence and a mind free from the cupidities in which the human race is involved, and therefore loved him more than I had done before, yes, even if as a boy he had foolishly loved ignoble ease and too great liberty to play and eat? Suppose he died soon after this was reported to me and I had no opportunity to question him and discover what his opinion really was. Would anyone be so unjust as to be angry with me because I praised his intent and purpose on the basis of the words I had heard? Probably no just judge of such matters would hesitate to praise my high opinion of innocence and my good will in thinking well of a man, though there was some doubt, and I might have thought ill of him.
V, 1 1. Such being the case as regards readers, let me tell you