Augustine: Earlier Writings
THE TEACHER 73 among corporeal objects, at least so far as they can be brought to knowledge without words? Ad.—When I said corporeal objects I meant all corporeal things to be understood, that is, all the qua Uties of bodies which are susceptible to sense-perception. Aug.—Consider, however, whether some exceptions are to be made. Ad.—You do well to warn me. I should have said not all corporeal objects but all visible objects. For I admit that sound, smell, taste, weight, heat, etc., which belong to the other senses, though they cannot be perceived apart from bodies and are therefore corporeal, cannot, nevertheless, be pointed out with the finger. Aug.—Have you never seen how men carry on conversation, as it were, with deaf people by means of gesture, and how deaf people, similarly by gesture, ask questions and reply, teach and indicate all their wishes, or at least most of them? Thus not only visible things are pointed out without the use of words, but also sounds, tastes and other such things. Actors, too, in the theatres often unfold and set forth whole stories by dancing simply and without using a single word. Ad.—I have no adverse comment to make except that neither I nor your dancing actor will ever be able to point out to you what the preposition, ex, signifies without using words.
6. Aug.—Perhaps you are right. But suppose he could. You would, I imagine, have no hesitation in saying that whatever movement of his body he used in trying to show me the thing signified by that word, it would still be a sign and not the thing itself Therefore, though he indeed would not explain a word by a word, he would, none the less, explain a sign by a sign. So that both the monosyllable, ex, and his gesture would signify one thing, which I was asking to have pointed out to me without a sign, directly. Ad.—Pray, how can that possibly be done?
Aug.—The way a wall does it. Ad.—But even a wall, as our reasoning showed, cannot be shown without a pointing finger. The holding out of the finger is not the wall but the sign by means of which the wall is pointed out. So far as I can see there is nothing which can be shown without signs. Aug.—Suppose I were to ask you what walking is, and you were to get up and do it, wouldn't you be using the thing itself to show me, not words or any other signs? Ad.—Yes, of course. I am ashamed that I did not notice so obvious a fact. Now thousands of examples come to my mind of things which can be denionstrated immediately and without signs, such as eating, drinking, sitting, standing, shouting and other things innumerable. Aug.—Wd\ then, tell me this. Supposing I had no idea of the meaning of the word "walking," and I were to ask you when you were walking what "walking" means, how would you teach me? Ad.— I should walk a little more quickly. The change in speed would give notice that I was replying to your question, and I should still be doing what I was asked to demonstrate. Aug.— But you know there is a difference between walking and hastening. He who walks does not suddenly hasten, and he who hastens does not necessarily walk. We speak of hastening in writing, reading and very many other things. Consequently, if, after my query, you did what you had been doing, only a little more quickly, I should conclude that walking was the same thing as hastening, for the acceleration was the new feature of your behaviour. So I should be misled. Ad.—I admit that a thing cannot be demonstrated without a sign, at any rate if the thing is an action in which we are engaged when we are questioned. If we add nothing new to what we are doing, our questioner will think that we don't want to show him, but are continuing in what we were doing without paying any attention to him. But if his inquiry is about actions which we can perform, and if we are not doing them when he inquires, by doing it after he has inquired we can demonstrate what he asks by the actual thing and not merely by a sign. A special case would arise if, while I was speaking, someone asked me what "speaking" was. In order to let him know I must speak, whatever I actually may say. And I shall continue to sho\v him until I make plain to him what he wants to know, not departing from the actual thing which he wished to have demonstrated to him, and yet not seeking signs apart from the thing itself wherewith to demonstrate it. iv, 7. Aug.—Most acutely stated. x\re we, now, agreed that there are two classes of things that can be demonstrated without signs; those which we are not engaged in doing when we are asked and can immediately start doing, and those in which the action consists in simply giving signs? For when we speak we make signs, whence is derived the verb, to signify. Ad.—^Agreed. Aug.—When the question concerns signs merely, signs can be demonstrated by signs. But when the question is about things which are not signs, they can be demonstrated by carrying out the action, if possible, after the question has been asked, or by giving signs by means of which the things can be brought to mind. Ad.—That is so. Aug.—Here, then, we have a threefold classification. Let us first consider, if you please, the case of signs being demonstrated by signs. Words are not the only