Augustine: Earlier Writings
46. If you can find any other kind of creature besides these three—that which is but has not Hfe, that which is and has Hfe but not intelhgence, and that which is and has hfe and inte Uigence—you may then dare to say that there is some good thing which does not owe its existence to God. Now instead of speaking of three kinds of things, we may speak simply of two, body and Hfe. For the hfe of beasts, which hve but have not intelhgence, and the life of men, who have intelligence too, are both ahke correctly called life. Of course we also speak of the life of the Creator but that is life in a supreme sense. When I speak now about body and life I am thinking only of created things. Well, these two created things, body and life, being "formable" as we said and returning to nothingness when form is completely taken from them, clearly show that they owe their existence to the form which remains always the same. There can be no good things, whether great or small, which do not owe their existence to God. Among created things, what can be greater than intelligent life, and what can be smaller than body? However defective they may become, thereby tending to nothingness, still some form remains in them so that they have some kind of existence. Whatever of form remains in any defective thing derives from that form which cannot be defective, and which does not allow the movement of things up or down the scale of being to transgress the laws of their being. Whatever, therefore, in nature is observed to be praiseworthy, whether it is thought worthy of great or small praise, should point to the exceeding and ineffable praise of the Creator. Have you anything to say to that? xviii, 47. Ev.—I confess I am entirely convinced; and I see also how it can be demonstrated, so far as that is possible in this life and among people like us, that God exists and that all good j things come from him. For all things which exist, whether they
I merely exist or have in addition life and intelligence, all are [from God. Now let us look at the third question, which is this.
Can it be shown that free will is to be numbered among the things which are good? When this has been demonstrated I shall not hesitate to concede that God has given us free will and has rightly given it to us. Aug.—You do well to recall the questions we proposed for our discussion; and you have shown your vigilance in observing that the second of them has been answered. But you ought to have seen that the third also has been solved. You said you thought that we ought not to have been given free will because by it men commit sin. When I urged