Augustine: Earlier Writings
ON FREE WILL I35 that it is by God that sinners are made unhappy and well-doers happy.
2. Aug,—I am not objecting; but I ask the question: how do you know that we derive our origin from God? You have not explained this though you have explained how we merit punishment or reward at his hand. Ev.—If it is accepted that God punishes sins, as it must be if it is true that all justice has its source in him, this alone would prove that we derive our origin from him. No doubt it is the characteristic of goodness to confer benefits on strangers, but it is not similarly the mark ofjusdce to punish sins in those who are not under its immediate jurisdiction. Hence it is clear that we belong to him because he is not only most kind in conferring benefits upon us, but also most just in his punishments. Moreover, from the statement I made and you accepted, that every good thing comes from God, it can be known that man also comes from God. For man, in so far as he is man, is good because he can live aright if he chooses to do so.
3. Aug.—Clearly if this is so, the problem you have posed is solved. If man is good, and if he would not be able to act rightly except by willing to do so, he ought to have free will because without it he would not be able to act rightly. Because he also sins through having free will, we are not to believe that God gave it to him for that purpose. It is, therefore, a sufficient reason why he ought to have been given it, that without it man could not live aright. That it was given for this purpose can be understood from this fact. If anyone uses his free will in order to sin, God punishes him. That would be unjust unless the will was free not only to live aright but also to sin. How could he be justly punished who uses his will for the purpose for which it was given? Now when God punishes a sinner what else do you suppose he will say to him than "Why did you not use your free will for the purpose for which I gave it to you, that is, in order to do right?" Justice is praised as a good thing because it condemns sins and honours righteous actions. How could that be done if man had not free will? An action would be neither sinful nor righteous unless it were done voluntarily. For the same reason both punishment and reward would be unjust, if man did not have free will. But in punishing and in rewarding there must have been justice since justice is one of the good things which come from God. God, therefore, must have given and ought to have given man free will. ii, 4. Ev,—I admit now that God has given us free will. But don't you think, pray, that, if it was given for the purpose of well-doing, it ought not to have been possible to convert it to sinful uses? Justice itself was given to man so that he might Hve rightly, and it is not possible for anyone to live an evil life by means ofjustice. So no one ought to be able to sin voluntarily if free will was given that we might live aright. Aug.—God will, I hope, give me ability to answer you, or rather will give you the ability to answer your own question. Truth, which is the best master of all, will inwardly teach us both alike. But I wish you would tell me this: I asked you whether you know with perfect certainty that God has given us free will and you replied that you did. Now ifwe allow that God gave it, ought we to say that he ought not to have given it? If it is uncertain whether he gave it, we rightly ask whether it was good that it was given.
If then we find that it was good, we find also that it was given by him who bestows all good things on men. If, however, we find that it was not a good thing we know that it was not given by him whom it is impious to accuse. If it is certain that he has given it, we ought to confess that, however it was given, it was rightly given. We may not say that it ought not to have been given or that it ought to have been given in some other way. If he has given it his action cannot in any way be rightly blamed.
5. Ev.—I believe all that unshakably. Nevertheless, because
I do not know it, let us inquire as if it were all uncertain. I see that because it is uncertain whether free will was given that men might do right since by it we can also sin, another uncertainty arises, namely whether free will ought to have been given to us. If it is uncertain that it was given that we should act righteously, it is also uncertain that it ought to have been given at all. Hence it will also be uncertain whether it was God who gave it. If it is uncertain that it ought to have been given, it is uncertain that it was given by him whom it is impious to believe has given anything which ought not to have been given. Aug.—At any rate you are quite certain that God exists. Ev.—I firmly believe it, but I do not know it. Aug.—We read in Scripture: "The fool hath said in his heart: there is no God" (Ps. 52:18). If such a fool were to say to you there is no God, and would not believe as you do, but wanted to know whether what you believe is true, would you simply go away and leave him, or would you think it your duty somehow to try to persuade him that what you believe is true, especially if he were really eager to know and not merely to argue obstinately? Ev,—Your last proviso tells me what I ought to reply to him. However absurd he might