Augustine: Earlier Writings
He is happy indeed who enjoys the chief good. Truth points out all the things that are truly good, and intelligent men, according to their capacity, choose one or more of them in order to enjoy them. People, for example, find pleasure in looking at some object which they are glad to behold in the light of the sun. Those among them who are endowed with strong healthy eyes love to look at nothing better than at the sun itself, which sheds its light upon the other things which delight weaker eyes. So a strong and vigorous mental vision may behold many true and changeless things with certain reason, but directs its regard to the truth itself whereby all things are made clear, and, cleaving to the truth and forgetting, as it were, all other things, it enjoys them all together in the truth. Whatever is pleasant in other true things is pleasant also in truth itself.
37. Herein is our liberts', when we are subject to truth. And Truth is our God who liberates us from death, that is, from the condition of sin. For the Truth itself, speaking as Man to men, says to those who believe in him: "If ye abide in my word ye are truly my disciples, and ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free" (John 8:31-32). No soul enjoys a thing with liberty unless it also enjoys it with security. xiv. But no one is secure in the possession of goods which he can lose against his will. Truth and wisdom no one can lose unwillingly. From them there can be no spatial separation. What is called separation from truth and wisdom is a per\'erse will which loves lower things. Xo one wills anything involuntarily. Here is something which we can all enjoy equally and in common. Here there is no straitness, no deficiency. She receives all her lovers, being grudging to none, shared by all in common but chaste to each. None says to another: "Stand back that I too may approach," or "Remove your hand that I too may touch." All cleave to the same wisdom. All are brought into contact with it. Nothing is consumed as in the case of food, and you cannot drink so as to prevent me from drinking too. From that common store you can convert nothing into your private possession. What you take remains unharmed for me to take also. I do not have to wait for you to breathe out what you have breathed in that I may then breathe it in. Nothing ever belongs to one man or to any group of men as a private possession. The whole is common to all at one and the same time.
38. Truth, therefore, is less like the things we touch or taste or smell, and more like the things we hear and see. For tvevy word is heard as a whole by all who hear it and by each one at the same
ON FREE WILL leg time. And every sight offered to the eyes is exactly the same for all who see it, and is seen by all at the same time. But though there is similarity there is also a great difference. A whole word is not spoken all at once. It is extended over a period of time, one syllable being pronounced first and another after it. Every visible sight varies with the place from which it is seen, and is nowhere seen in its totality. And certainly all these things can be taken from us whether we will or no, and there are difficulties in the way of our enjoying them. Even supposing someone could sing sweetly for ever, those who were eager to hear him would come as rivals. They would get packed closely together, and the more there were of them they would strive for seats, each one anxious to get nearer to the singer. And when they heard him no one would be able to retain permanently what was heard. They would hear nothing but transient fugitive sounds. If I wanted to look at the sun and had the power to do so without being dazzled, nevertheless it would forsake me when it set, or it might be veiled in cloud, and for many other causes I might unwillingly lose my pleasure in seeing the sun. And supposing I had the power and pleasure of eternally seeing the light and hearing music, what great advantage would I have, seeing that even beasts could share it with me? But the beauty of truth and wisdom, so long as there is a persevering will to enjoy it, does not exclude those who come by any packed crowd of hearers.
It does not pass with time or change with locality. It is not interrupted by night or shut off by shadow, and is not subject to the bodily senses. To all who turn to it from the whole world, and love it, it is close at hand, everlasting, bound to no particular spot, never deficient. Externally it suggests, internally it teaches. All who behold it, it changes for the better, and by none is it changed for the worse. No one judges it, and no one without it judges aright. Hence it is evident beyond a doubt that wisdom is better than our minds, for by it alone they are made individually wise, and are made judges, not of it, but by it of all other things whatever.
XV, 39. You admitted for your part that if I could show you something superior to our minds you would confess that it was God, provided nothing existed that was higher still. I accepted your admission and said it would be sufficient if I demonstrated that. If there is anything more excellent than wisdom, doubtless it, rather, is God. But if there is nothing more excellent, then truth itself is God. Whether there is or is not such a higher thing, you cannot deny that God exists, and this was the l6o AUGUSTINE: EARLIER WRITINGS question set for our discussion. If you are influenced by what we have received in faith from the holy discip Hne of Christ, that there is the Father of AVisdom, remember that we also received in faith that there is one equal to the eternal Father, namely Wisdom who is begotten of him. Hence there should be no further question, but we should accept it with unshakable faith. God exists and is the truest and fullest being. This I suppose we hold with undoubting faith. Now we attain it with a certain if tenuous form of knowledge. This is sufl[icient for the question in hand, so that we can go on to explain other pertinent questions; unless you have any opposition to oflfer. Ev.— I accept what you have said with incredible and inexpressible joy, and I declare it to be absolutely certain. I declare it in my mind where I hope to be heard by the truth itself, and where I hope to cleave to truth. For I confess that it is not only good, but the chief good and the beatific good.
40. Aug.—Indeed you are right, and I too am very glad. But are we already wise and happy, or are we still merely making for the source of wisdom and happiness? Ev.— I think we are rather making for the source. Aug,—Whence then do you derive your comprehension of the certain truths which have made you shout for joy? Has your comprehension got some connection with wisdom? Or can a foolish person know wisdom? Ev.—So long as he remains foolish he cannot. Aug.—Are you then wise already, or do you not yet know wisdom? Ev,—Indeed I am not yet wise, and yet I should not say that I am foolish, for I have some inkling of wisdom. I cannot deny that, since these things which I know are certain, and they belong to wisdom. Aug.—Tell me, pray, wouldn't you admit that he who is not just is unjust; and he who is not prudent is imprudent; and he who is not temperate is intemperate? Is there any doubt about that?
Ev.— I admit that when a man is not just he is unjust; and I should reply similarly with regard to prudence and temperance. Aug,—Why, then, shouldn't a man be foolish when he is not wise?
Ev.—I allow that too. When anyone is not wise he is foolish. Aug.—Now to which class do you belong? Ev.—Whichever of these epithets you care to apply to me, I do not venture yet to call myself wise. I see that the consequence of my admissions is that I must not hesitate to call myself foolish. Aug.—Then a foolish person knows wisdom. For as we said, no one would be certain that he wanted to be wise, and that he ought to be wise, unless the notion of wisdom were implanted in his mind. Think how you were able to reply to one question after another in