Augustine: Earlier Writings (continued)
THE USEFULNESS OF BELIEF 313 the second, the studious lovers of truth, beheve upon authority. The first of the faulty classes, i.e., those who are of opinion that they know what they do not know, exhibit faulty credulity. The other two classes believe nothing—both those who seek truth but despair of finding it, and those who do not seek at all. All this applies to matters pertaining to some branch of learning. For in practical life I just cannot see how anyone can refuse to believe altogether. Those who say that in action they follow probability prefer to say that they can know nothing rather than that they believe nothing. Who can approve what he does not believe? And what is the probable, if it is not approved? Wherefore, there can be two classes ofopponents of truth, those who reject knowledge only, not faith, and those who condemn both.
But whether this latter class can be found in actual life I do not know. I have said all this that we may know that in believing what we do not yet understand we escape the charge of being rashly opinionated. Let those who say we are to believe nothing but what we know beware of that charge which is a disgraceful and unhappy one. But if one dihgently considers the difference between thinking one knows, and believing upon authority what one knows one does not know, one will avoid the charge of error and of boorish pride. xii, 26. Now I ask, if nothing which is not known is to be believed, how will children serve their parents and love them with mutual dutifulness if they do not believe that they are their parents. That cannot be known by reason. Who the father is is believed on the authority of the mother, and as to the mother, midwdves, nurses, slaves have to be believed, for the mother can deceive, being herself deceived by having her son stolen and another put in his place. But we believe, and that without any hesitation, what we confess we do not know. Otherwise who does not see that dutifulness, the most sacred bond of the human race, might be violated by the most overbearing wickedness? Who would be so mad as to think him blameworthy who performed the duties due to those whom he believed to be his parents even if they were not his parents in reality? Who, on the other hand, would not think him worthy of banishment who did not love those who were probably his true parents on the ground that he feared he might love those who were not his parents? I could bring many instances to show that nothing would remain stable in human society if we determined to believe nothing that we could not scientifically establish.
27. Again, let me put this to you which I trust will even more readily have your assent. In matters of religion, that is in the knowing and worshipping of God, those people are not to be listened to who tell us not to believe, promising to give us from the start a reasoned account. No one doubts that men universally are either foolish or wise. By wise I mean not prudent and clever men but those who have, as far as is possible, clear and strongly established knowledge of God and man, and live and conduct themselves in a way that answers to that knowledge. All others, however skilled or ignorant, however excellent or depraved their manner of life, I put in the number of the foolish. If this is so, who with but moderate intelligence can fail to see that for the foolish it is more useful and helpful to obey the precepts of the wise than to live by their own whims? Every deed wrongly done is sin. Nothing can be rightly done unless it proceeds from right reason, and right reason is precisely virtue. Who then can be virtuous unless he is endowed with the mind of a sage? The sage alone does not sin. The fool sins in all that he does except when he obeys a sage, for then his actions proceed from right reason. But he is not to be considered master of his actions, so to speak, seeing he is the instrument and tool, as it were, of the sage. Therefore, if it is better for all men not to sin than to sin, all foolish people would live better lives if they could be servants of wise men. No one doubts that this would be advantageous in less important matters, like trading, agriculture, marrying, begetting and educating children, in short, managing one's worldly affairs; how much more in religion? For human affairs are more easily grasped than divine affairs; and in holier and more excellent things, where we owe greater reverence and obedience, all the more wicked and perilous is the sin of disobedience. You see, then, that if our heart is set on the good religious life, there is nothing for us so long as we are foolish, but to seek out wise men and to obey them, so that we may not suffer the domination of the folly which is in us, and may in time escape from it altogether. xiii, 28. Here again arises a most difficult question. How can fools find a wise man? Hardly anyone ventures to claim the title openly, yet many do so indirectly. Yet such is their disagreement concerning the very things knowledge of which constitutes wisdom, that either none of them, or at best only one of them can be truly wise. But which it is, I cannot see at all how the foolish man is to decide with any certainty. Nothing can be recognized by signs unless one knows the thing of which these are the signs; and the fool does not know wisdom. Gold and