Augustine: Earlier Writings (continued)
ON FREE WILL 127 question we now have on hand does not prevent us from seeking an answer to it as far as that is possible.
25. Let me ask you: have we a will? Ev.—I do not know. Aug.—Do you want to know? Ev.—Again I do not know. Aug.—Then do not ask me any more questions. Ev.—Why? Aug.—Because I ought not to answer your questions unless you want to know what you ask. Furthermore, if you do not wish to reach wisdom I ought not to hold conversation with you on matters of this kind. Finally you cannot be my friend unless you desire my good. So far as you are concerned yourself, you will have to see whether you have a will to the happy life for yourself. Ev.—I agree it is impossible to deny that we have will. Go on and let us see what conclusion you draw from this. Aug.—So
I shall. But first tell me whether you are conscious of having a good will. Ev.—What is a good will? Aug.—A will to live rightly and honourably and to reach the highest wisdom. Just see whether you do not desire to live a right and honourable life, whether you do not eagerly desire to be wise, or whether at least you would venture to deny that when we wish such things we have a good will. Ev.—I deny none of these things, and accordingly admit that I have not only a will but also a good will. Aug.—What value, pray, do you set on such a will? Could you think that riches or honours or bodily pleasures or all these together are to be compared with it? Ev.—God avert such wicked madness! Aug.—Are we, then, to rejoice a little in having something in our souls, I mean a good will, by comparison with which all those things we have mentioned are worthless, although we see that the mass of men refuse no toils and no dangers in order to obtain them? Ev.—We should rejoice exceedingly. Aug.—Do you think that those who do not have the joy of possessing so great a good suffer only a small loss?
Ev.—Nay, a great loss.
26. Aug.—You see, then, I imagine, that it is in the power of our will to enjoy or to be without so great and so true a good. For what is so completely within the power of the will as the will itself? Whoever has a good will has something which is far better than all earthly realms and all bodily pleasures. Whoever does not have it, lacks that which is more excellent than all the goods which are not in our power, and yet he can have it by willing it simply. He will probably judge himself to be most miserable if he loses glory, fame or immense riches, or other bodily goods. But won't you think him most miserable even if he have abundance of all these things, if he cleaves to things which t he can easily lose and cannot have simply by wdlling, and lacks the good will which is incomparably better than these things, and, though it is so great a good, can yet be had simply by willing? Ev.—Qjuite true. Aug.—Rightly, therefore, and deservedly foolish men, though they never were wise—and this is doubtful and quite beyond our knowing—suffer this kind of misery. Ev.—I agree. xiii, 27. Aug.—Now consider whether you think prudence is the knowledge ofwhat is to be sought and avoided. Ev.— I do. Aug.—And fortitude is the disposition of soul which enables us to despise all inconveniences and the loss of things not in our power? Ev.—That is my opinion. Aug.—And temperance is a disposition that restrains our desires for things which it is base to desire. Don't you agree? Ev.—I think exactly as you say. Aug.—And what shall we say justice is? Is it not the virtue that gives to each his own? Ev.—I have no other notion of justice. Aug.—We have spoken much of the excellence of the good will. Whoever has the good will, and embraces it with all the love he is capable of, delights himself in it, enjoys it and rejoices in it, knowing how great a good it is, and that it can never be snatched or stolen from him against his will—can we doubt that such a man will resist all that is inimical to this one good? Ev.— He will offer all resistance. Aug.—Can we think that a man has not prudence who sees that this good is to be sought and those things avoided which are inimical to it? Ev.—No one, I think could do so without prudence. Aug.—Quite right. But why should we not also attribute fortitude to him? He cannot love and set great store by things which are not in his power. The evil will loves these things, and he must necessarily resist it as the enemy of his dearest good. He does not love them nor grieve when he loses them but contemns them all; and this we have agreed is the function of fortitude. Ev.—Let us indeed attribute this virtue to him. I know of no one to whom I may more truly attribute courage than the man who can with a calm and tranquil mind bear the loss of things which it is not in his power either to obtain or to keep. This we have found he necessarily does. Aug.—Can we refuse to allow that he has temperance, since that is the virtue which restrains lusts? What is more hostile to the good will than lust? Hence you can understand that the lover of the good will resists and opposes lusts in every way, and so is rightly called temperate. Ev.—Go on, for I agree. Aug.—There remains justice, but I do not see how it can be lacking in such a man. He who has and loves the good