Augustine: Earlier Writings
good 'things, namely God. [He quotes at length II. xix. 50.] Again I said: "Believe with unshakable piety that you have no good which does not come from God.'' And again, "Since man cannot rise of his own accord as he fell by his own accord, let us with strong faith hold fast the right hand of God stretched to us from above, even our Lord Jesus Christ."
Pelagius made use of from my book—"Who commits sin by an
5. In the Third Book, after the words which as I mentioned act w hich he could by no means avoid? Sin has been committed, therefore it could have been avoided"—I immediately add: "And yet some things are done in ignorance which are disapproved . . .'' [III. x\iii. 51 is quoted at length.] At the close of the next paragraph I say: "To approve falsehood instead of truth, so as to err in spite of himself, and not to be able to refrain from the works of lust, because of the pain involved in breaking away from earthly bonds; these do not belong to the nature of man as he was created. They are the penalty of man as condemned. When w-e speak of the freedom of the will to do right we are speaking of the freedom wherein man was created."
6. You see that long before the Pelagian heresy emerged, I disputed as if I were already arguing against it. All good things, great, medium and small, were said to come from God. Free will was put among the medium goods, because we can make a bad as well as a good use of it, and yet it is good because we cannot live righteously without it. To make a good use of it is virtue, and \irtue is found among the greater goods, of which no one can make a bad use. Because all good things, as I said, great, medium and small, come from God, it follows that from God also comes the good use of free will, which is virtue, and which is numbered among the greater goods. Then I go on to say that the grace of God liberates men from the miser)* inflicted on sinners, because man was able to fall of his own accord, that is, by free will, but was not able to rise of his own accord. To the miser)' due to just condemnation belong the ignorance and inability which every man suffers from his birth. From that evil no man is delivered save by the grace of God. The Pelagians will not have it that misery springs from man's just condemnation, for they deny original sin. But even if ignorance and inabihtydid belong to man's primordial nature, still God should not be blamed but praised, as I argued in that same Third Book. This thesis is to be maintained against the Manichees who do not accept the Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament, in which ON FREE WILL IO5 original sin is recorded; and what is said about it in the apostoHc writings they contend with detestable impudence has been interpolated by corrupters of the Scriptures, as if the apostles had not said it. But against the Pelagians we must defend what is maintained in both Testaments, for they profess to accept both.
On Free Will
INTRODUCTION
IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE De Libero Arbitrio, at all events in its entirety, is to be included among the works known to Paulinus of Nola in 394 and called by him Augustine's "Pentateuch against the Manichees," for we find Augustine sending the three books to Paulinus in 395/6 {Epist. 31). In any case it was written against the Manichees, though not simply as a piece of negative polemic. It is an attempt to give a reasoned answer to the question which the Manichees, like the Gnostics, sought to solve by means of an absolute dualism: Whence is evil? The subject is, in fact, the nature and origin of evil, but because its origin is found in the free will of the rational creation, the whole work received the title it bears. Augustine began to write it during his short sojourn in Rome on his way home to Africa, but he completed the Second and Third Books after his ordination as presbyter, possibly as late as 396. Books I and II, which are in dialogue form, appear to be properly finished. In the Third Book the dialogue ceases abruptly at section 10, and the interlocutor seems to be quite forgotten except for a brief intervention in section 47. This fact, together with the difficulty of discerning a clear and coherent plan of composition, has given rise to the suggestion that this Book is rather a collection of materials put together at different times. It is noteworthy that, particularly towards the end, specifically Christian doctrines are handled albeit tentatively, e.g., the work of Christ (29-31); the effect of the sin of Adam (51-54) ; theories of the origin of the soul (55-59), none ofwhich is to be held obligatory. Occasionally, too, recourse is had 1 1 to Scripture quotation in the writer's later manner. On the ON FREE WILL IO7
[ / whole the De Libero Arbitrio may be regarded as the highwater mark of his ear Her works, and the best and fullest exposition of what may be called the peculiarly Augustinian brand of Neoplatonism.
In controverting the Manichees with largely Platonist weapons Augustine had exposed his flank to the Pelagians. Pelagius himself was happy to be able to quote from the De Libero Arbitrio in support of his own views. Augustine's defence is not altogether convincing, viz., that Pelagianism had not yet emerged when he wrote, and that the purpose of the work gave no occasion to speak of grace. It is true enough that at the very beginning of Book I he tells us that he received divine aid to enable him to escape from Manichaean error, and that throughout free will is assumed to be a gift of God. Pelagius made a point of that too. But the passages quoted in the Retractations as showing that the De Libero Arbitrio is virtually anti-pelagian all come from what must certainly be regarded as the later parts of the work.
ANALYSIS
Book I i, I—ii, 5. God is believed to be both good and just. Can this be rationally demonstrated?
(i) Evil means wrong-doing. Suffering is the just punishment of wrong-doing, therefore is not evil. If punishment is just, the wrong-doing must be voluntary. Therefore God is not the author of evil. (2) Evil cannot be taught. Only how to avoid it is taught. (4-5) In this inquiry we begin with faith: God is omnipotent creator of all things. Being the absolute good God cannot be the cause of evil. We seek to demonstrate our faith by reason. iii, 6—vi, 15. The Essence of Wrong-doing.
(6-7) What is the essence of evil in various deeds reputed evil? Not that they are condemned by law or pubHc opinion; not even that they transgress the rule not to do to others what you would not have done to yourself. (9) It is something internal, cupidity, i.e., (10) love of things one may lose unwillingly. (11) What of kil Hng, judicially or in war, which is permissible and even commanded? (13) Positive law reflects imperfectly a higher law, (14) Temporal laws are changed
I08 AUGUSTINE: EARLIER WRITINGS according to circumstances, but (15) reflect in this life the eternal law of reason. All things must be in perfect order, vii, 16—xi, 23. Perfect Order in Man.
(16) Man is superior to the beasts in possessing reason.
(17) Rational life is better than life without reason. (18) Order means that the worse is subordinated to the better, that reason rules the emotions. (19) All men have reason, though the majority may be fools. When reason rules, a man is wise. (20) No vicious soul can overcome a virtuous soul. Indeed nothing can do so. Hence sin is voluntary and (22) man's present state of ignorance and inability is the just penalty of voluntary sin. xii, 24—xiv, 30. The Good Will.
(24) We accept the story of the Fall in faith, but how can we maintain by reason the justice of man's present plight? (25) All men wish to live rightly and to reach wisdom, i.e., have a good will. (27) This implies possession of prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice and (28) happiness. (29) Hence the happy life is attained by simply willing to have it. (30) All men wish to be happy, but not all succeed. This is in accordance with the eternal law that happiness is the reward of goodness and unhappiness is the punishment of wickedness.
XV, 31—xvi, 35. Temporal and Eternal Law.
(31) Good men love the eternal law and obey it with pleasure. Bad men hate it but are subject to it, and on them the temporal law is imposed. (32) Temporal law regulates worldly desires so that peace and social life may be preserved. It regulates temporal relationships, life, property, kinship and citizenship. It inflicts punishments which are felt as evil by men who love material things. It does not punish the desire for these things but only infringements of the rights of others.
(33) Worldly things are not evil in themselves, but are not necessary for the good life. (34) Evil-doing is neglect of eternal things and love of temporal things to the extent of becoming subject to them. This is done by the free choice of the will.
Book II i, I—ii, 6. Ought God to have given Man Free Will?
(i) Free will makes sin possible but it was given that man might live righteously. If he uses it badly he is justly punished. (4) We beheve that God exists and is good, and that all his gifts are good. (5) This is proved by the authority of ON FREE WILL IO9
Scripture, but we seek rational demonstration. (6) Scripture encourages this endeavour. It demands faith to begin with but promises understanding. Three questions to be discussed (i) Does God exist? (ii) Are all good things from him? (iii) Is free will a good thing? iii, 7—XV, 39. Proof of the Existence of God.
(7) Existence, life, inte Uigence form an ascending scale of being. Man excels animals in having all three. (8 ff.) Living creatures have senses wherewith they perceive corporeal objects. They have also an interior sense which co-ordinates the work of the senses, and is superior to them because it is their ruler and judge. (13) Man alone has reason, which in turn is superior to the senses and the interior sense, because it judges them all. (14) If there be something eternal and unchangeable which is superior to reason, that will be God. (15-19) The senses belong to individuals, but the world perceived by them is common to all who perceive it. (20-24) ^^ the science of number, which has nothing to do with the senses, is common to all reasoning beings who are capable of mastering it. (25-27) Is wisdom also common to all, or are there as many "wisdoms" as there are wise men? For men vary in their views as to what wisdom is. But all agree that wisdom is a combination of truth and happiness, which cannot be had except in conjunction. All men seek truth and happiness. Hence both are in a sense known to all men, though they seek their supreme good in different things. (28-29) There are self-evident truths common to all minds, general judgments of value. These rules of wisdom are true and unchangeable and common to all men. (30-32) Wisdom belongs only to rational souls but number permeates all existing things. There is some relationship between wisdom and number. Both are true, and truth is the common property of all minds. (34 ff.) But truth is superior to the mind because it is unchangeable and eternal. We say of it that it is so, not that it ought to be so. Possession of truth makes men happy.
Panegyric on truth. (39) Truth, being superior to our minds and having nothing superior to it, is God, the Father of Wisdom, whose only begotten Son is his equal. The existence of God has been proved; faith has become knowledge, albeit a pale and tenuous form of knowledge.
XV, 40—xvii, 46. Form and order, wisdom and number are good things. They pervade all created things. Therefore all good things come from God.
no AUGUSTINE: EARLIER WRJTINGS
xviii, 47—XX, 54. Is Free Will a good Thing?
(48) The soul is better than the body; in both there are good qualities that may be abused. (49) Things necessary and not necessary for the good life. (50) The virtues are necessary and cannot be badly used. Bodily goods are not necessary and can be badly used. There are intermediate goods which are necessary and can be badly used, e.g. (52) Free will, which is necessary for the good life, but may be used badly.
It may seek and cleave to the unchangeable common good, or it may seek its own private good. To turn from the highest good to any lower good is evil, of which unhappiness is the just penalty. This "aversion" is purely voluntary; its only cause is in the will.
Book III i, I—iv, II. God's Foreknowledge and Man's Freedom.
Sin is a movement of the will away from unchangeable good to mutable good. Is this caused by natural necessity?
(2) Unlike the movement of a falling stone, it is voluntary and therefore culpable. (4) How is this compatible with our belief in God's foreknowledge of all things? (5) That question is often asked by way of excuse by sinners. (6-10) God foreknows what his creatures are going to do, but does not thereby rob them of the freedom of willing. Foreknowledge is not coercion. God is not the agent of all that he foreknows.
V, 1 2—xiii, 36. God is to be praised for all his Creatures.
(12) God has made all things good in all possible and conceivable variety, but in varying degrees of excellence. Inferior things are not to be grudged existence. (17) Mere utility from man's point of view is no standard for measuring the value of God's creatures. We may not say that he ought to have made any of them better than he has made them. (18-23) The miserable do not really wish to die. Existence of any kind as such is good. The suicide seeks not non-existence but rest. (24) The universe is perfect as it is; it is impious to criticize its parts. (25-26) The existence of souls justly miserable contributes to that perfection. Unless sin had its due penalty there would be lack of order. (29-31) The work of Christ in delivering man by persuasion from subjection to the devil. (32 ff.) The perfection of the universe redounds to the praise of its Creator.
ON FREE WILL HI
xiii, 37—xvi, 46. Sin is Defect.
(38) Sin is defect in an otherwise perfect nature. (41) To find fault with the defect is to praise the nature in its true state. (42) Transience is no defect in temporal things; without it the whole beauty of the temporal sequence would not be able to display itself. (44) Sin inevitably brings its own penalty according to God's law, and so is compensated for in the universe as a whole. (46) To attribute man's sin to his Creator is a contradiction. If his sin is not his own doing it is not sin. xvii, 47—xxi, 62. The Cause of the Evil Will. The Effects of the Fall.
(48) To ask for the cause of the evil will is to start an infinite regress. (50) There can never have been compulsion, else the deed was not sin. But (51) there are sins due to ignorance and inability. (52) Man's state of ignorance and inability is itself penal. Only as originally created, i.e., before the Fall, had man freedom to will and to do right. (53) In addition to original sin, men contract personal sins by refusing humbly to confess sin and to accept God's proffered help. (54) Strictly speaking, human nature means that nature as created, but we also use the expression of man's vitiated nature in its present penal condition. (55-60) Transmission of original sin. Four theories of the origin of the soul but none is obligatory for Christian faith. (61) The origin of the soul is a fit subject for inquiry, but knowledge of it is not necessary for salvation.
More important than the past is the goal ahead. (63) No cause of sin need be looked for other than the individual will. xxii, 64—xxiii, 70. Man's Advantage even in his Penal State.
(64) Man may rise above his ignorance and inability to wisdom and righteousness. To neglect to do so is sin. (65) He has both the capacity and the aid of God. Against this optimism various objections are urged. (66 f.) Infants often die before they acquire any merit, even if they are baptized—but their parents' faith may be imputed to them. (68 ff.) There are the grievous sufferings of children and animals. But suffering has its proper uses. All elements in our experience point to the goodness of the Creator. xxiv, 71—XXV, 77. The Origin of Sin.
(71 ff.) Man as created was neither wise nor foolish, but he was rational, i.e., capable of receiving and understanding
God's commandment. According as he obeyed or disobeyed the commandment he would become wise or foolish. He became foolish by willingly making himself his own good, instead of seeking his good in God. (74 ff.) But the will is moved by something external to itself and outwith its own power. In the case of Adam there was the commandment of God on the one hand, and the suggestion of the devil on the other. But what enticed the devil to sin? Simply the will perversely to imitate God. He thus began to be proud, then became envious and finally malevolent. His eternal punishment is a warning to men.