Augustine: Earlier Writings (continued)
4. Again the words in Chapter xii, "No one doubts that men universally are either foolish or wise," may seem to contradict what is written in De Libera Arbitrio, Book III, "As if human nature had no condition intermediate between folly and wisdom." I was then inquiring whether the first man was created wise or foolish or neither. We could not say that he was foolish when he was created without a fault, for folly is a great fault; and it was not quite clear how we could call him wise seeing he could be seduced. And so I offered as a brief suggestion a condition intermediate between folly and wisdom. I was also thinking of little children. We may admit that they bring original sin with them, but we cannot properly call them either wise or foolish, seeing they do not as yet use free will either well or ill. Now in this passage I have said that all men are either wise or foolish, meaning all men who have the use of reason, whereby they are distinguished as men from the animals, as in the sentence. All men wish to be happy. We need not fear that little children will be understood as included, for they cannot as yet will to be happy; and yet the sentence is quite true, obviously.
5. In Chapter xvi, after relating what the Lord Jesus did when he was in the flesh, I added, "Why, you ask, do not such things happen now?" and my reply was, "Because they would not affect us unless they were marvellous, and they would not be marvellous if they were familiar." In saying that, I meant that such great miracles do not happen now, not that no miracles happen even today.
6. In Chapter xviii, at the end of the book, I say that I have not begun to refute the Manichees and to attack their absurdities, nor to say anything important about the Catholic Faith. "I wanted simply if possible to rid you of a false opinion about true Christians maliciously or ignorantly distilled into us, and to stimulate you to learn certain great divine truths. Let this book be as it is. If your mind is somewhat placated, perhaps I shall be more ready to deal with other questions." I did not mean that I had hitherto written nothing against the Manichees, and nothing about Catholic teaching, for the books previously mentioned, published by me, testify that I had not kept silent on either subject. But in this book I had not begun to refute the Manichees or to attack their absurdities or to expound anything important about the Catholic Faith. I hoped that with this as a beginning I should later be writing to Honoratus himself what I had not yet written in this book. The book begins: Si mihi, Honorate, unum atque idem videretur esse, . . .
The Usefulness of Belief
INTRODUCTION
OTHING, IT SEEMS, IS KNOWN OF HONORATUS TO whom this tractate is addressed beyond what may be gleaned from the tractate itself. It is true, a certain Honoratus of Carthage sent a number of exegetical queries to f HonoFc
St. Augustine who, in 412, replied in a lengthy Epistle {Epist, 140), a veritable treatise in itself on the theme of the Grace of the New Testament. There is nothing in the Epistle to suggest that the two men are identical, though they well may be. It would be pleasant to think that St. Augustine won his case.
The Honoratus of De Util. Cred, was a student friend of St. Augustine in his Carthaginian days, and shared in his early enthusiasm for philosophy. Unlike his friend he had not come from a Christian home, and he had a strong aversion to the Manichees which was with difficulty overcome. But as the result of St. Augustine's persuasion he consented to become a hearer in that sect. He was acute enough to observe that the Manichees were more clever at refuting and deriding the tenets of others than at giving convincing proof of the truth of their own. He also suspected the weakness of a position which, while professing to accept the New Testament documents, too frequently attempted to get rid of inconvenient passages by alleging that they had been interpolated. Nevertheless, Honoratus had retained his connection with the sect long after St. Augustine had abandoned it, possibly because he had despaired of finding a satisfactory system to take its place. Catholic
Christianity in particular offended him because of its demand for belief upon authority.
This treatise, written shortly after St. Augustine had become a presbyter in Hippo in 391, may be said to show him at his best in controversy; unbending no doubt, but also amiable and reasonable. In his eagerness to win Honoratus for the Catholic Faith, he treats him with the utmost courtesy and respect. He reasons with him as an old friend, pointing out the way he had himself travelled through painful doubt to faith, hoping that Honoratus will be induced to follow it. The brief account of his personal history (sect. 20) most interestingly confirms, so far as it goes, the account in the Confessions. Here, too, are to be found his most cogent pleas for the authority of the Catholic tradition. Because it is founded on historical events (the life of Christ and the New Testament miracles), and has obtained world-wide acceptance, and inspired the ascetic life in many, it may well be believed and trusted as a starting-point, at least, for those who seek true religion which is the highest wisdom, important therefore if recondite. Even those w'ho think they can achieve knowledge of truth and of God by reason alone cannot neglect this authoritative tradition.
The main subject of the treatise is the relation of faith and reason. It is perhaps surprising that it should be entitled the Utility and not the Reasonableness of Believing but this corresponds to a central element of St. Augustine's early thought. Knowing, the result of rational demonstration, is the highest achievement of mind. But it is difficult except for the few who are wise. (Later he came to hold that it was impossible so far as religion is concerned for any man in this life.) Belief is a means to an end, which is knowledge, a necessary means for nearly all men, and not to be despised even by the wise, if only that the many who are foolish may not be discouraged. What is true of the intellectual life is even more obvious of the practical life of duty. Even sceptics, who teach that in the practical life probability is the rule, thereby implicitly recognize belief as the bond of human society. Moreover, historical events, e.g., the life and teaching of Christ, cannot strictly speaking be known, but can only be believed on the ground of credible testimony. Here the argument is developed which was to be expressed later in extreme and epigrammatic form, "I should not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me to do so" {Against the Fundamental Epistle of Manichaeus. 6).
THE USEFULNESS OF BELIEF 289
ANALYSIS
i, I—ii, 4. Introductory Address to Honoratus. Recalling early association in pursuit of wisdom, and explaining the subject and purpose of the treatise. iii, 5-9. Fourfold Sense of Old Testament Scriptures.
(5) Definitions. (6-8) Examples from the New Testament.
(9) Allegory. iv, 10—vi, 13. Difficulty of Interpretation of Literature. (10-12) Various possible misunderstandings. (13) Old Testament Scripture peculiarly difficult, but also peculiarly important for religion. It should be approached with respect, and with the aid of the best teachers, as we approach the study of Vergil. vii, 14—viii, 20. Seeking Religion resembles seeking Culture and Wisdom.
(14) True religion and wisdom are identical. (15) Where opinions differ we must go to the most widely renowned teachers, "that we may err with the human race itself" (16) The best teachers of rhetoric, e.g., are usually surrounded by a mass of pupils, few of whom excel; so also with religious teachers. The multitude of their disciples should not repel us.
(18) The Catholic Faith by its weight of authority, its worldwide acceptance and general support is at least the obvious starting-point. (20) Augustine's intellectual pilgrimage from doubt to faith since he left Africa. ix, 21—xiii, 29. Faith and Reason.
(22) Difference between belief and credulity. (23) The religious inquirer demands that his sincerity be believed. (24) Not everyone can use reason in religion. Those fitted to do so should not grudge the easier way of believing to those less able. (25) Knowing, believing and holding an (uninstructed) opinion. Only rational truth can be known. Events in the past cannot strictly be known but can be believed. In practical life probability is the only guide, and this implies some kind of faith. (26) The stability of human society depends on be Heving. (27) The foolish must believe and obey the wise, especially in religion, but (28) it is impossible for the foolish to decide who is wise. (29) There will be no earnest search for religious truth unless men first believe that God exists and gives aid to seeking minds.
A.E.W. 19
xiv, 30—xvii, 35. Belief in Christ.
(31) All heretics who hold the Christian name demand belief in Christ on the ground of Scripture. Such belief can only be grounded on Catholic tradition. (32) Christ himself demanded belief, and performed miracles in order to win the belief of men who could not be won by reason. (34) The authority of the Catholic tradition is based on the miracles of Christ in the past by which he gathered a multitude of believers, also on the successful expansion of Christianity, and its continuance. (35) The ascetic lives of many simple Christians also supports its authority. xviii, 36. Final Appeal to Honoratus to abandon Manichaeism.
The Usefulness of Belief
THE TEXT
To HONORATUS
i, I. If I thought, Honoratus, that there was no difference between a heretic and one who follows heretics, I should judge that my tongue and my pen alike should remain quiescent in this matter. But there is a great difference. A heretic, as I suppose, is one who for some temporal advantage, and chiefly for his own glory and pre-eminence, begets or follows new and false opinions. He who trusts such men is deluded by some illusory appearance of truth or piety. That being so, I thought I ought not to keep silent from you what I think about the discover)^ and the retaining of truth, for which, as you know, I burned with a great flame of love since my early youth. Truth is far removed from the minds of vain men who have gone too far among worldly concerns and, falling, think there is nothing beyond what they perceive by the senses, these five well-known messengers of the body. Even when they endeavour to withdraw from the senses, they carry with them the impressions and images received from the senses, and think that by their deathdeahng and fallacious rule the ineffable sanctuary of truth is to be rightly measured. Nothing is easier, my dear friend, than to say or even to think that one has discovered the truth. How difficult it really is you will, I trust, recognize from this letter of mine. That it may be a help or at least not a hindrance to you and to all into whose hands it may chance to fall, 1 have prayed to God and do pray. And I hope it may be so, if I am right in feeling that I have taken up my pen with a pious and dutiful mind and with no desire for vain reputation or empty ostentation.
2. My purpose, therefore, is to prove to you, if I can, that the
Manichees rashly and sacrilegiously inveigh against those who, accepting the authority of the Catholic Faith, before they can behold the truth which only the pure heart can behold, are forearmed by believing, and are prepared for being enlightened by God. You know, Honoratus, that I fell among these people for no other reason than that they declared that they would put aside all overawing authority, and by pure and simple reason would bring to God those who were willing to listen to them, and so deliver them from all error. What else compelled me for nearly nine years to spurn the religion implanted in me as a boy by my parents, to follow these men and listen diligently to them, than that they said we were overawed by superstition and were bidden to believe rather than to reason, while they pressed no one to believe until the truth had been discussed and elucidated? Who would not be enticed by these promises, especially if he were an adolescent with a mind eager for truth, but made proud and garrulous by the disputes of learned men in school? Such they found me then, scorning what I took to be old wives' tales, and desirous of swallowing and holding the open and sincere truth which they promised. But again, what reason kept me from wholly clea\ ing to them? For I remained in the grade they call "hearers" so that I might not give up worldly hopes and duties. The reason was that I observed that they were more clever and ready of wit in refuting others than firm and sure in proving their own doctrines. Why do I speak of myself, who was then a Catholic Christian, and who have now, nearly exhausted and parched after my long thirst, sought again with all avidity the breasts which nourished me, and, weeping and deeply groaning, have pressed them, that there might come forth sufficient to refresh me in my present state and bring back hope of life and salvation? Why do I speak of myself? You were not yet a Christian when you were, by my exhortation, with difficulty induced to hear and find out about these men whom you violently detested. What else delighted you, I pray you to recall, save their great presumption and the promise of a reasoned doctrine? Well, they harangued at great length and with great vigour against the errors of simple people, which I have since learned is extremely easy for anyone to do who is moderately educated; and if they taught us any of their own doctrines we thought we must maintain it because nothing else occurred to us to set our minds at rest. They dealt with us as tricky fowlers are wont to do, who fix their limed twigs near water to deceive thirsty birds. Other water they cover and con-