Augustine: Earlier Writings
ON FREE WILL I25 be subject. Ev,—I think so too. Aug.—Are we to be in any doubt that virtue is absolutely superior to vice, in the sense that it is as much superior in strength and power as it is in goodness and sublimity? Ev.—Who could entertain any doubt? Aug.—Then no vicious soul can overcome a soul armed with virtue? Ev.— Most true. Aug.—I do not think you will deny that any kind of soul is better and more powerful than every body. Ev.—No one would deny it who sees, as one easily may, that a living being is to be preferred to what is not living, and that that which gives life is to be preferred to that which receives hfe. Aug.—Much less does a body, whatever its quality, surpass a soul endowed wdth virtue. Ev.—It is self-evident. Aug.—Surely a just soul, or a mind that keeps its proper jurisdiction and rule, cannot cast down and subject to lust another mind that rules with equal justice and virtue? Ev.—By no means, not only because there is the same excellence in each, but also because it must first have fallen away from justice and become a vitiated mind if it attempts to make another mind vicious. For that very reason it will be weaker.
21. Aug.—You have perfectly understood the point. It remains for you to tell me if you can, whether you think there is anything more excellent than a wise and rational mind. Ev.— Nothing I think, save God. Aug.—That is also my opinion. But seeing that that is a difficult question and cannot now be suitably discussed so that we may understand it though we hold it most firmly by faith, let us complete a diligent and careful treatment of the question we have on hand just now. xi. At present we can be sure that whatever it be that may rightly excel a mind strong in virtue, it cannot be unjust in any way. So that not even it, though it have the powder, will compel a mind to serve lust. Ev.—There is no one who will not admit that without any hesitation. Aug.—So we are left with the conclusion that whatever is equal or superior to a ruling mind possessing virtue cannot make it serve lust because of its just character. And whatever is inferior cannot do it by reason of its weakness. So our argument teaches us: Nothing makes the mind a companion of cupidity, except its own will and free choice. Ev.— I see that is our necessary conclusion.
22. Aug.—The next step is that you must come to see that the soul justly pays the penalty for its sin. Ev.— I cannot deny that.
Aug.—What then? Is it to be regarded as in itself a small penalty that the soul is dominated by lust, spoiled of its resources of virtue, drawn hitherand thither in abject poverty, now approving