Augustine: Earlier Writings
ON FREE WILL IQg
will, and resists what is hostile to it, cannot will any evil to anybody. It follows that he injures nobody, which must mean simply that he gives to everyone his due. This, I said, was the function of justice, and I dare say you remember you agreed. Ev,—I remember. And I agree that we have shown that the four virtues which you described with my consent are found in the man who loves his good will and values it highly.
28. Aug.—Is there any reason why we should not allow that such a man's life is laudable? Ev,—No reason at all. Everything encourages us or even compels us to do so. Aug.—Can you by any means suppose that the unhappy life is not to be avoided? Ev.—Most certainly it must be avoided. That I hold to be our first duty. Aug.—And, of course, what is laudable is not to be avoided. Ev.—No indeed. It is to be most carefully sought after. Aug.—The laudable life therefore is not unhappy. Ev.—That follows. Aug.—You will have no difficulty now in admitting that a life which is not unhappy is the happy life. Ev.—Clearly. Aug.—We agree, then, that the man is happy who loves the will and in comparison with it scorns everything else that is called good, which can be lost even when the will to retain it remains. Ev.—We must agree since this is the necessary conclusion from our argument. Aug.—You are perfectly right. But tell me, to love the good will and to hold it in high esteem, is that not simply to have a good will? Ev.—True. Aug.—If we are right in judging this man happy, must we not rightly judge him unhappy who has a different kind of will? Ev.—Quite correct. Aug.—Why, then should we think it doubtful, even if we have never been wise formerly, that by the exercise of will we deserve and live either a laudable and happy life or a base and unhappy one? Ev.—I agree that we have reached this result by arguments that are certain and undeniable.
29. Aug.—Take this further question. I beheve you remember how we defined the good will. It was the power by which we seek to live rightly and honourably. Ev.—I remember. Aug.—If we love and embrace this good will and prefer it to all the things which we cannot retain by wilhng, those virtues, as we have learned by our argument, which together constitute right and honourable living, dwell in our souls. Hence it follows that whoever wishes to live rightly and honourably, if he prefers that before all fugitive and transient goods, attains his object with perfect ease. In order to attain it he has to do nothing but to will it. Ev.—Truly I can hardly refrain from shouting for joy, when I find I can so quickly and so easily obtain so great a good.
A.E.W
Aug.—This ver)^ joy which comes from attaining this good, especially when it keeps the mind calm and tranquil and stable, is what we call the happy life—unless you think that to live happily is something else than to rejoice in good things that are both true and certain. Ev.—That is what I think. xiv, 30. Aug.—Very well. But do you think there is a single man who does not in every possible way will and choose the happy life? Ev.—Who doubts that that is what every man wishes? Aug.—Why, then, do not all obtain it? We agreed that men by the use they make of their wills deserve either a happy or an unhappy life, and receive what they deserve. But now some opposition has arisen which, unless we examine it closely, threatens to throw our previous argument into confusion, though we thought it strong and carefully constructed. How has anyone to endure an unhappy life because of the use he has made of his will, when no one at all wills to live unhappily? Or how does any man attain by the use of his will a happy life, seeing that all wish to be happy and so many are unhappy? Is it because there are two different kinds of willing, a good and a bad? Or is there a difference between deserving by using a good will and deserving by using a bad will? For those who are happy —and they must also be good—are not happy simply because they wish to live happily. The bad also have the same wish. They are happy because they live rightly, which the bad do not wish to do. It is not surprising that unhappy men do not obtain what they wish, that is, a happy Hfe. For they do not at the same time wish its accompaniment, without which no one is worthy of it, and no one obtains it, that is to say a righteous life. The eternal law, to the consideration of which we must now return, has established firmly and unchangeably that merit accrues from willing, and that happiness is the reward of goodness and unhappiness the punishment of badness. So when we say that men are unhappy voluntarily, we do not mean that they want to be unhappy, but that their wills are in such a state that unhappiness must follow even against their will. So it is not inconsistent with our previous reasoning that all men wish to be happy but cannot be; for all do not wish to live aright, and it is that wish that merits the happy life. Have you anything to say against that? Ev.—I have nothing.
XV, 31. But let us see how all this apphes to the question raised concerning the two laws. Aug.—Let us do so. But first tell me whether he who loves to live aright and delights in it so that he finds it not merely right but also sweet and pleasant so