Augustine: Earlier Writings
THE TEACHER gi the same, no one could teach without speaking. Who can doubt there is a difference, seeing that, in fact, we can teach many things with other signs besides words? Aug.—Is there any difference between teaching and giving signs? Ad.— I think they are the same thing. Aug.—So it is correct to say that we give signs in order to teach? Ad.—Qpite correct. Aug.—If anyone says that we teach in order to give signs, he can easily be refuted by the previous sentence? Ad.—That is so. Aug.—If we give signs in order that we may teach, and do not teach in order that we may give signs, teaching and giving signs are different things. Ad.—You are right, and I was wrong when I said they were the same. Aug.—Now does he who shows us what teaching is do it by giving signs or otherwise? Ad.—I do not see how he can do it otherwise. Aug.—So you were wrong in saying a moment ago that, when the question is what teaching is, the true answer can be given without signs. Even this, we see, cannot be done without signs, and you have agreed that giving signs is a different thing from teaching. If, as now appears, they are different, teaching cannot be demonstrated without signs and by itself alone, as you thought. So up to this point we have discovered nothing that can be demonstrated by simply performing the action except speaking, which consists in giving signs. But even speaking is itself a sign, so that it seems there is absolutely nothing which can be taught without signs. Ad.—I have no reason for refusing my assent.
31. Aug.—It is estabhshed then that: {a) nothing is taught without signs, (b) knowledge should be more precious to us than the signs by means of which we acquire it; though (c) possibly not all things which are signified are better than the signs which indicate them. Ad.—So it seems. Aug.—Just think what a tiny result has been reached by so long and circuitous a path.
Since we began our conversation which has now continued for a long time, we have laboured to find answers to three questions: (a) whether anything can be taught without signs, {b) whether some signs are to be preferred to the things which they signify, {c) whether the knowledge of things is better than the knowledge of their signs. But there is a fourth question to which I should Hke to hear your answer. Do you think our results now stand beyond all doubt? Ad.—I should dearly like to think that after all these turnings and twistings we have indeed reached certainty. But your question makes me anxious, and deters me from answering in the affirmative. For it seems to me that you would not have asked the question unless you