Augustine: Earlier Writings
THE SOLILOQUIES qg
R.—Every point on the circumference is equidistant from the centre. A.—Exactly. R,—Have you gained this knowledge by the senses or by the intellect? A,—In this matter I have found the senses to be like a ship. They brought me to my destination, but when I dismissed them and began to think about these things in my mind I was still as one on the high seas and my footsteps long faltered. It seems to me one might more readily sail on dry land than learn geometry by the senses, and yet they seem to be of some use to beginners. R,—You do not doubt, then, that whatever you have learned of these things is to be called knowledge? A.—The Stoics would not permit me, for they attribute knowledge to none but the Sage. I do not deny that I have such perception of these matters as they concede even to fools. But I have no fear of the Stoics. Certainly I have knowledge of those things about which you asked me. Go on and let me see the purpose of your questioning. R.—There is no need for haste. We are at leisure. Just be careful to make no rash concessions. I am trying to give you confidence in matters in which you need fear no fall, and, as if that were a small business, you bid me hasten on. A.—May God do as you say. Ask as you see fit, and rebuke me more severely if I become impatient again.
10. R.—It is manifest to you, then, that a fine cannot by any possibility be divided lengthwise? A.—It is. R.—But across?
A.—It is infinitely divisible. R.—Similarly it is clear that a sphere cannot have more than one point from which circles may be drawn. A.—Quite so. R.—Are lines and spheres the same or do they differ? A.—Obviously they differ very much.
R,—If they differ very much, as you say, and yet you know both of them equally, the knowledge remains the same even if its objects differ. A,—No one denied that. R.—Oh yes, you did a moment ago. When I asked what kind of knowledge of God would satisfy you, you replied that you could not explain it because you had grasped nothing as you desired to know God, that you knew nothing comparable to God. Now does the line resemble the sphere? A,—Who would say such a thing? R.—My question was not what you know but how you know. Have you any knowledge that resembles knowledge of God? Your knowledge of the line and the sphere is the same knowledge though its objects differ. Tell me, would you be satisfied to know God
35 you know the mathematical sphere, that is, to have no more doubt in the one case than in the other?
Vj 1 1. A,—You press me hard and almost convince me, but I
30 AUGUSTINE: EARLIER W.RITINGS dare not say that I wish to know God as I know these things. Not only the things but the knowledge, too, seem to me to be different. First, because the Une and the sphere do not differ so much that knowledge of them cannot be contained within the framework of one science. Now no geometer ever professed to teach about God. Secondly, if knowledge of God were the same as knowledge of mathematical figures, I would rejoice as much in the knowledge of them as I expect to rejoice when I come to know God. But in comparison with the latter I despise the former so much that it sometimes seems to me that all these things would perish from my mind if I should come to know him and to see him in the manner in which he can be seen. Even now compared to love of him these things hardly enter my mind. R.—Granted that you would rejoice more in the knowledge of God than in the knowledge of these things, the difference would be due to the objects known not to the knowing. No doubt looking at a serene sky gives you much greater pleasure than looking at the earth, yet the seeing would be the same. If you were asked whether you were as certain of your seeing the earth as of your seeing the sky, I believe you would have to reply—unless your eyes were at fault—that you were just as certain, even though you had greater pleasure in the beauty and lustre of the heaven. A,—I confess your similitude affects me, and I am induced to assent up to a point. As the sky is superior to the earth in its peculiar beauty, so is the intelligible beauty of God superior to the certain truths of mathematics. vi, 12. R.—You do well to be so affected. For Reason who speaks with you promises to let you see God with your mind as the sun is seen with the eye. The mind has, as it were, eyes of its own, analogous to the soul's senses. The certain truths of the sciences are analogous to the objects which the sun's rays make visible, such as the earth and earthly things. And it is God himself who illumines all. I, Reason, am in minds as the power of looking is in the eyes. Having eyes is not the same thing as looking, and looking is not the same as seeing. The soul therefore needs three things: eyes which it can use aright, looking and seeing. The eye of the mind is healthy when it is pure from every taint of the body, that is, when it is remote and purged from desire of mortal things. And this, faith alone can give in the first place. It is impossible to show God to a mind vitiated and sick. Only the healthy mind can see him. But if the mind does not be Ueve that only thus will it attain vision, it will not